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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines two of the various literatures of energy in Victorian Britain: 
the scientific literature of the North British school of energy physics, and the poetic and prose 
literature of Gerard Manley Hopkins. As an interdisciplinary effort, it is intended for several 
audiences. For readers interested in science history, it offers a history of two terms – stress and 
strain – central to modern physics. As well, in discussing the ideas of various scientific authors 
(primarily William John Macquorn Rankine, William Thomson, P.G. Tait, and James Clerk 
Maxwell), it indicates several contributions these figures made to larger culture.  
For readers of Hopkins’ poems and prose, this dissertation corresponds with a recent 
trend in criticism in its estimation of Hopkins as a scientifically informed writer, at least in his 
years post-Stonyhurst. Accordingly, this dissertation presents readings of Hopkins’ poetry and 
prose in light of developments in Victorian energy physics. Three claims span the chapters 
pertaining to Hopkins’ oeuvre: First, that Hopkins’ distinctive terminology of stress and instress 
expresses the energetic relations between objects. Second, that Hopkins’ metaphors and 
analogies are unusual in that they often signify literal relationships between things compared, 
particularly when metaphysical forms of stress or instress are likened to physical forms of 
energy. And third, that in Hopkins’ writings the natural world and the supernatural order of 
creation are contiguous, and that energy suffuses both.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The steam engine and the industrial revolution made energy a matter of public concern 
and private interest. What was it?  Did it actually exist, or did the terms “energy” and “force” 
merely describe relationships between objects?  Could it be lost?  How could heat be converted 
into other forms of energy – work, electricity, light, sound?  And perhaps most importantly for a 
society so conscious of the price of manufactured goods: How could energy be conserved? How 
could the most work be derived from the least fuel?  In terms of human awareness at least, 
energies proliferated as the nineteenth century progressed. Steam engines turned heat into 
mechanical work, trains changed it to momentum, thermal couplings to electricity, and dynamos 
and arc lamps into light. Everywhere, clanking, chugging, puffing, whirring, shrieking machines 
turned heat to sound.  Light, heat, magnetism, electricity, work: energy was ubiquitous in 
Victorian industry. 
Technology and science followed industrial needs in perfecting the steam engine, an 
effort that necessarily involved physicists and engineers in the study of energy efficiency to 
maximize production while economizing fuel.  Such investigations, applied to the world at large, 
led to a new paradigm of the sun and stars as inconceivably powerful engines, yet fueled by 
finite energy and ultimately capable of limited production.  According to the new science of 
thermodynamics, though energy may not be destroyed, it perpetually escapes from areas of high 
concentration in stars and suns to areas of low concentration in surrounding space.  At some 
point, as entropy increases or the energy difference between stars and space approaches 
equilibrium, the stars and sun will go out and the cosmic system will no longer sustain life.  The 
laws of the new science, then, pointed to a time of future apocalypse or “heat death” during 
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which the magnificent engines of the cosmos would run short of fuel and cease production -- of 
heat, light, and even life itself.    
Scientists and engineers were not alone in thinking about energy and its manifestations.  
Michel Serres has called the painter J.W.M. Turner “the first true genius of thermodynamics” in 
that his vividly colored sunsets and novel treatment of light articulated a new and industrial 
sensibility of “matter transformed by fire,” or of the world reconceived in terms of the energy 
that suffuses and animates it (57).  Likewise, Barri Gold describes how Tennyson’s “pre-scient” 
grasp of thermodynamic physics prepared culture to embrace the emerging science and even 
aided “the shaping of what [Victorians came] to know as scientific fact” (40).  As these scholars 
show, energy was not the proper domain of scientists and engineers alone, but of painters and 
poets as well.   
This dissertation will examine two of the various literatures of energy in Victorian 
Britain: the scientific literature of the North British school of energy physics, and the poetic and 
prose literature of Gerard Manley Hopkins. As an interdisciplinary effort, it is intended for 
several audiences. For readers interested in science history, it offers a history of two terms – 
stress and strain – central to modern physics. Likewise, in discussing the ideas of several 
scientific authors (primarily William John Macquorn Rankine, William Thomson, Peter Guthrie 
Tait, and James Clerk Maxwell), it indicates some of the contributions that these ideas made to 
larger culture.  
For readers of Hopkins’ poems and prose, this dissertation corresponds with a recent 
trend in criticism in its estimation of Hopkins as a scientifically informed writer, at least in his 
years post-Stonyhurst. Accordingly, this dissertation will present readings of Hopkins’ poetry 
and prose in light of developments in Victorian energy physics. Three claims will span the 
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chapters pertaining to Hopkins’ oeuvre: First, that Hopkins’ distinctive terminology of stress and 
instress expresses the energetic relations between objects. Second, that Hopkins’ metaphors and 
analogies are unusual in that they often signify literal relationships between things compared, 
particularly when metaphysical forms of stress or instress are likened to physical forms of 
energy. And third, that in Hopkins’ writings the natural world and the supernatural order of 
creation are contiguous, and that energy suffuses both.  
For students of Victorian literature and culture generally, claims as to the interrelation of 
art, science, and culture amount to truisms by this point, thanks to the seminal work of such 
scholars as Gillian Beer, Michel Serres, N. Katherine Hayles, George Levine, Daniel Brown, 
Jude Nixon, Tom Zaniello, Barri Gold, and others. Nevertheless, the specific ways that art and 
science interpenetrate continue to fascinate. This dissertation will discuss several 
interpenetrations between culture and art and culture and science in the writings of Gerard 
Manley Hopkins, as well as of W. J. M. Rankine, William Thomson, and P.G. Tait.  
 Specifically, chapter 2 addresses the developing register of physical science in the 
nineteenth century. This chapter focuses on two terms, stress and strain, and traces their 
development within nineteenth century scientific writings, beginning with the works of John 
Robison, Peter Barlow, Olinthus Gregory, John Frederick William Herschel, and Michael 
Faraday, and ending with William John Macquorn Rankine’s redeployment of stress and strain 
as critical terms for 1850s mechanics and thermodynamics.  In explicating Rankine’s usage, this 
chapter emphasizes Rankine’s appropriation of stress to denote an object’s internal strength as an 
expression of its material form.  
From the perspective of science history, the development of stress and strain is interesting 
in its own right. However, chapter 3 turns from science history to literary history, and addresses 
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the importance of this development for the poetry and prose of Gerard Manley Hopkins. In 
comparing Hopkins’ usage of instress, outstress, stress, and strain against the context of 
nineteenth century science writings, chapter 3 will argue that the terms central to Hopkins’ 
poetics can be understood as an imaginative reinterpretation of contemporary science.  While 
many critics have explicated the significance of Hopkins’ stress, strain, and instress, only Daniel 
Brown has systematically compared Hopkins’ terms to the evolving registers of nineteenth 
century engineering and thermodynamics.  Chapter 3 extends from Brown’s exemplary history, 
situating Hopkins’ writings in their Victorian context and exploring several passages from his 
poems and other writings for additional nuance. 
Chapter 4, “Metaphor vs. Metonymy: Hopkins’ Figures of Stress,” assesses Hopkins’ 
imagery and figurative tropes. This chapter applies Roman Jakobson’s and Paul Ricoeur’s 
structuralist theories of language, particularly as integrated by Raymond J. Wilson. Compared to 
these theorists’ descriptions, Hopkins' metaphors are unusual because tenor and vehicle lack the 
"absurd" difference characteristic of most metaphor. Instead of difference, Hopkins' metaphors 
function through similarity. Accordingly, his comparisons between spiritual and physical stress 
suggest that he considered the physical and the metaphysical realms to operate by the same laws 
of energy, particularly the laws of thermodynamic "energetics" that had been defined by 
Victorian physicists in the 1850s. To support this reading, the chapter examines Hopkins’ poems 
“As Kingfishers Catch Fire” and “God’s Grandeur.”  
In treating the metaphysical world as an extension of the physical, Hopkins resembles a 
number of other Victorian writers, scientific and popular alike. To demonstrate the identity of 
spiritual “energy” with natural forms of energy, chapter 5 compares Hopkins’ psychology to 
nineteenth century brain science, as well as his commentary on Ignatius’ “Meditation on Hell” to 
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contemporary physical models of energy and aether.  Specifically, the chapter argues that for 
Hopkins, thought and memory were not disembodied mental processes but a matter of energy 
within the brain. Likewise, in Hopkins' descriptions of the soul, the soul acts by exerting a field 
of force similar to the electrical or magnetic fields studied by Victorian scientists such as 
Faraday, Maxwell, or Lodge. 
Before going further, I will briefly sketch some of the major developments in nineteenth 
century physical science. This sketch will introduce readers unfamiliar with nineteenth century 
science to important concepts, figures, and vocabulary necessary to follow the discussion of 
subsequent chapters. It will also indicate in a preliminary fashion several instances of reciprocal 
influence between science and broader Victorian culture.  
1.1 Energy Science in Victorian England 
In broad strokes, the Victorian understanding of energy consists of two propositions, 
known as the first and second laws of thermodynamics. The first law explains that while energy 
may change form – from heat to work, electricity to heat, magnetism to electricity, etc. – it 
cannot be created or destroyed. Thus, the total energy in the universe remains constant, even 
though it may shift from one form to another. The second law balances the first, and explains 
that while energy cannot be created or destroyed, the total useable energy in the universe is 
constantly decreasing. Energy “flows” from high concentrations to low concentrations, and once 
the energy gradient of a system has equalized, transfer of energy within that system ceases. 
But the understandings summarized as the laws of thermodynamics developed over an 
extended period of time between the late 1700s and the early 1850s. As I will explain below, in 
several respects the Victorian science of energy (otherwise known as thermodynamics) stems 
from industry, the steam engine specifically. But in another respect, it also emerges from a train 
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of scientific experiments that demonstrated the interconvertibility of nature’s energies. Taken 
together, the applied study of the steam engine and the experimental demonstrations of energy 
conversion supplied the matrix from which William Thomson and Rudolph Clausius derived the 
laws of thermodynamics in the 1850s. Below, I will summarize some of the scientific 
experiments before reviewing the study of the steam engine. 
One of the first insinuations of interconvertibility of nature’s energies dates to 1798, 
when Count Rumford (Benjamin Thompson) read his “An Inquiry Concerning the Source of the 
Heat which is Excited by Friction” to the Royal Society.  Rumford was an American Tory 
“knighted by George III for his loyal service during the American Revolution” (Smith 67). After 
the war, Rumford travelled to Bavaria at the request of Prince-elector Charles Theodore, where 
he oversaw the modernization of the Bavarian army. For his service, Rumform was made a count 
of the Holy Roman Empire, and took the title of Count Rumford. Back in England, Rumford, 
along with Sir Joseph Banks, established the Royal Institution in 1799, an institution that would 
provide the livelihood of such eminent men of science as Humphrey Davy, Michael Faraday, and 
John Tyndall.   
At one point in his 11-year stay in Bavaria, Rumford measured the heat produced as his 
men bored cannon barrels. Rumford observed that friction engendered the heat, and postulated 
the interconvertibility of work and heat. Rumford’s theory was set aside by his contemporaries 
for a number of reasons, however, primarily because he argued that heat was not a substance 
itself but a form of motion within a substance (in modern scientific terms, we would say that heat 
is molecular vibration). At the time, natural philosophers commonly took heat to be an 
imponderable substance (caloric) that could not be weighed or perceived, but that nevertheless 
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existed materially. Rumford, in claiming that friction generated heat, violated this doctrine, and 
his postulated conversion of work to heat was consequently discounted.     
In 1799, Humphrey Davy defended his benefactor’s claims by rubbing two pieces of ice 
together until they melted. Since ice cannot be said to contain an abundance of caloric – the fact 
that ice forms only at low temperatures discourages such a claim – partisans of the caloric theory 
of heat could not argue that rubbing the ice had “liberated” the caloric stored within it. The only 
available alternative was that friction induces heat, and that heat itself, far from being an actual 
substance, is a measure of the motion (in modern terms, the molecular vibration) of the particles 
within a substance. Thus, friction or mechanical work induces the particles of a body to vibrate, 
and this vibration registers as heat. Heat and mechanical work are fully interconvertible.   
Other conversions multiplied in the half-century between Davy’s experiment and Joule’s 
work in the 1840s. In 1820, Hans Christian Ørsted (Oersted) noticed that an electric current 
could deflect a magnetic needle. The fact that magnetism and electricity interacted suggested a 
close relationship between them, and perhaps even a common origin. Accordingly, philosophers 
began to consider whether the two forms of energy were simply a single energy variously 
expressed.  
Michael Faraday, working out of the Royal Institution, clinched the question in 
1831when he discovered electromagnetic induction. In a series of experiments, Faraday proved 
that magnets could cause – “induce” – an electrical current in a wire. If magnetism could cause 
electricity, then the two forms of energy were intrinsically related.  
In another experiment fourteen years later in 1845, Faraday proved the interaction of light 
and magnetism. Faraday positioned two electromagnets in such a way that the lines of force 
connecting them were parallel with a ray of polarized light. When Faraday sent current through 
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the electromagnets, the resulting magnetic field caused the plane of polarization in the ray of 
light to rotate. With this experiment Faraday demonstrated that magnetism affects light. As with 
his earlier experiment, the fact that different forms of energy impinge on each other suggests, at 
the least, a correspondence between them. But more than mere correspondence, such 
experiments tantalized physicists with the possibility of a deeper ontological identity common to 
all manifestations of energy. In the words of a paper Faraday read to the Royal Society in 
November of 1845,  
I have long held an opinion, almost amounting to conviction, in common I believe 
with many other lovers of natural knowledge, that the various forms under which 
the forces of matter are made manifest have one common origin; or, in other 
words, are so directly related and mutually dependent, that they are convertible, as 
it were, one into another, and possess equivalents of power in their action. (1-2)      
Other investigators arrived at similar conclusions. Thomas Kuhn identifies four 
investigators – Sadi Carnot, Mark Séguin, Karl Holtzmann, and G. A. Hirn – who between 1832 
and 1854 “recorded their independent convictions that heat and work are quantitatively 
interchangeable” (67).1 Kuhn also names four other “widely scattered European scientists – 
Mayer, Joule, Colding, and Helmholtz,” who considered not just heat and work to be convertible, 
but all forms of energy generally, and who proposed quantitative conversion formulae to 
calculate the amount of one form of energy that could be produced from a given amount of 
                                                 
1
 Given Carnot’s conception of heat “flow” in Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire (see 
below), Kuhn’s announcement may be surprising. However, Kuhn observes that Carnot’s 
thinking had evolved between his early Reflections and his later work. Based on an unpublished 
notebook written “between the publication of his memoir in 1824 and his death in 1832,” Kuhn 
argues that Carnot did at last conceive of the production of work from heat as a true conversion 
(67, note 2). Kuhn invites readers to “notice that Carnot considered the material in these notes 
quite incompatible with the main thesis of his famous Réflexions” (67, nt. 2).  
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another (67). Finally, Kuhn lists four additional figures (Mohr, Grove, Faraday, and Liebig) who, 
although they did not propose quantitative conversion formulae, nevertheless “described the 
world of phenomena as manifesting but a single ‘force,’ one which could appear in electrical, 
thermal, dynamical, and many other forms” (68). 
Kuhn’s point is that between the 1830s-50s, “the climate of European scientific thought 
included elements able to guide receptive scientists to a significant new view of nature” (70). He 
observes that several of the scientists mentioned above worked “in complete ignorance of the 
others,” and that their near-simultaneous discoveries should not be considered the product of 
specific influence so much as the result of the general condition of science at the time (66). 
Particularly, Kuhn specifies three characteristics of mid-century science that account for the 
sudden and simultaneous burst of conversion theories: “the ‘availability of conversion 
processes,’ the ‘concern with engines,’ and the ‘philosophy of nature’” (73).  
Yet while many scientists shared the conviction that the energies of nature were 
manifestations of a single, pervasive power, two stand out for translating their convictions to 
testable, quantifiable terms.
2
 The priority of Julius Robert Mayer and James Prescott Joule has 
been much debated from 1862 until the present.
3
 Mayer was the first to calculate the amount of 
                                                 
2
 In the passage that I quoted above from Kuhn, Kuhn identifies four figures who posited 
quantifiable conversion figures between various types of energy. However, Colding and 
Helmholtz followed Mayer in calculating their equivalents, and unlike Joule, they did not 
confirm their calculations experimentally.  
3
 The priority dispute of Mayer vs. Joule was one of the shibboleths in the power struggle 
between the agnostic X Club and the devout North British School. The X Club comprised 
Thomas Henry Huxley, John Tyndall, Joseph Dalton Hooker, Herbert Spencer, and others, while 
the North British School included William Thomson, James Prescott Joule, P.G. Tait, James 
Clerk Maxwell, W. J. M. Rankine, William Rowan Hamilton, and James D. Forbes. These cabals 
fought for the right to interpret the cultural meaning and influence of science: the X Club fought 
to enlist science to the cause of secular naturalism, while the North British School fought to 
interpret science to reveal God’s order and design in nature. Both groups sought to discredit 
members of the other faction, and even to block them from university appointments and 
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heat generated by a given amount of work. But Mayer derived his conclusions mathematically, 
and did not prove them through experiment. Joule, however, arrived at his “mechanical 
equivalent of heat” through a series of experiments, and is usually credited with proving 
definitively that heat and work are convertible. 
As a young man, Joule studied arithmetic and geometry under John Dalton (Smith 56). 
Crosbie Smith remarks that Joule’s characteristic esteem for quantitative measurement and 
experimentation may be an inheritance from his master. Additionally, as the son of a brewer, and 
subsequently as the owner of his family’s brewery, Joule’s occupation rewarded precise 
measurement. The brewery also afforded Joule space to work – it was his laboratory, and his 
men his laboratory assistants.  
In his most famous experiment, Joule constructed a brass container, and filled it with 
water. Inside the container, Joule set a thermometer, and rigged “a set of paddles, driven by cords 
attached to falling weights” (Hunt 33). The weights drove the paddles, which threshed the water. 
The friction of the paddles in the water translated to heat. As the water warmed, Joule’s 
thermometer registered the change in temperature. By comparing the force produced by the 
falling weights to the number of degrees by which the water warmed, Joule was able to establish 
an accurate equivalence between mechanical force and heat – “782 foot-pounds of work raised 
the temperature of a pound of water by 1° F” (Hunt 33).4 Joule not only demonstrated the 
qualitative equivalence of work and heat, but he also enabled quantitative estimates of the 
amount of work that could be derived from heat, or vice versa.  
                                                                                                                                                             
professional honors. In the present case, John Tyndall (an X Clubber) attempted to undermine 
the claim of James Prescott Joule (a North Britisher) to have been the first to ascertain 
experimentally the mechanical equivalent of heat. Please see Ruth Barton’s "Scientific Authority 
and Scientific Controversy in Nature: North Britain against the X Club" in Culture and Society 
in the Nineteenth-Century Media. 
4
 Joule later revised his results from 782 foot-pounds to 772. 
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The train of scientific experimentation from Rumsford to Joule accounts for one vector of 
thermodynamic theory. But thermodynamics also has its roots in the industry of the preceding 
century. Bruce J. Hunt and Crosbie Smith observe the especial importance of the steam engine in 
the production of scientific knowledge, arguing that the technology of steam preceded the 
science required to understand it. As engineers and scientists strove to understand the steam 
engine’s operation and to make it work more efficiently, they were forced to consider the way 
energy worked within the machine. Particularly, they were forced to consider the irreversible 
operation of the machine, or the irreversible directionality of energy within the machine. This 
consideration revealed a property of energy that had not appeared in the laboratory experiments 
of other scientists: namely, entropy. In Hunt’s words, “the story of the steam engine and the birth 
of thermodynamics provides a clear illustration of the chief theme of [his] book: that technology 
is not simply ‘applied science’ but has often taken the lead and shaped the development of 
scientific knowledge” (4).  
While British and German natural philosophers attempted to discover the ways one form 
of energy converted to another, the French engineer Sadi Carnot investigated the limitations of 
energy transfer. Carnot’s main thesis was that heat in a steam engine transfers from a hot body to 
a cold body. A hot body will never become hotter by touching a cold body. When a hot body 
touches a cold body, heat does not flow from cold to hot, but from hot to cold. Accordingly, 
when hot and cold bodies touch, their temperatures equalize. When the formerly hot and the 
formerly cold body reach the same temperature, net energy flow ceases. Once this happens, the 
machine stops. 
Carnot’s thesis sounds simple, but it has several profound applications for steam engines 
and for physics in general. For the steam engine, Carnot insisted that the best way to improve the 
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efficiency of the engine was to keep the hot boiler completely separate from the cool condenser. 
If energy transfer (hence the power of the engine itself) approaches zero as the hot and cold parts 
of the machine approach each other in temperature, then the best way to ensure the engine’s 
power is to keep hot parts hot, and cold parts cold. Carnot particularly stressed that no hot part of 
the machine should ever make contact with a cool part of the machine. Such contact sapped the 
machine of its strength, and uselessly squandered its motive power without producing any 
beneficial work. Instead, engineers should use every trick of the trade to buffer, insulate, sleeve, 
and separate hot and cold parts. In all, engineers should ensure that every diminution of the 
machine’s heat produced work. Heat must necessarily flow from the hot boiler to the cool 
condenser, but engineers should squeeze every possible bit of work out of the process. Not only 
would doing so improve the engine’s power, but it would also improve its efficiency, making it 
require less coal to perform the same work. 
Given the expense of coal, Carnot’s ideas – once popularized by British physicists such 
as William Thomson and implemented by engineers like W. J. M. Rankine – would significantly 
reduce industrial expense. But his ideas had an even larger effect on physics and culture, as we 
shall see shortly. The laboratory scientists discovered the ways energy shifted and transferred 
between forms, but the steam engine and Carnot showed energy’s limitations. Namely, within 
any given system, energy flows from high to low. It is impossible, without exerting work from 
without the system, to reverse the flow of energy and send energy from an unenergetic object 
back to an energetic object. Moreover, as energy flows from high to low, the difference between 
the two objects decreases – the unenergetic object becomes more energetic; the energetic object 
becomes less energetic. As this process continues, the rate of energy transfer decreases, and 
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ultimately stops when the system reaches equilibrium, or when all objects in the system have 
reached an equal degree of energy.  
In this process of equilibrium, the total amount of energy does not matter so much as the 
total difference between energetic and unenergetic parts. For example, an engine whose boiler 
works at 1500 degrees Fahrenheit will still stop if its condenser also reaches 1500 degrees 
Fahrenheit.
5
 Although the machine possesses an immense store of energy, the energy has been 
evenly dispersed, and is incapable of flowing through the machine. In effect, the energy has been 
bound up and made unavailable for use. Contrarily, an engine whose boiler works at only 300 
degrees Fahrenheit will perform splendidly if its condenser is kept to, say, 100 degrees. This 
machine has much less total energy, but the differential between hot and cold parts enables 
energy to flow from boiler to condenser, and to do work in the process. The latter machine has 
much less total energy, but much more available energy. Essentially, Carnot’s work deals with 
the latter factor instead of the former, or with available energy instead of total energy. 
Between 1849 and 1851, in a fundamentally critical exchange between the British 
physicist William Thomson and the German physicist Rudolph Clausius, the engineering 
tradition represented by Carnot would at last meet with the philosophical tradition spanning from 
Rumford to Joule. Thomson’ part of the exchange survives in the form of two papers, “An 
Account of Carnot’s Theory” (1849) and “On the Dynamical Theory of Heat” (1851). Clausius’ 
part persists as “On the Motive Power of Heat” (1850). In this exchange, Thomson and Clausius 
reconciled the philosophical and engineering traditions to form two complementary principles. 
These principles would be fleshed out, revised, and refined over the next two decades by 
                                                 
5
 My example is meant to illustrate a point, not to represent reality. Only boilers are constructed 
to reach such temperatures (and accompanying pressures). In reality, if the condenser of a steam 
engine reached anywhere near such a temperature, it would catastrophically fail.   
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Thomson and Clausius themselves, as well as by W. J. M. Rankine and other physicists. Along 
with Rankine’s theoretical contributions, his redefinitions of stress and strain and his coinages 
“potential energy” and “actual energy” furnished energy theorists with a tightly defined 
vocabulary to aid the necessary interchange of ideas (see chapter 2).
6
  
Thomson and Clausius’ first principle, later known as the first law of thermodynamics, 
summarized the findings of Rumford, Davy, Ørsted, Faraday, Mayer, Joule, and other natural 
philosophers. According to this principle, the various forms of energy in nature may alter and 
interconvert, but to use the words of Clausius’ 1864 statement of the first law, “the energy of the 
universe is constant” (Mechanical Theory 365). Although electricity, heat, work, magnetism, and 
light may shift into one another, the universe conserves its total energy nevertheless. However, 
the second principle, later the second law of thermodynamics, develops Carnot’s observation. 
Energy may shift back and forth between its various forms, but it travels in only one direction – 
from high concentrations to low concentrations. Ultimately, energy tends toward equilibrium. As 
a system approaches equilibrium, its energy becomes less and less available for use. Finally, 
when equilibrium is achieved, all energy transfer stops. Clausius coined the term “entropy” to 
designate the amount of bound energy in a system, or the amount of energy unavailable for work. 
Thus, as a system nears equilibrium, its available energy decreases, and its entropy increases. As 
Clausius later stated the second law of thermodynamics in 1864, “the entropy of the universe 
tends toward a maximum” (Mechanical Theory 365). Restated, the second law describes the 
universal trend of energy towards equilibrium, when no energy will be left available for use. 
                                                 
6
 For a seminal account of Rankine’s involvement with Clausius and Thomson in developing the 
theory and lexicon of thermodynamic science, see P. M. Harman’s Energy, Force, and Matter: 
The Conceptual Development of Nineteenth-Century Physics.   
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Depending on the system, the implications of the second law range from the trivial to the 
apocalyptic. In the system of a steam engine, temperature equilibrium between boiler and 
condenser results in the machine losing power and stalling. In a solar system, however, or in the 
universe itself, energy equilibrium results in stasis and death.  
The chilling import of thermodynamics augmented the cultural influence of the physical 
sciences. Victorians regarded the sibylline prophesies of the new energy science with fearful 
fascination. Thomson himself published an article entitled “On the Age of the Sun’s Heat” 
(1862) in MacMillan’s Magazine estimating the length of time which the sun would continue to 
heat and light the earth (see chapter 4). Thomson’s conclusion stimulated religious faith while 
stoking apocalyptic fears: “As for the future, we may say, with equal certainty, that inhabitants of 
the earth cannot continue to enjoy the light and heat essential to their life for many million years 
longer unless sources now unknown to us are prepared in the great storehouse of creation” (393).  
The number and quality of mainstream Victorian authors who integrated thermodynamic 
theory within their works attests the popular importance of the discourse. Barri Gold traces the 
thermodynamic resonance of Tennyson’s In Memoriam, Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, 
Bram Stoker’s Dracula, and Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray. Additionally, Jessica 
Kuskey reads Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend as a literary model of a steam engine, Tina Young 
Choi observes the implications of thermodynamics’ first law for Little Dorrit and Our Mutual 
Friend, and Darryl Jones compares Bleak House against the thermodynamic narrative of the 
“death of the sun.”7 Moreover, Jude Nixon probes Carlyle’s prose for thermodynamic parallels, 
and Barbara Lindquist investigates gender in Theodore Dreiser’s Cowperwood trilogy along 
                                                 
7
 Dickens was at the center of several developments in physical science. As part of a public battle 
between the devout North British School and the agnostic, naturalist X Club, P.G. Tait and 
William Thomson published an article in Dickens’ Good Words attacking John Tyndall. See 
Crosbie Smith’s “North Britain versus Metropolis” in his The Science of Energy.   
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thermodynamic lines. Steve Pinkerton considers the import of the second law of thermodynamics 
in James Joyce’s Ulysses. Sarah Alexander contemplates Arthur Morrison’s A Child of the Jago 
as an “entropic narrative.”  Gillian Beer applies thermodynamic theory to the works of Thomas 
Hardy. 
Yet few authors deploy the science of energy so systematically and to such transcendent 
extent as did the poet of instress, Gerard Manley Hopkins. In his central poetic theory, 
neologisms, imagery, themes, and mythos, Hopkins refashions thermodynamic physics as a 
divine system of stress subsuming nature in Christ. Specifically, in Hopkins’ mythos of the Great 
Sacrifice, Christ progressively incarnates himself within matter, producing the natural world as a 
byproduct of his Incarnation and charging it with his divine stress or “outstress.” In the following 
chapters, we will explore the thermodynamic register of Hopkins’ terms stress and instress, as 
well as the significance of his energetic imagery.  
But before we do so, a brief overview of Hopkins’ knowledge of physics is in order. 
Concerning his knowledge of science, Hopkins' biography becomes more conclusive as he ages. 
One of Hopkins’ earliest notebooks, since designated “B.I” by his biographers, contains notes 
from a Highgate (pre-Oxford) course on “mechanics and trigonometry” (Oxford Essays 
3). Before Oxford, then, Hopkins was familiar with at least the rudiments of mechanics, the 
mathematical study of the distribution of stress or force. Nevertheless, while mechanics 
contributed to the physical study of energy (mechanical force is one form of energy, and the 
steam engine for one translates heat to mechanical force), we cannot be sure that Hopkins 
understood the relations between mechanics and thermodynamics from this course.  
Evidence from Hopkins’ time at Oxford (1863-7) suggests that he continued to encounter 
physical science. In his Oxford essay "The Tests of a Progressive Science," for instance, Hopkins 
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makes explicit reference to spectroscopy. Illustrating the difference between scientific stasis and 
progress, Hopkins writes, 
Thus the discovery between a new species of willow or the observation of 
parthenogenesis in aphides two generations longer than had before been found 
possible shews little progressiveness in science; on the other hand the spectral 
analysis by wh. the chemical composition of non-terrestrial masses is made out is 
a development of optics wh. cannot be called supplemental but a complete 
widening or alteration of its beat. (Oxford Essays 286) 
Leslie Higgins traces Hopkins’ references to spectroscopy to a series of articles published in 
Frasier’s Magazine, particularly an article published in 1861 entitled “The Progress and 
Prospects of Astronomy” (Oxford Essays 287, n. 2). As Hopkins describes, Victorian 
astronomers used spectral analysis to identify the chemical constitution of distant stars. When 
combusted, chemical elements give off signature waves of light. The distinct colors of these 
lightwaves may be observed by the human eye with the help of a prism. When the lightwaves 
pass through the prism, the prism refracts each wave differently, displaying the lightwaves in an 
orderly fashion as a spectrum of color. The color spectrum for each chemical substance is 
unique. As such, the chemical substance of stars hundreds of light years away may be identified 
by the signature spectrum of color its light produces.  
Essentially, then, the science of spectroscopy applies the first law of thermodynamics to 
chemistry, identifying a substance’s chemical composition from the light it emits when it 
combusts. Thus, spectroscopy evidences the reciprocity of chemical and light energy. Once 
more, however, while spectroscopy and thermodynamics are essentially related, we have no hard 
proof that Hopkins understood the relation.    
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But the evidence mounts. Daniel Brown observes that “by the time that Hopkins began 
his studies at Oxford the principle of the conservation of energy was widely discussed and had 
been applied to many phenomena” (Brown 193). Brown discusses two articles, entitled “Energy” 
and “The Dynamical Theory of Heat,” that P. G. Tait wrote for the May 1864 and February 1865 
issues of the North British Review (Brown 194). Hopkins was certainly reading the North British 
Review during this time. His private journals mention an article about Wordsworth’s poetry 
published in the August 1864 issues of the North British Review by J. C. Shairp. But while 
Hopkins read Shairp’s article in the August 1864 issue, we cannot be certain that he saw the May 
1864 or February 1865 issues, nor whether he read Tait’s articles in these issues.  
Brown continues, however, and observes that thermodynamics informs one of the 
textbooks that Hopkins “crammed” for Greats examinations, J. S. Mill’s System of Logic. In an 
appendix to this ponderous volume, Mill discusses recent developments in physical science, 
observing that “It has of late become the general belief of scientific inquirers that mechanical 
force, electricity, magnetism, heat, light, and chemical action (to which has subsequently been 
added vital force) are not so much causes of one another as convertible into one another; and are 
all of them forms of one and the same force, varying only in outward manifestations” (Mill 
1120-1).  In post-1865 versions of System of Logic, Mill’s The Correlation and Conservation of 
Forces: A Series of Expositions also appears in this appendix. 
Once more however, while Hopkins certainly would have studied Mill’s book, no 
evidence exists to prove that he read the appendix. As Hopkins’ close friend Robert Bridges 
reports, Hopkins felt no need to read a book in its entirety. At one point, Hopkins stayed with 
Bridges to study for the upcoming Greats examination. Bridges dutifully read assigned texts 
from cover to cover. Hopkins, however, took his time with passages he felt were particularly 
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important, scrutinizing them for hours and examining them in precise detail. Hopkins’ acute 
methods of study prevented him from reading the whole text.
8
 If we extrapolate the same reading 
strategy to Mill’s System of Logic, it is likely that while Hopkins studied portions of Mill’s book 
with piercing intensity, he probably did not read everything in the tome.  
Hopkins’ tutors afford another potential source of physical science. Brown observes that 
Hopkins may have learned the rudiments of Victorian energy science from his tutor Walter Pater, 
or from T.H. Green and Benjamin Jowett. Brown reads the lectures of the latter two from a 
thermodynamic perspective, finding the new physics of energy at work in Jowett’s characteristic 
explanation of ‘the Hegelian vibration of moments’ and Green’s account of the Hegelian 
Worldspirit as ‘the energy of the world, related like motion to matter’ (Brown 195).   
Again, though, there is no way to prove that Hopkins picked up on Green’s and Jowett’s 
insinuations. Accordingly, the evidences from Oxford, though numerous and (to me) convincing, 
lack the hard proof that would set them beyond contradiction. Yet following his graduation from 
Oxford, the evidence becomes more concrete, and Hopkins’ knowledge of physics becomes 
more certain.  
After his time with Newman in the Birmingham Oratory (1867-8), Hopkins toured the 
Alps with his friend Edward Bond before entering the Jesuit Novitiate (1868). At one point, he 
met Tyndall himself “at the foot of the Matterhorn” (Further Letters 128).9 Bond was sick, and 
Tyndall "very kindly saw E.B. and prescribed a treatment" (Journals 182).  
                                                 
8
 Incidentally, Hopkins achieved a brilliant first on his Greats examination. Bridges achieved a 
respectable second.  
9
 Tyndall was a famous Royal Institution physicist, the protégé of Michael Faraday. As a 
member of the X Club, Tyndall participated in serial skirmishes with the North British School. 
Particularly, Tyndall was the primary target of Thomson and Tait’s ire for touting Mayer as the 
originator of the mechanical equivalent of heat instead of Joule. Gillian Beer argues that 
Hopkins’ “The Virgin Mary Compared to the Air we Breathe” was inspired in part by Tyndall’s 
20 
But even still, Hopkins’ encounter with a famous scientist does not prove that Hopkins 
understood the science for which the scientist was famous. Thankfully, evidence continues to 
mount. By the time of Hopkins’ Stonyhurst Philosophate (1870-73), the evidence is very good 
that Hopkins was well acquainted with physical science. During these years, Hopkins read the 
scientific journal Nature, still considered to be one of the flagship journals of the physical 
sciences. P. G. Tait, William Thomson's friend and co-author of the influential Treatise on 
Natural Philosophy, frequently contributed articles to the journal, as did Tyndall and other 
notable Victorian physicists such as Norman Lockyer and Balfour Stewart. In fact, the quarrel 
between Tait and Tyndall over the priority of Joule vs. Mayer – and more generally, the struggle 
for influence between the X Club and the North British School -- boiled over into Nature.
10
  
Moreover, at Stonyhurst itself, Hopkins studied with Fathers Stephen Perry and Walter 
Sidgreaves of the Stonyhurst Observatory. According to Tom Zaniello, the Stonyhurst 
Observatory was “one of [England’s] leading meteorological stations,” and Father Perry, the 
observatory’s director, was the “foremost Victorian astronomer” (“Scientific Interests,” 511; “An 
Attentive Observer,” 326). Perry specialized in solar and magnetic phenomena, and his 
“magnetic surveys were standards in the field” (“An Attentive” 327). Moreover, Zaniello states 
that Perry’s popular lectures on spectroscopy packed houses, and at times attracted as many as 
1,000 people to hear the renowned astronomer speak (327). With Perry as a friend and mentor, it 
seems inconceivable that Hopkins could have remained ignorant of the basic principles of 
physics. Not only are magnetism, spectroscopy, and astronomy subfields of physics, but the 
various forms of energy involved in these subfields were centrally important to the development 
                                                                                                                                                             
investigation of the behavior of light in the earth’s atmosphere. See her “Tyndall, Helmholtz, and 
Gerard Manley Hopkins: Leaps of the Prepared Imagination.”  
10
 See above, footnotes 7 and 11. For a more complete description, see Ruth Barton’s "Scientific 
Authority and Scientific Controversy in Nature: North Britain against the X Club." 
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of thermodynamics. As discussed previously, Oersted’s and Faraday’s research of the 
interconvertibility of magnetism and electricity, and Faraday’s discovery of the interaction of 
magnetism and light, were critically important in Thomson’s and Clausius’ articulation of the 
first law of thermodynamics. Furthermore, spectroscopy enquires into the fundamental 
association of light and chemical energy. Pertaining to astronomy itself, astronomers study 
gravity and light as subfields proper to their discipline. Magnetism, chemistry, light, gravity – 
Perry’s worked encapsulated the various forms of energy reconciled by the first law of 
thermodynamics. Accordingly, Hopkins’ friendship with and tutelage under the respected 
astronomer marks the endpoint when his knowledge of physical science can reasonably be 
doubted.   
By the time Hopkins resumed writing poetry at St. Beuno’s (1874-7), he was well 
acquainted with contemporary physics.
11
 Critics may debate the extent of Hopkins' knowledge 
pre-Stonyhurst, but few dispute that he knew physics post-Stonyhurst. In sum, while 
thermodynamic interpretations of Hopkins' Oxford poems are not impossible (Jude Nixon, 
Gillian Beer, and Marie Banfield make cautious thermodynamic readings of Hopkins’ Oxford 
poems, while James Leggio and Daniel Brown offer much more aggressive readings), they 
should be prefaced with a biographical defense. But from The Wreck of the Deutschland and on, 
Hopkins’ knowledge of Victorian physics is quite certain. Indeed, Hopkins is most likely more 
knowledgeable of contemporary physics than the twenty-first century critics who read his poems. 
Not only did Hopkins have the advantage of belonging to the culture that produced these 
scientific developments, but few twenty-first century critics can boast having an “internationally-
                                                 
11
 Hopkins’ enrollment at St. Beuno’s proceeds the composition of what are commonly 
considered his mature poems. The Wreck of the Deutschland is generally considered the first 
notable poem composed after Hopkins’ entered his St. Beuno’s Theologate.  
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known” astronomer as a personal friend and “mentor in matters scientific” (“An Attentive” 326; 
“Scientific Interests” 511). 
During Hopkins’ second stay at Stonyhurst from 1882-4, he began a serial 
correspondence of four letters published in the scientific periodical Nature. In the pages of this 
prestigious scientific organ, Hopkins’ words and letters mingled with those of England’s most 
highly-regarded physicists, including P. G. Tait, Balfour Stewart, Norman Lockyer, and John 
Tyndall.  Hopkins’ letters describe atmospheric phenomena, particularly the English sky shortly 
after the Krakatoa eruption. While these letters do not entertain any deep physical arcana, they 
do showcase his powers of observation, as well as his poet’s facility to phrase physical sensation 
in exquisitely precise and memorable language. Hopkins’ letters earned the praise of the Royal 
Society itself. In its survey of published literature pertaining to the Krakatoa eruption, the Royal 
Society report mentioned a “Mr. Gerard Hopkins of Stonyhurst College” and particularly 
observed his “very lucid description of the sunset of December 16, 1883” (Symons 172).12   
From Dublin (1884-9), Hopkins discusses with his friend R. W. Dixon his plans to write 
a "popular account of Light and the Ether," using P. G. Tait's Light as his main source 
(Correspondence 139). By this time, Hopkins has become sufficiently confident of his grasp of 
physics that he hopes to "make the matter [. . .] perfectly intelligible" (139). Hopkins does not 
intend his book to be "easy reading," but writes it for “the lay or unprofessional student who will 
read carefully so long as there are no mathematics and all technicalities are explained" (139). 
The science of light and aether were essential components of thermodynamic theory (see chapter 
5). As such, by this point Hopkins considers himself to be sufficiently knowledgeable about 
thermodynamic science to translate its arcana into plain English for diligent readers.  
                                                 
12
 See Monique Morgan’s account of artistic responses to the Krakatoa eruption in her “The 
Eruption of Krakatoa (also known as Krakatau) in 1883.”  
23 
Unfortunately, like so many of Hopkins’ other Dublin projects, the popular account of 
light and aether was never completed, or if it was, it has since been lost. Nevertheless, in 
Hopkins’ extant writings, in his poetry, journals, and spiritual notebooks, Hopkins translates the 
arcana of thermodynamics into an equally arcane mystery of spiritual instress and Incarnation.  
To this mystery we now turn. Chapter 2 will address the evolution of stress and strain 
within nineteenth century physical science. Subsequently, chapters 3-5 will trace the 
thermodynamic implications of stress for Hopkins’ poetry and prose. 
2  STRESS AND STRAIN: RANKINE’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SCIENTIFIC 
REGISTER 
In his seminal 1957 article “Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous 
Discovery,” Thomas Kuhn examines the preconditions of scientific discovery, or surveys the 
“experimental and conceptual elements” that necessarily precede the development of new 
scientific theories. Kuhn expressed his aim as identifying “the rapid and often disorderly 
emergence of the experimental and conceptual elements from which [scientific] theory was 
shortly to be compounded” (323).  
Kuhn in this essay specifically addresses the preconditions of energy conservation, but 
more broadly his methodology partakes of a general trend in science history to consider past 
scientific work within its own context as opposed to current scientific understanding. If the 
scientific historian’s traditional occupation has been to link present to past by tracing the lineal 
ancestry of contemporary scientific theory, such an enterprise as Kuhn adopts poses a second 
historical aspiration, that of explaining not so much how past theories have led to present 
knowledge but how those theories emerged in the first place from knowledge that was then 
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available. In broad form (and arguably in a broader form than Kuhn himself pursued), this 
aspiration motivates interest in theorists whose ideas have been disproven, and in scientific 
understandings that contemporary theory and practice reject. Far from unprofitable, such 
theorists and understandings are regarded by culture critics as simultaneously products and 
productive of the intellectual milieu of their era, and by more discipline-conscious historians as 
contributing – albeit in a negative or apophatic sense -- to a conversation that would ultimately 
conduce to scientific knowledge.
13
   
To this trend William John Macquorn Rankine owes his recent rebound in critical 
attention. Writing in 1981, Keith Hutchison observed that “to contemporaries, thermodynamics 
was a creation of [William Thomson, Rudolf Clausius, and W. J. M. Rankine]” (1). Given 
Rankine’s standing in his own time, Hutchison asks, “Why is [Rankine’s work] now so little 
known?” (1). Hutchison intends his answer to reveal as much about the nature of science 
historiography as it does about the quality of Rankine’s contributions to science. Regarding the 
latter, Hutchison explains that “Rankine's contributions to theoretical thermodynamics as it 
finally emerged were minimal” (1). Hutchison, however, is quick to point out the anachronistic 
fallacy of such thinking, arguing that an account of the history of thermodynamics that neglects 
Rankine is unfaithful to history itself not only in that it is “difficult to reconcile with the primary 
sources, where Rankine is so often referred to,” but also in that it “involve[s] a considerable 
misrepresentation of the thought of the 1850s” (20).  
                                                 
13
 In seeking to recover the milieu productive of past scientific understandings, recent science 
history in many senses resembles cultural criticism. The association should not be pushed too far 
in every case, however. Kuhn in particular argued that science breakthroughs and revolutions are 
best understood from within the tradition of science itself, not from external culture. See for 
instance his Structure of Scientific Revolutions.     
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Preceding Hutchison, but, if anything, emphasizing Rankine’s influence more pointedly, 
Donald Moyer in 1977 surveyed the trope of mechanical analogy in the publications of Rankine, 
Thomson, Tait, and Maxwell. In contrast to traditional estimations of scientific priority, Moyer 
boldly places Rankine at the head of a chain of influence uniting the four philosophers. While 
Moyer does not claim that Rankine preceded Thomson in articulating a specific theory, he 
nevertheless argues that Rankine provided Thomson, Tait, and Maxwell with an analytical 
method or pattern of thinking that freed them from dependence on mechanical explanations of 
phenomena and consequently enabled them to prosecute their respective theories. Moyer 
explains that in his 1853 Outlines of the Science of Energetics, Rankine – most likely plagued by 
the inherent improbabilities of his own theory of molecular vortices – attempted to account for 
physical phenomena not by the laws of mechanics but by the emerging laws of energy. Given 
that the laws of energy are expressed in the general behavior of matter, an “energetic” 
philosopher could henceforth explain phenomena according to matter’s general behavior instead 
of its hidden mechanical causes. In other words, philosophers of the new science of energetics 
were no longer bound to express with their models the causes of phenomena. Instead, they could 
focus on replicating the phenomenon itself: given that the same laws of energy governed the 
model, the phenomenon, and the phenomenon’s cause, the model would possess at least an 
analogical relationship to reality.  
In short, Rankine’s tactic alleviated physicists of the onus of explaining observed 
phenomena by mechanical causation. Scientific models could now function as approximations of 
reality, not actual representations of it, and could be employed as useful fictions to enable the 
mind to grasp theoretic concepts. Even if the model proved inapposite to reality, it could be 
profitable if it expressed the general behavior of phenomena, which in turn expressed the 
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behavior of energy itself. Such an estimate of useful fictions animates many of Thomson’s, 
Tait’s, and Maxwell’s most famous scientific projections, and, even if Moyer does not mention 
these models particularly, his account of the influence of Rankine’s figurative estimation of 
models explains such well-known instances as Maxwell’s daemon,14 Tait’s and Stewart’s unseen 
universe, and Thomson’s vortex atoms of whirling aether.15 
In recent years, Rankine has prompted various science historians. Those who wish to 
trace the development of present scientific understandings treat Rankine cursorily in footnotes 
and prefatory chapters, while Thomson, Clausius, and Maxwell remain central figures. 
Oppositely, science historians and culture critics interested in recovering the milieu from which 
thermodynamic theory emerged have come to regard Rankine as a central figure in Victorian 
science, and he has received particularly close attention in several recent works. This distinction 
is admittedly a generalization with several notable exceptions, but in broad strokes it holds true. 
For instance, in Jos Uffink’s 2001 survey of interpretations of the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, Uffink, in a footnote, explains “of course the work of several other authors 
was also highly significant, such as Rankine, Reech and Clapeyron. And although I agree with 
                                                 
14
 Maxwell’s daemon is a make-believe being capable of reversing entropy, energy’s universal 
trend to dissipate and disperse. In devising his uniquely-gifted being, Maxwell theorized what it 
would take to defeat thermodynamics’ Second Law, or to spontaneously accumulate energy 
without expending work. Maxwell imagined a gas-filled container split by a partition into two 
hermetically-sealed compartments. A slide in the partition – perfectly devoid of mass or friction 
so as to require no work to operate – is guarded by a “very observant and neat-fingered being” 
that sees molecules well enough to distinguish hot ones from cool ones and flips the slide open 
or shut fast enough to block certain molecules while allowing others to pass (Letters, 332). If this 
“neat-fingered being” should decide to allow only hot molecules to flow into one compartment 
and only cool molecules to flow into the other, over time the one compartment would become 
very hot and the other very cool. In essence, Maxwell’s talented sprite concentrates thermal 
energy without performing work (it should be remembered that the slide is massless and 
frictionless).    
15
 For more about Thomson’s vortex atom and Tait and Stewart’s Unseen Universe, please see 
chapter 5, section 5.5. 
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those historians who argue that the role of these lesser known authors is commonly 
underestimated in the traditional historiography of thermodynamics, I will not attempt to do 
justice to them” (325, fn. 19).16 Likewise, in Bruce Fegley’s 2013 Practical Thermodynamics for 
Geoscientists – a book that despite its title evidences nearly as much interest in the history of 
thermodynamics as in its theory -- Rankine is briefly mentioned as the innovator of the Rankine 
scale of temperature but is excluded from later chapters explaining the development of 
thermodynamic theory proper. Even in Bruce J. Hunt’s Pursuing Power and Light, a book that 
includes an impressive survey of the relationship between, as the subtitle tells, Technology and 
Physics from James Watt to Albert Einstein, Rankine receives hardly any attention besides a 
paragraph crediting him with the innovation of the terms “energy” and “potential energy.”17    
Among historians interested in recreating the mid-nineteenth century milieu for its own 
sake, however, Rankine has steadily accrued interest. Crosbie Smith, in his The Science of 
Energy: A Cultural History of Energy Physics in Victorian Britain, devotes nearly an entire 
chapter (“The Science of Thermodynamics”) to Rankine, particularly investigating Rankine’s 
close relationships with engineers in the Clyde river valley and his application of thermodynamic 
principles to the steam engine. Likewise, Keith Hutchison, in his “History of Thermodynamic 
Sciences” in the 2004 Encyclopedia of Energy, reserves a substantial portion of his essay to 
discuss the interrelations of Rankine’s vortex theory with the thermodynamic theories of 
Thomson and Clausius. Works such as these have prompted interest in the correspondence 
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 To be fair to Uffink, he later does discuss Rankine within the body of his article when he 
describes the disagreement between Rankine and Thomson and Clausius over the irreversibility 
of entropy (341-2). All the same, Uffink’s interest in ranking scientific authors from the 
retrospect of twenty-first century science appears in his subordination of “lesser” authors like 
Rankine to the greater authors whose influence has passed to the present in the form of currently 
accepted scientific theory. 
17
 Rankine’s general absence from the book is all the more surprising given his important work 
with the quintessential technology of the nineteenth century, the steam engine. 
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between Rankine’s life and the scientific achievements of his time, and Ben Marsden is slated to 
publish a biography of Rankine in the near future.  
A small number of culture and literary critics have also tapped Rankine to elucidate the 
scientific context of Victorian Britain and Victorian literature. Thus, Daniel Brown explores the 
significance of Rankine’s term stress for Gerard Manley Hopkins’ “Parmenides” notes (213-5), 
and Marie Banfield briefly alludes to Rankine’s part in developing the theory and language of 
energy science that she sees as operative in Hopkins’ “Spelt from Sibyl’s Leaves.”  
This and the next chapter take their cue from Daniel Brown. The present chapter 
proposes to trace the morphology of the terms stress and strain through the writings of nineteenth 
century science authors; the subsequent chapter will apply findings gleaned in the present 
chapter to the poetry and biographical materials of Gerard Manley Hopkins. In this enterprise, 
W. J. M. Rankine will be a central figure given his efforts to establish a rigorous and precise 
register of scientific language, particularly his self-conscious redeployment of the terms stress 
and strain.  
Such an investigation applies to Hopkins studies in that it uncovers still more 
correspondence between Hopkins’ poetry and the Victorian science of energy. Not only does the 
scientific origin of Hopkins’ central poetic terms emphasize the Victorian identity of Hopkins’ 
person and poetry, it also opens up a new valence of interpretation for Hopkins’ work, namely 
the correspondence of Hopkins’ philosophy of inscape with Rankine’s concept of an object’s 
self-distinctive stress.  
Likewise, for readers interested in the history of science, this chapter advances a history 
of terms critical to modern physical science. Whether Rankine’s vortex theory or his formulation 
of the laws of thermodynamics contributed to the making of new scientific knowledge, his 
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linguistic innovations certainly did. His terms stress, strain, energy, actual energy, and potential 
energy, are standard in modern scientific writing, even if Rankine’s initial intentions for these 
terms often differ from the way scientists currently define them.
18
 While much has been said 
about Rankine’s practical and theoretical work, and while several authors, Brown and Banfield 
among them, have noted his lexical additions to scientific language, none to my knowledge have 
traced the contemporary signification of stress and strain in an attempt to explicate the semantic 
field surrounding them in Victorian speech and culture.  
2.1 Science and Social Uplift 
William John Macquorn Rankine, in his 1858 A Manual of Applied Mechanics, discusses 
the evils of the heretofore unscientific practice of architecture in England:  
With respect to those works which, from unscientific design, give way during or 
immediately after their erection, I shall say little; for, with all their evils, they add 
to our experimental knowledge, and convey a lesson, though a costly one. But a 
class of structures fraught with much greater evils exists in great abundance 
throughout the country : — namely, those in which the faults of an unscientific 
design have been so far counteracted by massive strength, good materials, and 
careful workmanship, that a temporary stability has been produced, but which 
contain within themselves sources of weakness, obvious to a scientific 
examination only, that must inevitably cause their destruction within a limited 
number of years. (6) 
Rankine’s concern, repeatedly expressed, is to subject the “unscientific design” of British 
buildings to “scientific examination,” and thus to build up a core of “experimental knowledge” to 
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 “Actual” energy has been replaced by “kinetic” energy thanks to the influence of William 
Thomson and P.G. Tait. 
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invigorate the flagging architectural profession. Rankine’s ambitions for architecture were of a 
piece with his larger ambition to establish parity between the theoretical pursuits of the scientific 
and mathematical philosopher and the practical aims of the mechanic and engineer. As he 
announced to the Senate of the University of Glasgow upon his appointment to the Regius Chair 
of Civil Engineering (1855), the enlightenment of the Renaissance could be adduced to the 
proposition “that no [. . .] phenomenon, however familiar, is [. . .] beneath the attention of the 
philosopher; that [. . .] the labours of the artizan are full of instruction to the man of science; that 
the scientific study of practical mechanics is well worthy of the attention of the most 
accomplished mathematician” (Manual 3).   
In so saying, Rankine adapted utilitarian rhetoric to defend his newly-won professorship 
as well as the burgeoning engineering profession. Yet in doing so, he not only exploited 
utilitarian rhetoric but articulated a general trend during the Victorian era for the practical 
professions to become more scientific and technical.  As means to achieve the industrial virtues 
of efficiency and productivity, scientific methods of measurement and calculation were 
particularly prized by members of the practical occupations, and the practical pursuits 
consequently became increasingly technical during the industrial era. As the second occupant of 
the newly-established (1840) Chair of Civil Engineering and Mechanics at the University of 
Glasgow, Rankine himself owed his livelihood to this trend and considered his primary 
responsibility to promote and exhibit “the mutual communication of ideas between men of 
science and men of practice” (6). Likewise, the systems, schools, and centers of technical 
education that developed in Victorian Britain – from arrangements for working class and lower 
middle class wage-laborers like the Science and Art Department and the Midland Institute, to 
royally-endowed schools for the education of professional engineers like the School of Mines -- 
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also contributed toward this trend to elevate the practical professions through scientific 
education.  
Rankine was not alone in his insistence that engineering and the practical professions be 
established on an empirical basis. Rather, Rankine’s academic appointment to teach as a 
scientific subject a profession that had traditionally been considered an artisan’s trade 
represented the culmination of over a half century of reform. In 1797, another Scotsman, John 
Robison, had similarly called for scientific reform among Great Britain’s practical professions: 
The man of science who visits our great manufactures is delighted with the 
ingenuity which he observes in every part, the innumerable inventions which 
come even from individual artisans, and the determined purpose of improvement 
and refinement which he sees in every workshop. But the philosopher is mortified 
to see this ardent spirit so cramped by ignorance of principle, and many of these 
original and brilliant thoughts obscured and clogged with needless and even 
hurtful additions, and a complication of machinery which checks improvement 
even by its appearance of ingenuity. There is nothing in which this want of 
scientific education, this ignorance of principle, is so frequently observed as in the 
injudicious proportion of the parts of machines and other mechanical structures; 
proportions and forms of parts in which the strength and position are no wise 
regulated by the strains to which they are exposed, and where repeated failures 
have been the only lessons. (Robison 1) 
As well, in his aim to reduce the distinction between practical men and scientific 
philosophers, Rankine was preceded by yet another scientific academician who as professor at 
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the Royal Military Academy was closely involved in training army engineers. In his 1806 A 
Treatise on Mechanics: Theoretical, Practical, and Descriptive, Olinthus Gregory “regretted” 
that a forbidding distance and awkward jealousy seem to subsist between the 
theorists and the practical men engaged in the cultivation of mechanics in this 
country: and it is a desire to shorten this distance, and to eradicate this jealousy, 
that has been a principal stimulant in the execution of the following performance. 
(v-vi) 
In their desire to elevate the practical trades, particularly engineering, to the status of 
“philosophic” pursuits, Robison, Gregory, and Rankine participated in a nineteenth century trend 
in which emergently-scientific disciplines sought to achieve social recognition by furnishing 
society with a useful body of discipline-specific knowledge and work. Developing this 
knowledge, however, required communication between practitioners within the discipline, and 
this in turn required a precise and unambiguous language with which to communicate. 
Coterminous with the professionalization of the scientific disciplines, the development of a 
distinct register furnished engineering with a specialized vocabulary that would eventually enter 
the language of physical science generally.  
Nevertheless, the vernacular origin of several terms within this vocabulary harks to the 
time before professionalization. Thus, the present register of physical science preserves its 
kinship with other disciplines within the Victorian milieu. A historical survey of the development 
of such terms as stress and strain shows not only the interpenetration of physics with art, 
architecture, and mechanics during the mid-nineteenth century, but also evidences the reciprocal 
relationship between science and general culture. 
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2.2 Stress and Strain: The Scientific Register in Development 
Stress and strain are fundamental terms in the modern vocabulary of the physical 
sciences. As currently conceived, stress is a measure of force acting upon a given area, or, more 
simply, a measure of the force an object experiences. Strain, accordingly, measures an object’s 
response to the force exerted on it, or the effect of the force upon the object, which often 
manifests as a change in shape. Modern physical sciences (primarily the disciplines of physics 
and engineering) recognize six types of strain – compression, tension, torsion, shear, bending, 
and fatigue.
19
 Each of these instances of strain corresponds to stress, or to the effect of stress 
upon a material. Thus, for example, an object under compression shortens in response to two 
opposite forces compacting it, while an object under tension lengthens in response to two 
opposite forces stretching it. In addition to these macro-scale strains, physical and organic 
chemists investigate a number of atomic stresses and their molecular effects, including Van der 
Wals, torsional, and ring strain. Again, these strains constitute a molecule’s response to stress, or, 
to reword, the effect of atomic stresses upon the structure of a molecule.  
Consistently, then, the modern physical sciences treat stress and strain as reciprocal 
causes and effects.
20
 Yet the present consistency of terms is a product with a history, the end 
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 Rankine himself was one of the pioneers of the study of metal fatigue. In the early 1840s, he 
studied stress cracks in locomotive axles, concluding that even iron and steel structures could be 
progressively weakened through stress cracking to the point of catastrophic failure. In a paper 
presented to the Institute of Civil Engineers, Rankine applied his research to explain the 
Versailles train crash of 1842, in which between 52 and 200 people died returning from the 
public celebrations honoring King Louis Philippe I. The flames resulting from the wreck were so 
intense that authorities were unable to assess the number of casualties.  Rankine subsequently 
designed a process to manufacture stronger railway axles to resist stress cracking and fatigue. 
See Sendeckyj, “Early Railroad Accidents and the Origins of Research on the Fatigue of 
Metals.”  
20
 Since force can cause an object to change shape, and an object’s change of shape can exert 
force, the causality of stress and strain is reversible, and strain can cause stress just as much as 
stress causes strain. 
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result of the process by which the verbal register of the physical sciences developed during the 
early and middle decades of the nineteenth century. As participants in this process, stress and 
strain lent structure to the emerging scientific language while simultaneously evolving along 
with it.  
From the evidence of common speech, stress and strain were associated with words like 
“pressure” and “force” long before the nineteenth century and the evolution of the modern 
register of physical science. More precisely, stress and strain, in addition to being identified with 
force, functioned as particular aspects or manifestations of force that threatened the integrity of 
an object. As the OED notes, such an association informs the Earl of Surrey’s 1547 Poems when, 
in his translation of Ecclesiastes 4, he observes that "the single twyned cordes may no such 
stresse indure/ As cables brayded thre fould may, together wrethed swer” (OED 5a, my 
emphasis). In this instance, stresse is a particular manifestation of force threatening to sever the 
“twyned cordes.” Much the same usage features in Robert Venable’s description of a fly rod in 
his 1662 The Experienced Angler: “for if you observe the slender part of the rod, if strained, 
shoots forth in length as if it were part of the line, so that the whole stress or strength of the fish 
is borne or sustained by the thicker part of the rod” (OED 5a, my emphasis). Again, in being 
strained or subject to the stress of the fish, the rod is threatened with breaking, and only the 
flexibility of the slender top and the greater strength of the thicker base allow the rod to preserve 
its form.  
Similar usages prevail in nautical speech and writing. Captain Thomas James, in his 
account of his 1631-2 voyage in search of the Northwest Passage to the South Sea, recounts one 
stormy night where he and his crew “came to an Anker, and rid a good stresse all night” (387). 
Here, stresse indicates the force the ship exerts on the anchor and particularly the line, which 
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must endure the mass and drift of the ship, or break. Likewise, W.H. Smyth’s Sailor’s Word 
Book defines the phrase to “set up rigging” as “to take in the slack of the shrouds, stays, and 
backstays, to bring the same strain as before, and thus secure the masts” (609).  
As these nautical texts and Venable’s Experienced Angler suggest, modern physics’ 
customary pairing of stress and strain derives from ordinary speech just as much as its use of the 
individual terms themselves does. That this pairing was still common in the ordinary speech of 
nineteenth century speakers appears in the works of several poets. In Coventry Patmore’s The 
Angel in the House, when the poetic speaker fantasizes of nuptial bliss with his future bride, his 
mind, “puzzled and fagg’d by stress and strain [. . .] made bliss more hard to bear than pain” 
(“Sarum Plain” 3.14). Likewise, Browning’s Aurora Leigh complains of the “intolerable strain 
and stress” inherent in the poet’s “sorrowful great gift” of representing outwardly “the thing he 
feels the inmost” (Book 5). 
Patmore’s and Browning’s poems suggest the ease with which stress and strain have been 
metaphorically applied. While stress and strain denote physical force (particularly that 
jeopardizes the coherence of an object), they may also express emotional torsion (implicitly that 
jeopardizes one’s psychological coherence). Likewise, since the eighteenth century, poets have 
appropriated stress to describe the emphasis a syllable is accorded within a line of poetry. The 
first such instance, from John Mason’s 1749 An Essay on the Power and Harmony of Prosaic 
Numbers, asserts that ‘The Accents [. . .] were designed very probably at first to regulate the 
Tone or Key of the Voice, not the Stress or Force of it’ (OED, stress n. I.9). Mason adapts the 
word stress in reference to syllabic emphasis, but the fact that he pairs “Stress” with “Force” 
indicates that he applies the conventional, physical meaning of the term metaphorically. At base, 
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stress and strain address physical relations of force, and their metaphorical usages extend from 
this originary meaning.  
These examples indicate that, before and during the nineteenth century, stress and strain 
were commonly used in ordinary speech to describe physical force (and, by metaphorical 
extension, psychological pressure and syllabic stress). Not surprisingly, then, nineteenth century 
writers who observed physical forces at work in Nature frequently invoked these terms. Yet as 
professional discourses specialized, the terms stress and strain likewise accrued specialized 
significance in the technical disciplines that employed them.  
2.2.1 Strain in Chemical Literature 
Given their ubiquity in ordinary speech, the terms stress and strain suggested themselves 
readily to nineteenth century writers who investigated the nature and strength of molecular 
bonds, researched the behavior of gases subjected to variations of pressure and temperature, or 
tested the resistance of architectural materials to a load. Pertaining to the first of these 
investigations, as the accumulating mass of chemical literature fostered a rapid extension of 
theory, scientific writers struggled to find language fit to express new research. Stress and strain 
readily crossed from ordinary language to professional writing, as scientists’ literary and lexical 
struggles induced them to repurpose familiar terms to newly-emerging theoretical contexts. Such 
rapid linguistic innovation challenged communication, however, and many of the foremost 
chemical authors express concern to chasten scientific language to represent experimental 
findings clearly and unambiguously. These concerns prompted, on the one hand, a proliferation 
of new terms that furnished chemists with a tightly-defined professional register and, on the 
other hand, a suspicion of terms borrowed directly from common speech.  
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J.F.W. Herschel’s Encyclopedia Metropolitana treatise “Light” (1830) includes not only 
an early discussion of molecular strain, but also manifests a self-conscious interest in the 
technical assumption of common words. One of Herschel’s primary concerns is to clarify the 
developing terminology of photometric science. Thus, in the opening pages of his article, he 
offers the following definitions: 
Definition. The apparent superficial magnitude, or the apparent magnitude of any 
object, is a portion of a spherical surface described about the eye as a centre, with 
a radius equal to I, and bounded by an outline being the intersection of this 
spherical surface with a conoidal surface, having the object for its base and the 
eye for its vertex. [. . .] 
Definition. The real intrinsic brightness of a luminous object is the intensity of the 
light of each physical point in its surface, or the numerical measure of the degree 
in which such a point (of given magnitude) would illuminate a given object at a 
given distance, referred to some standard degree of illumination as a unit. [. . .] 
Definition. The apparent intrinsic brightness of any object, or luminary, is the 
degree of illumination of its image or picture at the bottom of the eye. [. . .] 
Definition. The absolute light of a luminary is the sum of the areas of its 
elementary portions, each multiplied by its own intrinsic brightness. (346) 
After establishing the meaning of these technical terms, Herschel then descants on their 
relationships to common speech. In so doing, Herschel is particularly concerned with the danger 
of confusing technical terms that descend from a single common word, as in his discussion of the 
“brightness” of objects:  
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In common language, when we speak of the brightness of an object of 
considerable size, we often mean its apparent intrinsic brightness. When, 
however, the object has no sensible size, as a star, we always mean its apparent 
light, (or, as it might be termed, its apparent absolute brightness,) because as we 
cannot distinguish such an object into parts, we can only be affected by its total 
light indiscriminately. The same holds good with all small objects which require 
attention to distinguish them into parts. Optical writers have occasionally fallen 
into much confusion for want of attending to these distinctions. (346, emphasis 
original to text) 
Despite Herschel’s self-conscious concern to segregate common from technical usage, 
his use of strain seems casual. In Herschel’s careful disaggregation of the technical senses of 
“brightness," his scientific language subdivides common usage, and assigns each of the multiple 
significations of the common word to a tightly-defined, carefully circumscribed scientific term. 
With strain, however, Herschel uses the same term in a variety of senses, some indisputably 
technical but others less certainly so. In his essay on “Sound,” for example (also 1830), Herschel 
comments upon the “well authenticated feat performed by persons of clear and powerful voice, 
to break a drinking-glass by singing its proper fundamental note close to it” (783). In his 
explanation of this common phenomenon, Herschel proposes that “the excursions of [the glass’] 
molecules in the vibrations into which they are thrown [are] so great as to strain them beyond the 
limits of their cohesion” (783). While Herschel applies strain to molecular behavior here, and 
thus supplies a scientifically-informed explanation of a common phenomenon, he means the 
same thing that a speaker discussing the strain on a fishing pole or length of twined cords intends 
– a force or pressure exerted against an object in opposition to its internal strength. Thus, 
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Herschel speaks of molecules rupturing and breaking apart from one another in much the same 
way as the fibers of a fish pole or rope might.
21
 In this instance, Herschel’s application of strain 
to molecular behavior lends the term empirical cachet, but without the specialized context 
supplied by Herschel’s discussion of molecules, his meaning would be identical to everyday 
usages of the word.    
In Herschel’s article “Light,” he again represents the relationship between common 
experience and speech, and scientific knowledge and language. In this article, Herschel employs 
the concept of strain to explain a number of phenomena, ranging from the deformation of 
crystals to the ability of unevenly-heated glass to polarize light. Both of these phenomena result 
from the expansion of matter due to heat, or the retraction of it due to cold. Again, however, 
Herschel points out the common-place equivalent of these phenomena, the capacity of glass to 
shatter when unevenly heated. Since molecular bonds lock the hotter particles, expanding, in 
place with the cooler particles, the “immediate effect of an increase or diminution of temperature 
in any one point of a piece of glass, is to produce a mechanical strain on all the surrounding part” 
(564). Given sufficient difference of temperature, the consequent strain is “capable of breaking 
asunder the thickest pieces of glass; an effect with which every one is familiar” (564). 
In “Sound” and “Light,” then, Herschel repeatedly compares common experience and 
scientific knowledge, as well common speech and scientific language. Granted, Herschel 
undoubtedly does so to help uninitiated readers understand the scientific terms and principles he 
discusses. But additionally, Herschel explains scientific knowledge as rising from but ultimately 
above common knowledge, being able consequently to explain the commonly perceived but 
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 And with good reason, given that an object’s rupturing necessarily entails the separation of its 
constituent molecules. My point here is not that Herschel misapplied the term, but that strain’s 
conventional meaning readily accommodated new scientific developments.  
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imperfectly understood phenomena of the world. Likewise, Herschel depicts scientific language 
as originating from the welter of common speech, but being systematized with logical rigor and 
precision. Despite these intentions, however, and in contrast to the way he treats other 
specialized terms, Herschel adapts strain to scientific speech without delimiting or defining its 
denotation in any special sense.   
 But while Herschel seems comfortable with strain’s dual citizenship in both popular and 
technical speech, other writers treated the term with more suspicion. Thus, although its facility to 
express relations of force recommended it to scientific authors, its capacity to retain its 
conventional meaning even as it extended its sphere of signification to the developing register of 
physical chemistry rendered it suspect. Strain’s ubiquitous applicability – and the necessity to 
develop an accurate and unambiguous mode of specialized speech -- may have influenced 
Michael Faraday to eschew the term in favor of its near-synonym tension.    
Like Herschel, Faraday apprehended the linguistic challenges posed by the proliferation 
of chemical research and writing, and his concern to develop a precise scientific lexicon appears 
in his numerous verbal coinages. When, for example, Faraday proposed electrochemical 
attraction as the prerogative of an electrical current and not, as was then commonly believed, the 
work of the current’s poles, his refinement of electrochemical theory prompted refinement of 
electrochemical language: 
The theory which I believe to be a true expression of the facts of electro-chemical 
decomposition [. . .] is so much at variance with those previously advanced, that I 
find the greatest difficulty in stating results, as I think, correctly, whilst limited to 
the use of terms which are current with a certain accepted meaning [. . . .] To 
avoid, therefore, confusion and circumlocution, and for the sake of greater 
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precision of expression than I can otherwise obtain [. . .] I purpose henceforward 
using certain other terms, which I will now define. (“On Electro-Chemical 
Decomposition, Continued,” 111-2) 
To clarify his argument, Faraday replaced the term “pole” with the term “electrode,” and 
dubbed the negative pole the “cathode” and the positive pole the “anode.” Likewise, substances 
that are susceptible to decomposition under the influence of an electrical current he called 
“electrolytes,” and the individual particles released during the electrolyte’s decomposition he 
termed “ions.” Since ions are mobile, borne along by the current to either the anode or cathode, 
Faraday likewise subdivided “ions” into “cations” and “anions.” Those that that congregate at the 
anode he named “anions,” and their counterparts that travel to the cathode he labelled “cations.”   
Strain’s protean applicability, taken together with Faraday’s persistent concern for verbal 
clarity and semantic precision, potentially explains Faraday’s typical avoidance of strain in favor 
of tension. While tension peppers the pages of Faraday’s writing, strain occurs rarely. By my 
count, Faraday uses the term strain, along with its derivatives restrain, restraint, constrain, and 
constraint, eight times in his 469-page Experimental Researches in Chemistry and Physics. By 
contrast, tension alone, to say nothing of its derivatives, occurs in some instances three or four 
times on a single page.  
A possible explanation for Faraday’s apparent reticence regarding strain appears in the 
rare instances when he does employ it. In his “On the Liquifaction and Solidification of Bodies 
generally existing as Gases,” Faraday describes the construction of one of his experimental 
apparatuses. It is a complex affair of tubes and pumps, but Faraday contrives to arrange the 
device so that one tube “could be raised and lowered vertically, without any strain upon [its] 
connexions,” with the other tubes (Chemistry, 101). While the term appears in Faraday’s 
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description of the construction of a scientific apparatus, the function of the term itself is in no 
way technical – the machine that Faraday builds measures the expansion of gases in response to 
temperature and pressure, but what Faraday describes here is merely the arrangement of the 
tubes themselves, not the behavior of gases or molecules of matter. While an engineer might be 
interested in measuring quantitatively the strain exerted by one part of a structure on another, 
such is not Faraday’s intention here – Faraday means to measure and quantify the behavior of 
gases, not the behavior of the parts of his machine. Faraday’s usage of the term here is then 
casual, neither theoretical nor quantitative.  
Apparently, Faraday’s suspicion of strain resulted from its range of expression, and its 
fungibility disqualified it from inclusion within the discipline-specific language that Faraday 
helped to create. When Faraday does discuss the behavior of gases and molecules, as well as the 
forces of electricity, magnetism, and light, he characteristically avoids strain in favor of the 
older, Enlightenment sense of tension. In modern scientific language, tension is a subset or 
particular variety of strain (a strain that stretches or elongates). But in Enlightenment philosophy, 
tension applied to any condition that prompted an elastic response from a substance. In rough 
terms, the Enlightenment sense of tension and the modern sense of strain are synonyms. For 
example, in his Experimental Researches in Chemistry and Physics, Faraday repeatedly 
describes gases as “having tension” when they exert pressure against a container, or even, as in 
the case of atmospheric gases, when they resist or counter the force of gravitational attraction. In 
modern scientific language, confinement of a gas within a container or the effect of gravity upon 
a gas would be termed compression, the exact opposite of tension. But since Faraday’s 
Enlightenment sense of tension is synonymous with the modern sense of strain, compression for 
43 
Faraday is a subset of tension instead of its opposite. In essence, Faraday’s term tension applies 
to any circumstance in which an object’s elasticity is evoked.22   
That tension and strain are precisely synonymous for Faraday appears in several fortunate 
parallels from Faraday’s oeuvre. In his popular children’s lecture On the Various Forces of 
Nature, Faraday explains how molecular “strain” within a piece of glass alters its refraction of 
polarized light (71).
23
 In a parallel passage from Experimental Researches in Chemistry and 
Physics, Faraday explains a similar phenomenon in which “an irregular tension” within an optic 
lens corrupts its refractive uniformity (237). The fact that both strain and tension occasion the 
same effect within a piece of glass suggests that Faraday considers the terms as expressing one 
and the same phenomenon. 
When Faraday does resort to “strain” (other than the aforementioned children’s lecture – 
see footnote 11), he attempts to delimit its meaning and function through grammatical prefixes 
and suffixes. Thus, “restrain,” “restraint,” “constrain,” and “constraint” figure much more 
frequently in Faraday’s writings than strain itself does.24 Given Faraday’s characteristic 
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 See also Faraday’s Experimental Researches in Electricity, where Faraday repeatedly 
describes electrical currents as building up “tension” when their circuits are impeded by an 
insulator. In these instances, tension evidently means “pressure” or “compression.” The imagery 
is of a compressible fluid building up pressure until at last its pent force enables it to pierce its 
way through the obstacle that impedes it.  
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 This children’s lecture is one of the very rare instances when Faraday uses strain to describe 
molecular force and behavior. Even in the infrequent instances when Faraday refers to strain 
instead of tension, he typically attempts to circumscribe strain’s wide applicability by adding 
suffixes and prefixes (see below). In this instance when Faraday does neither, his audience 
should be considered. Faraday presented this lecture to an audience of adolescents, and may well 
have selected strain in this instance for the very reason he avoided it in others – its ability to 
overlap common and scientific speech. 
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 This is not without difficulty, either, since the derivatives of strain carry metaphoric 
resonances of their own that further perplex verbal precision. For example, Faraday in one 
passage may use “constrain” to represent physical force exerted on an object, and yet in another 
passage use the same word to express a sense of moral obligation exerted upon a human being. 
Cf. Experimental Researches in Chemistry and Physics, pgs. 436 and 475: in the first instance, 
44 
grammatical derivations of strain, when William Thomson as a young man famously wrote to 
enquire of his scientific hero of the then-hypothetical relationship between magnetism and light, 
the young Thomson demonstrated his intimacy with Faraday’s thought both conceptually and 
rhetorically. In addition to citing Faraday’s coinage of the “dielectric,” Thomson also reproduced 
Faraday’s typical use of “constraint” for strain: 
A third question which I think has never been investigated is relative to the action 
of a transparent dielectric on polarized light. Thus it is known that a very well 
defined action, analogous to that of a transparent crystal, is produced upon 
polarized light, when transmitted through glass in any ordinary state of violent 
constraint. If the constraint, which may be elevated to the point of breaking the 
glass, be produced by electricity, it seems probable that a similar action might be 
observed. (Aug 6, 1845, my emphasis) 
But even this effort does not produce the terminological consistency that Faraday 
expected of scientific writing. Faraday’s grammatical permutations of strain carry metaphoric 
resonances of their own that perplex verbal precision. For example, at one point in his 1857 
essay “On the Experimental Relations of Gold (and other Metals) to Light,” Faraday describes 
the ability of thin gold foil to polarize the small quantity of light that passes through it. This 
polarization, Faraday remarks, “does not seem due to any constrained condition of the beaten 
gold,” or does not result from strain induced between the molecules by the hammering process, 
but is also present in “annealed leaf-gold,” “deposits of gold particles,” and “other uncrystallized 
transparent substances” (436). Yet while “constrain” here refers to tension or strain between 
molecules of gold, Faraday more frequently applies the word to express moral obligation. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the gold is “constrained” by mechanical force (being beaten), while in the second, the scientific 
observer is constrained through habitual mental and moral discipline. 
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in an 1855 essay “On Mental Education,” Faraday warns against “the temptation which urges us 
to seek for such evidence and appearance as are in favor of our desires,” and urges readers to 
“[practice] wholesome self-abnegation” (475). Yet such self-abnegation is impossible, Faraday 
claims, “for anyone who has not been constrained, by the course of his occupation and thoughts, 
to a habit of continual self-correction” (475). Granted, both the metal under the hammer and the 
mettle under moral discipline are alike in that they are forced and strained against their natural 
inclinations. But the very metaphoric nature of Faraday’s usage prohibits his sense of constrain 
from achieving the singular denotation that he expected of scientific terms.
25
 Try as he might to 
control the meaning of his words, Faraday’s derivations of strain persistently lapse from 
scientific precision and revert to the broader significations of ordinary speech.  
Faraday’s difficulties with strain instance the struggles other scientific authors had with it 
as well. In turning in the next section to the engineering sciences, we will survey the various 
permutations the term assumed in the mechanical and physical sciences as authors attempted to 
pare its meaning to a single and stable signification. W. J. M. Rankine at last fixed its meaning in 
1850 paper, “Laws of the Elasticity of Solid Bodies,” drawing from chemistry as well as 
engineering and physics to assign the word a stable definition. Rankine’s proposed definition 
was seconded by Thomson, and was subsequently adopted by the scientific community at large. 
Ironically, however, in at last articulating strain definitively as a scientific term distinct from the 
multiplex associations of common usage, Rankine added yet another association. In conjunction 
with Rankine’s companion term stress, this scientific association of strain would enrich common 
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 For other moralizing instances of constrain in Faraday’s oeuvre, see Experimental Researches 
in Chemistry and Physics, 136, as well as Experimental Researches in Electricity, 232, 233, and 
313. Much the same may be said of constraint, restrain, and restraint – each of these figure in 
Faraday’s writings as both an expression of molecular tension operative upon particles as well as 
a moral force operative upon individuals.  
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culture with a mechanical ontology, the most lasting effects of which would take shape in the 
poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins.   
2.2.2 Strain and Strength in Engineering Literature 
A similar effort to chasten the semantic field of strain appears in engineering and 
architectural literature. Although architecture was an established discipline long before the 
nineteenth century, the impetus during the nineteenth century to establish the professions on an 
empirical basis revitalized architecture and bred a number of technical architectural treatises. In 
“Strength,” an entry written for the 1797 Encyclopaedia Britannica, John Robison, Professor of 
Natural Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, defines strain as a particular manifestation of 
force that potentially threatens an object’s integrity. Thus,  
A piece of solid matter is exposed to four kinds of strain, pretty different in the 
manner of their operation. 1. It may be torn asunder, as in the case of ropes, 
stretchers, king-posts, tye-beams, &c. 2. It may be crushed, as in the case of 
pillars, posts, and truss-beams. 3. It may be broken across, as happens to a joist or 
lever of any kind. 4. It may be wrenched or twisted, as in the case of the axle of a 
wheel, the nail of a press, &c. (8) 
In so defining strain, Robison juxtaposes it against cohesion, the “connecting force” that 
holds the object’s component parts together (2). Furthermore, Robison explains, when the object 
experiences a strain, the cohesion between its particles is “excited” or “brought into action” as 
strength (2). Robison’s usage may be surprising to modern readers, who regard strength as either 
a quality or quantity, but Robison emphatically expresses strength as an actual and active force:  
It is this action which is what we call the strength of that part [. . . .] Thus when 
we observe a rope prevent a body from falling, we infer a moving force inherent 
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in the rope with as much confidence as when we observe it drag the body along 
the ground. The immediate action of this force is undoubtedly exerted between 
the immediately adjoining parts of the rope. The immediate effect is the keeping 
the particles of the rope together. They ought to separate by any external force 
drawing the ends of the rope contrary wise; and we ascribe their not doing so to a 
mechanical force really opposing this external force” (2, my emphasis). 
Strength, in Robison’s usage, is not merely a measure of cohesion. More than a quantity 
(“How strong?” “How much strength?”), strength exists as an actual force. Just as the external 
force exists which subjects the object to pressure, so strength exists as an internal force by which 
the object resists pressure. In fine, strength is the force of self-coherence an object exerts in 
response to an external strain. Phrased alternately, when an object experiences strain, it exerts 
strength to neutralize the strain and to preserve its integral form. Given that strength is an 
actualized expression of the cohesion between an object’s particles, and given that this cohesion 
depends on the organization and structure of the particles themselves, strength can further be 
defined as a force of self-coherence expressive of an object’s material composition or identity.  
Subsequently, however, in a curious shift, Robison sublates the force jeopardizing the 
object with the force sustaining it, treating both as opposite facets of a single identity. As 
Robison describes, “We must have some notion of that intermedium, by the intervention of 
which an external force applied to one part of a lever, joist, or pillar, occasions a strain on a 
distant part. This can be nothing but the cohesion between the parts” (2). In other words, strain 
propagates through the extent of an object only if the “cohesion between the [object’s] parts” is 
sufficient to endure the strain without breaking. If the object’s cohesion were to fail and the 
object were to break, then strain would no longer stem from one part of the object to the next. 
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For this reason, Robison perceives external strain not so much as opposed to an object’s self-
distinctive strength but rather “exciting” it or calling it from a dormant state to a state of active 
expression (2). In effect, strain simultaneously exerts pressure without and excites strength 
within, and up to the limit of the object’s cohesion, stress and strength are identical. As Robison 
explains, “thus it is the same force differently viewed, that constitutes both the strain and the 
strength” of an object (2). 
To summarize Robison’s definitions, strain refers to an external force that threatens to 
overpower the cohesion between an object’s parts. At the same time that strain threatens the 
object’s particular cohesion, however, it calls forth from the object an expression of that 
cohesion in the form of strength. Strength then is a real – not a potential – force, and is deployed 
in exact response to an external strain, up to the limit of the object’s cohesion. Much as strain 
exerts force without to destroy the object, so the object exerts force within to preserve itself. 
Strength then is an active force of self-preservation, a direct expression of the object’s proper 
molecular or particular cohesion. In essence, strength stems from and expresses the particular 
structure or identity of the object.  
Such distinctiveness of definition likewise characterizes Peter Barlow’s employment of 
strain and strength in two of his influential treatises, his Essay on the Strength and Stress of 
Timber, first published in 1817, and his Encyclopaedia Metropolitana article “Mechanics.”26 In 
what would now be considered plagiarism, Barlow, in the opening pages of his Essay, 
embellishes Robison’s four-fold definition of strain, interlacing his analysis with short quotations 
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 The versions I have been able to locate are later editions (Essay) or reprints (“Mechanics”). At 
the time of Barlow’s writing, stress and strain were considered to be precisely synonymous. This 
is better seen in Olinthus Gregory’s Treatise (see below). Rankine would segregate these terms, 
treating stress as a synonym for strength instead of strain (see below as well).  
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culled directly from his predecessor’s essay on “Strength” (compare italicized phrases below 
with Robison’s words quoted above):  
Four distinct cases or strains may be stated as follow: 1. A body may be torn 
asunder by a stretching force applied in the direction of its fibres, as in the case of 
ropes, stretchers, king-posts, tye-beams, &c. 2. It may be broken across by a 
transverse strain, or by a force acting either perpendicularly or obliquely to its 
length, as in the case of levers, joists, &c. 3. A beam or bar may also be crushed 
by a pressure exerted in the direction of its length, as in the case of pillars, posts, 
and truss-beams. 4. It may be twisted or wrenched by a force acting in a 
perpendicular direction, at the extremity of a lever or otherwise, as in the case of 
the axle of a wheel, the nail of a press, &c.
27
 (1-2, emphasis mine) 
Inherent in Robison’s and Barlow’s definitions of strain is a desire to treat the meaning of 
the term precisely and consistently. Accordingly, in Barlow’s later article for the Encyclopaedia 
Metropolitana, he avoids using the terms strain and strength in his initial exposition of the laws 
of force and his subsequent calculations of the force exerted and the work performed by simple 
machines. This is consistent with the conception of these terms that he derives from Robison: in 
the first part of this article, Barlow does not investigate the strain a machine can endure before 
failing but rather the force it can exert or the work it can perform.
28
 Accordingly, Barlow’s 
                                                 
27
 In Barlow’s defense, past authors should not be held responsible for conventions of quotation 
and citation adopted after their time. Nor does Barlow shirk acknowledging his debt to Robison, 
whom he frequently and prominently acknowledges in this Essay, albeit not in the passage 
quoted above. In pointing out that Barlow’s adoption of Robison’s phrases would now be 
considered plagiarism, I do not mean to accuse Barlow of dishonesty. Rather, I merely mean to 
show the similarities in their conception of strain, given that Barlow adopts Robison’s definitions 
as his own.  
28
 Two exceptions occur in this section. In the first, on page 51, Barlow briefly mentions the 
requisite “strength” of a machine’s parts in order that “they shall not break under the weight they 
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concern is not with the likelihood of the machine catastrophically shattering or exploding but 
with the amount of work it can produce in its normal operation. Since Barlow and Robison 
consider strain and strength as alternate modes of an object’s intrinsic capacity of cohesion, 
Barlow in the first part of his article uses the generic word “force” instead of the specific term 
“strain.”  
However, when in the same article Barlow turns from machines to architecture, he 
likewise turns from investigating force exerted to force endured. In doing so, Barlow shifts 
attention from investigating force’s ability to perform useful work to its propensity to deform or 
destroy – in a word, to exert what Robison meant by “strain.” Tellingly, Barlow introduces strain 
precisely at the point his investigation turns to architecture, and he systematically employs it 
throughout his subsequent research of the architectural strength of various “solid bodies” or 
building materials such as timber beams, stone blocks, and iron bars. Barlow’s restricted use of 
the term causes it to appear and disappear abruptly in his text. In the 54 pages before Barlow first 
proposes to “[compute] the relative strains upon solid bodies” (i.e., building materials), the term 
does not appear even a single time (54). Likewise, in the nearly 90 pages following his 
investigation of the strength of architectural materials, Barlow again suspends use of the term, 
with the exceptions of calculating the strain a bank of earth imposes on a revetment and 
remarking on the “disagreeable strain” felt when “we strike a smart blow with a stick” and “feel 
a painful wrench in the hand” (139). Yet these exceptions prove the rule: In the first instance, 
Barlow’s investigation of a revetment’s strength to endure the strain of the bank is closely akin to 
                                                                                                                                                             
are intended to counteract.” Here, Barlow’s use of “strength” corresponds with his shift in focus 
from the machine’s capacity to exert force to its capacity to endure strain. This exception further 
evidences Barlow’s consciously consistent use of strength and strain. The second exception does 
not, however. In this second instance, Barlow remarks on the force generated by “a man of 
medium strength, striking with a maul weighing 18 lbs” (52). Here, Barlow uses the term 
“strength” in the common sense.   
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his inquiry into the strength of architectural materials to endure a load. In the second instance, 
Barlow’s description of the “painful wrench” felt in the hand recalls Robison’s 4th description of 
material under strain -- “it may be wrenched or twisted, as in the case of the axle of a wheel, the 
nail of a press, &c.” (Robison 8).  
The distinctive conventions of Robison and Barlow’s nomenclature become more 
apparent given Newton’s third law, of equal and opposite reaction. Robison and Barlow concur 
that strain opposes strength, not as a measure of any force exerted by the object (as in a machine 
at work) but as a measure of the force it endures. Logically, however, an object endures any 
force it exerts. Thus, when a machine exerts pressure against an object, it exerts pressure against 
its members and parts as well. But the application of the term strain reflects a human observer’s 
perspective, not physical reality. When Barlow concerns himself with the work a machine can 
produce, and not the pressures it experiences, he consequently eschews the terms strength and 
strain. From an objective standpoint, however -- one that does not entertain Barlow’s perspective 
or purpose in observing -- when a machine exerts force, it experiences pressure.  
Similarly, Robison and Barlow express strength as an active force preserving, and 
expressing, the object’s internal composition. If an object’s strength consists in its ability to resist 
strain and to preserve its integral form, then strength is a direct expression of an object’s 
elasticity or cohesion. Given that strength stems from the molecular or “particular” composition 
of an object -- or from the bonds between those molecules that give the object its being -- then 
strength is an expression of the essential composition of the object. 
Robison’s and Barlow’s distinctive usage and application of strain explains the term’s 
appearance in architectural writing later in the century. Joseph Gwilt, in his 1842 An 
Encyclopedia of Architecture, treats strain as a discipline-specific term, defining it in his 
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technical glossary as “the force exerted on any material tending to disarrange or destroy the 
cohesion of its component parts” (1038). In this definition, Gwilt’s opposition of strain to the 
“cohesion” of “component parts” preserves an echo of Robison.  
Regarding stress, Olinthus Gregory’s 1806 A Treatise of Mechanics, Theoretical, 
Practical, and Descriptive clarifies that stress during the early nineteenth century was used 
“indiscriminately” as a synonym for strain (105). Besides clarifying the relationship of strain and 
stress, Gregory’s work also attests the normativity of Robison’s definitions of strength and strain. 
To quote the passage in full,  
168. DEF. Strength, and Stress or Strain, are terms, the former of which [strength] 
is used to denote the force or power with which any mass or body resists a breach 
or change in its state, which a pressure or stroke upon it has a tendency to 
produce; and the latter [stress and strain] are used indiscriminately to express the 
force which is excited in any such mass and tending to break it. Thus, every part 
of a pillar is equally strained by the load which it supports. Hence, it is evident 
that we cannot make any structure fit for its purpose, unless the strength in every 
part be at least equal to the stress laid on, or the strain excited in that part: and 
hence the necessity of an acquaintance with the nature of the resistance of bodies, 
so that there shall be neither a surplus nor a deficiency of materials in any 
machine. (105) 
As in Barlow’s and Gwilt’s works, Gregory’s Treatise draws directly from Robison’s 
definitions of strength and strain. With Robison, Gregory defines strength as an actual “force or 
power with which any mass [. . .] resists a breach or change in its state.” Thus, strength is not 
merely an index or measure of cohesion, but is an actual “force or power” in its own right. 
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Moreover, Gregory borrows Robison’s striking description of strain being “excited” within the 
object, even if, in doing so, Gregory signals his ambivalence about Robison’s rapprochement of 
strength and strain. In Robison’s essay “Strength,” although he initially deploys strain and 
strength as opposed moments, the fact that strain “excites” strength in an object ultimately 
sublates their negation, and “thus it is the same force differently viewed, that constitutes both the 
strain and the strength of an object” (Robison 2).29 In the passage quoted above, however, 
Gregory maintains the opposition between strain and strength. Even though strain/stress acts 
simultaneously upon the object and within it – “stress” is “laid on” the object while “strain” is 
“excited in” it -- Gregory avoids reconciling strain/stress to strength. Whether laid on or excited 
within the object, stress/strain continues to oppose strength. Thus, “the strength in every part 
[must] be at least equal to the stress laid on, or the strain excited in that part” (105). 
Consequently, Gregory sees two forces warring within an object’s members: strength, a force of 
cohesion, and strain/stress, a force of disruption. All the same, Gregory’s departure from 
Robison demonstrates the latter’s influence, and in echoing Robison’s characteristic description 
of strain exerting force from without yet nevertheless being “excited” within (albeit not as 
strength but in opposition to it), Gregory revisits Robison’s terminology and conception of an 
object under strain.
30
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 In casting Robison’s ideas in Hegelian terminology, I do not mean to imply that Robison ever 
heard of Hegel or was influenced by his ideas. Instead, Hegel’s terms offer a convenient means 
to explain Robison’s negative moments of strain and stress. The fact that Hegel derived his 
critical term “moment” from his study of mechanics excuses -- at least partially, I hope -- my 
application of his terms to Robison.   
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 A web of influence links the works of Robison, Gregory, and Barlow. Gregory’s and Barlow’s 
debt to Robison has been discussed above. Likewise, Barlow borrows the title of his An Essay on 
the Strength and Stress of Timber from a line in the introduction to Gregory’s Treatise, in which 
Gregory proposes to “treat of [. . .] the strength and stress of timber and other materials” 
(Gregory viii).  
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Beyond Gregory, Barlow, Gwilt, and Parker, Robison’s ideas of strain and strength 
extended further into the nineteenth century to a Scottish railroad engineer who would eventually 
win the recently endowed Regius Chair of Civil Engineering at the University of Glasgow.  
William John Macquorn Rankine would finally fix the definition of strain, and would postulate 
an important, but ultimately disavowed, definition of stress. Although Rankine’s definitions 
would alter Robison’s terminology, Robison’s concept of the reciprocity between outer and inner 
forces -- particularly his concept of an active, inner force expressive of the structural identity and 
particular cohesion of the object – would be especially important for Rankine’s later definitions 
of stress and strain.
31
     
2.3 Stress, Strain, and Enegy Science 
As scientific investigations proliferated during the nineteenth century, not only did 
scientific enterprise become increasingly demarcated by disciplinary boundaries, but the 
established crafts became increasingly technical. In this multiplicity of technical discourse, 
technical writers repurposed existing words -- when available -- to suit the particular needs of 
their developing disciplines. Stress’ and strain’s status as technical terms within the cognate but 
diverging registers of architecture, physics, and chemistry instances the broad applicability of 
single terms to a spectrum of technical interests, or shows how familiar words accrue new 
applications within specialized professional registers.  
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 Essentially, Rankine’s “stress” is identical to Robison’s “strength” – the internal force of vital 
identity. Robison’s “strain” is Rankine’s “external pressure” – the external force threatening the 
object’s structural integrity. As for Rankine’s strain, Rankine means a change in shape, not the 
force itself that causes the change in shape. All the same, while Robison conceived of strain as a 
force, not a change in shape, he did define the various strains by their directions of stretching, 
compressing, twisting, and shearing. Since the directional forces determine the resulting shape of 
the object, Rankine’s definition of strain as a change in shape are analogous to Robison’s 
definition of strain as a direction of force. 
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Yet when W. J. M. Rankine redefined stress and strain, he did not merely extend the 
terms’ application but altered their denotation. Rankine’s linguistic innovation of stress 
particularly, though promptly squelched by more authoritative voices who restored it to its 
customary meaning, nevertheless resurfaced periodically in future physicists’ writing. As well, a 
startling similarity between Rankine’s definitions of the terms and Hopkins’ use of them 
conjoins Rankine’s vitalist physics with Hopkins’ philosophy and poetics of inscape.  
Like Faraday, Rankine was an inveterate innovator of scientific terminology,
32
 one whose 
encyclopedic mastery of the literary corpus of the physical sciences made him sensitive not only 
to a term’s customary signification but also to the way an inapposite or improperly defined term 
could mislead scientific judgment. In a paper he read before the 1850 assembly of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science (hereafter the BAAS), Rankine prefaces his new 
definition of strain by pointing out the imprecision of the term’s accepted signification in 
common speech. In Rankine’s words,  
It is desirable that some single word should be assigned to denote the state of the 
particles of a body when displaced from their natural relative positions. Although 
the word strain is used in ordinary language indiscriminately to denote relative 
molecular displacement, and the force by which it is produced, yet it appears to 
me that it is well calculated to supply this want. I shall therefore use it, throughout 
this paper, in the restricted sense of relative displacement of particles, whether 
consisting in dilatation, condensation, or distortion; while under the term pressure 
I shall include every kind of force which acts between elastic bodies, or the parts 
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 One only has to read a page at random from Rankine’s A Manual of Applied Mechanics to 
witness his near-mania to name and to number. Readers will most likely be familiar with several 
of Rankine’s other coinages, including “potential energy,” “actual energy” (later changed to 
“kinetic energy”), and, arguably, “energy” itself as understood by modern physicists. 
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of an elastic body, as the cause or effect of a state of strain, whether that force is 
tensile, compressive, or distorting. (Misc. 68) 
To condense Rankine’s critique, the meaning of strain in “ordinary speech” is 
“indiscriminately” freighted with multiple senses, signifying both the force that causes a body’s 
shape to change and the actual change of shape itself. In the interests of greater precision, 
Rankine proposes to divide or “restrict” the semantic domain of strain, referring to the force 
exerted upon molecules as pressure, and the change of shape thereby induced as strain.
33
 
Although Rankine’s redeployment of strain amounts only to a reduction of its ordinary meaning 
and is in no way as radical as his subsequent treatment of stress (see below), it nevertheless 
accomplishes for the term what had eluded Herschel and Faraday: paring the term’s complex 
signification in ordinary speech to a stable, single meaning devoid of uncertainty or ancillary 
interpretation. In so chastening the signification of strain, Rankine enabled scientific speakers to 
express, succinctly and unambiguously, the relationship between force and figure, or between an 
object’s shape and the forces at play upon the object.34  
In describing an object’s change of shape as “relative molecular displacement,” Rankine 
overtly tailors his chastened sense of strain to the technical discourses of chemistry and physics. 
But consistently in his 1850 BAAS paper, Rankine has the practical professions of architecture 
and engineering squarely in view. Rankine’s practical emphasis appears from his first page, 
where he claims that the “most important application” of the “science of the elasticity of solid 
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 It should be remembered that causality between pressure and strain may also be reversed, as 
Rankine observes in the passage quoted above. 
34
 Rankine’s curtailed definition of strain is still observed in the physical sciences of 
engineering, mechanics, physics, and chemistry. In the last, it has given rise to the expressions 
“molecular strain” and “strain energy,” referring to the energy stored within a molecule as a 
result of its constituent elements being forced out of their normal shape or position. Ring, Van 
der Waals, and torsional strain are types of molecular strain.  
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bodies” is “the determination of the strength of [architectural] structures” (67). Likewise, he 
repeatedly illustrates abstruse definitions and technical points with examples drawn from 
carpentry and construction. Thus, to clarify his term transverse elasticity, Rankine first provides 
a more common synonym, rigidity, and then explains “When a beam, or any other portion of a 
solid structure, takes a set (or undergoes permanent alteration of figure), it is the rigidity which 
has been overstrained and gives way” (78-9). Such concern to connect the philosophical and the 
practical is consonant with his later assertion of the parity of the artisan with the philosopher, and 
also with the trajectory of his future career as an academic engineer.  
Rankine’s redefinition of stress followed as much from his intellectual identity as a 
practical philosopher or engineering physicist as from his curtailed denotation of strain. In his 
1850 definition of pressure versus strain, he distinguished only between force and molecular 
displacement, or force and change of shape. As Rankine explains, causation reciprocates 
between pressure and strain, and changes in an object’s shape may exert force as much as force 
may cause an object to change shape. Thus, as Rankine proposes, “under the term pressure I 
shall include every kind of force which acts between elastic bodies, or the parts of an elastic 
body, as the cause or effect of a state of strain” (68). 
Yet although Rankine has subsumed all force as pressure, whether caused or causal of 
molecular displacement, he subsequently segregates pressure in two categories. The first 
category includes external pressure, or any force that strains an object out of shape and 
potentially destroys its form. The second category of pressure refers to a structure’s internal 
strength or molecular coherence and “consists in a tendency of the body to recover its natural 
state” after being strained (74).  
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At length, Rankine adapted stress to denote the second form of pressure resident in the 
molecular composition of an object that enables the object to resist external pressure and to 
preserve its distinctive form and shape. Though Rankine’s term differs from Robison, Gregory, 
and Barlow’s, his definition of stress accurately reproduces their description of strength. As 
Rankine explains, stress is an active force depending on the molecular composition of an object. 
As an active force, it intensifies directly with strain and external pressure. Rankine defines the 
triple relationship in his 1855 paper, “On Axes of Elasticity and Crystalline Forms”:  
In this paper, the word strain will be used to denote the change of volume and 
figure constituting the deviation of a molecule of a solid from that condition 
which it preserves when free from the action of external forces; and the word 
stress will be used to denote the force, or combination of forces, which such a 
molecule exerts in tending to recover its free condition, and which, for a state of 
equilibrium, is equal and opposite to the combination of external forces applied to 
it. (Misc. 120)  
As such – and reminiscent once more of Robison and Barlow -- stress in its variable guise 
depends on pressure and strain and is called forth by them, functioning as an active force called 
into being within the object that balances or equilibrates the external forces exerted upon it. Up 
to the limit of the object’s elasticity, the more pressure exerted against the object, the more stress 
the object musters in opposition from within. In so saying, the variable activity of stress 
necessarily depends on a stable substratum. While stress may be evoked by external force, the 
evocation manifests an essential quality of the substance, namely its elasticity or molecular 
strength. As a sign of a solid’s molecular structure, stress is at once a force of internal self-
preservation and a force of identity, an innate faculty expressing the internal composition of a 
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material object. Because stress expresses a material’s identity or internal molecular composition, 
the distinctive elasticity (an object’s total capacity for stress) of each form of matter may be 
scientifically measured, calculated and predicted. Thus, a steel beam will always support what a 
steel beam can support, provided its elasticity is not exceeded and its integrity compromised by 
stress cracking and fatigue. In this way, as Rankine devoted his professional life to demonstrate, 
architecture and engineering flow seamlessly from the philosophical research of the chemist and 
the physicist. 
Yet in distinguishing external pressure from internal stress, Rankine created a division 
within force that would strike his audience as arbitrary and indefensible. For a physicist, such 
distinction between forces is redundant. External or internal, force is force and can be expressed 
by a single term. But for an engineer, the two forms of force are entirely distinct. The first makes 
a structure fall flat; the second causes it to stand upright. That Rankine was an engineer as well 
as a physicist appears in his eventual segregation of the two forces. In this, yet another link 
between Rankine and his engineering predecessors Robison, Gregory, and Barlow appears. 
Much as Robison, Gregory, and Barlow distinguished strain from force to accommodate human 
perception, and thus their discrimination between the two terms applies not to a difference in 
reality but to a difference in the observer’s viewpoint or purpose in analysis, so Rankine 
distinguished internal stress from external pressure. As William Thomson was later to maintain, 
no inherent difference divides the cohesion of molecules within an object from the cohesion of 
other molecules outside the object. Yet while no inherent difference divides the two cases, an 
apparent difference does – the way reality is orchestrated by the human eye. Much as “strain” for 
Robison and Barlow depended on human perspective, so does Rankine’s stress. 
60 
Rankine defined stress as described above in a Royal Society paper, “On Axes of 
Elasticity and Crystalline Forms” (1855). Three years later, however, in his acclaimed A Manual 
of Applied Mechanics (1858), Rankine disavows his idiosyncratic coinage of stress, and reverts 
to the conventional sense of the term. As he writes in his A Manual of Applied Mechanics, "The 
word stress has been adopted as a general term to comprehend various forces which are exerted 
between contiguous bodies” (68, emphasis mine). In so defining stress, Rankine abandons his 
engineer’s distinction between external pressure and internal stress, and collapses force, stress, 
and pressure together as precisely synonymous.  
Nevertheless, Rankine’s phrase “has been adopted” suggests that in abandoning his 
distinctive sense of stress, he capitulates to the consensus of scientific writers instead of 
following his own proper inclinations. Most likely, this consensus was prompted by William 
Thomson, later Lord Kelvin, in a paper he read to the Royal Society in 1856, “Elements of a 
Mathematical Theory of Elasticity.” In many regards, Thomson’s paper parallels Rankine’s 
paper from 1855: both authors investigate the “distribution of force” among “axes of elasticity,” 
both derive twenty-one “coefficients of strain” from an “orthogonal system of six strains,” and 
both conclude their papers by applying their findings to natural crystals.
35
 Likewise, both 
discriminate between stress and strain. But while Thomson accepts Rankine’s circumscription of 
strain, he sets aside Rankine’s redefinition of stress. As he clarifies in a footnote, 
These terms [stress and strain] were first definitively introduced into the Theory 
of Elasticity by Rankine, and I have found them very valuable in writing on the 
subject. It will be seen that I have deviated slightly from Mr. Rankine’s definition 
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 In so saying, I do not mean to imply that Thomson was merely translating Rankine’s thought. 
Influence was reciprocal, and Rankine, in his paper, cited Thomson prominently and repeatedly, 
along with other writers like George Green and James Joseph Sylvester. 
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of the word “stress,” as I have applied it to the direct action experienced by a 
body from the matter around it, and not, as proposed by him, to the elastic 
reaction of the body equal and opposite to that action. (481) 
Most likely, Thomson objected to Rankine’s reformulation of stress for the very reasons 
Rankine first redefined the term. While Rankine sought to distinguish or even estrange the 
scientific lexicon from ordinary speech, Thomson frequently collapsed distinctions between 
scientific and vernacular English, often by emphasizing the popular origin of scientific terms.
36
 
As well, as a physicist and not an engineer, Thomson most likely objected to what would have 
seemed to him as an arbitrary division of force. Thus, instead of treating external and internal 
pressures as opposed and distinct, Thomson regards “internal” and “external” states as relative 
with respect to scale – while pressures inside a brick may be internal with the entire brick in 
view, the same pressures become external from the perspective of a single molecule or atom. 
Thus, Thomson restored stress to its conventional meaning as precisely synonymous with 
pressure or force.  
In so doing, Thomson at once set aside not just Rankine’s lexical innovation, but the 
engineering tradition behind Rankine’s term stretching from Robison to Gregory to Barlow and 
finally to Rankine. In collapsing stress with pressure and force, Thomson exorcises the active 
force resident within objects that sustains their integral coherence. While Thomson’s revision of 
stress enabled the term to express the operations of force with greater consistency and broader 
scope, at the same time his revision banished appreciation of the object as an object, with a 
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 For an example from the present paper, Thomson clarifies the meaning of strain by observing 
that “a ship is said ‘to strain’ if in launching, or when working in a heavy sea, the different parts 
of it experience relative motions” (481). He repeats this originary explanation of strain in his and 
Tait’s Treatise on Natural Philosophy (116). As these instances suggest, Thomson’s patterns of 
verbal usage departed from Rankine’s in that he preferred keeping scientific language as close as 
possible to ordinary speech. 
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distinct form, structure, and being.  In short, Thomson’s emendation prompts speakers to regard 
the workings of force without regard to human perceptions of objects’ scale, structure, and form. 
Integrated object or dissociated atoms, force is force. Gone was the human perspective of 
Robison, Gregory, Barlow, and Rankine that considered the integral unity of solid bodies. From 
Thomson’s perspective, human estimation of form and feature was an imposition upon reality, 
and given that objects were nothing but associations of bonded molecules and atoms, form and 
feature should best be regarded as accidental qualities of molecular arrangement, not as intrinsic 
or predicated upon the nature of the object itself as a holistic entity.  
Despite Rankine’s capitulation, his definition of stress was not immediately banished by 
Thomson’s. Philosophers and engineers employed both definitions alternately through the end of 
the nineteenth century. Indeed, Thomson himself used Rankine’s definition in 1867 when, along 
with P. G. Tait in their Treatise on Natural Philosophy, he wrote “We adopt, from Rankine, the 
term stress to designate the forces called into play through the interior of a solid when brought 
into a condition of strain” (507). 
Rankine’s engineering disciples particularly championed their mentor’s term. In 1880, 
W. J. Millar published Rankine’s Miscellaneous Scientific Papers, for which P. G. Tait wrote a 
glowing introductory memoir. In his preface, Millar wrote that “the papers now published are of 
permanent value” (v-vi). Millar draws specific attention to Rankine’s 1855 “On Axes of 
Elasticity and Crystalline Forms,” observing that “In the Sixth Paper the distinction between 
Strain and Stress is made clear” (viii). The fact that Millar writes this in 1880 suggests that a 
contingent of engineers still preferred Rankine’s nomenclature to Thomson’s even twenty-two 
years after Rankine had adopted Thomson’s redefinition of stress. Millar’s preface indicates that 
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Rankine’s definition of stress was, if not the primary understanding of the term, still in common 
use through the 1870’s and into the 1880’s. 
Furthermore, according to an anonymous “Student’s Column” in the February 3, 1900 
edition of The Builder, “Rankine ﬁrst introduced the term stress into mechanics about the year 
1855. [. . .] Unfortunately, it happened in the following year that Sir William Thomson, now 
Lord Kelvin, applied the word stress as being synonymous with pressure” (118-9). The 
columnist’s assessment that Thomson’s redefinition of Rankine’s term was “unfortunate” is 
reinforced several lines later: “Rankine‘s theory is to be preferred as presenting a truer picture of 
the interactive forces involved” (119). Nevertheless, the columnist admits, “[Thomson’s] theory 
is more convenient and equally as serviceable for all practical purposes. Some writers adopt one 
theory, and some the other” (119). 
Coupled with Millar’s preface, the anonymous Builder columnist evidences that 
Rankine’s definition of stress was alive and well – at least in engineering literature -- as late as 
the 1900’s. Even more so, the Builder columnist demonstrates that the differences between 
Rankine’s and Thomson’s terms were generally understood (indeed, the “Student’s Column” 
author apparently writes for the express purpose of informing engineering students about these 
differences), as were their respective merits and demerits. Moreover, both definitions contributed 
to scientific discourse, and were current through the end of the century. Scientific writers 
“adopt[ed] one [or] the other” definition depending on their purposes and personal preferences.  
2.4 Summary 
Scientific terminology is a product with a history. While stress and strain currently have  
stable and consistent meanings, this consistent stability results from a century of innovation 
spanning Robison’s and Barlow’s attempts to define stress and strength, Herschel’s and 
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Faraday’s misgivings about terminological imprecision, and Rankine’s and Thomson’s alternate 
articulations of stress. The last development particularly contrasts with the singular, unitary 
meaning of terms in modern scientific vocabulary. While the meaning of stress is now tightly 
defined, between 1858 and at least 1900, stress had two meanings that could be alternately 
invoked depending on circumstance.  
But the most enduring application of Rankine’s usage appears not in physical literature 
but in poetic. In the works of the poet-priest Gerard Manley Hopkins, stress describes the self-
distinctive force by which objects preserve not only their material shape and form, but also their 
ontological being. To Hopkins’ assumption of Rankine’s term we turn in the next chapter. 
3 STRESS AND STRAIN: ENERGY SCIENCE AND HOPKINS’ POETICS  
In the previous chapter, we have seen how Rankine drew on the technical literature of 
engineering and natural philosophy to articulate stress as a forceful and active expression of an 
object’s elasticity in response to pressures threatening the object’s coherence.  Given that an 
object’s elasticity stems directly from its molecular composition, stress then expresses the 
integral structure that gives the object its distinct being.  Accordingly, stress for Rankine is an 
active expression of the object’s structural composition called forth by external pressure. 
Moreover, it is an actual and active force maintaining an object’s coherence and hence its 
existence. 
While Rankine’s materially essentialist notion of stress was undermined by William 
Thomson, a similar treatment of stress appears in the writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins. The 
present chapter will interrogate Hopkins’ poetic terminology of stress and strain that has 
heretofore struck many critics as entirely idiosyncratic. In comparing Hopkins’ usage of these 
words against the context of nineteenth century science writings, I will argue that the terms 
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central to Hopkins’ poetics can be understood as an imaginative reinterpretation of terms central 
to the engineering lexicon developed by Robison, Gregory, Barlow, and Rankine, and ultimately 
curtailed by William Thomson.   
Hopkins’ treatment of the relationship between an object’s internal stress and its external 
shape and behavior prompts comparison of the poet’s vocabulary with the engineer’s. As in 
Rankine’s works, stress functions in Hopkins’ writings as a physical force inherent within 
objects and natural phenomena. Likewise, both Hopkins and Rankine consider stress an active 
expression of individual form, an expression that not only reveals the nature of an object but that 
preserves and maintains it as well. Yet while Hopkins’ stress adheres to Rankine’s usage apropos 
physical objects, it extends beyond the engineering tradition to encompass an object’s (or 
being’s) ontological or essential form in addition to its physical structure. Semantically, 
Hopkins’ term begins with Rankine’s but stretches beyond it, extrapolating from the physical to 
the metaphysical.
37
 In the engineering tradition of Robison, Gregory, Barlow, and Rankine, 
while strength or stress seemingly, at times, approaches ontological signification, the authors 
restrict their terms to the mechanical and material nature of objects.
38
 Thus, the engineers’ 
strength and stress express the molecular or particular arrangements that make up an object, but 
make no claim of any form, structure, or being beyond the purely physical. For Hopkins, 
however, while stress is equally material, it spans the divide between the mechanical and the 
metaphysical and functions as a fully ontological term.  
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 By “physical,” I mean “physics-ical.” Thus Hopkins’ term initially applies to relations of 
energy and force, the sort of relations studied by nineteenth century physics and physicists. 
However, in its furthest extension, Hopkins’ term passes beyond physics and also applies 
metaphysically.     
38
 Not all nineteenth century scientific authors were so circumspect in their distinction of 
mechanical science from metaphysical speculation. See chapter 5’s discussion of P. G. Tait and 
Balfour Stewart’s Unseen Universe. 
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In Hopkins’ writing, then, stress scales the physical to the metaphysical, and 
simultaneously expresses the mechanical and vital force of each being.  In conflating the material 
with the metaphysical, Hopkins participates in a general trend in nineteenth century psychology 
and art. Alan Richardson, in his British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind discusses the 
encroachment of “romantic brain science” on the traditional ground of metaphysics. In this work, 
Richardson investigates how the traditional prerogatives of the soul – thought, sensation, and 
desire – became progressively coterminous with the activity of the bodily brain and organs. 
Likewise, William A. Cohen, in his Embodied: Victorian Literature and the Senses, surveys 
Victorian artistic representations of the soul or personal essence. In his investigation, Cohen 
argues that Victorians, when they distinguished soul from body at all, often represented the soul 
in bodily terms. As Cohen writes, Victorian fiction often “represents interior being” as material, 
and thus “the soul consequently assumes the form of a tangible entity” (11).  Cohen substantiates 
his claim by observing the materiality of ghosts or souls in a number of Victorian novels and 
poems, perhaps most pointedly in Emily Bronte’s Wuthering Heights when Catherine’s ghost 
“displaces air” with her sighs or when, in Heathcliff’s dream, Catherine’s ghost scrapes her arm 
against a window and bleeds (Cohen 12).
39
      
Hopkins himself corroborates Richardson’s and Cohen’s observations. In his “The 
Probable Future of Metaphysics,” Hopkins records that “the Positivists foretell and many other 
people begin to fear [that] the end of all metaphysics is at hand. Purely material psychology is 
the [conqueror] foretold and feared” (Higgins, Oxford Essays 287). Hopkins summarizes the 
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 Hopkins himself verifies Cohen’s and Richardson’s observations. In his essay “The Probable 
Future of Metaphysics,” Hopkins writes that “the Positivists foretell and many other people 
begin to fear [that] the end of all metaphysics is at hand. Purely material psychology is the 
[conqueror] long foretold” (Oxford Essays, 287). Hopkins himself remained an idealist who 
believed in the soul, but his idealism incorporated positivist materialism.  
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characteristic Positivist tactic of “show[ing] an organ for each faculty and a nerve vibrating for 
each thought idea” (287). While Hopkins is not a Positivist, his metaphysics encompasses 
Positivism and lives at peace with it. Hopkins readily admits that the brain or another bodily 
organ may well govern the mental faculties, and that thoughts consist of “vibrating” nerves. But, 
Hopkins rejoins, “this merely shows in the last detail what broadly no one doubted, to wit that 
the activities of the spirit are conveyed in those of the body as scent is conveyed in spirits of 
wine, remaining still inexplicably distinct” (287). Although thought, desire, and sensation may 
legitimately be activities of the body or the embodied brain, they are better understood as 
activities of the spirit “conveyed” to the body. Thus, each of the soul’s actions has a bodily 
counterpart, and the body corresponds to the spirit in all activities and faculties conceivable. 
Nevertheless, the spirit moves the body to act, and all of the body’s activity begins in the spirit 
and is conveyed to the body by and from the spirit. In short, Hopkins reconciles metaphysics 
with Positivism without departing from the traditional definition of spirit – a principle of life 
animating the body.    
 While many critics have explicated the significance of Hopkins’ stress and strain – as 
well as his related coinages instress and inscape -- none to my knowledge has systematically 
compared Hopkins’ terms to the evolving registers of nineteenth century engineering and 
thermodynamics.  The scholar that comes closest to doing so is Daniel Brown, and, indeed, the 
present chapter is indebted to his Hopkins’ Idealism: Philosophy, Physics, Poetry. But while 
Brown was the first to trace the origin of Hopkins’ term stress to Victorian energy science, he 
minimizes distinctions between how this and related terms were treated in the evolving register 
of the physical sciences. Particularly, Brown collapses Rankine’s initial definition of stress with 
Thomson’s revised definition of it. In Brown’s defense, his purpose in writing was to rebut “the 
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radical opposition of art [. . . ] to mechanistic science [which was] a central presupposition of 
Anglo-American New Criticism” and which still exerted considerable influence in Hopkins’ 
scholarship when Brown wrote in 1997 (Brown 200).  Given this purpose, Brown’s point was to 
demonstrate the symmetry between the terms of Victorian science and Hopkins’ poetics, not to 
itemize distinctions between the ways scientists used these terms.
40
 Yet in collapsing Rankine’s 
and Thomson’s definitions, Brown depletes Rankine’s definition of stress of its mechanical 
vitalism, or its emphasis on a self-distinctive force resident within each object.
41
 This chapter 
aims to assess Hopkins’ poetics in light of the various contemporary meanings of stress, and will 
treat the word as a matrix of multiple and contested meanings instead of as a stable term with a 
single definition. 
Such a reading not only situates Hopkins within his nineteenth century milieu but also 
reflects his theory of language in which a word functions as the “contraction or coinciding point” 
of several definitions (Oxford Essays, 306-7). Moreover, recovering the contested meanings of 
stress enables new interpretations of Hopkins’ work or opens passages from his poems to 
additional nuance. Particularly, attending to Hopkins’ metaphysical extrapolation of Rankine’s 
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 Brown himself is aware of these distinctions, but they were not important for his argument in 
1997. See pages 214-5 of his Gerard Manley Hopkins: Philosophy, Physics, Poetry, where 
Brown briefly touches on the distinctions between Rankine’s and Thomson’s definitions of stress 
and strain. But Brown’s main task was to establish a core of conceptual unity for the term in 
scientific writing, and then to show this same unity in Hopkins’ writing as well. In effect then, 
Brown collapses Rankine’s and Thomson’s definitions of stress, emphasizing their conceptual 
similarities instead of their distinctions. In Brown’s words, “’Stress’ refers in both Rankine’s and 
Thomson’s definitions to the tendency by which the equilibrium of a body is maintained” (215). 
41
 To recap from the previous chapter, Rankine’s and Thomson’s definitions of stress agree in 
that each articulates the ways various forces act, react, and equilibrate each other. Yet 
Thomson’s definition of stress makes no provision for the individual object, and declines to 
distinguish between pressures internal to the object and external to it – all are stresses alike. For 
Rankine’s early definition of stress, however, the object is central, and the term stress is reserved 
only for those forces within the object that enable it to resist external pressures. An object’s 
stress then is the force that it musters in response to external pressure. Stress then is the internal 
force that preserves an object’s integrity, structure, and function.  
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term explains several of the images ubiquitous in Hopkins’ poems and also clarifies his 
conception of the soul. More importantly, however, Hopkins’ verbal extemporizations of stress 
illustrate the symmetry he saw between physics and metaphysics, between this world and the 
world beyond. Energy bridges the physical and the spiritual, and thus the motions of the physical 
world are susceptible to the divine impulse of instress or grace. The present chapter will illustrate 
Hopkins’ usage of stress and discuss his physical metaphysics; the subsequent chapter will 
define Hopkins’ instress and explain his field theory of grace. 
3.1 Review of Scholarship 
James Cotter, in his seminal monograph Inscape: The Christology and Poetry of Gerard 
Manley Hopkins, examines the Christian and classical contexts of Hopkins’ stress and strain. 
Cotter explains Hopkins’ stress in terms of the Greek philosopher Parmenides’ concept of Being. 
Parmenides taught that a Universal Existence, or Being in an abstract sense, was the true reality 
and substratum of all phenomenological existence. Individual phenomena then, or the “Many,” 
are extrusions from this singular and total ontological unity. In light of Parmenides’ doctrine – 
and Hopkins’ manifest interest in it -- Cotter defines Hopkins’ stress, as “the ictus of being 
flowing from the world of objects, their knowability as projectiles of thought; [. . .] the bridge or 
juice through the stem of things, which impels us to acknowledge Being” (14). Stress then is a 
particular expression of Universal being, or, more precisely, the force or “pressure” by which 
Universal being expresses itself in the phenomenal world as a material object (278-9). Cotter 
links stress and strain in that, if stress is the expression or pressure of Being, strain is the quality 
of Becoming or coming-into-being. Cotter argues that for the classically-Christian Hopkins, 
Parmenides’ Being is none other than Jesus Christ the Son of God, present within and 
undergirding the phenomena of his creation. If Christ is Being, the substratum of all phenomenal 
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existence, then Christ’s creatures result from an “outstress” of his Being. Stress then describes 
the divine energy responsible for a creature’s creation and continued existence as a material 
thing; strain expresses the creature’s continued development as it returns to Christ through moral 
obedience to him.  
If the creature goes out from God through stress, it returns to him through strain. As 
Cotter writes, strain is an “inherited tendency toward Christ,” or, in Hopkins’ words, the 
tendency of “being [to draw-]home to Being” (Cotter 203; Oxford Essays, 314). In straining, 
creatures achieve greater self-definition yet paradoxically draw closer to Christ as the Universal 
pattern and telos of all created things. Cotter accordingly finds an analogue for Hopkins’ term in 
Philippians 3:13-14 as well as in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa (203).  Within this Christian 
context, strain connotes what Gregory termed epectasis, or the continuous effort in response to 
divine grace to draw ever more like and near to God (202-3).   
J. Hillis Miller similarly investigates the ontological import of stress in his 1955 article 
“The Creation of the Self in Gerard Manley Hopkins.”  Miller describes Hopkins’ term inscape 
as “Hopkins’ word for the design or pattern which is the perceptible sign of the unique 
individuality of a thing” (300). Inscape, the sign of a thing’s essence, results from the thing’s 
stress, or the “vital pressure” that sustains the object “from within” (301, 302). Not a metaphor or 
a loose turn of speech, stress for Hopkins describes an ontological force, an “inward energy” 
responsible for producing a thing’s identity and for “up[holding]” its very existence (304, 303).  
Leonard Cochran crystallizes Cotter’s and Miller’s insights in a particularly lucid and 
systematic study, and adds to their investigations by differentiating stress from instress. For both 
Cotter and Miller, the term stress describes the vital energy that God communicates to a thing at 
creation by which it exists and maintains its hold on being. Thus, stress is an ontological force 
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that causes things to exist as materially concrete objects. Cochran divides Cotter’s and Miller’s 
stress in two, identifying the first movement as stress proper and the second as instress. “The 
struggle to maintain existence is essentially a struggle to hold together,” Cochran writes. “Stress 
is a struggle towards being in genere; it is the inherent nature of being to tend to remain in being, 
i.e., in existence. Instress is a struggle to hold in specie, i.e., the struggle of this thing to remain 
in being, to hold together” (160). Cochran subsequently clarifies these definitions, observing that 
“stress and instress have several things in common. They both represent kinds of energy, stress 
the energy of the thing as it tends towards existence in general; instress the energy which keeps 
in existence the particular thing” (165). Thus stress affords an object the ability to be, or to exist 
in a general sense; instress affords an object the ability to be itself, or to exist as a particular, 
concrete thing.  
Other than Cotter, Miller, and Cochran, several other scholars have articulated the 
ontological significance of stress. Norman MacKenzie defines stress as “the selving force within 
a being” (Readers’ Guide 244). Likewise, W. A. M. Peters explains that “stress [marks] the force 
which keeps a thing in existence and its strain after continued existence” (13). In other 
investigations, however, applications to stress remain implicit, overshadowed by attempts to 
define inscape, another of Hopkins’ notable coinages which Dennis Sobolev aptly identifies as 
“without a doubt [. . .] the most overdetermined word in the vocabulary of Hopkins criticism” 
(219). Notwithstanding, given the close relationships among stress, scape, instress, and inscape 
in Hopkins’ philosophical poetics, a claim about of any of these terms necessarily impinges upon 
the others.
42
 While this paper will refrain from further overdetermining inscape, it will provide 
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 Stress is not the same as inscape, yet the two are related. Stress is the root of Hopkins’ term 
instress, and instress and inscape are companion terms. Volumes have been and continue to be 
written on these terms, but stress is usually considered to be, to recall Hillis Miller, the “vital 
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an etiological and cultural context for stress and instress, specifically grounding Hopkins’ terms 
within the developing disciplines of the Victorian physical sciences. 
Other scholars have perceived the musical or metrical applications of stress. Laura 
Gutman, in her study Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Music of Poetry, combines the musical 
and ontological senses of stress, defending her hybrid exposition of the term with a perspicacious 
account of Hopkins’ linguistic practice: “Hopkins’ usage of words,” Gutman argues, 
“consciously combin[es] each word’s various aspects to present [the word’s essential self] as a 
coinciding-point of all its meanings” (76). Accordingly, Gutman argues that Hopkins conceives 
of human selfhood in musical terms, and that Hopkins’ term stress advances “the musical string 
as analogy for man” (75).  As Gutman explains, “Man is like a musical string, stretched upward 
from its base [. . .] to God. Depending on the tightness of the string, its pitch goes up or down” 
(75).  The musical scale of nature contains all of the pitches of God’s creatures, and the 
distinctive stress of an individual, or the “tightness of the string” that produces its pitch, is an 
intrinsically moral quality that determines the creature’s proximity to its creator: “the more the 
stress or instress to the will, the higher the moral pitch [. . . .] Man is strung tight to a certain 
moral pitch as a string is tightened to its pitch” (75-6). 
Similarly, Meredith Martin emphasizes the ontological import of Hopkins’ metrical 
marks of poetic stress. Arguing that “understanding Hopkins’ metrical marks is crucial to 
                                                                                                                                                             
energy” of a thing active within the thing itself, while instress is often taken as that energy 
outwardly expressed and received within by a percipient observer.  
With Hopkins’ term inscape, the plot thickens, and a discussion at least half a century old 
continues without abatement. In broad terms, and among many other subsidiary definitions, 
inscape is often treated as either a thing’s essence (Scotus’ haecceitas), or as the signs, 
expressions, or aspects of a thing’s essence (Scotus’ formalitates).  For the prior position, see 
Pick, Peters, and Ellsberg. For the latter view, see Ward. Dennis Sobolev presents an exemplary 
summation of many of the formulations of inscape, along with the problems inherent within 
each, as well as offering his own attempt to reach a stable and universal definition.  
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understanding Hopkins’ metaphysics,” Martin demonstrates that Hopkins’ system of metrical 
marks (a term that is itself fraught with Christo- and ontological significance for Hopkins) 
controls the stress, both syllabic and semantic, of Hopkins’ lines, and consequently controls the 
poem’s “assertion of being” (244, 246). Closely akin to Gutman’s treatment of musical stress, 
Martin’s analysis of stress emphasizes the term’s related ontological and metrical meanings: 
“when stress is uttered, a word becomes being. [. . .] Hopkins implies that language, uttered in a 
certain way and perceived in a certain way, becomes an assertion of being” (246). 
Another cluster of critics analyses Hopkins’ stress alongside his Roman Catholic faith. 
Walter Ong first argued that Hopkins’ sprung meter registered an attempt to return English 
prosody to the medieval, pre-Reformation age of English Catholicism. Thus, the rough metrics of 
Hopkins’ sprung rhythm recalls the poetry of England’s Catholic period “before the ‘reform’ and 
‘smoothing’ of English numbers principally under the influence of Edmund Spencer” (170). 
Geoffrey Hill adapts Ong’s argument to explain the strangeness of Hopkins’ meter as one 
instance of the pervasive estrangement of a Catholic convert in Protestant England. As Hill 
writes, Hopkins, in converting to Catholicism, “suffered an abruption of his familiar rhythm” 
manifested not only in Hopkins’ estrangement from his Protestant countrymen but in his poetry’s 
novel system of stress in the form of sprung rhythm. Similarly, Eric Griffiths applies Hill’s 
insight more broadly, explaining Hopkins’ poetic efforts as a missiological attempt to acclimate 
his countrymen to a new form of Catholic prosody, thereby acclimating them to the oddness of 
Catholic language and belief: “The unfamiliar language of Catholicism had to be seen and heard 
as truly English speech, not as something unutterably alien, if the convert’s voice was to be 
persuasive to the as yet unconverted” (267).  Most recently, Joseph Pizza has argued that the 
strangeness of Hopkins’ sprung rhythm “can be understood as accentuating the strange, and, 
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even self-estranging, ambivalence that Hopkins and many of his fellow converts felt in becoming 
English Roman Catholics” (58).  
The above sampling of Hopkins scholarship suggests the broad applicability of stress in 
Hopkins’ ontology, theology, epistemology, musicology, and prosody.  Yet while many critics 
have probed individual applications of these terms, few have asked how the disparate usages 
hold together, or have considered how, in Gutman’s phrase, the single term stress coheres as a 
“coinciding point of all its meanings” (76). Such an investigation entails a study of the term’s 
etiology for Hopkins, or of the various meanings and significations of the word available to 
Hopkins in his contemporary culture of Victorian England.    
In this effort, several sources mentioned above point the way. To return to Cotter, in 
addition to his classical and patristic exposition of stress and strain, Cotter repeatedly implies a 
scientifically physical dimension of the terms. Thus, at one point Cotter explains that “the Spirit 
channels out the stress and energy which have been gathered and foredrawn in Christ” (70). In 
treating “stress” and “energy” as synonymously parallel, Cotter hints that Hopkins’ language 
may be drawn from physical science as well as from Greek literature and Christian theology. 
Other instances of scientific allusions sprinkle Cotter’s text: “Man forms [. . .] a nucleus of 
centrally charged and positive energy, massing reality with the mind, the focus of stress” (272); 
“Instress then involves centrifugal motion from, and inscape centripetal motion toward, a center, 
a stem of force shooting outward or converging inward” (275); “Like an in-stressed steel rod the 
lines of force meet, counterpoise, and give way in kenosis – and the pleroma bursts into being as 
Omega” (278); “Instress may be further defined then as the literal exterior force (the “stress” of 
“stars and storms”) which, delivered through the senses and converging on the mind, results in 
inscape, the shaping of fresh incarnation in the new man” (278). Several of the passages cited 
75 
above admittedly may be metaphorical, yet in his final definition of “stress” as a “literal exterior 
force,” Cotter anticipates (whether knowingly or not) recent criticism recouping the symmetry 
between Hopkins’ poetry and Victorian energy science.43 
Much the same may be said of Miller. While his definition of Hopkins’ instress as a 
“spiritual force” may initially seem metaphorical, this same “spiritual force” of instress 
“up[holds] each thing” in being, and is accordingly responsible for the continued existence of 
phenomenal things (304, 303). As such, this force of instress, though spiritual, is as real as the 
things themselves are. As a plenum of spiritual, yet real, instress, the world consequently “is a 
vast network of electrical discharges given and received by objects which are an inexhaustible 
source of the divine energy” (304).44 The very fact that Miller, following Hopkins, speaks of the 
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 For a similarly proleptic source, see Claudette Drennan’s treatment of stress in her 1956 essay 
“A Critical Analysis of Hopkins’ ‘That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire, and of the Comfort of the 
Resurrection.’” Following Hopkins, scholars prior to the 1990s often explained stress and 
instress through metaphors drawn from physical science. At times it can be difficult to determine 
how metaphorically these scholars intended their language to be taken. For example, as Daniel 
Brown points out, Leonard Cochran consistently uses the language of mechanics to describe 
stress (at one point Cochran goes so far as to state that stress “carries [. . .] the connotation of a 
dynamic rather than a passive or static being”), yet makes no overt connection between stress 
and physical science or any form of physical energy (149, my emphasis). Brown blames critics’ 
“suppress[ion]” of the scientific derivation of Hopkins’ terminology on “the radical opposition of 
art [. . .] to mechanistic science” that originated with the Romantic poets and descended to 
“Anglo-American New Criticism” (200). Yet while Brown’s criticism is convincing, it is 
unnecessarily harsh, and minimizes previous critics’ important work of elaborating Hopkins’ 
poems and his central poetic terminology of inscape and instress. 
44
 By “real,” I mean “somehow existing in such a way as to affect physical, material objects.” 
Whether instress itself is “material” or “physical” depends on one’s definition of these words. 
These words have been variously defined by philosophers.  
See also William Cohen’s “Subject: Embodiment and the Senses” in his Embodied: 
Victorian Literature and the Senses. In this chapter, Cohen explores Victorian conceptions of 
body and spirit, with especial attention to the trend in Victorian literature to consider the spirit as 
material. In Hopkins’ frequent likening of instress to electricity, Hopkins instances another 
example of this Victorian trend, particularly so given the centrality of electricity to what Rankine 
dubbed as the “science of energetics.”   
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spiritual energy of instress in terms of the physical energy of electricity underscores the fact that 
instress is an actual form of energy itself.    
Such early explications of stress prepared later critics to analyze more closely Hopkins’ 
treatment of science. While many of these critics do not address stress specifically, their work 
deserves mention in any account of science in Hopkins’ writings. James Leggio, writing in 1977, 
was among the first to examine Hopkins’ poems for explicit scientific reference. In Hopkins’ 
Oxford poems, Leggio hears echoes of the Victorian physics of thermodynamics, arguing that “a 
number of [Hopkins’] undergraduate poems deal with entropic conditions” (60). Leggio 
accordingly interpretes several of Hopkins’ undergraduate poems – “A fragment of anything you 
like,” “I am like a slip of comet,” and “Summa” – in terms of the entropic apocalypse predicted 
by the second law of thermodynamic physics. 
Yet Norman MacKenzie and Allison Sulloway call for caution, particularly regarding 
Hopkins’ early poems. Surveying Hopkins’s Highgate and Oxford notebooks, essays, journals, 
and sketches, Mackenzie notes “Hopkins’ surviving essays [. . .] occupy many note-books, but a 
scrutiny reveals how seldom the topic [bears] any conceivable relationship to the scientific world 
which was shaping itself beyond the charming medieval towers” (53).  Mackenzie credits 
Hopkins’ perspicacious observations of Nature to his inquisitive disposition and naturally 
perceptive – though scientifically untrained – senses.  In MacKenzie’s view, Hopkins during his 
Oxford years was a careful observer of appearances in Nature, despite his “almost total lack of 
formal contacts with any branch of science” (54).   
Allison Sulloway corroborates MacKenzie’s judgment. In her Gerard Manley Hopkins 
and the Victorian Temper, Sulloway compares Hopkins’ nature journals to Ruskin’s writings, 
finding that Hopkins, adopting Ruskin as a conscious model, studied Nature as a disciplined 
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aesthete instead of as a scientist. As Sulloway argues, Ruskin’s dictum “there is a science of the 
aspects of things, as well as of their nature” splits the “science of aspects” apart from the 
“science of essences” and offers a precise framework for Ruskin’s (and Hopkins’) aesthetic 
project: to understand the aspects of Nature as they appear to the senses of a sympathetic 
observer, not to pry into the actual mechanics or structural principles by which they work 
(Ruskin, Modern Painters III, 314).   
Gillian Beer, however, in her 1991 “Helmholtz, Tyndall, Gerard Manley Hopkins: Leaps 
of the Prepared Imagination,” tentatively surveys Hopkins’ private and informal contacts with 
science as an undergraduate, pointing out that he could have accessed the thermodynamic theory 
of Hermann von Helmholtz through a number of avenues both public and personal, including the 
popular writings of John Tyndall, the public lectures of Hopkins’ favorite linguist, Max Müller, 
and the private instruction of Hopkins’ tutor, Walter Pater.  Beer accumulates similar details as 
she follows Hopkins through his post-Oxford Jesuit training, amassing probability to justify her 
scientific readings of Hopkins’ late poems, “The Blessed Virgin compared to the Air We 
Breathe”  and “That Nature Is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection.”   
Likewise, Tom Zaniello examines Hopkins’ early writings for implicit parallels with 
contemporary developments in natural science. Specifically, his Hopkins in the Age of Darwin 
(1988) recoups the intimations of Darwinian naturalism in Hopkins’ Oxford essays (1863-68), 
illuminating the young poet’s Oxford-era terms “diatonic” and “chromatic” in light of Victorian 
concerns with progress and flux.  In the second half of the monograph, as well as in a series of 
later articles published in the 1990s, Zaniello turns from Hopkins’ naturalism to his natural 
philosophy (physics).  Zaniello describes Hopkins’ extracurricular tuition at Stonyhurst 
Seminary between 1870-3, where he spent many hours in the Stonyhurst Observatory working 
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with two well-respected meteorologists and astronomers, Fathers Stephen Perry and Walter 
Sidgreaves.  
Thanks to Zaniello, Darwinian readings of Hopkins’ poems, early or late, are now 
generally acceptable.  Physical or thermodynamic interpretations, however, are viewed as 
biographically tenable only of Hopkins’ latter poems, post-Stonyhurst. Physical readings of 
Hopkins’ poems composed prior to 1870-3 are still regarded with suspicion.  
Accordingly, MacKenzie’s and Sulloway’s skepticism, particularly regarding physical 
science, still appears in recent critics’ treatment of Hopkins’ early work. In a 2007 article, Marie 
Banfield insightfully discusses the symmetry of evolutionary and physical theory in mid-
nineteenth century scientific discourse.  As Banfield claims, evolution and thermodynamics, far 
from distinct theories of discreet scientific disciplines, were parallel iterations of the “translations 
and transformations of nature’s forces,” and shared common roots in the atomist philosophy of 
flux and Victorian narratives of development (Banfield 180). To prove her claims, Banfield 
traces the simultaneously Darwinian and thermodynamic register of Hopkins’ poems. Tellingly, 
however, when Banfield discusses Hopkins’ undergraduate work, she dilates the Darwinian 
features and collapses the thermodynamic. Banfield treads lightly on the thermodynamic 
qualities of Hopkins’ early poetry, discussing his early poems cursorily while relying on his later 
work to carry her claims. 
Jude Nixon’s treatment of Hopkins’ thermopoetics is similar.  Nixon is forthright in his 
judgment that Hopkins knew about contemporary physics while at Oxford: “Hopkins’ Oxford 
poems (1863-67) exploit the general energies of the universe” (Nixon, “Death blots” 134). All 
the same, Nixon treats the Oxford poems in a single paragraph, and devotes the remainder of his 
article to a close examination of Hopkins’ post-Stonyhurst writings.  In Nixon’s own words, 
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though the undergraduate poems suggest Hopkins’ general awareness of energy science, the 
“poems written during and after Hopkins’ Stonyhurst years (1870-73) exhibit a more direct 
embracing of thermodynamics” (134). 
Daniel Brown’s influential 1997 study Hopkins’ Idealism: Philosophy, Physics, and 
Poetry offers the most extended explication of physical science in Hopkins’ poetry. Unlike most 
critics, however, Brown argues forthrightly that even as an undergraduate, Hopkins knew and 
understood the physical theories of Victorian energy science. Brown particularly scrutinizes 
Hopkins’ terms stress and instress, arguing that Hopkins transposed stress directly from the 
writings of William Thomson, and that the derived term instress expresses the unique 
combination of stresses within an object. Thus, if stress denotes the natural forces which inhere 
in all things, instress refers to the unique balance of forces that furnishes a thing’s identity and 
character. Simply put, all things result from identical forces in nature; variety results not from 
different forces but different combination of forces. Things consist as the product of composite 
forces, then, or as the “equilibrium [of energies] which may be said to constitute [a thing’s] 
definitive instress” (219). 
This chapter takes its cue from Brown and others, and seeks to situate Hopkins’ 
terminology of stress and strain within Victorian mechanical science and energy physics. In so 
doing, it will ground previous critics’ expositions of stress and instress as ontological terms. As 
the above survey of literature suggests, critics universally agree that stress, in its multifaceted 
applications within Hopkins’ work, inevitably expresses ontology. Critics have perceptively 
explored the prepossession and extensions of the term, but their efforts beg the question of why 
the word stress?
45
 What about the word’s usage in contemporary Victorian England suggested it 
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 “Prepossession” and “extension” are Hopkins’ terms. See Lesley Higgins’ edition of Hopkins’ 
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to Hopkins as a suitable vehicle for his metaphysical speculations and ontological theory? In 
other words, when Hopkins wanted to express ontology and Being, why did he choose the word 
stress instead of another, more traditionally philosophical term? Additionally, what underlying 
connection between Being, music, poetry, and physical and mechanical force does the word 
stress supply? And finally, how does Hopkins respond artistically and intellectually to his 
contemporary context? This and the following chapters will explore these questions. 
Additionally, with the work of Leggio, Beer, Zaniello, Banfield, Nixon, and Brown, this 
chapter tentatively suggests that the young Hopkins knew more about physical science – 
specifically mechanics – than he is often given credit for. In this chapter, I compare Hopkins’ 
usage of stress to the engineering understanding of the term as first articulated by W.J.M. 
Rankine. Given that many of the instances – particularly the 1868 “Parmenides” notes -- in 
which Hopkins used the term “stress” date to a time before his Stonyhurst Philosophate (1870-
1873), Hopkins’ language suggests early familiarity with physical science.    
In positing stress and strain as derived from the contemporary Victorian context of 
engineering and physics, I certainly do not mean to question or challenge the other meanings of 
these terms that scholars have previously discovered. Rather, I wish to show how Hopkins 
adapted the emerging tradition of Victorian physical science to previous Christian and classical 
traditions to yield a fecund poetic register.  Hopkins’ words typically express a pleroma of 
meaning, and it would be a mistake to posit one signification at the expense of others.  If 
Hopkins’ linguistic usage accords with his poetic practice, then he is interested in the intersection 
and patterning of terms and meanings, or in the ways all things spare and strange lace, lance, and 
pair. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Oxford Essays and Notes, pgs. 306-8.  
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3.2 Group versus Individual: Hopkins’ Theory of Language 
Hopkins’ caudal sonnet “That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort of the 
Resurrection” often features in critical discussions of Hopkins’ religious eschatology, ecocritical 
sensibility, and – most recently – thermodynamic poetics. But the sonnet also illustrates 
Hopkins’ taxonomy, or the way he relates individuals to a group. Not only is Hopkins’ taxonomy 
critically important to understand his poetic celebration of the “sweet especial” scenes of nature 
and the “dappled” inscapes of creation, but it is also important to his theory of language and his 
understanding of the relationships between a word’s core – the “contraction or coinciding-point 
of its definitions” -- and its various “sides” or “sidings” or “extensions” (“Binsey Poplars”; “Pied 
Beauty”; Oxford Essays, 306).  
In rough terms, the sonnet describes Hopkins’ dismay at the loss of beautiful things in 
Nature. It opens with a winsome description of clouds traversing the sky. Hopkins’ feeling for 
the clouds appears in his speaker’s personification of them. These clouds are not merely bodies 
of evaporated water – they are “heaven-roysterers” on holiday, thronged in “gay-gangs”; they are 
mounted knights “chevy[ing] on an air--/Built thoroughfare”; they are armed troops that “glitter 
in marches.”  
From the clouds in the sky, Hopkins’ narrator lowers his gaze to the branches of trees. 
“Wherever an elm arches,” he writes, “shivelights and shadowtackle in long lashes lace, lance, 
and pair” “down roughcast, down dazzling whitewash” (3).46 In the sun’s light, the elm’s 
branches cast shadows on the broken-textured surface of a roughcast wall or on the glistening 
surface of a whitewashed fence. The elm branches and twigs do not occlude the light completely, 
but cast long, thin rope- and spear-like shadows upon a field of light. The shadowropes and 
                                                 
46
 The OED defines “roughcast” as “a semi-fluid composition of lime (or later cement), water, 
and fine gravel, used as roughly textured plaster on the outside of a building” (“roughcast,” 2a).  
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shadowspears “lace” and “lance” the light, and “pair” when they cross. Hopkins’ dapple, or the 
play of light, shadow, and shape ubiquitous in his poetry, puts in another appearance in this 
poem in the “shivelights” and “shadowtackle” that pie the surface of the wall or fence.47 The 
interplay of light and shadow is kaleidoscopic, changing with the wind that tosses the elm 
branches and the light itself as the sun runs its course through the sky. Like the clouds, the 
shadows drift and alter, and typify the impermanence of the natural world indicated by the title: 
nature is a Heraclitean fire.  
From the sky to the treetops to walls and fences, the speaker at last turns his gaze to the 
ground. He looks at a mudpuddle or “rutpeel” – the top-most layer or “peel” of mud in a rut – 
and observes how the “bright wind boisterous ropes, wrestles, beats earth bare/ Of 
yestertempest’s creases” (5-6).48 The wind desiccates the ooze of the mud to “dough,” then 
“crust,” and finally to “dust.” He sees some footprints -- the “manmarks” that “treadmire toil” 
(walking) has “footfretted” in the rut – in the mud, but the wind soon “stanches” them (8-9). 
Clouds and shadows drift and alter, and footprints weather away. While disparate, each of 
nature’s selves has one thing in common with the rest: dissolution. As in Tennyson’s lament in 
In Memoriam, the scapes and selves of nature expire while “Million-fueled, nature’s bonfire 
burns on” (“Heraclitean Fire,” 9).49 
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 Note Hopkins’ continuation of his rope and spear imagery in the “shivelights and 
shadowtackle” of the shadows. The OED lists Hopkins as the originator of the term “shivelight,” 
which it defines as a “sliver of light” (“shive,” compounds). Given that a “shive” or “shiver” is a 
splinter of wood, the “shivelight” corresponds to the spear- or shaft-like imagery of his verb 
“lance” later in the line.  No definition appears for “shadowtackle,” but given the association of 
tackle with ropes, the term probably refers to the rope-like quality of the shadows, and thus 
corresponds to his noun “lashes” and his verb “lace.” 
48
 Ropes appear once again in the poem in the way the “bright wind” furrows the muddy ooze.  
49
 Hopkins often treats trees, clouds, and even places or scenes as individual and irreplaceable 
selves. For example, the trees in “Binsey Poplars” presented, before their felling, a “sweet 
especial scene.” When the hewers fell the trees, they “unselve” this “sweet especial scene” (22, 
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Emotional intensity builds as the sonnet approaches its theme. The narrator’s gaze shifts 
from sky to earth, and from shadows of trees to footprints of human beings. At last, at the end of 
an extended octave, the poem finds its center: “But quench her bonniest, dearest to her, her 
clearest-selved spark/ Man, how fast his firedint, his mark on mind, is gone!” (10-11).50 All 
sparks flame out in nature’s bonfire, but the spark of the individual human being is most 
precious. The “Manshape” of the human self “[shines] sheer off, disseveral” from all other selves 
in nature (12-3). 
From the proposition of the elongated octave that nature is a Heraclitean fire, the 10.3-
line sestet moves to the comfort of the resurrection. Nature’s bonfire exhausts the sparks caught 
in its blaze, but the resurrection restores their living fire. “Enough!” the speaker announces –  
the Resurrection/ A heart’s-clarion!  
Away grief’s gasping, joyless days, dejection. [. . .]  
In a flash, at a trumpet crash,  
I am all at once what Christ is, since he was what I am, and 
This Jack, joke, poor potsherd, patch, matchwood, immortal diamond,  
                                                                                                                                                             
21). As Hopkins saw it, a “self” is any expression of singular, cohesive being, whether sentient 
or inanimate. Not all selves are created equal, however, and in the words of “Heraclitean Fire,” 
the more conscious or “clearly-selved” the individual, the “dearer” and “bonnier” it is.    
50
 Hopkins’ sonnet is a caudal sonnet, exceeding the typical sonnet’s length but precisely 
preserving its proportions. The octave (if I may use the term) stretches from lines 1-13.7, and the 
sestet from 13.7-24. In this scheme, Hopkins’ precision appears in that line 13 does not divide in 
a half-line. Rather, if “Manshape” begins the sestet, then by my scansion it is preceded by 5 
stresses, and it itself is the sixth stress of a seven-stress line. Thus, “Manshape” occurs roughly 
seven-tenths of the way through the line, and the proportion of octave to sestet in Hopkins’ 24-
line sonnet precisely duplicates the proportion of octave to sestet in a traditional 14-line sonnet: 
8/6 = 13.7/10.3 = 1.33. Nor am I being more fastidious than the poet: Hopkins was fascinated by 
the proportions of sonnets, and frequently described sonnets mathematically. In his “Author’s 
Preface,” he describes a curtail sonnet as follows: “12/2 + 9/2 = 21/2 = 10 1/2.” Likewise, in a 
letter to his friend Canon Dixon, he describes “the equation of the best sonnet” as “(4+4) + (3+3) 
= 2.4 + 2.3 = 2(4+3) = 2.7 = 14” (Correspondence 71). 
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Is immortal diamond. (15-16, 17-20)   
Oddly, in the chemically reactive logic of the poem, Heraclitus’ fire brings about the 
resurrection.
51
 Carbon transforms to diamond under heat, and the Heraclitean fire changes the 
speaker’s “matchwood” to “immortal diamond.” Moreover, “at once” is a pun – much as the 
sestet turns the Heraclitean bonfire from an engine of flux into an engine of resurrection, it turns 
the speaker from matchwood to matchwood and immortal diamond at once. The resurrection 
redeems the Heraclitean flux, and transforms – even before the fact – what once was just 
matchwood into matchwood that is immortal diamond in the making. Still in the midst of the 
Heraclitean fire, the speaker is potential immortal diamond even in his actual state of 
matchwood. Thus, the speaker not only changes “at once” from matchwood to immortal 
diamond, but he is “at once” matchwood and immortal diamond already. In the moment of the 
“trumpet crash” on the last day, “this Jack, joke, poor potsherd, patch, matchwood, immortal 
diamond” becomes “immortal diamond” pure and simple (17, 19-20).  If the resurrection can be 
dated to a precise point in the poem, it occurs in the twinkling moment as the penultimate line 
gives over to the last. But the speaker is already “immortal diamond” in the penultimate line. 
Much as the last line omits the matchwood but preserves the immortal diamond, the resurrection 
realizes, ultimately and completely, the potential of each human being.  
 The foregoing summary touches upon several leitmotifs of imagery, tone, and theme in 
Hopkins’ poetry: ropes and spears, the dapple, self-deprecatory humor, faith challenged by 
hardship, joy in the beautiful forms of nature and grief at their passing, and temporal flux in time 
building to the final “change” of the resurrection at the end of time.  As well, the sonnet 
illustrates another recurrent theme in Hopkins’ writings: spiritual realities are described as 
                                                 
51
 See D.C. Haggo’s “Hopkins’s ‘Immortal Diamond’: A Poetic Use of Science” for an insightful 
discussion of the chemical logic of the poem.   
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resulting from and extending beyond physical laws and material processes. Thus the Heraclitean 
fire is a heat engine transforming the speaker’s matchwood to immortal diamond, and it is also 
an engine of time and change driving toward the final change of the resurrection at the 
consummation of time. 
The sonnet also displays Hopkins’ typical taxonomy of individuals and groups, a 
taxonomic system that helps to explain the function of words in his theory of language. In a 
notebook entitled “Notes on Greek Philosophy,” Hopkins outlines a sketch of his philosophy of 
words:  
To every word meaning a thing and not a relation belongs a passion or 
prepossession or enthusiasm wh[ich] it has the power of suggesting or producing 
but not always or in everyone. [. . .] The prepossession [. . .] is in fact the form [of 
the word], but there are reasons for being cautious in using form here, and it bears 
a valuable analogy to the soul, one however wh[ich] is not complete, because all 
names but proper names are general while the soul is individual. (Oxford Essays, 
306)  
To paraphrase the above, each word that names an object has acquired a “prepossession of 
feeling” (Hopkins later links prepossession to connotation) that elicits an emotional response 
from an audience (306). This “prepossession” is the form or soul of the word. Yet while souls are 
individual, common nouns – “words meaning a thing” – are general. Thus, the word “man” or 
“manshape” in Hopkins’ Heraclitean sonnet does not express a particular person, but humanity 
as a group.
52
  
Since a common noun is general, it possesses another “moment” or “term belonging to it” 
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 I will modify this claim shortly. For now, I am merely discussing what the word itself means, 
not Hopkins’ meaning in the poem.  
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(Oxford Essays, 306). Hopkins names this moment the noun’s “application, ‘extension,’ the 
concrete things coming under it” (306). Extension describes the correspondence between the 
name or word for the group and the specific things that belong to the group. The word “man,” for 
example, is a general term that names a group of featherless bipeds, but it can be applied or 
extended to any particular human being. Similarly, Hopkins’ word “manshape” has a number of 
extensions, equal to the number of human beings that have existed or will exist in the world. 
In his extraordinary sonnet, Hopkins names humans as a group, yet the “selving” or 
individuality of human beings is critical to the sonnet’s meaning and central to the redemption of 
its potential tragedy. In the language of his “Notes on Greek Philosophy,” Hopkins’ words 
“man” and “Manshape” name a group, but his chief concern is with the extensions of those 
terms, or the individual men and manshapes that collectively form humanity. To quote the lines 
germane to the present discussion,  
Million-fueled, nature’s bonfire burns on. 
But quench her bonniest, dearest to her, her clearest-selved spark 
Man, how fast his firedint, his mark on mind, is gone! 
Both are in an unfathomable, all is in an enormous dark  
Drowned. O pity and indignation! Manshape, that shone  
Sheer off, disseveral, a star, death blots black out; nor mark 
Is any of him at all so stark 
But vastness blurs and time beats level. Enough! The Resurrection, … (9-15) 
Hopkins names the collective as a shorthand way to describe each individual within it. His 
celebration of “man” as nature’s “clearest-selved spark,” as well as his imagery of individual 
sparks and “fire-dints” within nature’s bonfire, suggests that his real concern is with individual 
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humans. The collective nature of humanity is to be individually distinct, and thus “Manshape” 
not only differentiates human nature in general from the cosmos, but the shape of an individual 
man from all others. If the sonnet is “careful of the type” but “careless of the single life,” then 
nothing is lost for the resurrection to reclaim: the individual dies, but the group lives (provided, 
of course, that not all of the individuals die at the same time) (Tennyson, In Memoriam 55. 7, 8). 
Given that Hopkins does feel loss despite the persistence of the type, and given that the 
resurrection does redeem human sorrow, then the poem concerns the individual.  
Hopkins’ portmanteau coinage “disseveral” further illustrates the individuality of 
“Manshape.” As I interpret the word, it is an adjectival form of “dissever” describing something 
that is distinct or separate. In the line from “Heraclitean Fire,” “disseveral” complements the 
phrase “Sheer off.” In what I take to be its primary function within the line, “Sheer” is an 
adjective, but “sheer off” recalls the verb “shear” or “to cut.” (Hopkins always claimed to 
compose his poems for the ear, not the eye, it should be remembered.) Thus, “dissever-al” and 
“sheer off” cooperate to indicate something that is separate or cut away from others. In addition 
to acting as an adjectival form of “dissever,” however, “disseveral” is also a portmanteau term 
merging “dissever” with “several.” According to the OED, in addition to meaning “more than 
one,” several also means “distinctive, particular” (OED A.I.2.d; A.I.1.c) As such, it connotes 
multiplicity but also particularity. In “Heraclitean Fire,” then, when Hopkins applies the term 
“disseveral” to “Manshape,” he means the “distinctive, particular” mold of “Manshape” for each 
human being, unique and separate or “cut away” from every other individual’s especial being. 
Each man, and not merely humanity as a whole, is “a star” in the sky of nature, or a “spark” or 
“firedint” in “nature’s bonfire.”  
Though all humans descend from a common root, each person “selves” individually and 
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is distinct from other human beings. Similarly, though all of a word’s extensions follow from a 
collective prepossession, each extension is a concrete particular in its own right. Like other poets 
– one might remember Milton’s equation of a “good book” with the “lifeblood of a master spirit” 
– Hopkins classifies words much as he does human beings. His association of words with people 
perhaps explains his claim that a word’s prepossession or “form” “bears a valuable analogy to 
the soul” (Oxford Essays, 306).  
In addition to prepossession and extension, words have a third term -- definition.
53
 Much 
as a single prepossession generates multiple extensions, so a single word generates many 
definitions. As Hopkins relates, “every word may be considered as the contraction or coinciding-
point of its definitions” (Oxford Essays, 306). Thus, “manshape” has been historically defined as 
the image of God, a featherless biped, a reasoning animal, an evolved hominid, a dualism of 
matter and spirit, and a complex of nerves and chemicals. Yet provided that these definitions are 
not false or mutually exclusive (in actuality they well may be), they faithfully define the same 
word, and the word’s meaning, in total, should be considered the sum, contraction, or 
coincidence of each of its subsidiary definitions. A word is a unity of disparate definitions, then, 
with each definition describing an aspect or “side” of the word’s total or collective meaning.54 
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 To be more precise, definition is part of the second term (“utterance”) of a word, and extension 
is the third term. I am explaining Hopkins’ theory of language out of sequential order. In the next 
chapter, I explain Hopkins’ trinitarian theory of language in more detail and restore the terms to 
their proper order.  
54
 While “side” and “siding” are conventional words, Hopkins uses them several times in his 
writings in a new sense to express an aspect or nuance of a thing or of a word’s meaning. See 
Journals, 130: “For the phenomenal world [. . .] is the brink, limbus, lapping, run-and-mingle / 
of two principles which meet in the scape of everything – probably Being, under its modification 
or siding of particular oneness, and Not-being, under its siding of the Many.” See also 211: “A 
beautiful instance of inscape sided on the slide, that is/ successive sidings of one inscape, is seen 
in the behaviour of the flag flower from the shut bud to the full blowing: each term you can 
distinguish is beautiful in itself and of course if the whole ‘behaviour’ were gathered up and so 
stalled it would have a beauty of all the higher degree.” Again, see 267: “That [a pattern of 
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Thus, the several (or “disseveral,” perhaps) and particular definitions of a word “contract” or 
“coincide” to form a rich aggregate core: “every word may be considered the contraction or 
coinciding-point of its definitions” (306).  
Hopkins’ tripartite theory of words resembles a solar system in which meaning shuttles 
two ways, radiating outward from the core and falling back into it. In terms of extension, 
meaning radiates outward from the word’s core prepossession to the “things coming under it,” or 
from the idea of the word to its physical instances and permutations. In terms of definition, 
however, meaning flows inward from the peripheral definitions toward the aggregate core. Given 
that a “word [is] the contraction or coinciding-point of its definitions,” the various subsidiary or 
“orbital” definitions fall back to the core to supply it with a rich, collective meaning. Yet this 
two-way movement is complementary, as is the relationship between a word’s definition and its 
extension.
55
  
Hopkins intended his three-fold theory of language to apply to “every word meaning a 
thing and not a relation” (Oxford Essays, 306).56 Pertaining to stress, while stress may be 
                                                                                                                                                             
speech] may be marked it must be repeated at least once, that is/ the figure must occur at least 
twice, so that it may be defined/ Spoken sound having a repeated figure. (It is not necessary that 
any whole should be repeated bodily: it may be sided off, as in the metres of a chorus, but then 
some common measure, namely the length of a ᴜ or – or strength of a beat etc, recurs).” 
55
 In this sentence, I collapse Hopkins’ second moment (utterance/definition) with his third 
moment (extension). Yet given that our ways of defining a word are shaped by the instances of 
the word that we see (in other words, our definition of a common noun depends on the instances 
that we know of that noun), the overlap between the two terms seems inevitable. Although each 
“side” or subsidiary definition should reside in each instance or extension of the noun, certain 
instances/extensions express a side more clearly or forcefully than others do. To advert once 
more to the traditional ways of defining a human being, some people are more expressive of 
God’s image than others, some are more rational than their peers, some are more neurotic, etc. 
Thus, while the divine image, reason, and nervous chemistry are sides of every human existence, 
some people express (and alternately suppress) a particular side more forcefully than other 
people do. Accordingly, definition follows experience, and a definition of a noun reflects the 
instances of that noun that have been experienced.  
56
 It is possible to read Hopkins’ phrasing to mean that he restricted only the first term – 
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considered a relation between things instead of a thing in itself, Hopkins’ lifelong philosophic 
inquiry into the subject suggests that it is at least an object of thought if not an object of 
sensation. Furthermore, Hopkins’ complex treatment of stress suggests that he perceived the 
word in terms of his linguistic model, as a core of meaning with various coinciding definitions, 
and as a root term with far-reaching extension. In what follows in this chapter, I will attempt to 
articulate the core meaning of stress as a coinciding point of its various definitions, and to trace 
its various extensions that ray out from a contracted point of meaning. In so doing, I will 
demonstrate the centrality of Rankine’s stress to Hopkins’, and argue that Rankine’s 
understanding of stress as an active expression of material structure is central to Hopkins’ core 
definition of the term. 
3.3 Hopkins’ Definitions of Stress 
Stress for Hopkins is a many-sided thing. Like other words, however, despite its far-flung 
extensions, its several definitions orbit a central core. In attempting to define this core and its 
various extensions, I will follow Laura Gutman’s useful formulation that Hopkins “consciously 
combin[es] each word’s various aspects to present [the word’s essential self] as a coinciding-
point of all its meanings” (76). In examining the various ways Hopkins uses the word stress, I 
will attempt not only to define particular instances of the word but also to illustrate their 
correspondence to a collective or unified understanding of stress. In articulating this “contraction 
or coinciding-point of [the] definitions” of stress, I will furthermore show the centrality of 
Rankine’s usage to Hopkins’, or show how Hopkins’ contraction-point for stress resembles 
Rankine’s definition of the word (Oxford Essays, 306). In fine, I argue that although stress’ total 
                                                                                                                                                             
prepossession – of his three-fold theory, but not the second and third terms. In this case, even if 
stress is considered a relation instead of a thing, the latter terms (utterance/definition and 
extension) would still apply. 
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definition is a nucleus with wide-ranging orbits, at its core stress expresses a vital force of being 
that is at once material and vital, mechanical and ontological. Hopkins’ fundamental 
understanding of stress resembles Rankine’s usage, yet stretches beyond it to encompass the 
metaphysical as well as the physical. 
3.3.1 Stress as Force 
In its furthest extent from the core, stress merely means force.
57
 Stress in this sense spans 
Hopkins’ writings, from his early poems and journals to the works composed late in life. Certain 
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 I exclude (perhaps in error) from my analysis Hopkins’ casual or commonplace usages of 
stress such as “to lay a stress to” or “He stressed that.” In these casual phrases, stress means “to 
emphasize,” and doesn’t necessarily carry any sort of special or technical resonance. All the 
same, Hopkins’ technical senses of the term most likely colored his commonplace usages. At any 
rate, were I to examine his casual use of the word, I would assign it to the most peripheral 
orbital, beyond the one described in the paragraph above. 
In distinguishing stress’ core from its periphery, one is faced with a definitional 
challenge. Does the core consist of the most generalized or specialized definition of stress? If the 
former, then the central definition will be shared as the least common denominator of the 
peripheral definitions, and thus the word may be mapped as a series of concentric circles or 
orbitals, the innermost reflecting what is fundamental to the outermost and hence to the word as 
a whole.      
Alternately, the word may be mapped with the most specialized definition at the center. 
Thus, what is common or fundamental will be shifted to the periphery, and what is most 
specialized (what contains but exceeds the previous fundamental moments) will occupy the 
center.  
Given that Hopkins defines a word in total as the “contraction or coinciding-point of its 
definitions,” the second option seems to be what he has in mind (Oxford Essays, 306). 
Admittedly, this statement itself is not without complication, and partakes of Hopkins’ habitual 
shiftiness where potentially opposite meanings are combined within a single term or phrase. If 
“coinciding-point” is interpreted to mean a common point within the definitions themselves -- as 
a point within each definition that coincides with a point in all other definitions -- then the core 
of a word should be regarded as the most basic denominator of all definitions. However, if the 
“coinciding-point” is interpreted to mean not a shared point in every definition but a single point 
that encompasses or contracts all aspects of each definition, then the core of a word should be 
regarded as the most complex and full definition possible, as containing all subsidiary or 
fundamental definitions within itself. 
Since Hopkins defines the core not only as a “coinciding-point” but also as a contraction 
point, the second alternative is most appropriate to his description. Thus, the center contains 
everything that any of the peripheral definitions mean, and is a plenary summation of the word’s 
total meaning. It follows from this that the peripheral definitions are fundamental to the core, and 
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instances suggest particular knowledge of mechanics and engineering, and seem to rephrase an 
engineer’s calculations as a poet’s meter and imagery. One early example of such an instance 
occurs in a July 1865 fragment of Richard. Of a riverside meadow where the shepherds Richard 
and Sylvester feed their flocks and recite the romantic poets, the narrator describes  
The grass was red 
And long, the trees were colour’d, but the o’er-head,  
Milky and dark, with an attuning stress 
Controll’d them to a grey-green temperateness, 
Making the shadow sweeter. (iv, 11-15) 
Common sense makes sense of these lines easily – mixing any number of pigments 
typically results in a neutral grey-green color. Yet such a common sense reading makes no sense 
of Hopkins’ word “stress.” What does stress mean in the passage? What sort of stress is active in 
the colors of nature?  
It is possible to account for stress in the poem in a Wordsworthian sense, as an idea in 
Nature or as a moral, intellectual, or metaphysical value expressed through Nature. While 
Hopkins was certainly a Wordsworthian poet in this sense (indeed, the poetic speaker equates the 
hues of light in the meadow with “temperateness”), and while his term stress would later acquire 
metaphysical import, it had not yet done so by the time he wrote this fragment of Richard. 
Hopkins composed fragments iii and iv of Richard in July of 1865 (Phillips 316 n49). During 
this time, as his journals attest, he struggled to find meaning in Nature and to articulate the 
patterns and forms he found there. But he had not yet coined his term stress to do so. His journals 
attest his quest for “laws” and structures and “shapes” and “inlaws” in the phenomena of nature, 
                                                                                                                                                             
thus the core is built up from the periphery.  
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but his technical vocabulary of stress and instress is notably absent at this time, and does not 
appear until his “Notes on the Greek Philosophers” in 1868. Accordingly, Hopkins’ later 
development of this term should not be superimposed on the present early instance of it.  
“Attuning stress” raises other possibilities. Given that the “attuning stress” of the sky’s 
milky darkness “controlls” the vegetation’s greens and reds to a “grey-green temperateness,” 
stress is a principle of harmony, and the various hues of light are analogous to musical tones in a 
chord. Properly speaking, however, stress stems not from musicology but metrics, and signifies 
the emphasis a syllable receives in speech. From this perspective, the opposing colors are 
analogous to opposing rhythms in a line of counterpointed poetry. Much as a counterpointed line 
of poetry consists of one rhythm laid over another, so the total effect of the light (grey-green 
temperateness) consists of the sky’s somber hue laid over the vegetation’s vibrant hue.  
Stress also operates in a mechanical register, and another potential meaning of stress 
becomes clear if one interprets the various hues in the poem as vectors of force, and views the 
meadow’s contrary colors much as an engineer might view the various pressures exerted upon an 
object. Viewed as such, Hopkins’ language of stress recalls an engineer’s calculation of a 
resultant of component forces. One of Hopkins’ early notebooks from his schooldays at Highgate 
before Oxford summarizes a course of lectures in trigonometry and mechanics (Oxford Essays, 
3). A page from this notebook shows Hopkins using a parallelogram of force to resolve 
component forces into a single resultant (page reproduced in Brown 217-18).
58
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 “Component” and “resultant” are nineteenth century terms closely related to the modern word 
“vector.” An object may be submitted to any number of component forces, each with varying 
strengths and pushing the object in differing directions. To calculate the net effect – the resultant 
-- of these component forces, an engineer cancels and simplifies the various components to 
determine a single quantity and direction of force active upon the object. Suppose, for example, 
that a 2000-lb. car traveling Northward at 45 mph crashes at an intersection into a 3000-lb. car 
travelling Westward at 30 mph. Such an example offers two component forces – a Northward-
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In his undergraduate fragment of Richard, then, Hopkins does much the same that he did 
earlier in his schoolboy notebook, only instead of calculating the total effect of colliding forces, 
he calculates the total affect of colliding colors. Thus the vibrant hues of the red grass and the 
(presumably) green trees create one vector of bright color, and the “milky and dark” sky 
overhead creates another vector of somber color. The two vectors crash, and the resultant 
between vibrant red/green and somber milky darkness is “a grey-green temperateness.” 
Apparently, the somber vector of the sky is greater than the bright vector of the vegetation, since 
the former “controlls" the latter and the resulting “grey-green temperateness” of the total scene is 
closer to the sky’s component darkness than to the vegetation’s component brilliance. Much as 
an engineer determines the resultant of component forces within a structure or system, so 
Hopkins estimates the resultant mood derived by a human observer from the component hues 
within a scene.  
Granted, the fact that stress in the Richard fragment may be explained as a musical or 
metrical term potentially obviates any mechanical application. Simply put, if the conventional 
metrical meaning of stress will make sense of the poem, why consider any unconventional or 
unexpected sense of the term? Thankfully, however, other instances of stress in Hopkins’ early 
poems and writings are expressly mechanical, and emphasize stress as synonymous with force. 
Considering the Richard fragment in tandem with these other writings suggests that even as early 
as 1865, stress was a rich, polysemic term for Hopkins, one that allowed him to consider the 
natural world of force and matter in terms consonant with music and poetry. In stress’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
moving component and a Westward-moving component – that are preserved in a larger system. 
Even after the crash, the two component forces are not annihilated, but continue to exert their 
force in combination. Accordingly, the direction and speed of the total mass of both cars after the 
crash is the result (or the resultant) of the combined force of both component forces. The crash 
does not destroy the component forces – both are operative in the behavior of the system after 
the crash.  
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simultaneously musical, metrical, and mechanical significations, the inner world of art could be 
reconciled to the outer world of nature. 
Perhaps the clearest connection between stress and force occurs in Hopkins’ poem 
“Oratio Patris Condren: O Jesu vivens in Maria” (1868?). In this poem, the speaker prays 
Jesu that dost in Mary dwell,  
Be in thy servants’ hearts as well,  
In the spirit of thy holiness,  
In the fulness of thy force and stress (1-4)    
As I will discuss in the next chapter, “fulness” is a theological term and suggests a metaphysical 
dimension for both force and stress, but the primarily material and mechanical meanings of these 
terms should not be overlooked. Here in this poem, Hopkins’ parallel restatement of “force” as 
“stress” emphasizes the synonymous relationship between the two terms. Though “fulness” 
recasts stress in Christological terms, it does much the same for force. Thus, “fulness” 
transmutes two terms – two synonyms – that would otherwise express the mundane relations of 
matter and energy. 
Other instances in Hopkins’ writings, particularly those written during and after his 
Philosophate at Stonyhurst Seminary (1870-3), attest his equation of stress with force. Notably, 
Daniel Brown observes Hopkins’ analysis of the behavior of bubbles and steam in his “Lenten 
chocolate” (Journals 203-4, Brown 209-10). As Brown describes, Hopkins watches his hot 
chocolate with curiosity, questioning why the vapor escapes the liquid in “throes” or in fits and 
sputters. Hopkins at length finds the answer: Bubbles consist of the same substance in two states, 
gaseous and liquid. The substance in the gaseous state forms the apparently hollow inside of the 
bubble, while the substance in the liquid state forms the “shell” or external “film” of the bubble. 
96 
The heated gas in the middle of the bubble expands as it heats and strains the liquid film of the 
bubble, but the film itself, as a liquid, has surface tension and resists the expansion of the gas. At 
some point, the “stress of heat” causing the bubble to expand overcomes the surface tension of 
the film (Journals 203). At this point, the film ruptures, the bubble bursts, and the gas trapped 
within forcibly escapes as vapor. Even though the “stress of heat” may be fairly uniform 
throughout the liquid, the surface tension of bubbles is not. Thus, bubbles burst at unpredictable 
and uneven rates. When a sufficient size or number of bubbles burst simultaneously, the amount 
of vapor released noticeably increases, making a sputtering effect as the vapor roils off the liquid 
in “throes.” 
In this Lenten meditation, Hopkins again uses stress as a synonym for force, more 
precisely the force of pressure. By “stress of heat,” Hopkins refers to the pressure the expanding 
gas exerts against the film of the bubble. In this case, however, while the “stress of heat” is 
positionally located within the bubble, it is not expressive of the bubble’s composition, neither 
does it preserve the bubble’s integrity -- unlike the surface tension which preserves the film’s 
coherence and which stems from the molecular properties of the liquid itself. The “stress of heat” 
stems from energy supplied by an external source, and should not be considered innate to the 
liquid. Thus, in this case the “stress of the heat” is an internal force in that it expands the bubble 
from within, but is not native to the liquid. In his description of the “stress of heat,” then, 
Hopkins intends stress to denominate force pure and simple, separate from any vital or intrinsic 
correspondence to a particular object. 
3.3.2 Springs, Wells, and Watches: Stress as Inherent Force 
In another sense of the term, however, Hopkins frequently uses stress to denote not 
merely force, but force which inheres within material objects and natural phenomena. This usage 
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appears particularly frequently in Hopkins’ nature journals to describe the inherent quality of 
objects to endure strain and preserve proper shape and form. In moving from simple force to 
force as an inherent property of objects, this definition of stress comes nearer to Hopkins’ 
conception of the core or composite meaning of the term. It also approaches Rankine’s definition 
of stress as an active expression of elasticity by which an object resists external pressure and 
preserves its material form and shape.  
Always attuned to the shape and curvature of nature’s wonders, Hopkins often describes 
stress as the inner force (or “spring”) by which an object resists external pressure and maintains 
its distinctive form. His usage is perhaps most striking when he describes stress as inadequate to 
the burden of external force. For example, in a March 12, 1870 journal entry, he describes “a 
heavy fall of snow” that “tufted and toed the firs and yews” (196). The snow accumulates on the 
boughs “and went on to load them till they were taxed beyond their spring” (196). Under the 
snow’s weight, the boughs of the firs and yews droop unnaturally: the snow overcomes the trees’ 
“spring” or internal stress, and alters the characteristic shape, set, or “scape” of their boughs.59 
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 Hopkins was deeply fascinated by the shapes of trees and boughs, and devoted much of his 
nature journal to classifying not only the characteristic shape of each species of tree, but the 
“inlaw” or “inscape” or inner principle of form responsible for a particular species’ distinctive 
shape. See his discussion of the oak: “Oaks: the organization of this tree is difficult. Speaking 
generally no doubt the determining planes are concentric, a system of brief contiguous and 
continuous tangents, whereas those of the cedar would roughly be called horizontals and those 
of the beech radiating but modified by droop and by a screw-set towards jutting points. But 
beyond this since the normal growth of the boughs is radiating and the leaves grow some way in 
there is of course a system of spoke-wise clubs of green --- sleeve-pieces. And since the end 
shoots curl and carry young and scanty leaf-stars these clubs are tapered, and I have seen also 
the pieces in profile with chiseled outlines, the blocks thus made detached and lessening towards 
the end. However the star knot is the chief thing: it is whorled, worked round, a little and this is 
what keeps up the illusion of the tree: the leaves are rounded inwards and figure out ball-knots. 
Oaks differ much, and much turns on the broadness of the leaf, the narrower giving the crisped 
and starry and Catherine-wheel forms, the broader the flat-pieced mailed or shard-covered ones, 
in which it is possible to see composition in dips etc on wider bases that the single knot or 
cluster. But I shall study them further” (Journals 144-5).   
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 While Hopkins does not expressly equate spring to stress in his description of the snow-
laden firs and yews, he does associate the terms elsewhere. On a short Blandyke from St. 
Beuno’s, Hopkins and a friend walked to Holywell to bathe in St. Winefred’s Well.60 Hopkins 
wrote in his journal, 
The sight of the water in the well as clear as glass, greenish like beryl or 
aquamarine, trembling at the surface with the force of the springs, and shaping out 
the five foils of the well quite drew and held my eyes to it. Within a month or six 
weeks from this (I think Fr. di Pietro said) a young man from Liverpool, Arthur 
Kent (?), was cured of rupture/ in the water. The strong unfailing flow of the 
water and the chain of cures from year to year all these centuries took hold on my 
mind with wonder at the bounty of God in one of his saints, the sensible thing so 
naturally and gracefully uttering the spiritual reason of its being (which is all in 
true keeping with the story of St. Winefred’s death and recovery) and the spring 
in place leading back the thoughts by its spring in time to its spring in eternity: 
even now the stress and buoyancy and abundance of the water is before my eyes. 
(261)  
“Spring” in this instance refers primarily to a fount of water, not an elastic force stored 
within an object under strain. Nevertheless, given Hopkins’ theory of language, all definitions of 
a word build to a central core of meaning. A word’s various definitions – and its various 
extensions – should consequently correspond, and often Hopkins invests the different senses or 
extensions of a word with complex patterns of meaning.
61
 Spring is one such word, and whether 
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 “Blandyke” is a Jesuit term for a vacation. 
61
 Hopkins actually went a bit further than this. Hopkins thought that not only did words have a 
stable core of meaning, but sounds or phonemes did as well. His early journals are full of 
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the word appears as a form of force, a wound coil of metal, or as a fountain of water, an 
underlying consistency informs each instance.
62
 Namely, spring in Hopkins’ writings uniformly 
suggests a pent inward force, one that often resists or is restrained by external pressure. 
Accordingly, Hopkins’ “spring” is synonymous with stress in the Rankinian sense of an elastic 
force residing within an object.  
Moreover, Hopkins consciously equates spring with force and stress. In the Holywell 
passage quoted above, Hopkins first intimates such a connection in his description of the surface 
of the water “trembling [. . .] with the force of the springs” (Journals 261). Granted, “springs” 
here literally means “fountains of water,” but the underlying resonance of “pent force” appears in 
spring’s proximity to “trembling” and “force.” Likewise, later in the passage, Hopkins similarly 
associates springs with stress. The physical “spring in place” (the fountain of St. Winifred’s Well 
itself) reminds Hopkins of the historical “spring in time” (the moment of St. Winefred’s 
miraculous healing and resuscitation when the fountain first gushed forth), both of which flow 
from the divine “spring in eternity” (the Creator’s eternal power and Godhead). The historical 
and divine springs are expressed by the physical spring, or as Hopkins puts it, “the sensible thing 
so naturally and gracefully [utters] the spiritual reason of its being” (261). In sum, Hopkins 
compounds all three springs in his closing formulation that “even now the stress and buoyancy 
and abundance of the water is before my eyes” (261). 
 Each of these three terms – stress, buoyancy, and abundance – applies equally to the 
“sensible thing” (the physical spring) and to the “spiritual reason of its being.” Accordingly, 
“abundance” refers to the Creator’s omniscient power displayed in Winefred’s resurrection and 
                                                                                                                                                             
speculations about the etymological and semantic connections between words derived from 
common phonetic roots. See for instance Journals 10-16. 
62
 Pertaining to spring at least, Hopkins’ theory of language makes good common sense. Most 
things that share the name of “spring” share a common nature and behavior – springs spring.  
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in the “chain of miracles” since, as well as to the plentiful waters of the spring. Likewise, 
“buoyancy” describes the river of God’s grace throughout time, from its fountainhead in eternity 
to its manifold instantiations in human history, as well as the physical waters of the fountain.
63
 
And finally, stress applies both to the metaphysical force of God’s grace, as well as to the 
physical force inherent within the spring of water. Much as the “sensible thing” utters the 
“spiritual reason of its being,” so the physical force of the fountain points to the eternal power 
that brought it into being.  
In fine, both stress and spring articulate a physical force capable of metaphysical 
extension. Much as in “Oratio Patris Condren,” when force and stress were transmuted by 
“fulness,” so spring and stress are transmuted here in Hopkins’ journal. But like force and stress 
in Father Condren’s prayer, spring and stress in this description of Winefred’s Well are initially 
material, and describe a physical force inherent within the fountain. The sequence of the journal 
entry itself should be noted: Hopkins first notices the “force of the springs” that makes the water 
“[tremble] at its surface,” and this physical power “leads back [his] thoughts” to the eternal 
power from which all power stems.        
Beside representing a physical force, Hopkins’ springs also suggest an internal force by 
which an object preserves its shape. As mentioned above, the “spring” of the firs and yews offset 
(albeit unsuccessfully) the weight of the snow on their branches. Others of Hopkins’ springs 
behave similarly. In his sermons, Hopkins employs a watch spring to illustrate the motive force 
of sin within human nature: 
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 Hopkins’ rivers tend to flow in space and through time equally. Readers may remember from 
the Wreck of the Deutschland that “it” “rides time like riding a river,” and, “dat[ing] from day of 
his going in Galilee [. . .] is in high flood yet.”   
101 
Everybody feels at least some inclination to heat of temper, to gluttony or 
drunkenness, to impurity, to love of money, and so on, one or all of these things, 
and more or less they fall into them, some more, some less. But if God by a 
special grace were ever to have kept anyone, as perhaps he may have kept St. 
John Baptist, from falling into any the least sin, still such a man would have the 
inclination to sin left though he did not yield to that inclination: a watch wound up 
but kept from going has the spring always on the strain though no motion comes 
of it. Such a mainspring of evil in us is the concupiscence that comes in with 
original sin and lasts even when original sin has been taken away by baptism. 
(Sermons 44) 
While the impetus to sin is a metaphysical quality, the image Hopkins selects to express it 
– the watchspring – is manifestly physical, as is the stress which the spring stores in its coils. The 
watch spring attests the inner and intrinsic nature of sin, reproducing in physical terms what sin 
works psychologically and metaphysically. Much as the stress of a spring is stored internally 
within its coils, so the impetus to sin is pent within the heart. Additionally, both watch-spring 
and sinful nature express an inherent force opposed to external pressure that preserves an 
intrinsic shape or “bent.” Sinful nature rebels against social, religious, and personal inhibitions to 
exhibit the malformed “shape” of the heart, and a watch spring reacts against the force that 
wound it to recover its wonted unwound shape. The ticking of a watch illustrates the spring’s 
action in unwinding itself to regain its customary shape.  
Like his sin nature sermon, Hopkins’ curtal sonnet “To His Watch” also works by a 
similarly metaphorical extrapolation of the stress of a coiled spring. Hopkins compares his heart 
to his watch, noting that both will eventually “fail at our force” (3) Given that the “force” of a 
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watch stems from its spring – wound and under stress -- once more Hopkins uses the spring as an 
image connoting stress and physical force to recover proper form. In applying force to recover 
form, Hopkins’ watch-springs correspond to the “spring” of the fir and yew trees in reproducing 
Rankine’s definition of stress as an internal force which “consists in a tendency of the body to 
recover its natural state” after having been strained out of shape (Miscellaneous,74). Both 
springs, mechanical and arboreal, suggest an elastic force expressive of an essential organization 
of parts that resists strain and seeks to recover proper shape. 
Other passages from Hopkins’ journals also illustrate the congruence of Hopkins’ with 
Rankine’s stress. At one point in his journals Hopkins describes an especially frightening 
instance of waking sleep paralysis. Hopkins narrates the experience in terms that recall a 
succubus, recalling that “I thought something or someone leapt onto me and held me quite fast.” 
Awakened by the sensation, Hopkins finds that his mind and senses are alert, but -- to his horror 
-- his body remains paralyzed by sleep. He likens his fright to waking mid-fall, “as when one is 
very tired and holding oneself at stress not to sleep yet/ suddenly goes slack and seems to fall and 
wakes.” But unlike a person who wakes mid-fall, Hopkins, although he regains conscious 
sensation, does not regain muscular control. He records that “I had lost all muscular stress [. . .] 
but not sensitive, feeling where each limb lay” (238). While Hopkins can feel, he is unable to 
move or exert muscular force. In the absence of the “muscular stress” that tensions the body’s 
bulk, Hopkins feels his body crush under the gravitational force of its own inert mass: “The 
feeling was terrible: the body no longer swayed as a piece by the nervous and muscular instress 
seems to fall in and hang like a dead weight on the chest” (238). Without the intrinsic and proper 
stress of his muscles, his body loses its coordinated unity (it is “no longer swayed as a piece”), 
and collapses inward under gravitational pressure. 
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As with his treatment of springs, Hopkins discusses “muscular stress” in this passage as 
an inherent pressure that maintains the body’s shape against external gravitational force. Without 
the internal stress the muscles provide, the prone corpse “fall[s] in” and “hang[s] like dead 
weight” on the ribcage. Much the same conception of stress appears in another passage where 
Hopkins recollects watching the ebb and surge of the sea from a cliff in the Isle of Man. While 
the context of his observation (a cliff overlooking the sea) differs completely from those 
discussed previously, his vocabulary and meaning remain consistent. Hopkins writes, “I noticed 
from the cliff how the sea foots or toes the shore and the inlets, now with a push and flow, now 
slacking, returning to stress and pulling back” (221). As in his description of sleep paralysis, 
when the sea “slacks” its stress, it “falls in” or “pull[s] back” down the shore, but in “returning to 
stress,” it resurges to the extent of its shape and bounds.64 Repeatedly, whether describing a tree, 
a well, a watch, a body, or a wave, Hopkins treats stress as an intrinsic force preserving an 
object’s shape. Hopkins’ imagery of stress closely resembles Rankine’s definition of it: “the 
force [. . .] which [an object] exerts in tending to recover its free condition, and which, for a state 
of equilibrium, is equal and opposite to the combination of external forces applied to it” (Misc., 
120).  
3.3.3 Slack Ropes and Dis-stressed Selves: Stress as Force of Formal Unity 
Moving still closer to Hopkins’ core understanding of stress, the poet uses the term not 
only to describe the inner force preserving an object’s shape, but the inner force by which an 
object consists. In this, Hopkins’ usage realizes the full extent of Robison, Gregory, Barlow, and 
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 It may seem odd to think of a body of water having a “shape,” but Hopkins consistently 
describes the sea (and water or fluid in general – see below) in terms of its bounds, limits, or 
foredrawing. See the first stanza of the Wreck of the Deutschland, where Hopkins likens God’s 
mastery in shaping the sea to his creative act of shaping the human frame. As “World’s strand,” 
God gives the sea its shape or bounds, and as Creator of the human form, God gives the poetic 
speaker his bodily shape and bounds as well.    
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Rankine’s strength/stress. As the engineers defined strength/stress as an active force expressing 
and preserving an object’s structural coherence, so Hopkins treats stress as a vital force 
indicative of the distinct character of natural phenomena, living organisms, and even human 
beings. Yet in realizing the extent of the engineer’s term, Hopkins also surpasses it. In 
characterizing stress as the vital force of living organisms and human beings, Hopkins’ term 
leaves the realm of the strictly mechanical and ventures into psychology and metaphysics. All 
the same, though Hopkins’ usage does eclipse the engineers’, it nevertheless stems from a 
mechanical and physical grounding of the word.   
As in his observations of the yew and fir trees, his sleep paralysis, and the waves below 
the cliff, Hopkins often describes the force of stress in abeyance or “slackening.” This trait recurs 
in his poems “The Times are Nightfall,” “Spelt from Sybil’s Leaves,” “Carrion Comfort,” and in 
his commentary to St. Ignatius’ “A Meditation on Hell.”65 Norman MacKenzie compares the 
sonnet fragment “The Times are Nightfall” to Hopkins’ “extraordinarily weighty” sonnet “Spelt 
from Sibyl’s Leaves,” observing that the “opening imagery” of the poems matches closely (157, 
228). Indeed, in both poems, light wanes in the world and darkness encroaches. “Nightfall” tells 
of a “world undone,” where the “light grows less,” while “Sibyl’s Leaves” similarly claims “for 
earth her being has unbound” and warns “our evening is over us, our night whelms, whelms, and 
will end us” (“Nightfall” 1, 2; “Sibyl’s Leaves” 5, 8). Additionally, the poems correspond in 
sequence and structure, moving from an initial exposition of cosmic apocalypse to the doom of 
particular living creatures, and closing with a cautionary moral. Beyond these similarities, 
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 “The Times Are Nightfall” is an unfinished sonnet, likely composed in 1886 (MacKenzie, 
Readers Guide, 228). “Carrion Comfort” is usually regarded as one of what Robert Bridges 
called Hopkins’ “terrible sonnets,” or what critics often refer to as the “sonnets of desolation,” 
most likely composed between 1885 and 1886. Likewise, Hopkins sent “Spelt from Sybil’s 
Leaves” to Robert Bridges in a letter dated 11 December 1886. Given the proximity of their 
composition, similarities between these poems are not surprising. 
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however, both poems concern the loss of individually distinguishing form, or the unique 
coherence or pattern – the stress – by which a living being exists.  
“Sibyl’s Leaves,” in describing the apocalyptic extinction and obliteration of life (“self in 
self steeped and pashed – quite disremembering, dismembering all now”) presumably speaks of 
the annihilation of human life during the Last Days, but also enfolds the flora and fauna of 
Nature in the doom of the world. “Nightfall,” however, speaks particularly of “man’s distress.” 
Given the apocalyptic imagery elsewhere in these two poems, “distress” should be taken as a 
Spenserian pun, or as “dis-stress.” Much as the play of earthly life – earth’s “dapple” – is “at 
end” in the apocalyptic vision of “Spelt from Sibyl’s Leaves,” so human life is “dis-stressed” at 
the “Nightfall” of the world. In the context of these two poems, “dis-stress” not only connotes 
loss of being or loss of life, it also signifies the loss of personal distinctiveness or particular 
individuality. In “Sibyl’s Leaves,” the heterogenous dapple of life is reduced to just two “skeins” 
or “spools”: “black, white” or “right, wrong.”66 In the apocalypse the Sybil foresees, and more so 
in the Dies Irae following the apocalypse, individual beings lose their fine distinctions and 
become indistinguishable: they are “pashed” together, and earth’s scintillating dapple is “all 
throughther.”67 The beauty and form and variety of Nature are irrelevant in the Last Day, and all 
that matters is God’s assortment of his creatures upon the two spools of “right, wrong.”  
                                                 
66
 Hopkins often uses thread-like imagery of skeins, ropes, and strands to speak of the self-
distinctive action of a creature indicative of its essential nature. Thus, the world is a welter of 
various skeins or strands of being. In the judgment following the apocalypse, however, the welter 
or dapple of life is viewed in “black, white,” and the various “skeins” of being are “wound” onto 
two spools. Presumably, one spool represents the just, while the other represents the damned. 
The fact that these two “spools” of being are also likened to two “flocks” or “folds” recalls the 
biblical judgment of the sheep and the goats. 
67
 “Throughther” is a dialect word, a portmanteau of “through” and “other.” Distinct shapes are 
muddled and confused, and each is blent, in a Spenserian sense, with others. Thus, an observer 
sees one thing “through other,” or inextricably pashed and melded with other forms.  
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Most likely, this dissolution of self-distinction stems from two competing causes, both 
the violence of the apocalypse itself and the moral judgment of God in the Dies Irae. MacKenzie 
sees the sonnet describing “the last evening before Chaos takes total repossession of the earth” 
(158). Thus, while God at creation formed the multivariate phenomena of Nature, in the final 
dissolution of the world the various shapes within Nature return to Chaos, or to their amorphous, 
pre-formed state. Thus, the “pashing” and “throughthering” of the sonnet, in one sense, describe 
earthly things as they lose their individuation, melt together, and commingle in Chaos. In another 
sense, however, the loss of individuation results from God’s moral judgment of the earth’s 
dapple, in which the manifold forms of Nature are reduced to the “black, white” categories of 
“right, wrong.” Readers should remember that the sonnet’s title stems from a line in a requiem 
hymn: “That day of wrath [. . .] to which David and the Sibyl bear testimony.” Much as the 
requiem hymn merges Classical and Judeo-Christian sources, so the sonnet merges classical and 
Christian versions of the apocalypse. As such, the octave of the sonnet describes the world 
returning to a classical Greek Chaos, while the sestet describes the world undergoing a Judeo-
Christian judgment. The fact that the classical and Christian versions of doom are incompatible 
generates part of the tension between the octave and sestet. But the versions of doom agree in 
that, whether through physical dissolution or moral judgment, the variety of the natural world is 
depleted and reduced. In both the Greek octave and the Christian sestet, the things of this earth 
grow strangely dim, losing their distinctive shape and identity either physically -- to Chaos -- or 
morally -- to God’s absolute judgment. 
Taken together, both parts of the long sonnet are concerned with the loss of a thing’s 
distinctive, particular form. Given that “Nightfall” partakes of similar imagery as “Sibyl’s 
Leaves,” it seems reasonable to consider the “dis-stressing” of “man” in “Nightfall” as 
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resembling the “pashing” and “throughthering” and “disremembering, dismembering” of natural 
phenomena in “Sibyl’s Leaves.” Thus, distress or dis-stress connotes losing one’s distinctive 
form, or losing the active force of stress that preserves one’s individuality and integral identity.  
In the apocalypse, this loss of vital stress occurs in the tumult of the end times, as the 
phenomena of the world decompose to the warring elements of Chaos, or in the judgment on the 
Day of Wrath, as one’s personality or selfhood is submitted to God’s rigid rubric of Right versus 
Wrong. In the first instance, stress is quite physical, and closely duplicates Rankine’s, Barlow’s, 
Robison’s, and Gregory’s usages in that it represents a quantity of force binding the particles of 
an object together in a stable and cohesive form. In the second instance, however, stress 
functions as a psychological force, and preserves the psychological unity of a person. Given that 
Hopkins wrote both “The Times Are Nightfall” and “Spelt from Siby’s Leaves” in a time of 
abject depression and despair in Dublin, this psychological meaning of “distress” should be 
considered as primarily operative in the poem. However, the psychological is underwritten by 
the physical, and the meaning of distress as to lose psychological unity is founded on the 
meaning of distress as to lose physical coherence. 
The psychological and physical extensions of stress – or rather, of stress’ absence –  
similarly vie with each other in Hopkins’ “terrible” sonnet “Carrion Comfort.” In this sonnet, the 
word “stress” never appears, but its direct antonym “slack” does. “Slack” and “stress” are paired 
opposites in Hopkins’ personal vocabulary, and the presence of the one calls the other to mind, 
even in emphasizing its absence. Most likely, Hopkins derived his pairing from poetic scansion, 
with its various systems and patterns of stressed and slack syllables.
68
 But Hopkins’ customary 
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 Critical discussion of Hopkins’ poetics supports a particularly robust conversation about his 
metrical theories, as is appropriate given that Hopkins was a daringly experimental poet. 
Hopkins’ innovation of sprung rhythm is probably his most well-known and widely-discussed 
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pairing of the terms extends beyond scansion, and, as Hopkins’ journals, letters, and poems 
attest, the two terms systematically function as direct antonyms when Hopkins discusses either 
physical force or psychological unity, as well as when he discusses poetry. As we have seen 
previously, Hopkins contrasts the two words in the preliminary discussion of his account of 
waking sleep paralysis: despite one’s effort to “hold oneself at stress not to sleep,” one “suddenly 
goes slack and seems to fall” (Journals 238). Likewise, as we also have seen above, Hopkins 
contrasts the terms in his description of the sea’s alternate “slacking” and “returning to stress” 
(Journals 221).  
While in these examples, both terms appear on the page in sharp opposition, in other 
passages of Hopkins’ writing, slack emphasizes stress’s absence both on the page itself and in 
the object being described. When, for instance, Hopkins describes a waterfall in the Alps, he 
records that “in one place over a smooth table of rock came slipping down a blade of water 
looking like and as evenly crisped as fruitnets let drop and falling slack” (Journals 178). 
Nowhere in this passage does Hopkins use the term “stress,” but his description of the fruitnet 
recalls the ropes, braids, bands, bonds, bounds, lace, lashes, lanyards, coils, strings, strands, 
webs, and all other things threadlike, single and woven, that wind through Hopkins’ works. 
Typically, Hopkins’ rope imagery is described in terms of its stress or strain.69 The fruitnet in 
this instance poses no exception – while it “fall[s] slack,” its slackness is a measure of its stress, 
or rather the lack of it. 
                                                                                                                                                             
experiment. While sprung rhythm is outside the scope of this paper, please see my brief sketch, 
above, of critical appraisals of Hopkins’ metrical “stress”.   
69
 The most frequently discussed examples of Hopkins’ ropes occur in his shipwreck poems, The 
Wreck of the Deutschland and The Loss of the Eurydice. Both poems feature rope-like images 
under stress and strain (e.g. “But roped with, always, [. . .] a pressure” or “he is strung to duty, is 
strained to beauty”). The fact that a rope’s primary function is to exert stress or to endure strain 
suggests that Hopkins’ fascination with rope imagery stems from his desire to represent stress 
and strain.  
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Hopkins’ writings feature several other instances of slack ropes. One of the most 
interesting of these passages describes “a strong shadow [that] lay in a slack between two brows 
of Pendle” (Journals 210). In one sense, the description implies an earthen rope: the “slack” 
earth sags between the two higher, stressed brows. The description also suggests a line of poetry 
– the earth-line falls in the slack and rises in the stress. As elsewhere in his writings, Hopkins in 
this passage seems to be trying to resuscitate the ossified metaphors of common speech.
70
 Here, 
by mixing poetic and topographical terminology, he seems to be trying to recoup the rope 
imagery embedded in poetry (“a line of poetry”) as well as in topography (“earth-line,” “sky-
line”). Thus, Hopkins imagines mountains as lines of poetry, and the falling and rising syllables 
of poetry as valleys and crags of mountains. But beneath that, he sees both poems and 
topographical features as waving, oscillating ropes -- lines of force responding to varying 
degrees of slack and stress.  
Yet another slack rope appears in “Carrion Comfort,” one that simultaneously signifies 
slackness of both physical and psychological stress. The first four lines of the sonnet are 
addressed to Despair, one of Spenser’s psychomachic villains from the Faerie Queene. Both 
Hopkins and Spenser associate Despair with death and carrion. The face of Spenser’s monster is 
essentially a death’s head, with his “deadly dull” eyes and his skeletal, “raw-bone Cheeks, 
[which] through Penury and Pine,/ Were shrunk into his Jaws, as he did never dine” (1.9.xx-xx). 
Likewise, Despair lives in a veritable charnel house amidst the bodies of the knights he has 
convinced to commit self-slaughter: he “his dwelling has, low in an hollow Cave [. . .] like a 
Greedy grave, that still for carrion Carcases doth crave” (1.9.xx-xx). Furthermore, the final lines 
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 Compare, in Hopkins’ sermons and in the poem “Felix Randal,” his use of the Lancashire 
phrases “in this road,” “any road,” and “all road” for the more typical phrases “in this way,” “any 
way,” and “all ways” (Sermons 47, 73). By following the Lancashire people in replacing “way” 
with “road,” Hopkins restores the spent metaphor to its original vitality.  
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of Spenser’s canto suggest that Despair is himself undead carrion. When the Redcross Knight at 
last, at Una’s reproof, spurns Despair’s deathly counsel, Despair hangs himself, “But Death he 
could not work himself thereby/ For thousand times he so himself had dress'd,/ Yet natheless it 
could not do him die” (1.9.xx-xx).  
Hopkins’ Despair also appears as a carrion corpse with a mordantly bewitching offer. 
While Spenser’s Despair tempts Christian knights to commit suicide, Hopkins’ Despair, in 
addition to suicide, tempts the poem’s speaker to wallow in misery, or to feed on death by 
“feasting” on Despair’s undead corpse. The opening line of the poem announces the speaker’s 
refusal: “Not, I’ll not, carrion comfort, Despair, not feast on thee.” The temptation Despair offers 
is to submit passively, to acquiesce to one’s misery, and to derive bitter comfort from the 
delusion that one has done all one can do. Against this temptation, the speaker resolves “I’ll not 
[. . .] cry I can no more. I can;/ Can something, hope, wish day come, not choose not to be.” Yet 
despite the speaker’s heartening resolution, the sequence of “hope, wish day come, not choose 
not to be” is unsettling. In searching for the “something” he can do, the speaker at first considers 
that he can at least hope. Presumably, he hopes for relief and future joy. The next phrase, “wish 
day come” tempers this, however – the speaker hopes not for future joy but merely for the dawn 
of the next day. Even this is tempered in the final phrase “not choose not to be.” In this phrase, 
the speaker appears almost completely inert once again, not hoping, not wishing for dawn, not 
seeking to improve his condition, but merely refusing to choose death. 
In a word, Despair tempts the speaker to be “slack,” to give over the struggle for hope 
and to acquiesce to grief and even death. Appropriately, the first quatrain of the sonnet’s octave 
features yet another of Hopkins’ slack ropes. Immediately after vowing not to feast on Despair, 
the speaker asserts that he will “Not untwist – slack they may be – these last strands of man in 
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me.” Although his inner “strands of man” are slack already, the speaker pledges not to make 
them slacker still, or to willingly cooperate with the dolor that oppresses him.  
While Hopkins’ “strands of man” are admittedly metaphorical, they suggest a physical 
basis for the psychological “slack” in the poem. In the terms of the poem’s metaphor, Hopkins 
likens his psychological state to a physical body, one whose stability and coherence is assured by 
strings or ropes that pass between his members and lace his body together.
71
 If poems and 
mountains are oscillating ropes, so is the human body, and the human ropes respond to slack and 
stress as do the other strands of Nature. In “Carrion Comfort,” slack ropes suggest a weakened 
body, one threatened with dissevering and pulling apart. Stressed ropes or strands, on the other 
hand, suggest a strong and robust body, one that can withstand the pressures and strains exerted 
upon it.  
While Hopkins’ usage is metaphorical here, and the physical imagery of slack ropes 
represents a psychological state, the physical imagery nevertheless suggests an understanding of 
stress closely akin to Rankine’s. For Rankine and his engineering forebears, strength/stress 
preserved the integral unity of an object from external assaults upon it. Similarly, in Hopkins, 
slackness corresponds to a lack of stress and leads to personal disintegration – physically, and by 
metaphorical extension, morally and psychologically.  If “stress” is an internal force that 
preserves individual identity and being, then slack represents the decomposition of this force. 
Once again, “Carrion Comfort” depicts stress as a vital tension without which the integrity of the 
                                                 
71
 Again, Hopkins is revitalizing old idioms – “heartstrings,” “fiber of [my] being,” “strands of 
[my] being,” etc. Hopkins typically revitalizes idioms by taking them at face value, and 
reawakening his audience to the concrete materiality of the objects and images within the idiom. 
See footnote 36, above, concerning Hopkins’ revitalization of the expression “any way.” In order 
to restore English metaphors to their originary force, Hopkins de-familiarizes their imagery, 
forcing readers to consider the metaphor afresh and to discover the concrete expressions 
underlying them. 
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object/person decomposes. Importantly, the psychological and moral value of stress/slack is 
underwritten by a physical understanding of the binary pairing, and is accompanied by a network 
of physical imagery –ropes, strands, webs, threads, nets, etc. Although the “slackness” of 
Despair figures primarily in moral and psychological relationships in the sonnet, these 
relationships extend from an originary physical sense of stress/slack. Thus, the physical sense of 
the “strands of man” within the speaker, while metaphorical, are also originary, and the moral 
and psychological extensions of these terms derive from the physical.  
3.3.4 Flushing and Foredrawing: Stress as Ontology 
Stress also accrues ontological signification in Hopkins’ writings, as perhaps best seen in 
his notes on Parmenides and in his commentary on the Ignatian exercise “A Meditation on Hell.” 
As I have remarked earlier, Hopkins’ term stress should be regarded more as a matrix of 
meaning – or rather a root word with broad-ranging definitions and extensions -- instead of as a 
single, discrete term. Accordingly, in his exposition of Parmenides, Hopkins explores the 
metaphysical resonance of stress, and in his commentary on Ignatius’ “A Meditation on Hell” he 
abuts several senses of stress together. Among the other meanings of stress in his commentary on 
hell, at points Hopkins equates stress with the “energy [. . .] with which the soul animates [. . .] 
the body” or the “energy of the whole being” (Sermons, 138). Much as the psychological import 
of stress in “Carrion Comfort,” “The Times Are Nightfall,” and “Spelt from Sybil’s Leaves” 
derives from physical imagery and a physical understanding of stress, so the various 
metaphysical energies of stress in Hopkins’ “Parmenides” and his commentary on hell stem from 
an underlying conception of stress as physical force. Physical and metaphysical definitions of the 
term contract and coincide at the term’s core, and the physical basis of stress is preserved as a 
moment within Hopkins’ central and metaphysical definition of the term.  
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The classical philosopher Parmenides was, like Xenophanes and the Pythagoreans, 
simultaneously a skeptic and a seer. Parmenides mistrusted the physical senses on the ground 
that one object can appear differently to different people.
72
 But while he mistrusted sensation, he 
trusted reason, which he believed to be entirely separable from sensory perception. Through 
rational argument, Parmenides demonstrated that Being exists in a total or universal sense.
73
 Yet 
because he mistrusted the senses, he strongly doubted whether any particular instance of Being 
(an object that can be seen with the eyes, felt with the hands, tasted by the tongue, etc.) exists as 
it appears to the senses. 
In his philosophical hymn to Being, Parmenides accordingly holds that Being is one and 
indivisible. The hymn, entitled On Nature, divides in two after an introductory proem. The first 
section, Aletheia or “The Way of Truth,” teaches that the “Many” – the objects we perceive with 
our senses – do not exist in truth but only to our sensuous perceptions. Being, then, should not be 
perceived as divided into separable objects, but should be conceived as it truly is: indivisible, 
universal, and single. However, the second section – Doxa or “The Way of Opinion” – 
summarizes the way people typically perceive Being. In this section, Parmenides describes 
individual objects in a way he forbade in the Aletheia, as not only separable and individual 
themselves, but as composed of the elements of fire and night/earth. 
Contention persists in reconciling Aletheia to Doxa. Essentially, if Doxa is false, why did 
Parmenides afford it such interest? As well, if individuated being is illusory, why should 
Parmenides devise his own cosmogony in which the world, and all objects within it, form from 
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 Drunkards, the sick, and the insane perceive objects differently than a human being in his or 
her normal state. It may be argued that this recommends the perception of a healthy human being 
as accurate. Parmenides disagreed, though, perceiving all human beings as inebriated or feverish. 
Thus, reality is a collective hallucination.  
73
 Parmenides’ Being was not abstract but concrete. In other words, Parmenides did not conceive 
of Being as immaterial or estranged from matter.   
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fire and night/earth? Scholars have variously attempted to reconcile the two sections.
74
 Hopkins, 
at least, under the Germanic – particularly Hegelian – influence of his Oxford professors and 
tutors Benjamin Jowett, T.H. Green, and Walter Pater, sublates the negation between monist, 
universal Being and the several, particular Many. Thus, each instance of the Many is a 
particularization of universal Being. In Hopkins’ words, “the phenomenal world [. . .] is the 
brink, limbus, lapping, run-and-mingle / of two principles which meet in in the scape of 
everything --- probably Being, under its modification or siding of particular oneness or Being, 
and Not-being, under its siding of the Many. The two may be called two degrees of siding in the 
scale of Being” (Oxford Essays 316).75 As Daniel Brown writes, “Hopkins believes that the 
Parmenidean fragments sustain his view that ultimate Being is comprised of numerous discrete 
instances” (Brown 175). In Hopkins’ interpretation, Parmenides teaches that metaphysical Being 
expresses itself in the objects of the physical world.   
Hopkins structures his response to Parmenides according to the philosopher’s own 
categories of transcendent Truth (Aletheia) and Opinion or sensuous perception (Doxa). 
Pertaining to the first, Hopkins addresses metaphysical Being or God; pertaining to the second, 
Hopkins addresses phenomenology or observed reality. For both categories, however, Hopkins 
applies his coinages “flush” and “foredrawn.”  Aspects of stress – or more precisely of instress – 
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 Efforts are complicated by the fact that Parmenides' poem exists in fragments, some of which 
are missing, and by the fact that Parmenides himself is a slippery dialectical thinker. 
75
 Hopkins’ subdivision of Being is a little unwieldy. He divides Being into two “sidings,” Being 
and Not-being. On the one hand, Hopkins creates the apparently tautological claim that Being is 
a subdivision of Being. On the other hand, Hopkins creates the apparently contradictory claim 
that Not-being is a subdivision of Being. What Hopkins means by this is that Being, in total, 
exists in two guises, a universal guise and a particular guise. The universal guise Hopkins names 
Being, and the particular guise Hopkins names Not-being. (After all, what is particular is not 
universal. If universality is Being, then what is particular is not Being, or Not-being. In this case, 
“Not-being” does not imply non-existence, but merely non-universality.) Accordingly, Being 
exists as Being (universality) and Not-being (particularity). Please see below for a fuller 
explanation of the universal (one) and particular (individuated) aspects of being.  
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the flush and the foredrawn adapt the language of mechanical force to illustrate the nature of 
Being, both noumenal and phenomenological. In so doing, these coinages reinforce the analogy 
between the Being and matter, and employ forces constitutive of material objects as metaphors to 
characterize ultimate Being – God himself.  
Daniel Brown articulates the relationship between stress, instress, flushing, and 
foredrawing. According to Brown, “stress is synonymous with Being,”76 and “instress is an 
instance of such being to which belongs, as the prefix indicates, an internal or intrinsic principle 
of unity” (Brown 175). Furthermore, as Brown observes, Hopkins defines instress as a composite 
unity of two opposing forces, flushing and foredrawing: “[Parmenides’] feeling for instress, for 
the flush and the foredrawn, [. . .] is most striking” (Oxford Essays, 311). According to Brown, 
flushing is a “principle of motion” or “dynamic liquidity” characteristic of thin, runny fluids like 
water (171, 173). Contrarily, foredrawing “focuses upon the bounding definition in which such 
force draws together as a unity,” and is characteristic of more viscous fluids like oil (174). To 
rephrase, flushing is a property of things to lose individual distinction and to flow together, much 
as two droplets of water may come together and merge as one. Foredrawing, on the other hand, is 
the capacity for objects to maintain individuation. Hopkins often represents foredrawing as the 
surface tension of a liquid, especially evident in such viscous liquids such as oil. Thanks to its 
surface tension, a drop of oil will bead or form a spherical globule rather than bursting its 
meniscus and running flat across a surface. Likewise, when two globules of a sufficiently viscous 
liquid meet, although they may touch they will not merge. 
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 Elsewhere, as I do, Brown links stress to energy and force. In associating stress with Being, 
Brown does not contradict himself, however. As Brown proceeds to explain, Hopkins himself 
describes Being in the language of force.   
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Brown observes a characteristic instance of Hopkins’ flush/foredrawn binary in an 
August 30, 1868 journal entry: 
I saw the phenomenon of the sheepflock on the downs again from Croham Hurst. 
It ran like the water-packets on a leaf – that collectively, but a number of globules 
so filmed over that they would not flush together is the exacter comparison: at a 
gap in the hedge they were huddled and shaking open as they passed outwards 
they behaved as the drops would do (or a handful of shot) in reaching the brow of 
a rising and running over.    
Here, Hopkins compares a sheepflock to drops of water running on a leaf. As Norman 
MacKenzie explains, just as droplets merge and join in flowing, the sheep from the distance of 
Croham Hurst appear to lose their individual distinctions and run across the downs like a single 
rivulet of sheepwater (MacKenzie, Readers Guide). Yet despite the illusion created by Hopkins’ 
distanced perception, he understands that the sheep, unlike water droplets, retain their 
individuation. Accordingly, Hopkins refers to them not as droplets but “water-packets,” or as 
“globules so filmed over that they would not flush together.” The sheep are sharply foredrawn, 
and their proximity cannot overcome their “viscous” selving. Hopkins ultimately compares them 
not to droplets or globules of fluid, but to spherical solids -- “a handful of shot.” Like a fluid, the 
sheep-shot flow together across the downs, dam up as they pass through a gap in a hedge, and 
then pour out of the gap to flow over a ridge. But unlike a fluid, the sheep maintain their selving 
and remain individuated.  
In naming the force by which a fluid coheres or the force by which a fluid disperses, 
foredrawing and flushing designate physical properties of liquids, and describe the various 
operations of force within a liquid medium. Accordingly, the terms correspond to 
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hydrodynamics. Yet through metaphorical extension, Hopkins adapts his terms to 
phenomenology, likening fluid mechanics to the mechanics of human perception. In 
phenomenological terms, flush, given its associations with fluidity and unity, speaks to the 
correspondence between objects, or an object’s propensity to resemble another object. Thus, 
objects are flushed by the characteristics they share with other objects, particularly those 
universal characteristics or mental categories in which they partake (e.g. -- all red objects partake 
of the universal category of redness; all sharp objects partake of the mental category of 
sharpness; etc). Accordingly, “flushness” unites disparate objects and tends to express the unity 
and universality of Being. Contrarily, foredrawing “denotes [an object’s] specificity as a 
differentiated unity, a concrete particular” (Brown 174). While the characteristics of an object 
may be common, the particular collection of characteristics may be unique to that object. A red 
pen, for example, shares its color with other red objects, and its cylindrical shape with other 
cylinders. It also may share its material composition with other composite plastic-metal objects. 
But in its collection of characteristics as a red cylindrical plastic-metal object, it comes closer to 
individual distinction. As well, even though some mass-produced objects may be identical to 
others of their kind, each is unique in that it is this object and not another – this red pen or that 
red pen and not any other red pen. Much as flushness is a principle of unity, then, foredrawing is 
a principle of individuation, and expresses the distinction of concrete particulars. All objects or 
selves partake of flushing and foredrawing alike: all objects share universal characteristics with 
others, but possess their own distinct being nevertheless.
77
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 In phenomenological terms, Hopkins schema of “flush” and “foredrawn” may be compared to 
Hegel’s chapter “Sense Certainty” from his Phenomenology of Spirit. In this chapter, Hegel 
argues that all objects are discrete complexes of universals. Every object is informed by multiple 
universals, and receives its particular nature from the unique combination of universals it 
contains. Hegel’s description of the universal characteristics that an object shares with other 
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As phenomenological terms, flush and foredrawing figure prominently in Hopkins’ 
commentary on Parmenides’ Doxa, or his analysis of sense perception: 
For the phenomenal world (and the distinction between men or subjects and the 
things without is unimportant in Parmenides: the contrast is between the one and 
the many) is the brink, limbus, lapping, run-and-mingle / of two principles which 
meet in the scape of everything – probably Being, under its modification or siding 
of particular oneness or being, and Not-being, under its siding of the Many. 
Foreshortening and equivalency will explain all possible difference. The inscape 
will be the proportion of the mixture. (Oxford Essays, 317) 
Hopkins’ description here applies “for the phenomenal world,” or for the world as 
perceived by the senses, not the noumenal or metaphysical realm of absolute Truth or Being. 
Sensuous perception of an object (perceiving the “scape of [a thing]”) occurs as the result of two 
principles: one principle by which the “particular oneness” of Being is perceived in the scape of 
the thing, and another principle by which the individuated “Many” are perceived in the scape of 
the thing.
78
 Given that flushing connotes oneness, and foredrawing connotes individuation, the 
present account of sensation repeats Hopkins’ formulation that “all things [. . .] are meaningless 
without [. . .] instress, the flush and the foredrawn” (311). Without the categories of flushing and 
foredrawing, all things are meaningless to human perception, or human perception itself is 
meaningless.  
Hopkins further clarifies the operations of flushing and foredrawing in another passage in 
his “Parmenides” notes. Without stress, or the opposed principles of flushing and foredrawing, 
                                                                                                                                                             
objects may be compared to Hopkins’ “flushing”; the discrete unity of the object as a complex of 
its universals is analogous to Hopkins’ “foredrawing.”    
78
 I discuss scape in the next chapter. For now, I will define scape as the perceived image of a 
thing.  
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“there would be no bridge, no stem of stress to carry the mind over: without stress we might not 
and could not say / Blood is red / but only / This blood is red / or / The last blood I saw was red / 
nor even that, for in later language not only universals would not be true but the copula wd. 
break down in particular judgments” (313).79 Without flushing, the ability to perceive the 
universal common to particular instances, an observer could not reason inductively to define a 
thing by its instances. Specifically, an observer could not, by examining various instances of 
blood, perceive that all instances of blood are red, and thus induce that Blood must be red. 
Likewise, without foredrawing, the ability to perceive the particular object in the matrix of the 
universals that compose it, no recognition of particular being would be possible. Without 
foredrawing, one might be able to see the qualities of redness and fluidness at large in the world, 
but one would not be able to see these qualities combined in a particular object, or would not be 
able to see the red fluid itself.   
Hopkins’ hydrodynamic phenomenology begins to explain instress -- that term so critical 
to his poetics -- as well as his metaphysical sense of stress. Through stress, or the instress of a 
particular thing, Hopkins can generalize from the specific object to universal Being, or 
alternately, can see universal Being in the specific object. Thus, when Hopkins claims to have 
“felt the depth of an instress or how fast the inscape holds a thing,” he means that he has 
perceived how the foredrawn, particular object corresponds with the universal Being that flushes 
it (313). In simple terms, he claims to have found a transcendent quality in the object of his 
perception.  
                                                 
79
 Hopkins uses the word “stress” here, but Brown’s point should be remembered that “instress is 
an instance of [stress]” (Brown 175). Accordingly, Hopkins means stress as general term to 
express collective instress.  
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Yet while stress in this sense extends from phenomenology to metaphysical Being, the 
prior moment of physical force should not be overlooked. In describing the behavior of fluid 
bodies, flushing and foredrawing apply a hydrodynamic understanding of physical force from 
fluid mechanics to phenomenology and metaphysics. Physical force underwrites Hopkins’ 
central poetic term instress.     
Pertaining to Parmenides’ Aletheia, in verging from phenomenology to metaphysics, 
Hopkins has already bridged the division between Parmenides’ “Way of Truth” and his “Way of 
Opinion.” He has acquired knowledge of ultimate Being through sense perceptions. But a good 
portion of his “Parmenides” notes apply to Being directly and without recourse to the senses. 
These passages respond to Parmenides’ Aletheia and transpose Parmenides’ Being into the 
Christian God. Yet just as Hopkins’ hydrodynamic exposition of Parmenides’ Doxa implies an 
analogy between physical force and metaphysical Being, so his exposition of Parmenides’ 
Aletheia does as well. Importantly, Hopkins applies his principles of flushing and foredrawing to 
God himself. In so doing, in representing God in the language of physical force, Hopkins 
establishes a relationship between God and force that is something more than analogous. 
Hopkins’ analogy between spiritual and physical energy will be the subject of the next chapter, 
but I would like to offer a few observations in closing.  
Particularly, Hopkins emphasizes Parmenides’ claim that Being/God “is the unextended, 
foredrawn.” In saying that God is “foredrawn,” Hopkins claims that God is not immaterial but 
concrete, and is not only universal but particular. As well, glossing his meaning of “unextended,” 
Hopkins cites Parmenides’ comparison of Being to a ball, bounded and finite. This may seem 
heretical, but Brown observes that “it is understandable, given [. . .] the centrality of the 
Incarnation to Hopkins’ faith [. . .] that he finds Parmenides’ conception of the necessarily 
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determinate nature of transcendent Being especially engaging” (169). Brown’s words recall St. 
Paul’s paradox, that in the finite, delimited frame of Christ “dwelleth all the fulness of the 
Godhead bodily” (Col. 2:9). Such a paradox of infinity in finitude also appears in the Catholic 
doctrine of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. James Cotter explains the Sacred Heart as a “burl” or 
compacted center of being containing all things.  
Being not only is foredrawn, but it is also flush. Comparing Being to a ball, Hopkins 
contrasts the outline and surface of ball-like Being to its “inner flushness” (Oxford Essays, 314). 
Infinite in finitude, Jesus, as determinate Being, is both bounded but contains all things. Bounded 
by a physical body, he nevertheless is the fulness of God and is the universal of all particulars. 
As universal, he flushes all things, and all things are concrete expressions of his Being.  
Hopkins extends his hydrostatic binary of flushing/foredrawing from physical relations of 
force clear through the spectrum of Being and at last to the second person of the Trinity. In 
likening Jesus’ determinate Being to a ball, foredrawn on the outside but flush on the inside, he 
anticipates his later analysis of the bubbles in his Lenten chocolate, which are similarly 
foredrawn by their outer film yet flushed by the expanding gas within. Other globes, balls, 
droplets, and bubbles sprinkle Hopkins’ writing, with oil and blood typically providing the 
medium for these fluid spheres. In conjunction with flushing and foredrawing as the secondary 
aspects of stress, the bubble and sphere imagery that sprinkles Hopkins’ poems and devotional 
writings links metaphysical Being to physical force. 
4 METAPHOR VS. METONYMY: HOPKINS’ FIGURES OF STRESS 
The previous chapter applied Hopkins’ theory of words to articulate stress not as a single 
term but as a matrix of meaning structured by several definitions. These several definitions shape 
the periphery of the matrix, but they contract together at the matrix’s core to render a richly 
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composite meaning. Hopkins’ matrix accordingly falls into a concentric hierarchy, with the most 
simple and generalizable definitions at the periphery informing the more specialized definitions 
closer to the core. Thus, in its outermost and most broadly applicable definition, stress equates to 
physical force pure and simple. Yet as the various definitions of stress “contract” together within 
the core, they become more complex and more specific. Mapping Hopkins’ matrix as a planetary 
system yields a number of definitional orbits: stress as force pure and simple; stress as interior 
force maintaining an object’s shape; stress as interior force maintaining an object’s material 
form; and finally stress as ontological force maintaining an object’s very being. In this 
movement toward the core, stress acquires new signification all the while that it conserves the 
meaning of previous definitions. Thus, at the system’s dense core, the ontological sense of stress 
merges with the material. The membrane between nature and supernature thins, and stress passes 
fluidly from the physical to the metaphysical. In short, the material world and the unseen world 
belong to a single universe, and the subtle energies of stress carry over from one realm to the 
other. 
Given the importance of stress for Hopkins’ ontology, this confluence of physics and 
metaphysics frequently manifests itself in his poems and prose. Hopkins routinely illustrates 
stress and instress metaphorically, as magnetism, electricity, or light. Yet how metaphorical are 
Hopkins’ metaphors, particularly given the correspondence of physics and metaphysics within 
his semantic matrix of stress? Is Hopkins’ instress an actual form of energy, or does it merely 
possess an analogical resemblance to the forms of energy Hopkins uses to describe it? In keeping 
with Hopkins’ reverence for the Real Presence, and with his Scotist perception of Christ’s 
Presence in nature, I propose that Hopkins’ metaphors often function literally, and posit a real 
and essential connection between the two objects they compare.   
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In the following chapter, I will argue that instress is an actual force, a form of energy 
subtle and refined but nevertheless as real and as operative as the other forces in nature. In the 
present chapter, however, I will treat Hopkins’ figurative language. Specifically, I will argue that 
Hopkins’ metaphors are unusual in that they do not express likeness in unlikeness, but instead 
posit physical correspondence as indicative of a deeper ontological unity. In fine, Hopkins’ 
metaphors are more than metaphorical, and suggest a literal or physical identification between 
the objects they compare. Accordingly, when Hopkins compares divine outstress or ontological 
instress to the various forms of energy in nature, his comparisons are not inert or merely 
metaphorical. Instead, his comparisons offer yet another instance of energy scaling the material 
to the metaphysical, and suggest that for Hopkins, all force -- ontological and physical alike -- 
partakes of a single origin and expresses an underlying unity.  
4.1 Metaphor, Metonymy, and (Meta)physics 
The following list samples a few instances of Hopkins’ conflation of physical energy and 
metaphysical force: 
1) “Thou art lightning and love….” (Deutschland 70) 
2) “I did say yes/ O at lightning and lashed rod….” (Deutschland 9-10) 
3) “Stroke and a stress that stars and storms deliver….” (Deutschland 45) 
4) “The world is charged with the grandeur of God./ It will flame out, like shining 
from shook foil”80 (“God’s Grandeur” 1-2) 
5) “As kingfishers catch fire….” (“Kingfishers” 1) 
6) “Buckle! AND the fire that breaks from thee then….” (“Windhover” 10) 
                                                 
80
 That Hopkins intended the “shining from shook foil” to recall lighting appears in a January 4, 
1883 letter to Bridges: “Shaken goldfoil gives off broad glares like sheet lighting and also, and 
this is true of nothing else, owing to its zigzag dints and creasing and network of small many 
cornered facets, a sort of fork lightning too” (Letters 169).   
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7) “That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire….” (title) 
8) “This … matchwood … is immortal diamond.” (“Heraclitean Fire” 23-4)  
9) “The Blessed Virgin compared to the Air we Breathe” (title) 
10) “I say that we are wound/ With mercy round and round/ As if by air….” (“Blessed 
Virgin” 34-6) 
11) “This is mechanical reflection and is the same as optical. All nature is mechanical, 
but then it is not seen that mechanics contain that which is beyond mechanics.” 
(Journals  252) 
12) “The energy or instress with which the soul animates and otherwise acts in the 
body….” (Sermons 137) 
While this list is by no means exhaustive, it provides a brief sampling of a recurrent 
connection in Hopkins’ writings between spiritual force and physical energy. As recent 
scholarship attests, Hopkins frequently expresses God’s grandeur in terms of energetic systems, 
or through singularly spectacular displays of natural energy (lightning particularly, but also the 
aurora borealis, storm fronts and thunderheads, etc.). James Cotter was perhaps the first to 
identify Christ with the energetic wave of water in The Wreck of the Deutschland, and Tom 
Zaniello, David Levy, Norman MacKenzie, Marie Banfield, Jude Nixon, and Sarah Winters have 
traced Hopkins’ incorporation of energetic systems -- atmospheric, meteorological, and celestial 
-- within his poems.
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 Likewise, John Gordon “explore[s] the implications of [. . .] electrical 
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 See Cotter’s Inscape: The Christology and Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins. MacKenzie’s 
entry in his Readers’ Guide similarly discusses “God’s Grandeur” in terms of the lightning that 
flames out from the charged world. For readings of the atmospheric phenomena in The Wreck of 
the Deutschland, see Banfield’s “Darwinism, Doxology, and Energy Physics: The New Sciences, 
the Poetry and the Poetics of Gerard Manley Hopkins” (185-8), and Nixon’s “’Read the 
Unshapeable Shock Night’: Information Theory, Chaos Systems, and the Welsh Landscape of 
Hopkins’s The Wreck of the Deutschland.” Likewise, Winters describes the “Heavenly Bodies in 
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inspiration” in The Wreck of the Deutschland and “The Windhover,” associating the figure of 
lightning with “inspiration and salvation alike” in that it “enacts an arc of contact [. . . ] between 
sky and ground,” or between God and his creatures (506, 507). Gillian Beer discovers the origin 
of Hopkins’ atmospheric conceit, “The Virgin Mary Compared to the Air we Breathe,” in the 
experimental science of John Tyndall. As Beer relates, Hopkins’ comparison of Mary and the 
“world-mothering air” hinges on Tyndall’s discovery that suspended particles in the air reflect 
specific wavelengths of light energy (blue), but do not “taint” or color the light itself. Finally, 
James Leggio, Jude Nixon, Marie Banfield, Hazel Hutchison, and others have pointed out the 
overlap between Hopkins’ apocalyptic imagery and the thermodynamic laws of energy.   
Each of the authors mentioned above observes either a form of energy in nature (light, 
heat, electricity, chemical bonds, etc.) or an energetic system within nature (the atmosphere, a 
storm, gravitation) that functions in Hopkins’ poetry to express a metaphysical truth about God, 
God’s relationship to creation, or a person’s experience of God. Hopkins is certainly not the first 
poet to ascribe the energies of nature to God, or to liken God’s power to natural forces. But he is 
unusual in that he perceives nature’s energies as continuous with God’s power, as descendants of 
God’s original “outstress” at the creation of the world. 
Critics commonly observe the overlap in Hopkins’ poems between natural energy and 
spiritual force, particularly God’s creative power. Virginia Ridley Ellis, for example, writes that  
The power of any created thing to give off instress and to instress derives 
specifically and absolutely from an original and divine source, God's stress of 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Windhover,” while Tom Zaniello, in his “The Scientific Background of Hopkins’ ‘Loss of 
the Eurydice’: Two Documents,” describes how Hopkins’ second shipwreck ode incorporates 
meteorological data gathered about the storm that capsized the H.M.S. Eurydice. Finally, David 
Levy’s “Poet and Observer: Gerard Manley Hopkins and Some Mid-nineteenth Century Comets” 
traces the import of celestial phenomena in Hopkins’ poems.       
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energy, which charges the  world with life, sustains it, keeps inscapes taughtly at 
tension, prevents  disintegration of being. Instress is thus both the life-giving 
energy in any object, derived from God, and the energy given off by that object, 
news of its selfhood and of its maker, when it is perfectly fulfilling its God-given 
function. (33) 
In so defining instress, Ellis positions Godly power and natural energy in a relationship of lineal 
descent. God’s originary act of creation marks the beginning of nature, and nature’s energies – or 
“the energy[ies] given off by [. . .] objects” -- persist as permutations of the power God exerted 
to bring matter into being.
82
 Yet Ellis carefully qualifies her definition to preclude a direct 
equivalence between God’s power and natural energy. In Ellis’ definition, the energy given off 
by an object is instress only when the object “is perfectly fulfilling its God-given function.” 
Natural energy itself is not instress, then. Instress as Ellis describes it may require natural energy, 
or in some way be analogous to natural energy, but the essence of instress, for Ellis, is obedience 
to God’s will. Presumably, instress is analogous to natural energy in that, in conformity to God’s 
will, it is active and forceful. But by Ellis’ definition instress is not natural energy per se.  
With due respect to Ellis, her book Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Language of Mystery 
was published in 1991, before Brown, Zaniello, and Nixon published their germinal works on 
Hopkins and science. Nor would Ellis have had access to Beer’s seminal article, “Tyndall, 
Helmholtz, and Gerard Manley Hopkins: Leaps of the Prepared Imagination,” also published in 
1991. If anything, even though Ellis ultimately pulls back from a direct association between 
energy and instress, she deserves credit for positing the relation, however briefly, in the first 
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 By “natural energy” or “nature’s energies” I mean the forms of energy in nature: magnetism, 
electricity, heat, light, mechanical force, etc. 
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place. My point here is not to criticize her work, but to show how scholars have traditionally 
placed instress and the natural forms of energy in an analogical or metaphorical relationship. 
Speaking in 2006, Glenn Hughes seconds Ellis’ definition of instress. For Hughes, the 
energy of instress takes two forms. His first form of instress, closely modelled on Ellis’ 
description of the term, likewise depicts energy emanating from God to create and subsequently 
to uphold all things. As Hughes explains, instress is “the force, the tensional dynamism, or 
‘stress,’ that holds together a thing’s form. Ultimately [. . .] instress is the active presence of 
God’s will sustaining a thing in its being or essence” (118).  Hughes’ second form of instress 
designates “the subject’s empathic perception of [another] thing’s instress, the felt apprehension 
of [. . .] its stress or energy of being” (119). Thus, instress in this guise is a two-part operation, 
and depends on a union of object and subject. Perceived objects exert their stress outwardly, and 
perceiving subjects extend themselves to take in the external stress of an object. In this way, 
instress is “a kind of bond, or better yet an identity that can emerge between a perceiving subject 
and a perceived object” (119). Hughes quotes Hans Urs von Balthasar approvingly in that the 
subject’s instress is ‘an answering stress, so that the [subject] can hold communion with the 
stress of things and experience them within. . . . The objective stress is taken up by the subject 
that is open to it’ (quoted 119).  
Yet while Hughes consistently employs the vocabulary of stress and energy, the 
relationship he describes between instress and the energies of nature is likewise analogical or 
metaphorical. At one point, Hughes writes that “for Hopkins, everything in nature is the very 
energy, the incarnated stress, of God’s immutable beauty” (120, Hughes’ emphasis). While this 
claim unites nature with God, the “energy” in this passage is of a metaphysical kind – it is the 
energy of “God’s [. . .] beauty,” not of electricity, heat, magnetism, chemistry, and mechanical 
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work. Hughes’ subsequent analysis of psychological energy reinforces the analogical nature of 
instress. Hughes surveys Hopkins’ discussion of two forms of intellectual energy – ‘a transitional 
kind, when one thought or sensation follows another’ and ‘an abiding kind [. . .] in which the 
mind is absorbed [by] a single thought’ (Hopkins, Oxford Essays 307, quoted in Hughes 120). 
Although Hughes follows Hopkins in referring to mental instress as “energy,” he does not 
associate this psychological or neurological energy with the energy exerted by things in nature.
83
 
Once more for Hughes, the various divine, natural, and psychological forms of energy are merely 
analogous, and no underlying identity reconciles their inherent distinctions.    
If Ellis’ book (1991) and Hughes’ lecture (2006) articulate the majority position within 
Hopkins scholarship, then Hopkins’ terms stress and instress fracture and break apart in their 
three-fold application to God’s work, the natural energies of creation, and the personal and 
psychological energies of human beings. Such treatment of instress implies that while the natural 
energies of the world may be likened to God’s creative power or to the mental energy of the 
mind, the material, the mental, and the metaphysical are ultimately irreducible and constitute 
three distinct and impermeable spheres. Contrarily, building upon previous chapters’ discussions 
of stress, I argue that instress is synonymous with energy in its real or literal sense, and that the 
various forms of natural, psychological, and spiritual instresses are ultimately reducible, much as 
magnetism, heat, light, sound, electricity, and work are ultimately reducible as various 
expressions of energy. In coining his term instress, then, and in extending its application to 
metaphysics, psychology, and physics, Hopkins does for his poetry what the first law of 
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 Neurology is a surprisingly old term. According to the OED, the noun form dates to the latter 
1600s, while the adjective form dates to the 1830s (“Neurology,” “Neurological”). 
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thermodynamics did for science, showing the fundamental identity of various forms of energy by 
subsuming them under a single term.
84
  
If spiritual, psychological, and natural energies are consanguineous, or are parts of a 
larger whole, then Hopkins’ metaphors of energy function more like metonymy than like true 
metaphor. Metaphor posits a semantic association between physically incongruous objects. 
Indeed, if the objects are not physically incongruous, then the metaphor breaks down and fails to 
work.
85
 Metonymy, contrarily, posits a physical kinship between the objects associated. In its 
most extreme forms (Fontanier’s “relations of connection”), metonymy posits an ontological 
identity that subsumes the objects compared. However, less rigorous forms (Fontanier’s 
“relations of correlation”) link objects more tenuously, and posit relations of sequence, as in 
cause-and-effect metonymy, or of proximity, as in spatial metonymy, instead of ontology. 
Nevertheless, at a minimum, all metonymy require physical correspondence of some sort, 
whether sequential, proximal, or ontological. Thus the relation of metonymy is real and objective 
while that of metaphor is semantic or subjective.  
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 Please see my discussion of thermodynamics’ first law in Chapter One. It is important to note 
that the laws of thermodynamics were a distinctly high Victorian contribution to science. The 
experiments that prompted the laws had their roots in the 18
th
 and early nineteenth centuries, and 
included sources as diverse as Rumford’s account of frictional heat (1798), Sadie Carnot’s 
description of heat flow in a steam engine (1824), Mayer’s accounts of chemically and 
mechanically generated heat (1840-5), Faraday’s experiments with chemistry, electricity, 
magnetism, and light (1820s-1845), and Joule’s experimental determination of the mechanical 
equivalent of heat (1845). Nevertheless, it was not until the 1850s that Thomson, Clausius, and 
Rankine would develop the theory and laws of thermodynamics to account for the previous 
decades’ experimental results. Accordingly, the laws that articulated the unity of nature’s energy 
in all of its forms were a Victorian contribution.  Much the same, Hopkins’ theory of instress, or 
his articulation of the unity of natural, neurological, and spiritual energy, is a fittingly Victorian 
contribution.      
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 See my discussion of Richard’s and Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor, below. The necessary 
tension of metaphor stems from the physical incongruity (the “absurdity,” in Ricoeur’s words) of 
the objects compared. 
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If Hopkins intends to posit a real or actual connection between metaphysical, mental, and 
physical energies, then his metaphors of energy function metonymically. Two difficulties 
complicate such a claim, however. First, in saying that Hopkins’ metaphors function 
metonymically, I set form and function at odds with each other, and claim that Hopkins’ 
comparisons, though ostensibly metaphorical in grammatical structure, act like metonymy. I will 
attempt to address this difficulty later in this chapter by invoking Hopkins’ ontology, specifically 
his perception of the formal correspondence of all created things in Christ.  
Second, my characterization of Hopkins’ analogy as “metonymic” is fraught with the 
notable difficulty that no other form of metonymy sets forth the relation that I claim Hopkins’ 
metonymy does. If I am correct that Hopkins relates the energies of spirit, mind, and matter as 
alternate expressions of a single universal “outstress,” then the relationship that obtains among 
these energies is that of part to part within a whole. However, no other class of metonymy takes 
this form. Most kinds of metonymy (Fontanier’s “relations of correlation” -- spatial, cause-for-
effect, instrument-for-action, etc.) posit spatial or sequential correspondence. Only synecdoche 
(Fontanier’s “relations of connection”) posits an ontological connection between the two objects. 
But synecdoche compares part to whole, not part to part within a whole as I describe of Hopkins’ 
figures. Implicitly, my argument involves a claim that Hopkins practiced an unusual form of 
comparison in creating his unique metonymical analogies of energy.
86
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 Again, in positing an ontological connection as opposed to a sequential or spatial 
correspondence, Hopkins’ metonymy is unusually strict, and belongs with synecdoche in 
Fontanier’s “relation of connection” instead of his “relation of correlation.” To quote Ricoeur’s 
explanation, Fontanier’s correlation “brings together two objects, each of which constitutes an 
absolutely separate whole’” (The Rule 56). Contrarily, “in the relationship of connection, two 
objects ‘form an ensemble, a physical or metaphysical whole, the existence or idea of one being 
included in the existence or idea of the other’” (The Rule 56). If Hopkins posits metaphysical, 
psychological, and physical forces as alternate expressions of a unitary source of stress, then the 
relationship that obtains is not between ‘absolutely separate whole[s]’ but between parts that 
131 
But while Hopkins’ figures are unusual, and do not fit well with the customary forms of 
metonymy, they still resemble metonymy functionally in that, in contrast to metaphor, they posit 
an actual and physical correlation between the objects compared. As may be said of his poetry 
generally, Hopkins’ rhetorical figures are formally adventurous. Nevertheless, in maintaining the 
concrete or physical correspondence of objects, Hopkins’ figures partake of the essential activity 
of metonymy.
87
 Accordingly, I characterize Hopkins’ figures as metonymic in this qualified 
sense. 
While a complete treatment of Hopkins’ analogy lies outside the scope of this chapter, I 
will assess one of Hopkins’ most recurrent comparisons, that between God’s “outstress” within 
nature and the various energies of nature. To examine Hopkins’ figure, I will employ Paul 
Ricoeur’s and Raymond Wilson’s structuralist analyses of metaphor and metonymy. First, 
however, I will define metonymy and metaphor as these tropes have traditionally been regarded, 
and discuss their salient forms. 
4.2 Structure of Metonymy: Form and Function 
Classical rhetoricians viewed metaphor as a matter of naming or denomination, or of 
replacing one word with another. Aristotle famously defined metaphor as “the application of an 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘form an ensemble, a physical or metaphysical whole.’ Accordingly, as I will discuss in more 
detail in the following chapter, Hopkins’ metonymy of stress resembles Fontanier’s relation of 
connection, and ‘the existence or idea of one [form of energy is] included in the existence or idea 
of the other.’  
For Fontanier, the difference between “correlation” and “connection” was large enough 
for him to separate the two classes entirely. Most modern theorists do not follow Fontanier’s 
taxonomy, however, and group synecdoche as a form of metonymy. Despite this, Fontanier’s 
categories of correspondence and connection provide an excellent description of the types of 
relationships possible within the genus of metonymy. Hopkins’ relationship between physical, 
psychological, and metaphysical stresses is like synecdoche in that it posits connection instead of 
correspondence. Accordingly, I refer to Hopkins’ metonymy as a “rigorous” or “strict” form of 
metonymy. 
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 For a fuller explanation of this sentence, please see the following section, “Structure of 
Metonymy: Form and Function.”  
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alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from 
species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion” (Poetics 77-9). Significantly, Aristotle 
defined metaphor while articulating the various properties of words, asserting that “every word is 
either current, or strange, or metaphorical, or ornamental, or newly-coined, or lengthened, or 
contracted, or altered” (77).88 From Aristotle’s treatment of metaphoricity as a property of a 
word, it appears that classical grammarians and rhetoricians regarded metaphor as consisting of a 
single word, an “alien” or unexpected word that replaces the conventional term.   
Instead of defining metaphor as a species of trope, Aristotle defines it as a genus 
comprising several species, including synecdoche and metonymy. In the definition of metaphor 
cited above, the first class that Aristotle describes, “genus to species,” is the inverse of 
synecdoche and expresses the transference of a property from whole to part. The second class, 
“species to genus,” is synecdoche, more commonly defined as “part to whole.” The third class, 
“species to species,” potentially encompasses a number of specific tropes, including metonymy, 
simile, and the modern sense of metaphor proper.
89
 The fourth class, “analogy” or “proportion,” 
identifies yet another species within the metaphorical genus (see below).   
Twentieth and twenty-first century readers typically regard metaphor as a clash – or, as 
I.A. Richards might say, a “tension” -- between two terms. Accordingly, modern readers think of 
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 Ricoeur argues that “word” is better translated as “noun” (The Rule 16). As Ricoeur argues, 
“the noun is the pivot” upon which Aristotelean metaphor turns (16). Ricoeur does make some 
allowance for metaphor to signify other parts of speech, but he stresses nouns as the primary 
parts of speech that Aristotle intends.  
89
 Aristotle does not mention simile in his Poetics. However, he does relate metaphor and simile 
in his Rhetoric. Simile, then, is a “developed” or “explicit” metaphor (Ricoeur 24-25). As well, 
in including the “modern sense of metaphor proper” within Aristotle’s metaphorical genus, I 
follow D.W. Lucas’ comment that “[Aristotle’s] word [metaphora] is used in a wider sense than 
English “metaphor,” which is mainly confined to the third and fourth of Aristotle’s 
[metaphorical] types” (204). 
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a metaphor as a sentence like “all the world’s a stage.”90 Even when the metaphor itself does not 
take the form of a sentence (for instance, consider the phrase “the sleep of death”), modern 
readers take it to imply a sentence (“Death is sleep”). Aristotle, however, understood metaphor to 
work not by a clash between two words in a sentence, but by substitution or replacement of one 
word for another. For Aristotle, this substitution is total: not only does the second term (the 
vehicle) take the place of the first, but the first term (the tenor) goes entirely unmentioned in the 
speech or on the page, and must be inferred by listeners or readers. As Robert Fogelin observes,  
It is important to recognize the type of construction that Aristotle takes as 
paradigmatic of metaphors. In the example he presents, Achilles is referred to as a 
lion rather than called a lion. That is, the construction looks like this: 
(1) The lion [i.e., Achilles] leapt 
rather than this: 
(2) Achilles is a lion. (28) 
This substitutionary nature of metaphor as a genus appears particularly clearly in 
Aristotle’s closely circumscribed fourth species of metaphor. This species of metaphor functions 
by comparing the second terms of two ratios in a proportion. To sample Aristotle’s explanation, 
take the proportion “Bacchus is to cup as Mars is to shield.” In Aristotle’s example, the second 
term (cup) of the first ratio (Bacchus is to cup) crosses over and replaces the second term (shield) 
of the second ratio (Mars is to shield). Alternately, the second term of the second ratio may cross 
over and replace the second term of the first ratio. Thus, a “shield” can be called the “cup of 
Mars,” or a “cup” can be called the “shield of Bacchus.” Importantly, however, when this class 
of metaphor appears in speech, listeners must infer that the “cup of Mars” is a shield. The 
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 I should note that my example from Shakespeare precedes the modern “tension” theory of 
metaphor developed by twentieth century structuralist critics like Richards and Ricoeur. 
134 
connection occurs implicitly instead of explicitly, and the word “shield” goes entirely 
unmentioned in the utterance that listeners hear. Similarly, hearers or readers of the metaphor 
“the shield of Dionysus” understand that the “shield” is a cup, but the word “cup” is omitted. In 
this way, metaphor as Aristotle conceived the trope involves complete substitution, so complete 
as to expunge the tenor from the very page or speech.
91
 Thus, the modern formula for metaphor, 
“X is Y,” may describe the semantic function of Aristotelean metaphor, but not its form as it 
appears on the page or as it is heard in speech.    
While Aristotle is unusual among classical authorities in treating metaphor as a genus 
instead of a species, he is entirely conventional in identifying the essential function of metaphor 
as “transference” or substitution (Poetics, 77).92 If substitution identifies the essential function of 
metaphor, then Aristotle’s purpose in defining metaphor as a genus instead of a species becomes 
clear. Since, by Aristotle’s definition, synecdoche and metonymy also function by substituting 
one word for another,
93
 they may be subordinated to metaphor as particular instances of it.
94
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 Modern theorists such as Wilson and Lodge still consider metaphor to function by substitution 
or replacement. Instead of a formal replacement, however, where the vehicle banishes the tenor 
from the very page, Wilson means a functional or semantic replacement, where the vehicle poses 
an absurd contradiction of the tenor that must be figuratively resolved.  
92
 Ricoeur argues that Aristotle “was confused” in considering transference to necessitate 
substitution. Ricoeur points out that the terms are not synonyms, and the one does not require the 
other (The Rule 19). By “transference,” Aristotle means that the figurative name for the object is 
borrowed or transferred from an “alien” domain (Poetics 77). Substitution, as I explain above, 
means that the figurative or transferred name cancels or replaces the conventional name, or that 
the vehicle banishes the tenor from the actual page. Taking the modern form of metaphor as an 
example, “X is Y,” Ricoeur argues that transference does not necessitate substitution, or striking 
the tenor from the text. As is customary in modern metaphor, the conventional and the alien 
terms may both appear on the page in explicit comparison.   
93
 Twentieth century structuralists distinguish metonymy and metaphor in that “both metaphor 
and metonymy appear to operate through replacement; however, the true replacement in 
metaphor contains the element of difference while metonymy’s apparent replacement does not” 
(Wilson 296). Note however, that the modern sense of substitution or replacement differs from 
the classical sense. The classical sense involves formal or grammatical replacement, while the 
modern sense involves functional or psychological replacement. See footnote 12, above. As well, 
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Quintilian, however, classifies metaphor, synecdoche, and metonymy independently of 
one another as separate tropes. While in so doing, Quintilian departs from Aristotle’s taxonomy 
of metaphor as simultaneously a genus and a species, Quintilian follows his predecessor in his 
insistence that metaphor operates by formal substitution (or by “banishing” the tenor from the 
page). This appears in Quintilian’s claim that “On the whole, metaphor is a short comparison; 
differing in this respect, that, in the one, an object is compared with the thing we wish to 
illustrate; in the other, the object is put instead of the thing itself” (126). If the vehicle (or 
“object”) “is put instead” of the tenor (or “thing”), then the tenor is implicit, or is absent from the 
stated comparison in the speech or on the page.   
Pertaining to metonymy, Quintilian’s Institutes is particularly helpful because it specifies 
the various forms that metonymy typically assumes. Quintilian defines metonymy as the 
“substitution of one word for another,” and identifies a number of subclasses (II.129).95 
Quintilian illustrates the first subclass, in which the inventor stands in for the invention, through 
poetic references to the Greco-Roman deities. Thus, classical poetry often speaks of Neptune in 
place of the sea (Neptune created or “invented” the sea), or Ceres instead of grain (grain is 
                                                                                                                                                             
please see my discussion later in this chapter of metaphorical difference and metonymical 
correspondence. 
94
 At this point, readers may wonder why, if metaphor as a genus functions through substitution, 
Aristotle in other writings (his Rhetoric) classifies simile as a type of metaphor. After all, a 
simile names its tenor and vehicle explicitly, and the vehicle of a simile does not replace the 
tenor in a formal sense or banish it from the page. This challenge must be admitted. All the same, 
a simile is a type of metaphor in that it makes explicit what a metaphor keeps implicit. Ricoeur 
remarks on the ways Aristotle’s taxonomy of metaphor deconstructs or “jumbl[es] classification” 
(The Rule 21). Perhaps, in violating the substitutional logic of Aristotle’s metaphoric taxonomy, 
simile contributes to this jumbling effect. 
95
 Aristotle, had he lived long enough to read Quintilian’s Institutes, might object that 
Quintilian’s definition of metonymy fails to identify any distinction between metonymy and 
metaphor. If metaphor puts “the thing” for “the object” as Quintilian claims it does, then it also 
“substitutes one word for another.” As such, Quintilian’s definition of metonymy recapitulates 
his description of metaphor.   
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Ceres’ invention). Quintilian continues to list a number of other metonymical relations: container 
for content (drinking a “cup” instead of the liquid in the cup); possessor for possession (reading 
“Virgil” instead of Virgil’s poetry); cause for effect (speaking of “rash anger” instead of a “rash 
deed” caused by anger); and plural for singular (a person’s “looks” instead of his “look”). Other 
common kinds of metonymy not mentioned by Quintilian include instrument for action 
(“knifing” someone instead of “stabbing” him) and location for thing/person (the “Stagirite” for 
Aristotle). Quintilian treats synecdoche (part-to-whole) as a separate trope.   
If Aristotle and Quintilian represent, in a general sense, the various classical 
understandings of metaphor and metonymy, then Roman Jakobson, I.A. Richards, and Paul 
Ricoeur may be taken to represent modern conceptions of these rhetorical figures, conceptions 
particularly influential in twentieth century structuralism. Roman Jakobson redefined metaphor 
and metonymy as fundamental principles of language instead of discrete figures of speech. In his 
Fundamentals of Language, Jakobson repeatedly refers to language as a code that speakers 
manipulate to create meaning. While speakers have a measure of freedom in selecting and 
combining their words, the structures within the linguistic code limit speakers’ choice, and 
speakers enjoy only those freedoms the code allows. For example, when speakers select a word, 
they must choose one word from a pool of related words. The linguistic code determines the 
pool; speakers draw from the pool. Similarly, in combining words to create phrases and 
sentences, speakers have a measure of freedom, but they must abide by grammatical and 
idiomatic conventions set by the linguistic code.  
Accordingly, Jakobson identifies two partial freedoms essential to language: selection 
and combination. In a general (and admittedly imprecise) sense, combination roughly equates to 
style while selection roughly equates to content. More precisely, selection describes a speaker’s 
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choice of elements from the linguistic code. To make this choice, the speaker surveys a network 
of synonyms, images, objects, and other “entities conjoined in the code” (61). Connections 
between things (words as well as images and objects) stem not from the individual speaker then, 
but from the code itself, and speakers sample or replicate these connections in creating an 
utterance. Selection therefore entails a choice among a limited number of possibilities. 
Importantly, since connections between things exist within the code and not necessarily within 
the utterance or even the speakers’ mind, the possibilities not selected remain possible. At a later 
point in the utterance, these heretofore unchosen possibilities may be chosen to replace former 
selections. In Jakobson’s words, “a selection between alternatives implies the possibility of 
substituting one for the other [. . . .] Actually, selection and substitution are two faces of the same 
operation” (60). 
The principle of selection finds its epitome in the figure of metaphor. In devising a 
metaphor, the speaker surveys the network of connections between objects furnished by the 
various codes (linguistic, certainly, but apparently social as well) s/he has experienced. The 
speaker replaces one object with an associated object, and the resulting metaphor recapitulates 
the structure of the socio-linguistic code from which it stems. In two ways, then, metaphor 
epitomizes the principle of selection that is active in any utterance, poetic or pedestrian. First, 
metaphor involves a choice among alternatives furnished by the linguistic code. And second, 
metaphor illustrates the suppressed salience of “entities conjoined in the code but not [yet 
conjoined] in a given [utterance]” (61).   
Combination opposes selection as the other freedom available to speakers in forming an 
utterance. If selection entails choosing among the alternatives furnished by a code, combination 
consists in arranging these elements in a comprehensible fashion. In sum, combination describes 
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a speaker’s effort to match words together and to build words into phrases and larger units of 
meaning. As does selection, combination depends upon the structures of the linguistic code.  
Beyond grammar and idioms, however, combination also applies to what Jakobson dubs 
“contiguity” or “contexture,” or the proximal grouping of associated objects and images within 
an utterance. This contiguity of objects in an utterance recapitulates associations between objects 
in the linguistic code. Ultimately, Jakobson aims not merely to account for the structure of a 
specific utterance but to analyze the structure of the linguistic code as expressed through 
utterances. In examining contexture and contiguity, then, Jakobson is as interested in the 
contiguity of objects in the socio-linguistic code as he is in the contiguity of objects in a specific 
instance of speech or writing.  
Jakobson’s discussion accordingly turns to the contexture of objects in the code of 
people’s lived experience.96 Particularly, in his examination of similarity disorder, Jakobson 
observes that while aphasic speakers may not be able to provide the conventional noun to name 
an object, they can name it according to the context within which they have experienced it.
97
 
Thus, one man that Jakobson recalls could not name a knife a “knife,” but he could identify it as 
a “pencil sharpener,” an “apple-parer,” a “bread-knife,” or a “knife-and-fork.” Even though the 
man could supply several contextual descriptions that contained the term “knife,” the man was 
unable to name the knife simply as “knife” (65). In effect, the man named the knife not through 
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 If I interpret Jakobson correctly, his implicit claim is that the linguistic code encapsulates 
collective experience, and a particular individual’s application of the linguistic code follows 
individual experience. Language and socialized experience are intrinsically linked.  
97
 Jakobson’s interest in aphasia becomes clear in his claim that aphasic speakers regress through 
the same stages through which infants progress. In studying aphasic speakers, Jakobson hopes to 
learn about language acquisition, albeit in reverse. Jakobson finds that there are two kinds of 
aphasic speakers – those who suffer from an inability to select words, and those who suffer from 
an inability to combine them meaningfully. He adduces the two-fold nature of aphasia to support 
his binary model of language as consisting of the two principles of selection and combination.  
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selection of the appropriate word, but through combination with other words. Similar to a blind 
man with an extraordinary sense of hearing, the man compensated for his inability to exercise the 
first principle of language, selection, with his extraordinary ability to exercise the second, 
combination.  
As the aphasic man’s speech implies, the combination principle finds its epitome in 
metonymy. In replacing one term with a conventionally associated term, metonymies show the 
hidden contiguities between terms within the socio-linguistic code. Given that metaphor and 
metonymy represent the two essential principles of language, selection and combination, then all 
language-making can be considered a joint exercise of the metaphorical and metonymical modes 
of speech. By Jakobson’s theory, metaphor and metonymy in their extended sense are not merely 
tropes or figures of speech, but rather are modes of language-making that subsume all tropes and 
all language production.  
A particular strength of Jakobson’s system is that it expands the domain of metaphor and 
metonymy in treating them as qualities or principles instead of grammatical tropes. Jakobson’s 
qualitative treatment of metonymy and metaphor allows him to theorize about language 
production and linguistic debility. A similar qualitative treatment has allowed subsequent critics, 
namely David Lodge and Raymond Wilson, to classify various rhetorical tropes (symbols, 
particularly) as either “metaphorical” or “metonymic.” In effect, Jakobson’s theories freed the 
terms metaphor and metonymy to be applied to literary patterns and structures of imagery that 
are not expressly metaphors or metonyms. In classical grammar, metaphor requires renaming, or 
substituting an “alien” noun in place of the conventional word for an object. Critics following 
Jakobson’s theories, however, argue that symbolic imagery can be referred to as “metaphorical” 
even if it does not expressly rename the original object.   
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A weakness of Jakobson’s system, however, is that it empties function of form. If the 
term metaphor applies to a category of language, then what should the conventional grammatical 
form of metaphor be called? What should the conventional form of metonymy be called? In 
short, if grammatical form is passed over, then what distinguishes the formal trope of metaphor 
from other tropes (particularly symbols) that function similarly by selection and substitution? 
Much the same difficulty persists for metonymy – if metonymy is a category, then what 
distinguishes the traditional trope of metonymy from other tropes that are similarly 
metonymical? 
This challenge has been taken up by later theorists, particularly David Lodge and 
Raymond J. Wilson. Wilson finds symbols to partake of both metonymy and metaphor, and 
accordingly sets forth a four-fold taxonomy of metaphorical figure, metaphorical symbol, 
metonymical figure, and metonymical symbol. As this taxonomy suggests, a symbol may be 
either metaphorical or metonymical. Wilson discriminates metaphorical and metonymical figures 
from metaphorical and metonymical symbols in that symbols work by contextual implication, 
and require an inference from the reader, while the traditional figures do not. By Wilson’s 
system, the metaphorical figure (a traditional metaphor) explicitly compares tenor to vehicle in 
the form of a grammatical sentence. A metaphorical symbol, on the other hand, operates by 
suggestion and implication, and does not explicitly link tenor to vehicle. Readers must infer this 
linkage from contextual cues within the text. Wilson also distinguishes between the metonymical 
figure and the metonymical symbol in a similar fashion, again distinguishing the two according 
to the necessity of inference. The metonymical figure relies on convention (Jakobson might say 
the “linguistic code”) to associate related terms, and consequently does not require an inference 
to be understood. Since sailors by convention are referred to as “hands,” the expression “all 
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hands on deck” does not require the reader to infer the connection between “hands” and 
“sailors.” On the other hand, if an author were to use less conventional terms (Wilson suggests 
referring to ships as “nails” instead of the conventional metonym “sails”), he would then need to 
provide systematic contextual clues to enable readers to make the association (298). Such 
systematic implication would require the reader to make an inference and would consequently 
result in symbolism.      
In contrast to Jakobson’s functional analysis of metaphor and metonymy as modes of 
language creation, I.A. Richards and Paul Ricoeur consider metaphor formally, as a grammatical 
phenomenon. By Richards’ and Ricoeur’s account, metaphor is a syntactic effect that arises from 
the tension between the subject and the predicate of a sentence. Opposing Aristotle and 
Quintilian, who considered metaphor to be a simple matter of replacing a conventional term with 
an alien word, Ricoeur writes that metaphor is an effect of “impertinent predication.” Ricoeur 
intends his term “predication” grammatically, and means that a metaphor consists of a sentence, 
not a single word, and involves an absurd or shocking disruption between subject and 
predicate.
98
 While a literal statement matches the subject with an expected or “pertinent” 
predicate, a metaphor shocks readers or listeners by linking the subject with a predicate that, 
from a literal perspective, is absurd. Ricoeur follows I.A. Richards in stressing that metaphor 
functions not just by replacing an expected predicate noun with an unexpected one, but through 
the tension generated by the total sentence, or by the disjunction between the subject of the 
sentence and its “impertinent” predicate. In Ricoeur’s words, a metaphor occurs when a speaker 
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 Granted, not all metaphors appear as sentences. Many metaphors appear as words or phrases 
instead of clauses. Thus, the expressions “mantle of sorrow” and “evening of life” are metaphors, 
even though they are not sentences. However, even if a metaphor appears as a single word or 
phrase, it implies a clause in which a subject noun compares to a predicate noun. Thus, the 
metaphor “mantle of sorrow” implies the clause “sorrow is a mantle,” and the metaphor “evening 
of life” implies the clause “life is a day” or “old age is evening.” 
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sets “two terms [. . .] in tension. And only the ensemble constitutes the metaphor. So we should 
not really speak of the metaphorical use of a word, but rather of the metaphorical utterance” 
(Interpretation Theory 50). 
As Ricoeur elaborates, “metaphor is the result of the tension between two terms in a 
metaphorical utterance” (Interpretation Theory, 50). Ricoeur presently emends this statement, 
however, observing that “what we have just called the tension in a metaphorical utterance is not 
really something that occurs between two terms in the utterance, but rather between two opposed 
interpretations of the utterance” (50). Ricoeur explains that a metaphor poses an interpretive 
crux, forcing listeners either to construe the sentence literally or to impose a figurative “twist” 
upon the literal words (50). The metaphor functions by virtue of the tension between its literal 
claim and listeners’ figurative conciliation of the literal claim. Effectively, the metaphorical 
utterance poses a literally “absurd” claim which listeners must reconcile with their understanding 
of the world. In order to effect this reconciliation, the listener allegorizes the literal claim, or 
transmutes its literal import to a figurative meaning. Thus,  
the strategy of discourse by means of which the metaphoric utterance obtains its 
result is absurdity. This absurdity is only revealed through the attempt to interpret 
the utterance literally.  [. . .] The metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal 
interpretation which self-destructs in a significant contradiction. It is this process 
of self-destruction or transformation which imposes a sort of twist on the words, 
an extension of meaning thanks to which we can make sense where a literal 
interpretation would be nonsensical. Hence a metaphor appears as a kind of 
riposte to a certain inconsistency in the metaphorical utterance literally 
interpreted. (Interpretation Theory, 50) 
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Critically, however, the literal meaning of the metaphorical sentence does not evaporate 
in the transaction. Ricoeur stresses that “it is the conflict between [the literal and the figurative] 
interpretations that sustains the metaphor” (Interpretation Theory, 50). Similarly, Ricoeur claims 
that “the metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal interpretation” (50). The “extension” 
that Ricoeur speaks of from the literal to the figurative is not a one-time event then, nor is it a 
one-way transaction. Instead, the tension of a “living” metaphor implies a continuing dialectic 
between literal and figurative interpretation. This dialectic movement between the literal and the 
figurative creates the metaphor’s essential tension and preserves its life. Contrasting live and 
dead metaphors, Ricoeur writes that “live metaphors are metaphors of invention within which the 
response to the discordance in the sentence is a new extension of meaning” (52). As soon as 
listeners cease to sense the cognitive discordance of the literal words, they also cease to make 
“new extension of meaning,” and the metaphor’s life expires with its tension. At this point, the 
now-dead metaphor “really no longer [is a metaphor] properly speaking” and “becomes part of 
our lexicon” (52).99 Contrarily, a living metaphor that retains its sense of literal absurdity 
likewise retains its tension and life. Ricoeur remarks upon the “infinite” reciprocation between 
literal absurdity and figurative conciliation, stating that “tension metaphors are not translatable 
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 Ricoeur’s discussion of living and dead metaphors recalls George Orwell’s comments about 
“dying metaphors” in his essay “Politics and the English Language.” According to Orwell, “a 
newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a 
metaphor which is technically ‘dead’ (e.g. iron resolution) has in effect reverted to being an 
ordinary word and can generally be used without loss of vividness” (255). Both Orwell and 
Ricoeur see a living metaphor as one that stirs readers to consider the concrete imagery of the 
comparison. For Orwell, the reader’s ability to see the concrete objects makes an impression that 
clarifies thought. For Ricoeur, the reader’s ability to “see” the absurdly incompatible images 
generates the necessary tension to prompt a figurative reinterpretation of the metaphorical 
utterance. A dead metaphor, on the other hand, does not induce readers to consider the tenor or 
vehicle as concrete objects. As Orwell and Ricoeur both argue, dead metaphors do not actually 
function as images. When hearing the phrase “iron resolution,” for example, few listeners 
actually picture a piece of iron. Instead, most listeners treat the two-word phrase as a single word 
with simple denotative meaning instead of figurative meaning.   
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because they create their meaning. This is not to say that they cannot be paraphrased, just that 
such a paraphrase is infinite and incapable of exhausting the innovative meaning” (52). A tension 
metaphor has “infinite” meaning because the dialectic between its literal and figurative senses 
continues without cessation. As long as the literal claim of the metaphor continues to generate a 
sensation of absurdity, listeners will continue to generate new figurative meanings.
100
  
Raymond J. Wilson, in developing his fourfold taxonomy of metaphorical figure, 
metaphorical symbol, metonymical figure, and metonymical symbol, addresses Ricoeur’s theory 
as well as Jakobson’s. Pertinent to my purposes in this chapter, Wilson adapts Ricoeur’s 
explanation of tension to express the critical difference between metaphor and metonymy. 
According to Wilson, what distinguishes metaphor from metonymy is that the hearer of a 
metaphor “discards” the vehicle while the hearer of metonymy “retains” it. Distinguishing 
between metaphorical and metonymical symbols, Wilson writes that “the reader’s mind retains 
the vehicle” of a metonymy (299). Contrarily, at an earlier point in the article, Wilson writes that 
“the reader’s mind must discard the [. . .] vehicle” of a metaphor (297). 
In describing the metaphorical vehicle as being “discarded,” Wilson offers a 
psychologically causative explanation of the process by which, according to Ricoeur, the listener 
moves from a literal interpretation of the metaphorical sentence to a figurative understanding of 
it. By Wilson’s telling, because metaphor posits a connection between two physically unlike 
things, listeners make figurative sense of the metaphor by stripping the vehicle of its concrete, 
physical meaning and reducing it to an idealized quality. As Wilson explains,  
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 Phrased as such, this aspect of Richards’ and Ricoeur’s criticism approaches reader response 
theory. It is possible to say that “the text” generates new figurative meanings instead of listeners 
or readers, but the fact that meaning stems from a sensation of absurdity implies that at some 
point a thinking human reader or listener must be involved.  
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in the sentence ‘The man is a rock,’ we assume that the reader’s mind intuitively 
and instantly rejects the literal reading since human beings have none of the 
physical hardness and inertness of rocks [. . . .] After rejecting the literal 
interpretation, the reader, guided by what Ricoeur calls the strategy of ‘absurdity’, 
finds an unexpected overlap of meaning, such as firmness of character and 
emotional stability of the man, parallel to the rock’s physical firmness and 
stability. (“Ricoeur’s ‘Allegory’,” 294-5).   
In this example, Wilson equates Ricoeur’s interpretive strategy of absurdity with 
emptying the vehicle of a metaphor of concrete or physical content. As Wilson reasons, the 
literal difficulty of reconciling a man to a rock inheres in their physical differences. The man is 
fleshy; the rock is hard. However, if the physical nature of either the man or the rock is 
transmuted to an ideal quality, the physical negation between the two objects may be superseded. 
In Wilson’s example, listeners discard the rock as a physical object, transmuting its literal 
hardness to a quality of firmness or stability which may then be applied to the man. In this 
manner, Wilson explains Ricoeur’s “self-destruction of the literal” as a discarding or emptying 
out of the vehicle’s concrete objectivity.  
Wilson’s adaptation poses several apparent discrepancies that must be resolved before his 
system can be applied. First, Ricoeur says nothing about discarding the vehicle of a metaphor.
101
 
For Ricoeur, a metaphor’s tension stems from the conflict between the metaphorical utterance’s 
literal and figurative interpretations, not between the utterance’s tenor and vehicle themselves. In 
                                                 
101
 Ricoeur does write that the “primary signification” of allegory may be “eliminated once [the 
allegory] has done its job” (56). But Ricoeur is speaking of allegory here, not necessarily 
metaphor. To be more precise, Ricoeur speaks of the “primary signification” of allegory here, 
not necessarily the vehicle of a metaphor. I do believe that Wilson is correct in mapping 
“allegory” onto metaphor and “primary signification” onto the metaphorical vehicle, but these 
developments must be scrutinized before they may be accepted. 
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Ricoeur’s words, “it is a conflict between [. . .] two interpretations,” the literal and the figurative, 
“that sustains a metaphor,” not any supposed conflict between the tenor and vehicle 
(Interpretation Theory 50). Ricoeur describes the “literal interpretation” of the metaphor (an 
interpretation which includes vehicle as well as tenor) “self-destruct[ing],” not the vehicle itself 
doing so (Interpretation Theory 50). Thus, Wilson reads “vehicle” where Ricoeur expressly says 
“literal sense.” Second, even if the self-destruction of the literal sense of a metaphor implies that 
the metaphor’s vehicle must be discarded, Wilson treats discarding as a one-time occurrence 
while Ricoeur treats self-destruction as a dialectical moment instead of a time-bound event. 
Ricoeur’s repeated assertions of the literal meaning’s importance in generating the essential life 
and tension of the metaphor suggest that the self-destruction of the literal is a reversible, 
reciprocal, and repeatable process. Contrarily, Wilson’s claim that the vehicle is “discarded” 
suggests a one-time transition from the literal to the figurative. 
However, these apparent discrepancies resolve upon further analysis. The first resolves 
readily in that Ricoeur presents a process while Wilson represents the mechanism by which the 
process works. Simply put, Ricoeur tells what readers do (exchange a literal interpretation for a 
figurative one) while Wilson explains how they do it (by transmuting the physical substance of 
the vehicle to an idealized quality). The second discrepancy, however, poses more of a problem. 
Ricoeur expressly states that a metaphor’s “life” stems from the persistent tension between its 
literal and the figurative meanings. Wilson, contrarily, makes no provision to return the 
metaphorical utterance to its literal meaning, or to recover the concrete substance of the vehicle 
upon which the metaphor’s literal meaning depends. However, Wilson’s readers should keep in 
mind that his point is not to distinguish living from dead metaphors, nor to express the dialectic 
tension that causes a metaphor’s infinite meaning. Instead, Wilson’s purpose is to distinguish 
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metaphor from metonymy. Wilson does not entertain the fluid exchange between a metaphor’s 
literal and figurative meanings, but rather identifies static differences between metaphor and 
metonymy. Accordingly, Wilson isolates one moment in the dialectic process of metaphor to 
distinguish metaphor from metonymy.    
 As a final result, Wilson’s elaboration develops several aspects of Ricoeur’s theory of 
metaphor. Primarily, metaphor juxtaposes likeness with unlikeness or “[sees] the similar in the 
dissimilar” (Ricoeur, The Rule 6). In metaphor, while a common property between two things 
may create resemblance, the things themselves are essentially distinct. Accordingly, Ricoeur 
writes that metaphor operates by “absurdity” and “semantic shock” (Interpretation Theory 50, 
“Imagination” 7). The reader observes the absurdity of a literal equation of the two compared 
things, and resorts to an “allegorical” reconciliation between them. Crucially, this allegorical 
reconciliation strips the metaphor’s vehicle (usually, the second term in a traditional or 
grammatical metaphor) of its concrete objectivity. Instead of representing a discrete object, then, 
the vehicle represents a disembodied quality. Upon first encountering the Shakespearean 
metaphor “All the world’s a stage,” for example, the reader immediately realizes the absurdity of 
supposing the world to be a literal stage, and accordingly interprets the sentence allegorically to 
mean that the world is like a stage in that much as actors play many roles, people’s identities 
change throughout life. Thus the concrete literality of the comparison’s vehicle (the stage) 
evaporates, leaving behind an allegorical comparison of the world to a certain quality of the 
stage. 
Wilson’s elaboration also develops Ricoeur’s incipient division of metaphor and 
metonymy. In truth, Ricoeur writes very little about metonymy, and Wilson’s distinction 
between the two figures presumably originated from Jakobson’s theory, with its fundamental 
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opposition of the metaphoric and metonymic modes of language creation. Nevertheless, Wilson 
ultimately distinguishes the two figures in terms of Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor, and his 
definition of metonymy consequently inverts Ricoeur’s definition metaphor.  
Ricoeur does leave a few brief hints in his The Rule of Metaphor. In a section entitled 
“Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Metaphor,” Ricoeur approbates Fontanier’s division of figures 
into “relations of correlation or correspondence,” “relations of connection,” and “relations by 
resemblance.” As Ricoeur interprets, the first relation amounts to metonymy, the second to 
synecdoche, and the third to metaphor. Subsequently, Ricoeur collapses the first and second 
relation (metonymy and synecdoche) in that they “connect objects prior to connecting ideas” 
(56). Thus, in metonymy and synecdoche, the physical, concrete objects take precedence over 
any ideal relationships between the objects. As Ricoeur concludes, “in both cases [of metonymy 
and synecdoche], one object is designated by the name of another; and in both cases, it is the 
objects [. . .] that enter into a relationship” (57). 
Ricoeur contrasts – or cites Fontanier as he contrasts – metonymy/synecdoche with 
metaphor. He writes that metaphor does not contrast objects so much as conventional ideas about 
objects. Ultimately, Ricoeur claims that “metaphors do not name, but characterize what has 
already been named [i.e., the tenor]” (57). The examples Ricoeur uses to illustrate this claim are 
instructive: “the Swan of Cambrai,” “consuming remorse,” “courage craving for peril and 
praise,” and “his seething spirit” (57, emphasis original). In each of these examples, Ricoeur sets 
aside the explicit formula “X is Y” and instead rewrites the metaphor to idealize or sublimate the 
concrete vehicle. As an idea instead of a concrete object, the evanesced vehicle “characterizes” 
the tenor. For instance, to take his final example of a “seething spirit,” the metaphor phrased 
explicitly would read something like “His spirit is a hot skillet.” As Ricoeur writes it, however, 
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the physical skillet has evaporated to a quality (seething) that characterizes spirit: “his seething 
spirit.”  
In so contrasting metonymy/synecdoche with metaphor, Ricoeur implies that the 
difference between the two classes is that metonymy/synecdoche preserves the vehicle as a 
concrete object, while the vehicle of metaphor sublimates to an ideal quality that “characterizes” 
the tenor. Wilson develops Ricoeur’s idea further, again offering a causal argument to explain 
Ricoeur’s empirical observation. As Wilson claims, much as the sublimation of the metaphoric 
vehicle results from the fundamental difference between it and the tenor (readers feel that the 
posited connection is absurd, and consequently idealize the vehicle as a quality of the tenor), the 
concrete objectivity of the metonymic vehicle results from a fundamental likeness between it and 
the tenor. To cite Wilson directly, “the true replacement of metaphor contains the element of 
difference while metonymy’s apparent replacement does not” (“Ricoeur’s Allegory” 296). When 
the vehicle of a metaphor replaces the tenor, then, a shocking or absurd difference poses a 
challenge to interpretation. Readers overcome this challenge by distilling the concrete vehicle to 
a quality that may then be applied to the tenor. However, when the vehicle of a metonymy 
replaces the tenor, no intrinsic negation or dissonance between the two objects poses any such 
challenge. The two objects fit or correspond. Accordingly, the vehicle of a metonymy may be 
retained as a concrete object and not transmuted to a characteristic.      
In fine, metaphor signifies likeness in unlikeness. Metonymy, however, to borrow 
Fontanier’s vocabulary, posits a real correspondence or connection between the physical objects, 
and accordingly compares like to like.
102
 Since metonymy compares similar things (whether 
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 I do not mean that this likeness is necessarily ontological. The “likeness” of metonymy may 
be the sequential correspondence of a cause to its effect, the spatial correspondence of a 
container to its contents, etc. My point (and Fontanier’s and Wilson’s) is that metonymy 
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similar in nature or similar in proximity), the literal meaning of metonymy need not be 
destroyed. Moreover, since a real and literal connection exists between tenor and vehicle, the 
vehicle need not be sublimated to make sense of the figure. For instance, to sample Lodge’s 
metonym “keels ploughed the deep,” readers understand that “keels” is a metonymical 
substitution for “ships,” much as “deep” is a metonymical substitute for “sea” (Lodge xiii).103 
But since the keel is part of a ship, it follows that the “keels” cross the sea just as much as the 
ships themselves do. Thus the metonym is true in a literal sense – the keels really do cross the 
deep -- and no sensation of absurdity drives readers to discard the vehicle in order to resolve the 
metonymical utterance.  
But “keel” relates to “ship” by synecdochic (part-to-whole) metonymy, or by what 
Fontanier would consider a “relation of connection.” What about other forms of metonymy, 
however, such as Fontanier’s “relation of correlation”? For example, take the spatial metonymy 
of pinning a medal to a person’s chest, or of saying that a pot or a kettle is boiling. In the first 
example, listeners understand that the medal is not literally pinned to the person’s chest but to his 
shirt. Likewise, hearers of the second example understand that the water in the pot boils, not the 
metal of the pot itself. In both of these examples, one object (chest or kettle) replaces another 
(shirt or water) based on proximity. Such spatial metonymies make a clear difference between 
literal meaning and figurative meaning. Literally pinning a medal to someone’s chest would be a 
painful and bloody affair. Likewise, the heat required to make a metal pot literally boil would be 
far more intense than any kitchen stovetop could muster. All the same, because of the general 
nature of metonymy, listeners realize that the chest and the pot/kettle literally exist and are 
                                                                                                                                                             
indicates a real or physical correspondence between objects. 
103
 Like Ricoeur and Wilson, Lodge considers synecdoche to be a subset of metonymy. In this 
example, “keels” is a synecdoche for the entire ship. But since synecdoche is metonymy, Lodge 
refers to “keels” as a metonymy of “ships.”  
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associated with the shirt and water literally and physically. The very fact that the chest and the 
pot stand in as proxies for the shirt and the water necessitates their literal and concrete existence. 
Even more, the chest and pot/kettle must exist literally to understand the figurative sense of the 
metonymy.  It is difficult to imagine water boiling without a pot or kettle to hold it; similarly, it 
is difficult to imagine pinning a medal to a shirt without a person – and a chest – filling it. Since 
the purpose of pinning a medal to a shirt is to honor the person wearing the shirt, pinning a medal 
to an empty shirt would miss the point.  
To generalize, then, metonymies do have a figurative sense distinct from their literal 
sense, but the figurative sense of metonymy does not discard the literal vehicle. Indeed, as we 
have seen through the examples above, the figurative sense of metonymy requires the literal 
vehicle. The reason for this is because metonymies associate objects that share a real and literal 
correlation or connection, whether spatial, causal, or ontological. While the vehicle of a 
metaphor is inherently unlike its tenor, a literal and actual likeness inheres between the vehicle 
and tenor of metonymy.
104
 The differences between metaphor and metonym may be summed by 
saying that metaphors compare unlike to unlike, while metonymies compare like to like.
105
    
In what follows, I adopt Wilson and Ricoeur’s distinction between metaphor and 
metonymy to assess Hopkins’ analogy between spiritual and natural energy. Specifically, I argue 
that Hopkins’ metaphors are more than metaphorical, and posit an actual correspondence 
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 Richards intended the terms “tenor” and “vehicle” to apply to metaphor, not metonymy. In 
applying these terms to metonymy, I follow Wilson’s precedent. See for instance his “Ricoeur’s 
‘Allegory’,” page 299. 
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 Following Lodge and Jakobson, Wilson describes the tenor and vehicle of metonymy as 
“contiguous” instead of “like.” “Contiguous” emphasizes spatial proximity, causal sequence, or 
(as Jakobson and Lodge use the term) psychological association, while “like’s” purview is 
broader, including contiguity but also suggesting ontological correspondence. Since I am setting 
up a reading of Hopkins’ metaphorical metonymy, “like” in all of its senses works well for my 
purposes in this paper. 
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between tenor and vehicle. In effect, Hopkins’ metaphors verge upon metonymy, and instead of 
positing likeness between unlike things, identify likeness between like things. More specifically, 
as I will argue at the end of this chapter, when Hopkins compares God’s outstress to electricity 
and fire, or the soul’s energy to magnetism, he does not merely identify an apparent similarity 
but emphasizes an essential unity. Energy for Hopkins scales the physical to the metaphysical, 
and the energy of the soul is energy, albeit of a highly subtle variety, just as much as the energy 
of electricity, light, heat, work, or magnetism is energy.  
Admittedly, in citing Ricoeur and Wilson, I am applying their theories in a way they 
would not allow. Ricoeur emphasizes the role of grammatical form in the function of metaphor, 
and probably would disapprove of confounding metaphor’s grammatical form with metonymy’s 
figurative function. Similarly, Wilson takes pains to discriminate metaphor from metonymy, and 
to distinguish metaphorical symbols from metonymical symbols. My point though is not to 
interpret Hopkins’ poetry from within the perspective of Ricoeur’s or Wilson’s systems, but to 
apply insights from Ricoeur and Wilson to Hopkins’ poetry. Specifically, I will consider 
metaphor to imply an underlying difference between tenor and vehicle and metonymy to require 
an underlying likeness between them. In sum, I argue that when Hopkins compares spiritual 
force to natural energy, what begins as metaphor often ends as metonymy, and the tension of 
like-in-unlike transitions to the differentiated unity of like-in-alike. To reword, Hopkins’ 
metaphorical figures often stretch rhetorical convention, and signify not an underlying difference 
between the things compared, but an underlying correspondence. In this manner, although the 
figures he uses may be metaphorical in grammatical form (they consist of a sentence comparing 
two apparently unlike things) they are metonymical in function, and suggest unity instead of 
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difference. Such an account of Hopkins’ metaphor applies particularly well to two of his sonnets, 
“As Kingfishers Catch Fire” and “God’s Grandeur.”  
4.3 Hopkins’ Metonymical Metaphors: “As Kingfishers Catch Fire” 
The opening quatrain of Hopkins’ sonnet “As Kingfishers Catch Fire” offers one of the 
most compressed bursts of metaphor in Hopkins’ oeuvre.106 The first line compares kingfishers 
“catch[ing] fire” in the sun’s light to dragonflies “draw[ing] flame” from the same source. The 
second line compares both kingfishers and dragonflies to stones “tumbled over rim” of a round 
well. Line three compounds the comparison, adding the additional simile of a “tucked string” 
telling its name. Line four finishes the salvo, depicting the bow-shaped path of a swinging bell 
“flinging out broad [the bell’s] name.” 
Structurally, simile and metaphor differ, and the comparisons in “As Kingfishers Catch 
Fire” should be regarded as similes instead of metaphors. The conventional definition of simile 
as “a comparison between two unlike things using the words ‘like’ or ‘as’” points out one 
distinction between the two figures. Beyond this, however, metaphor and simile differ in their 
grammatical forms. As Raymond Wilson, following Ricoeur, explains, a “metaphor is not a word 
but a full sentence with definite predication” (294). Stated alternately, a metaphor is a 
grammatical sentence in which the subject compares to a noun in the predicate, with the copular 
verb “to be” providing the necessary connection between them. In the case of a metaphorical 
conceit, the metaphor may extend throughout a poem or passage of prose, but the germ of any 
metaphor invariably consists of a single grammatical clause in which subject compares to 
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 To be precise, these comparisons are similes, yet as I discuss immediately below, most critics 
regard simile as a species of metaphor. My point in this section is to show that Hopkins’ 
metaphor, whether simile or metaphor proper, often suggests a metonymical relationship 
between the things compared. In other words, Hopkins’ metaphor and simile are unusual in that 
they do not suggest an essential unlikeness between things. Contrarily, they function like 
metonymy, and posit an underlying unity between objects. 
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predicate.
107
 The verb of the clause marks the turning or coinciding point where the two 
compared objects meet.  
The grammatical structure of simile is much looser, however. With metaphor, the fact 
that a verb links the two objects together constrains them to appear within a single clause. The 
comparison of a simile, however, often spans multiple clauses because the comparison turns not 
on the verb of a clause but rather on an adverb -- “like” or “as.” The adverb can either begin an 
adverbial phrase within a clause (“I float like a butterfly”), in which case the comparison occurs 
within a single clause; or it may begin a separate adverbial clause (“As kingfishers catch fire, 
dragonflies draw flame”), in which case the comparison spans two clauses. 
Functionally, however, simile and metaphor correspond in that they posit an apparent 
likeness between essentially unlike things.
108
 More precisely, as Ricoeur and Wilson make 
particularly clear, the vehicle loses its concrete subsistence and serves merely to highlight a 
quality of the tenor. To revisit Ricoeur’s and Wilson’s explanation of metaphor, the reader or 
hearer of a metaphor perceives the absurdity of directly likening the two objects. Consequently, 
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 Readers may object that some metaphorical comparisons are implied and not stated. By 
Wilson’s account, these comparisons are metaphorical symbols, not metaphorical figures in a 
strict grammatical sense. (See my discussion above of Wilson’s distinction between symbol and 
figure.) While this may seem like a dodge, Wilson’s point is that if a metaphor is stated 
explicitly, it will invariably take the form of a grammatical sentence comparing subject to 
predicate. Similarly, readers may object that a metaphor need not take the form of a clause at all. 
To cite an example from Ricoeur, the expression a “mantle of sorrow” is a metaphor, but it does 
not form a clause. Admittedly, this is so, but the expression implies the clause “sorrow is a 
mantle” (Interpretation Theory 50). Still other readers may object that some metaphorical 
expressions contain embedded clauses, and consequently do not consist of a single clause. 
Complex grammatical subjects, for example, often consist of a clause functioning as the subject 
of a larger clause. While this may be, the clause that expresses the comparison -- the clause upon 
whose copular verb the comparison hinges – also forms the metaphor proper. 
108
 According to Ricoeur’s history, Aristotle first posited simile as an instance of metaphor (The 
Rule 24-5). Other rhetoricians “from Quintilian onwards” reversed Aristotle’s classification and 
made metaphor a subset of simile (25). Ricoeur’s sympathies seem to lie with Aristotle in 
perceiving simile as a “developed” metaphor (25). Taxonomic hierarchies aside, Ricoeur’s 
history evidences the longstanding association of the two tropes. 
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the hearer strips the vehicle of its objectivity and allegorizes it to represent a quality of the tenor. 
Tenor and vehicle are essentially unlike as real objects, and the connection between them takes 
the form of an abstracted quality. In sum, because hearers perceive the “absurdity” of the copular 
link between subject and predicate, they “[reject] the literal” identification of the two nouns and 
substitute an ideal or semantic relation (Wilson 295). In this relation, the objectivity of the tenor 
persists while that of the vehicle evanesces.  
Simile functions similarly, with the exception that it never posits the relation as literal. 
The fact that the comparison hinges on the adverbs “like” or “as” instead of the copula “to be” 
primes hearers to expect an allegorical or abstracted relation. For simile and metaphor alike, 
then, objects compared are essentially distinct, and in order for the comparison to hold, the 
concrete objectivity of one of the objects must be superseded or allegorized. The quality that 
links vehicle to tenor is neither essential nor physical, and in the comparative relation the reality 
or presence of the vehicle is exchanged for an abstraction.     
Ricoeur’s and Wilson’s analyses highlight several idiosyncrasies of Hopkins’ tropes in 
“As Kingfishers Catch Fire.” First, the welter of comparison confounds distinction between tenor 
and vehicle. The first four lines feature five objects, and assigning primacy to one object over the 
others disrupts the poem’s logic of serial comparison. Second, the sonnet compares objects as 
they perform an essential activity of “selving.” The sonnet’s emphasis on selving forbids 
abstraction, and underscores the concrete reality of each of the five objects within the serial 
comparison. Third, in comparing objects as they “selve,” the sonnet compares not so much the 
objects themselves but the objects’ action of selving. Effectively, the sonnet compares selving 
with selving. This tautology emphasizes the objects’ underlying connection, and further 
confounds distinction between tenor and vehicle. Fourth, the sestet of the sonnet insists upon a 
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unity that legitimates -- essentially and not abstractively – not only the comparison among the 
first five objects, but also the likeness of all things in creation. Thus Hopkins’ metaphors are 
more than metaphorical, and in positing a link between things, the sonnet points not to an 
idealized or abstracted connection but a real and vital identity that inheres in the nature of things 
themselves.        
Part of what confounds allegorization is that each of the compared objects “does one 
thing and the same” (5). The first of Hopkins’ serial similes – “As kingfishers catch fire, 
dragonflies draw flame” – shows two creatures exhibiting identical behavior. As a kingfisher 
flies in the sun, his feathers catch the light and give off an iridescent glare. The glare depends as 
much upon the kingfisher’s keratinous feathers as on the sunlight itself. Accordingly, the glare 
illustrates a quality native to the kingfisher (at least to its feathers) corresponding with the sun’s 
light to produce a fiery flash. The dragonfly “draws flame” from the sun in precisely the same 
way. As it flies in the sun, its exoskeleton reflects light in an iridescent display. The hues 
reflected originate from the sunlight, but the dragonfly’s chitinous exoskeleton selectively 
absorbs some hues while scattering others. The flame that an observer sees depends not on the 
light alone then but on the properties of the dragonfly’s exoskeleton, in addition to the observer’s 
position. Although bird and insect catch the same light, the light scattered depends on the 
absorptive qualities of the keratinous or chitinous structures that cover the bird’s and the insect’s 
bodies.
109
  
Thus, the kingfisher and dragonfly charge themselves with the sun’s light – they catch its 
fire or draw its flame – and then release (or reflect) the charge in a spectacularly and 
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 The terms “chitin” and “keratin” are Victorian. The OED cites Todd’s Cyclopaedia of 
Anatomy and Physiology as the English source of both terms. “Chitin” occurs in volume II of the 
first edition (1836-9), while “keratin” occurs in volume IV of the same edition (1847-9). See 
OED, “chitin, n.” and “keratin, n.” 
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individually-distinctive display. A critical oddity of Hopkins’ similes appears here. In selving, 
the kingfisher’s and dragonfly’s actions are identical, but their identities are distinct. Thus the 
sonnet observes unity of action but individuality of being.  
Readers of Hopkins’ “Kingfisher” poem should remember the poet’s interest in 
spectroscopy.  In spectral analysis, the elemental composition of an object may be identified by 
the wavelengths of light it emits. While kingfishers and dragonflies (and non-luminescent things 
in general) do not emit light, they do absorb and reflect light. The light absorbed and reflected 
depends on the chemical composition of the bird feather, insect exoskeleton, or thing. In catching 
fire, then, the kingfisher’s feathers absorb and reflect light in a specially identifiable pattern, and 
the iridescent flash that results marks an essential quality of the kingfisher.
110
 So for the 
dragonfly drawing flame. In both cases, light stems from the same source, but is differently 
filtered by the living things it illuminates. The kingfisher’s fire and the dragonfly’s flame signify 
special being, then, and suggest the unique essence of two distinct forms. 
Grammatically, one might say that the first clause of the simile (“As kingfishers catch 
fire”) contains the comparative adverb and serves as the vehicle of the comparison, while the 
second clause (“dragonflies draw flame”) serves as the tenor. Functionally, however, since each 
clause expresses the same thing – light transforming into specially distinctive iridescence -- it 
makes little sense to prefer the one clause as more essential or concrete than the other. Another 
alternative persists, however. Potentially, the mechanics of iridescence could be the poet’s focus, 
and both the dragonfly and the kingfisher could be allegories for the properties of reflected light. 
In other words, while the poem ostensibly contrasts the actions of the dragonfly and the 
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 Interestingly, the spectral properties of bird feathers and insect exoskeletons still excite 
scientific curiosity. In a recent article published in the Nov. 21, 2011 issue of Optics Express, 
scientists measured the “refractive index of butterfly wing scales” against that of bird feathers.  
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kingfisher in catching fire and drawing light, perhaps the two are incidental to an investigation of 
the properties of light. Thus, if the poem is about light and not about creatures, the concrete 
existences of the kingfisher and the dragonfly may be allegorized away as vehicles for an inquiry 
of light.  
Yet the poem forbids this alternative as well. As the previous analysis suggests, the poem 
really is about the distinct nature or essence of creatures, and the concrete reality of the creatures 
may not be superseded. In one sense, both clauses concern light and express the same thing -- the 
way light, filtered or reflected by matter, illustrates the essential properties of that matter. In 
another sense, however, the clauses concern creatures and express different things: the first 
expresses the essential nature of a kingfisher; the second expresses the essential nature of a 
dragonfly.  
The other similes in the poem function similarly, and testify to the special nature of 
objects as witnessed by the general behavior of energy. The second simile is particularly odd, 
and performs a synesthetic transposition of sight to sound. Moreover, in this transposition, the 
second simile appropriates the first simile, annexing it as its first term.  
As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;  
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells  
Stones ring; 
Usually, a new simile in a poem will pose two new objects of comparison. But the second 
simile of Hopkins’ poem poses only one new object or class of object – the stones that ring as 
they are tumbled over the rims of round wells. The stones’ ringing compares to both the 
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dragonfly’s drawing flame and the kingfisher’s catching fire. Thus the first simile, collapsed 
together, forms the first term of the second simile.
111
 
Alternately, the two terms of the third simile, collapsed together, may be viewed as the 
second term of the second simile. Either way – or perhaps both ways -- the incomplete second 
simile suggests that comparison spills over between similes. In mathematical terms, the similes 
of the first quatrain of the sonnet may be represented as follows: (A  B)  C  (D  E), where A 
is the kingfishers catching fire; B is the dragonflies drawing flame; C is the stones ringing; D is 
the tucked string telling; and E is the swung bell flinging.
112
 Such a mathematical arrangement 
suggests that comparison acts between similes in addition to within them. Whole similes 
compare to each other much as terms within a simile compare to each other. In effect, the 
individual similes act as terms within a larger or compound simile. The fragmentary and 
incomplete nature of the second simile (containing only one term, “C”) emphasizes the fact that 
comparison spills over from one simile to another. Effectually, these compound similes further 
confound distinction between tenor and vehicle: finding the tenor of a single simile is 
problematic, but finding the tenor of the entire morass is nigh impossible. In fine, all terms in the 
quatrain are equally important, and the serial and interlocking nature of the similes preserves the 
concreteness of each term.    
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 Hopkins’ punctuation signals where one simile ends and the next begins. Commas distinguish 
objects compared within a simile, and semicolons distinguish one simile from another. Viewed 
this way, it is evident that the second simile contains only one object or “term” – the ringing 
stones tumbled over rim in roundy wells. 
112
 More specifically, considering the first simile, collapsed together, as the first term of the 
second simile yields the notation [(A  B)  C]  (D  E). On the other hand, considering the 
third simile, collapsed together, as the second term of the second simile yields (A  B)  [C  (D 
 E)]. But since neither notation is more valid than the other, the most proper construction of the 
quatrain is probably [(A  B)  C]; [C  (D  E)].  
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Hopkins’ unusual comparative structure highlights his transition from the behavior of 
light to the behavior of sound. Much as light expressed the distinctive nature of the kingfisher 
and the dragonfly, so sound expresses the distinct hardness of stones as they ring against the 
sides of the well. Again, the general behavior of energy, whether light or sound, attests the 
special character of objects. James Milroy argues that Hopkins modelled his aural similes in the 
poem after Max Müller’s “Ding-Dong” theory of language (66). By Müller’s theory, human 
language evolved from mimicking the sounds objects make when they are tapped or rapped. 
Struck sharply, an object “utters” its nature or the idea of its being: stones ring to attest their 
essential hardness, and likewise wood knocks, mud splats, and wisps whisper. For prehistoric 
human listeners, the self-distinctive sounds objects made when struck supplied a symbolic basis 
for language. Accordingly, the roots of human language reach back to a prehistorical moment 
when speakers began to apply symbolically, to circumstances and events, the sounds objects 
make when struck.    
If Milroy is correct, then once more the poem examines physical phenomena indicative of 
material composition and structure. Much as the iridescent spectroscopy of the kingfisher and 
dragonfly expresses their physical composition, so the ringing of stones “tumbled over rim in 
roundy wells” expresses their physical structure. An object’s hardness follows directly from its 
material make-up: When a hard object is struck, the ringing sound it emits witnesses its internal 
order and form. An object’s signature sound (ringing) suggests its characteristic properties 
(hardness), which in turn imply its intrinsic material composition. Again, the common behaviors 
of energy, light or sound, attest the especial nature of objects. As the fire and flame of the 
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kingfishers and dragonfly reveal their internal order, so the ringing of stones discloses their inner 
constitution.
113
  
The third simile extends from the second, again identifying objects by the sounds they 
produce when struck or stroked: “Like each tucked string tells, each hung bell’s/ Bow swung 
finds tongue to fling out broad its name” (3-4). With this simile, Hopkins’ speaker turns from 
natural objects (stones) to human artifacts, stringed instruments and tolling bells. The strings of 
an instrument are named according to the pitch they play. When a violinist, for instance, “tucks” 
or plucks a string (pizzicato), the tone that issues from the string names the string. An “E” string 
plays the musical pitch E, an “A” string plays the musical pitch A, a “D” string plays the musical 
pitch D, and a “G” string plays the musical pitch G. Accordingly, “each tucked string tells [. . .] 
its name.” Much the same applies for bells, which also may be described according to the pitch a 
listener hears.
114
 A bell’s or string’s pitch depends directly on the frequency at which the 
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 Technically, sound isn’t a distinct form of energy. Since sound consists of a pressure wave in 
a medium (air, usually, but potentially water or earth or any other medium), sound is actually an 
instance of mechanical pressure. All the same, sound is a “form” of energy in that it is an 
instance of it. 
114
 The naming of bells is complex. In an English ring of bells, bells are numbered from highest 
to lowest. A ring comprises between 3 and 16 bells, depending on the range of the ring and the 
intervals between individual bells. The highest bell in the ring (bell #1) is called the treble; the 
lowest toned, the tenor. The intervening bells are designated by the number of their place in the 
ring.   
In addition, the tenor bell is often named according to the pitch or tone listeners hear 
when it is rung. But bells do not have a single or “pure” pitch. Rather, bells produce multiple 
pitches, and the tone a listener hears depends as much upon the human sensorium as upon the 
bell itself. The predominant pitches a bell produces are called “partials,” and most bells have five 
partials: the nominal (usually unheard), the quint, the tierce, the prime, and the hum. The pitch 
most listeners hear is usually a synthesis of several of these partials. Ironically enough, this 
means that the pitch most listeners hear is not actually produced by the bell. Instead, this 
“virtual” pitch is a psychological compromise the human ear reaches to resolve the competing 
partials.  
Musicians trained in the art of analytical listening, however, may pick out the partials of a 
bell. Opposed to virtual pitch, the tone these listeners hear is called a “spectral” pitch, and 
corresponds to the pitch of one (usually the most dominant) of the bell’s partials.  
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instrument vibrates. Since the rate of an instrument’s vibration depends on its material makeup, 
as well as its shape, length, and volume, then once more sound reveals the physical composition 
and structure of the object. In terms of the simile, just as a string’s material structure determines 
the sound that it makes, so a bell’s material structure determines the sound that it makes.   
In all, Hopkins’ similes repeatedly compare how energy expresses, in a manner 
perceptible to the senses, the innate constitution of objects. In so doing, the similes emphasize 
the distinct material forms of creatures and objects. The first simile compares the way light 
energy reveals the composition of kingfishers’ feathers with the way that light energy reveals the 
composition of dragonflies’ carapaces. The second simile likens how light translates keratin and 
chiton as a flash to the eye with how sound translates stone as a ringing to the ear. Finally, the 
third simile contrasts the way a string’s physical vibration yields its distinctive pitch with the 
way a bell’s physical vibration yields its distinctive pitch. In each simile, the manner in which 
energy acts on one object to reveal its material structure to the senses compares with the manner 
in which energy acts on another object to reveal its material structure to the senses.
115
   
As the previous sentences suggest, Hopkins’ similes border on tautology. If, as classical 
grammarians have written, a simile compares two unlike objects; and if, as Ricoeur and Wilson 
                                                                                                                                                             
I have been unable to determine whether Hopkins knew of the difference between virtual 
and spectral tones. Hopkins’ knowledge of bells (campanology) and bell ringing 
(tintinnabulation) is not clear from his biographical materials. If Hopkins knew the musical 
mechanics of bells, then presumably his poem concerns spectral pitch as opposed to virtual pitch. 
Given the long history of campanology, and given Hopkins’ interest in church architecture, bell 
towers, and music generally, I would be surprised if Hopkins was ignorant of the subject, but this 
is merely my surmise. At any rate, Victorian physicists made substantial contributions to the 
theory of bells, most notably Lord Rayleigh’s “On Bells” (1890) and Hermann Helmholtz’s On 
the Sensations of Tone (German edition, 1863; English edition, 1875). 
115
 But see below. While readers understand that light illuminates the kingfisher and the 
dragonfly, and that the stone, string, and bell emit sound only if they are tumbled or “tucked,” 
Hopkins consistently treats the objects themselves as active. For Hopkins, being is active and not 
passive.   
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argue, the vehicle of a metaphorical comparison evaporates into an idea or quality, then it is 
possible to question the extent to which Hopkins’ similes function as similes. As the previous 
paragraph implies, the similes do not compare objects so much as they compare actions. In both 
halves of all three similes, a form of natural energy acts upon an object to make its intrinsic form 
sensuously apparent to an observer. Since the two actions of each simile are congruent if not 
identical, Hopkins’ similes compare like to like. Moreover, with the objects themselves in view, 
Hopkins’ similes do not sublimate from the concrete to the abstract. Instead, they emphasize 
physical phenomena which “tell” or “fling out broad” the innate material form of created things.  
These two characteristics – Hopkins’ comparison of like to like, and Hopkins’ refusal to 
abandon the concrete particular – inform the second quatrain of the octave: 
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;  
Selves – goes its self; myself it speaks and spells,  
Crying What I do is me: for that I came. (5-8). 
At this point, I should note that above when I ascribe agency to the various forms of 
energy that act upon the objects, I depart from Hopkins’ language. Consistently, Hopkins 
ascribes agency to the objects themselves. In the words of the poem, light does not act upon the 
kingfishers; the kingfishers “catch fire.” The agency of the object is even more pronounced with 
the dragonfly, which “gathers flame.” Similarly, the string “tells” and the bell “flings out broad 
its name.” For Hopkins, the object expresses its agency in being what it is. Being is not passive 
but active, and the forms of energy that act against an object merely translate its activity of being 
to a form perceptible to the senses. To be precise, then, the actions in the poem that are being 
compared are not the actions of energy but the actions of creatures and things. Each object in the 
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poem “speaks and spells” its distinct being, yet in doing so performs an activity identical to 
every other object in the poem, which also speaks and spells its being. This unity of action 
suggests an underlying unity of being that reconciles distinctions between objects. As Hopkins’ 
poetic speaker says, in “dealing out” that unique being which “indoors in each one dwells,” 
“each mortal thing does one thing and the same.”  
This action, individually distinctive yet collectively univocal, provides an initial clue to 
the sestet, and also explains Hopkins’ unusual similes. If an underlying unity underwrites the 
distinct natures of created things, or if an ontological connection legitimately exists between 
things, then for Hopkins, comparisons express the genuine unity among created things. Hopkins’ 
metaphors or similes, then, need not allegorize or banish the concrete vehicle, because the link 
between vehicle and tenor inheres not merely in the observer’s mind but in the nature of the 
things themselves. Opposed to Ricoeur, who perceived metaphor as a surface similarity between 
two inherently dissimilar things, Hopkins perceives metaphor as a surface similarity that points 
to a deeper ontological unity.
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 Comparisons between things are warranted because the things 
actually correspond, and the phenomenal linkages discovered by metaphor act as signs pointing 
to a deeper noumenal correspondence. 
Hopkins’ sestet justifies the similes of the octave, and identifies the unifying 
commonality inherent within created things – Christ: 
I say more: the just man justices;  
Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces; 
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 My claim about a “deeper ontological unity” underwriting the distinct forms of created things 
is nothing new in Hopkins’ scholarship. After James Cotter’s Inscape, this claim amounts to a 
truism. What is new about my claim is that I apply it to Hopkins’ metaphor. To my knowledge, 
the metonymical function of Hopkins’ metaphor has not been addressed by any critic. Later in 
this chapter, I will apply my discussion of Hopkins’ more-than-metaphorical metaphors to his 
metaphors of spiritual stress. 
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Acts in God’s eye what in God’s eye he is --- 
Christ. For Christ plays in ten thousand places,  
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his 
To the Father in the features of men’s faces.  
As the kingfishers, dragonfly, stones, string, and bell reveal their identity through action, the 
“just man” also has a self-distinctive and self-identifying activity. The just man “justices.” 
Justicing apparently applies to a person’s individual actions, since the parallel synonym of 
justicing, “keep[ing] grace,” applies to individual action or “goings”: “the just man justices;/ 
Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces.” In the octave, “going” (“going it self”) is  
identified with “selving.” So too in the sestet, the phrase “all his goings” likewise describes the 
just man’s process of selving. If keeping grace and justicing characterize “all [one’s] goings,” 
then these synonyms likewise apply to the actions by which one “selves” or “deals out that being 
indoors each one dwells.”  
But though “justicing” applies to the individual actions a person takes, it also 
characterizes the collective behavior of all just men and women. As in the octave, where the 
creatures’ acts of selving are individually distinctive at the same time that they are collectively 
identical, so in the sestet, the individual’s justicing marks his distinct behavior all the while it 
identifies him with others. In other words, though the “goings” of one just man may be 
distinguished by circumstance from the “goings” of another just man, a single identity underlies 
all just “goings.”  
In fine, all just men and women participate in a common identity. Given Hopkins’ 
religious beliefs, this identity is not surprising: just men and women “[act] in God’s eye what in 
God’s eye [they are]/ – Christ.” In so saying, Hopkins extrapolates the Pauline metaphor likening 
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individual Christians to parts of Christ’s body.117 As Hopkins’ poetic speaker continues, “For 
Christ plays in ten thousand places,/ Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his/ To the Father 
through the features of men’s faces.” 
In naming Christ, these lines utter the Identity underlying the similes of the octave as well 
as the metaphor of the sestet. Admittedly, the similes of the octave entertain a different sort of 
existence than the metaphor of the sestet. The octave’s similes address physical objects and 
require a material consonance between things in nature, while the sestet’s metaphor addresses 
human behavior and requires a moral consonance between the actions of just men and women. 
But for Hopkins, Christ underwrites creation materially and morally. As several critics have 
shown, Hopkins conceived of matter as a direct consequence of Jesus’ Great Sacrifice. In 
Hopkins’ poetic mythos, matter originates from Jesus going “forth from the Father [. . .] to give 
God glory and that by sacrifice, sacrifice offered in the barren wilderness [of matter] outside of 
God” (Sermons 197). Even more, not only is the material world implicit with Christ in that it 
affords him a sphere in which to offer his sacrifice, it is also instinct with his nature. Much as 
Christian tradition identifies Jesus as the “Word” or “Image” of God, Hopkins writes that “God’s 
utterance of himself in himself is God the Word [Jesus], outside himself is this world. This world 
then is word, expression, news of God” (Sermons 129). Accordingly, just as Jesus is the “express 
image of [God’s] person,” the world is an image of God as well (Hebrews 1:3). Given that Jesus 
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 See, for instance, I Corinthians 12:12-19,27 – “For as the body is one, and hath many 
members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ. For 
by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be 
bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit. For the body is not one member, 
but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand I am not of the body; is it therefore not 
of the body? And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it 
therefore not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole 
were hearing, where were the smelling? But now hath God set the members everyone of them in 
the body, as it hath pleased him. And if they were all one member, where were the body? [. . .] 
Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular.”   
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provides the world with its structure and being, the world takes form as an image of Jesus’ 
Image. Created things bear Jesus’ stamp or “mark” in their very natures, and God’s Nature 
underwrites all nature.
118
 As J. Hillis Miller describes Hopkins’ mythos,  
To say that all things are created in Christ means seeing the second person of the 
Trinity as the model on which all things are made, nonhuman beings as well as 
men [. . . .] To see things as created in Christ means seeing Christ as the Word, 
the Being from whom all words derive [. . . .] Christ is the perfection of human 
nature, but he is also the perfection of birds, trees, stones, flowers, clouds, and 
waterfalls. He is, to give the Scotist term for this concept, the natura communis, 
the common source who contains in himself all natures. (313)     
Though the octave of the sonnet concerns material objects instead of moral agents, the 
underlying unity of octave and sestet is Christ. If Christ is “the common source who contains in 
himself all natures,” then he contains the natures of kingfishers and dragonflies, and matter itself 
– stones, strings, and bronze bells – takes its nature and being from Christ’s Being.  Accordingly, 
though each material object “goes its self” and “speaks and spells” itself, it also speaks the 
underlying Nature of its being, a Nature it shares with every other being. Within the material 
world as well as the moral sphere of human action, “Christ plays in ten thousand places/ Lovely 
in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his.” 
Hopkins’ metaphorical figures emphasize this tension between an object’s unique selving 
from other objects and its collective correspondence with other objects. Because of Hopkins’ 
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 “Mark” is one of Hopkins’ favorite terms. It is a pun, and identifies nature with Christ’s Great 
Sacrifice in two ways. First, created things were made by Christ as part of his procession out of 
the Trinity into the wilderness outside God. Accordingly, matter and material objects bear Jesus’ 
maker’s “mark,” or the impress of his design. Second, fallen nature is redeemed by Christ’s 
sacrifice on Calvary and hence is identified with the stigmata, the “marks” of crucifixion.  
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ontology, two qualities distinguish his metaphors from Ricoeur’s theoretic description. First, 
Hopkins’ metaphors retain the concreteness or material substance of both objects compared. 
Hopkins’ metaphors do not need to empty the vehicle of concrete existence since his 
comparisons rely not on an allegorical but a real connection between the two (or three or four or 
five) things. Second, Hopkins’ metaphors indicate identity or correspondence instead of 
difference, while for Richards and Ricoeur, difference epitomizes metaphor. For Ricoeur, and for 
Lodge and Wilson after him, difference demarcates the territories of metaphor and metonymy. 
As Raymond Wilson summarizes his theoretic predecessors, “both metaphor and metonymy 
appear to operate through replacement; however the true replacement in metaphor contains the 
element of difference while metonymy’s apparent replacement does not” (296, italics original to 
text). In other words, the hearer of a metaphor “replaces” or banishes the concrete vehicle in 
favor of the tenor because tenor and vehicle are essentially different, and a literal connection 
between them is absurd. Metonymy, however, operates by semantic consonance instead of 
dissonance. While one term may replace another, the selected term does not banish the replaced 
term. Rather, the latter term preserves the former in the mind, and even suggests it to the mind. 
Given the spatial, causal, or proportional correspondence between the two terms, the one 
suggests the other.    
If difference marks metaphor (or simile), and consonance marks metonymy, then by 
Ricoeur’s, Lodge’s, and Wilson’s definition, the figures in “As Kingfishers Catch Fire” may be 
similes formally but they are metonymies functionally. Crucially, tenor and vehicle share in a 
common ontological substratum – Christ – and correspond to each other as parts within a larger 
whole. Thus, the apparent similarity posited by the metaphor points to an actual correspondence 
between the things themselves, and Hopkins’ metaphor consequently lacks the absurd dissonance 
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that compels readers to empty the vehicle of concrete objectivity. Thanks to the vehicle’s actual, 
literal, physical correspondence to the tenor, a correspondence that exists in reality and prior to 
the metaphorical relation, the vehicle persists as an object in its own right, and compares to the 
tenor as another part within the larger, interrelated whole.  
Such, I argue, is the nature of Hopkins’ metaphor in “As Kingfishers Catch Fire.” Yet 
since Hopkins’ other poems similarly express Christ’s universal presence, and likewise stem 
from his poetic mythos of the Great Sacrifice, I propose taking “As Kingfishers Catch Fire” as a 
primer for Hopkins’ metaphor generally. Accordingly, in the next section of this chapter I will 
read “God’s Grandeur” in a similar fashion as I read “As Kingfishers Catch Fire.” Specifically, I 
will consider the relationship between tenor and vehicle, or between God’s grandeur and the 
energies of the mundane world, in the poem’s metaphorical conceit. Much as the tenor and 
vehicle in “As Kingfishers Catch Fire” correspond as parts within a larger whole, so in “God’s 
Grandeur,” God’s outstressed power and the powers of nature correspond as forms of energy 
within Hopkins’ integrated cosmos.   
4.4 Outstress and Energy: Hopkins Integrated Cosmos 
As we have seen in “As Kingfishers Catch Fire,” the correspondence among creatures 
themselves and between creatures and Christ stems from the Great Sacrifice. So too does the 
correspondence, in poems like “God’s Grandeur,” among forms of energy and between energy 
and outstress. In his devotional writings, Hopkins defines the Great Sacrifice as the origin of all 
creation, of the metaphysical (or aeval) realm of angels and spirits as well as of the physical 
realm of stars and planets and bodies of matter. Hopkins’ universe includes these realms equally, 
and neither is more native or proper to the created world than the other. Likewise, God’s creative 
energy (his “outstress”) circulates generally, permeating both realms.  
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According to his notes on the Long Retreat of 1881, creation or the cosmos is a means to 
an end, a measure to furnish the Son a place and a body for sacrifice.
119
 In Hopkins’ Trinitarian 
theology, “the Son of God [goes] forth from the Father [. . .] in the eternal and intrinsic 
procession of the Trinity” (197). Thus, the Father generates the Son in eternity, and the Son is 
coeval and co-eternal with the Father. So far Hopkins accords with mainstream Catholic 
doctrine. But Hopkins, drawing from Duns Scotus, extends the Son’s trajectory outside the 
Trinity with his question “Why did the Son of God go thus forth from the Father not only in the 
eternal and intrinsic procession of the Trinity but also by an extrinsic and less than eternal, let us 
say aeonian one? To give God glory and that by sacrifice” (197). One might say that Hopkins 
attributes to the Son an affective momentum. Given a motion forth from God within the Trinity, 
the Son carries this motion outside the Trinity. The motion itself? Love for the Father and the 
desire to “give God glory and that by sacrifice.”  
Accordingly, the Son goes forth into “the barren wilderness outside of God” to offer 
sacrifice (Sermons 197). The wilderness outside of God is presently barren because it has not yet 
been filled or created. However, as he journeys into the wilderness to offer sacrifice, the Son 
populates the wilderness, and forms and fills the barren wilderness with life. In Hopkins’ words, 
Christ “create[s] angels to be his company, lambs to follow the Lamb” (197).120     
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 Most Christians see creation as the cause of Christ’s incarnation and sacrifice. By this view, 
Christ was born to die in order to redeem his fallen world. However, as Christopher Devlin 
explains, Hopkins “saw creation as dependent upon the decree of the Incarnation, and not the 
other way around” (109). Jesus created the world so that he might enter it, take on material form, 
and offer himself as a sacrifice to the Father. Devlin also notes that Hopkins believed Jesus’ 
sacrifice was originally intended to be bloodless. The original point of sacrifice was not to 
cleanse sin, since sin did not exist. Rather, the point of sacrifice was for the Son to express his 
love for the Father through voluntarily self-descent. To humble himself by taking on material 
form was sufficient – blood was not required.  
120
 Hopkins distinguishes between the Son in eternity and Christ in the world. Essentially, Christ 
is the incarnate Son. Note that Christ’s incarnation dates not to his birth in Bethlehem. Rather, in 
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As Christ progressively incarnates himself in the barren wilderness, he creates creatures 
according to the nature he takes on.
121
 When Christ incarnates himself within the aeonian or 
angelic realm, he takes on an angelic nature and creates the angels to be as he is. Similarly, when 
Christ presses into the wilderness beyond the aeonian realm and into the physical realm, he 
further incarnates himself as a being with a physical and material body. Accordingly, he creates 
more creatures to be as he is now: physical and material. Thus Christ’s creatures partake of his 
nature in that what they are is what Christ made himself to be. To rephrase, their nature (physical 
or angelic) is the nature that Christ originally made for himself, and only afterwards extended to 
them. Thus, the angelic order and angelic beings originate from the nature that Christ made for 
himself to be; likewise, the material order and material beings originate from the nature that 
Christ made for himself to be. In this way, as the “Kingfishers” sonnet shows, Christ is the 
substratum of all existence, and underwrites the nature of every individual thing. His incarnate 
nature is expressed through the individual natures of all things.
122
  
Christ’s creates his creatures to participate in his Sacrifice. Hopkins writes, “they were to 
take part in the sacrifice and he was to redeem them all” (197). In this sacrifice, however, neither 
                                                                                                                                                             
the sense of time, his incarnation is incremental, and began with or before his creation of the 
angels (the aeonian order) when he first ventured into the wilderness outside God. In this sense, 
Christ’s birth as a baby is the culmination of his incarnation, not the beginning of it. Of course, 
in God’s “order of intention,” Christ is eternally incarnate, since the will of God was always for 
him to be so (Sermons 196). 
121
 In terms of literary genre, Hopkins’ Great Sacrifice narrative might be classified as a 
Scholastic romance. Several of Hopkins’ sermons and poems describe Christ as a chivalric Hero. 
Furthermore, Christ’s incarnation takes the form of an episodic quest, the climax of which is 
sacrifice and the resolution glory. Nor is the Hero without companions, for he “create[s] angels 
to be his company” (Sermons 197). 
122
 Granted, Hopkins composed his notes on the Great Sacrifice during the Long Retreat of 1881, 
while he composed “As Kingfishers Catch Fire” several years earlier, most likely in 1877 
(MacKenzie, Reader’s Guide). As such, the Great Sacrifice may have developed from the 
intimation of the sonnet and other poems like it. At any rate, the sonnet and the Great Sacrifice 
concur in establishing Christ as the substrate of all created beings.   
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Christ nor his creatures were intended to die. Rather, the Sacrifice consists in an act of love, a 
voluntary humiliation “which would have taken place in one form or another whether or not 
there had been any sin” (Devlin 109). As originally intended, Christ’s humiliation involved no 
further debasement than that the creator would take material form and become his own creature, 
conformable to the rest of his creatures. Yet beside humiliation, the Sacrifice also entails 
exaltation, for Christ and his creatures. In humbling himself, Christ glorifies the Father, who then 
glorifies his Son for his supreme act of supererogatory obedience. Likewise, the creatures 
themselves are glorified in Christ, and in participating with Christ in his voluntary humiliation, 
are elevated with him in his exaltation. Thus, by participating with Christ in his Sacrifice, the 
creatures become God the Son’s companions and co-participants. Ultimately, the Great Sacrifice 
is a mechanism of cosmic uplift, and has a two-fold purpose: to give God glory through self-
sacrifice, and to elevate God’s creatures to God-worthiness. Hopkins writes,  
They were to take part in the sacrifice and he was to redeem them all, that is to 
say / for the sake of the Lamb of God who was God himself God would accept the 
whole flock [. . .]; for redeem may be said not only of the recovering from sin to 
grace [. . .] but also of the raising from worthlessness before God (and all creation 
is unworthy of God) to worthiness of him, the meriting of God himself, or, so to 
say, godworthiness.” (Sermons 197) 
Effectively in the Great Sacrifice, God lowers himself to his creatures, and then lifts his creatures 
to himself.  
But the sacrifice is progressive, and trends downward or outward from God before it 
returns upward or inward to him. After creating the aeonian realm of the angels, Christ moved 
further into the wilderness, intending to create the physical world of matter. At this further 
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humiliation, Hopkins writes, Satan rebelled: “But when Satan saw the mystery and the 
humiliation proposed he turned back and rebelled” (197). Thus the Great Sacrifice explains the 
origin of the cosmos, spiritual and material, as well as the origin of sin.  
The Great Sacrifice also explains the origin of energy. At each stage of the Great 
Sacrifice – at Christ’s incarnation within the aeonian realm and his creation of the angels; at his  
incarnation within the physical realm and his creation of material objects and beings; at Christ’s 
incarnation as a baby in Bethlehem; at his ultimate sacrifice on Calvary; and finally in his Real 
Presence in the Eucharist – Jesus introduces “stress” to the world, or “outstresses” power from 
himself within the world.
123
 The ultimate unity of natural energy and spiritual force stems from 
this “outstress.” Outstress, as Hopkins defines the term in his notes to Great Sacrifice, is an 
exertion of God’s power “outside himself” (Sermons 197). Since Hopkins held God to be 
infinite, it may seem odd for Hopkins to conceive of anything outside God, but Hopkins follows 
Christian orthodoxy in holding nature, creation, or the cosmos (these terms are perfect synonyms 
for the devout Hopkins) as external to God in the sense that nature does not partake of God’s 
being.
124
  
Outstress, like many of Hopkins’ key terms, shuttles between material and energetic 
signification. Thus, the expression “an outstress” or “the outstress” applies equally well to the 
created object as it does to the creative power by which the object came into being. Since the 
object results from the power, Hopkins applies the same phrase to object and power alike, 
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 The difference between outstress and instress appears to be a matter of perspective. God or 
Jesus outstresses power from himself. The power outstressed from God is instressed into 
creation. For a somewhat expanded description of this, see below.   
124
 Matter (and spirit) partakes of Christ’s created being, since matter (and spirit, too) is the 
nature that Christ created for himself to take on. However, creation does not partake of the nature 
of the Trinity. Christ, containing both natures in one within himself, mediates between the 
Trinity and creation. 
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presumably to emphasize the causal relation between them. When using this term, it should be 
remembered that “outstress” signifies being or energy outside and apart from God’s nature. 
Given that created things are outstresses from God, they are distinct and separate from his being. 
Similarly, the energy that God outstresses to his creation is just that – energy resident in creation 
that God separates or stresses outwardly from himself. Accordingly, when Hopkins speaks of 
outstress, he does not mean the infinite and eternal power of God at rest beyond time and the 
cosmos. Rather, he means energy that originates from God but has been stressed outwardly or 
severed in some way from the Trinity to act within time and within creation.
125
    
Hopkins’ sonnet “God’s Grandeur” establishes the analogy between God’s “grandeur,” or 
his outstress in creation, and the various mundane forms of energy within creation.
126
 According 
to the well-known opening lines of the poem, “The world is charged with the grandeur of God./ 
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil.” The imagery of “charged” and “flame out” 
possesses metaphoric resonance in suggesting electricity and light, but the first grammatical 
metaphor in these lines occurs with the predicate “like shining from shook foil.”127 Not only is 
this metaphor the first in the poem, it is the central figure of the poem and poses an interpretive 
crux. If this figure is a metaphor functionally as well as formally, then it posits a surface 
similarity between God’s grandeur and the “shining” light, all the while preserving an essential 
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 See Sermons, 197 and 129. Both passages emphasize that outstress is an application of power 
“outside” of God. In describing the Great Sacrifice, Hopkins equates “outstress” with an 
“intention [. . .] of God outside himself” (197). Similarly, in his meditation on the meaning and 
purpose of the world, Hopkins emphasizes that “God’s utterance [. . .] outside himself is this 
world” (129, my emphasis). 
126
 For now, I will assume that grandeur is a synonym of outstress. My reasons for doing so will 
become apparent when I discuss the sonnet’s sestet. Given that God’s grandeur and the Holy 
Spirit’s creative “brooding” have an identical effect in that they charge and restore the world, 
God’s grandeur should be considered as a manifestation of his creative power, and hence an 
instance of his outstress.  
127
 Technically, “like” makes the figure a simile. Again, however, simile is a subset of metaphor. 
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distinction. On the other hand, if this formal metaphor drifts into functional metonymy, it 
suggests an essential unity between grandeur and light, and by extension between God’s 
outstress and the energies of the natural world.  
Grammar provides the first clue. Pertaining to the sonnet’s opening lines – “The world is 
charged with the grandeur of God./ It will flame out like shining from shook foil” -- various 
critics have observed that the antecedent for “it” is unclear, and that the pronoun “it” may refer to 
either “the world” or “the grandeur of God.”128 Unless Hopkins lapses here (hardly conceivable 
for such a painstaking poet), the ambiguous antecedent poses an initial connection between 
divine grandeur and the “charged” world. This connection between divine and natural energy 
becomes more explicit in the rest of the second line. If “it” refers to “world,” then the world, 
charged by God’s grandeur much as a battery is charged by an electrical current, breaks forth in 
flames and flashes of light (or “lightning,” according to an earlier draft of the poem). However, if 
“it” recalls “the grandeur of God,” then the grandeur of God manifests in physically energetic 
form, much as fire and light are physically energetic forms. In short “world” and “grandeur” 
express one another through the medium of energy. If the world flames and shines, it does so 
because it has been energetically charged by God’s grandeur. If grandeur flames and shines, then 
in doing so it expresses its nature as consonant with the energies of the natural world.
129
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 “World” has a grammatical advantage over “grandeur” in that “grandeur” is an object of a 
prepositional phrase (“with the grandeur of God”).  Nevertheless, in actual English speech and 
writing, pronouns frequently refer to objects of prepositions. “Grandeur,” on the other hand, has 
a positional advantage over “world” in that it is the closest noun to the pronoun “it.” Given 
Hopkins’ love of double meanings and uncertain syntax, it might be best to assume that both 
“world” and “grandeur” are intended as alternate antecedents.  
129
 And also consonant with forms of energy closely studied by Victorian physicists. The line “it 
will flame out, like shining from shook foil” evokes a number of forms of energy: heat (of the 
flame), chemistry (the flame’s combustion of oxygen), electricity (an earlier draft of the poem 
read “like lightning from shook foil”), and light (“shining”). From the 1790s through the 1840s, 
physicists like Rumford, Davy, Orsted, Faraday, Mayer, Joule, and others indicated the 
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Yet while the first two lines establish the analogy between God’s outstress (his grandeur) 
and natural energy, they do not define the nature of this analogy. At first blush, this analogy may 
appear entirely metaphorical. While the Bible tells of instances when God’s presence takes 
energetic form -- storms, lightning, columns of fire, etc. – such miracles are rare and intermittent. 
Likewise, the sonnet itself forbids accounting for God’s grandeur solely through miracle, treating 
the grandeur of God as an ongoing and ever-present “charge.” If “it” in the third line (“it gathers 
to a greatness”) refers to “grandeur,” then God’s grandeur gradually but steadily accumulates, 
drip by drop “like the ooze of oil/ Crushed.” From this, Hopkins conceives of grandeur primarily 
as a gathering of everyday grace, not an explosive dam-break of miracle.  Importantly, while the 
verbs in the octave of the poem describing human activity are frequently present perfect (“have 
trod,” “is seared,” “[is] bleared” “[is] smeared”), denoting past actions with present 
consequences, the verbs in the sestet stemming from the Holy Spirit’s activity are present tense 
(“lives,” “springs,” “broods”), and imply continual action in the present. As such, the “charge” of 
God’s grandeur includes miracles of flame and lightning and light, but more often attests God’s 
continual and everyday presence in the world.  
Yet although God’s grandeur does not usually appear as literal flames and lightning and 
light, the subsequent lines of the poem nevertheless treat it as an energy active within and 
necessary to the physical processes of the cosmos. The analogy of the poem is not merely or 
“just” metaphorical. Instead of comparing two dissimilar things, as in metaphor or simile, the 
analogy of the poem associates God’s grandeur with other forces in nature that are similarly 
energetic. Accordingly, the poem’s analogy operates not by metaphor but by metonymy, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
interconvertibility of these forms of energy. In the 1850s, Thomson, Clausius, and Rankine 
articulated their predecessors’ findings as a coherent theory, the central tenets of which found 
expression as the laws of thermodynamics.  
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grandeur, light, electricity, magnetism, heat, and work are associated because of an underlying 
connection or unity.
130
 In short, God’s grandeur, or his “outstress” in creation, is not like energy. 
It is energy, energy in its subtlest and most pervasive form in creation.     
Hopkins’ metonymy gathers force throughout the poem. In the first quatrain of the 
octave, his ambivalent antecedents “the world” and “the grandeur of God” provide an initial hint. 
If both “the world” and “the grandeur of God” are energetic systems, then either may be said to 
“flame out, like shining from shook foil.” Yet while the first quatrain oscillates between the 
energies of outstress and the natural world, the second quatrain addresses yet another application 
of energy, namely humanity’s ability to harness natural energy in industrial production:  
Generations have trod, have trod, have trod; 
And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil;  
And wears man’s smudge and shares man’s smell: the soil  
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod. (5-8) 
Echoes of the first quatrain reverberate in this second. The natural energies of fire and 
heat reappear in the world “seared,” “bleared,” “smeared,” and “smudge[d]” by industrialized 
trade. These images remind readers of pollution from coal and wood fires that heated factory 
steam engines. Thus the flames of “the [natural] world” and “the grandeur of God” in the first 
quatrain become the coal fires and sooty “smudge” of the second. If God’s grandeur charges 
nature in the first quatrain, industrial mis-production denudes it in the second. The world, so 
fecund at the octave’s beginning, “is bare now” at its end (8). Tragically (the word is not too 
strong when speaking of Hopkins’ feeling for the “sweet especial scene[s]” of nature), trades 
“sears” both the landscape and the human conscience. While the “soil is bare,” the sole is shod, 
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 See my earlier discussion of Hopkins’ “strict” metonymy. Again, Hopkins’ metonymy 
functions according to Fontanier’s “relationship of connection.”  
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and human sensibility, blunted and estranged from nature by the luxuries of industrial 
production, cannot feel its guilt.      
If the first quatrain considers the ways God’s outstress “charges” the natural world, the 
second considers the ways industrial society “spends” (or misspends) this charge (1, 9).131 
Together, in reducing divine, natural, and human activity to the substratum of energy, the first 
and second quatrains correspond, and instantiate the underlying unity of energy within creation. 
Much as the energies of the natural world correspond with God’s grandeur in the first quatrain, 
so in the second quatrain industrial power corresponds -- in one sense -- to God’s grandeur in 
that it also is a manifestation of energy. The irony in the second quatrain stems from a 
juxtaposition of the divine origin of industrial power, the “grandeur” of God that charges the 
natural world and that is subsequently harnessed by industry, and the debased end of industrial 
society -- the filth and “illth” that results from industrialized production.132 As Hopkins writes in 
another sonnet, “the inmate does not correspond”: the human “inmates” of industrial society, 
gifted with power from Nature and ultimately God, fail to correspond with their gifts, selfishly 
squandering them and polluting their world (“The Valley of the Elwy” 11).  
Yet the second quatrain is not mere moralization. In context with the first quatrain’s 
depiction of the world as a “charged” battery, the waste and misspending of this charge in the 
second quatrain instances a peculiarly Victorian anxiety concerning the implications of 
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 As various critics, most notably Norman MacKenzie, have noted, “charge” is a pun. The 
world is charged by God’s grandeur as a battery is charged by an electrical current, but the world 
is also charged as a subordinate is charged by a superior. The word charge simultaneously 
expresses a quantum of energy and a quality of obedience. In essence, to squander the provision 
(the “charge” of energy) is to disobey the command (the “charge” to duty). 
132
 “Illth” is Ruskin’s term from Unto this Last (105). Ruskin uses it as the antonym of “wealth.” 
For Ruskin, “Illth” does not mean poverty. Instead, if “wealth” describes riches that tend to life 
(grain, bread, practical clothing, lumber and housing materials, etc.), then “illth” describes riches 
that tend to death – luxury goods and systems of production that enslave the worker to enrich 
proprietors and consumers.   
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thermodynamics’ second law. According to the first law of thermodynamics (see chapter 1), if 
energy can be neither created nor destroyed, then the energy within a closed and isolated system 
must be constant. Energy can change form (from electricity to magnetism as Oersted found; from 
magnetism to light as Faraday found; or from electricity, magnetism, and work to heat as Joule 
and others found) but it cannot be annihilated. However, the second law holds that while energy 
cannot be destroyed, it progressively becomes less available for use in a closed system. Given 
that energy disperses, a system’s energy diffuses evenly over time. In that system’s final state, its 
energy will be too diffuse and too uniform to be used. If the physical universe is a closed system, 
then the second law predicts that at some future time, the stars will burn out and the universe will 
no longer support life.  
In previous chapters (see 1 and 2 particularly), we have seen William Thomson, Rudolf 
Clausius, and W. J. M. Rankine as they struggled to articulate the first and second laws of 
thermodynamics during the early 1850s. Their efforts represent a distinctly Victorian 
contribution to science, and chime with the industrial concerns over thrift, waste, and efficiency 
characteristic of the Victorian era. Anxiety over the laws of thermodynamics appears in many of 
the writings of scientific and scientifically-inclined authors from the time. Recently, critics have 
observed thermodynamic traces in the works of a surprisingly diverse array of authors. Barri J. 
Gold, in her insightful monograph ThermoPoetics: Energy in Victorian Literature and Science, 
surveys the import of the first and second law of thermodynamics for such authors as Tennyson, 
Spencer, Bulwer-Lytton, Dickens, Wilde, and Stoker. Similarly, Jude Nixon, in his “‘Eternity 
and the Vesture of Time’: Carlyle, Thermodynamic Discourse, and Apocalyptic Anxieties,” 
examines Carlyle’s scientifically-informed philosophical anticipation of the laws of 
thermodynamics. No Victorian writer, however, with the exception of practicing scientists 
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themselves, was so centrally concerned with thermodynamic science as was the priest of instress, 
the Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins. A bevy of critics, including James Leggio, Gillian Beer, 
Daniel Brown, Jude Nixon, Marie Banfield, and Hazel Hutchison, have demonstrated the integral 
reliance of his poetics on contemporary thermodynamic theory.   
Most students of Victorian culture regard Darwinian naturalism as the central scientific 
discourse of the era. Yet many Victorians – particularly scientific Victorians – subordinate 
natural history to natural philosophy.
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 To quote no less a luminary than John Tyndall himself in 
his famous Belfast Address of 1874, “In our day grand generalizations have been reached. The 
theory of the origin of species is but one of them. Another, of still wider grasp and more radical 
significance, is the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy,” articulated as the first law of 
thermodynamic science (Tyndall 45). Tyndall continues to explain the importance of this 
“doctrine”: if all forms of energy express a single, underlying unity, then all science or all study 
of the natural world remarks the manifold permutations of this univocal force.
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 Essentially, all 
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 See my discussion in Chapter 1 of the ways Victorian physicists sought to extend their empire 
to govern chemistry, sociology, biology, and evolution. Tyndall himself participates in this 
imperial effort, arguing that the principle of the Conservation of Energy “bring[s] vital as well as 
physical phenomena under the dominion of that law of causal connexion which, so far as the 
human understanding has yet pierced, asserts itself everywhere in nature” (45). Subsequently, 
Tyndall explains that the law of Conservation of Energy (i.e., the first law of thermodynamics) 
was “applied in the first instance to inorganic” matter by physicists, but has “rapidly embraced 
organic nature” (45).   
I should note that Tyndall himself was a physicist and may have reflected an occupational 
bias in esteeming natural philosophy over natural history. Yet other Victorians, most notably 
Herbert Spencer, recreate the same prioritization. For Spencer, the principles of energy or force 
as described by natural philosophers condition all historical development, whether natural or 
social.   
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 In this paragraph, I use force and energy as synonyms in deference to Tyndall’s usage. The 
relationship between these terms was contested, however, and marked the vitriolic machinations 
of the North British School and the X Club against each other. North British scientists Thomson, 
Tait, Stewart, Rankine, Maxwell, Hamilton, and others defined energy as the general term and 
force as a particular application of physical energy to change the motion of an object. The X 
Club, however, comprising Tyndall, Huxley, and Spencer among others, favored force as the 
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science becomes physics, the study of the transformation of force. Botanists study energy’s 
permutations from solar light to chemical chlorophyll; biologists study the pathways by which 
the energy of chemical bonds is released in digestion and stored in the tissues of the body; 
psychologists study the fine impulses of energy within the nerves and brain responsible for 
sensation and thought; and even sociologists (Tyndall names Herbert Spencer) account for 
human relations according to the thermodynamic laws of energy.     
If Tyndall in his 1874 speech explains the central importance of thermodynamics for 
Victorian science, William Thomson, in an 1862 article written for MacMillan’s Magazine, 
explains the importance of thermodynamic science for Victorians in general. Thomson in his 
brief article creates a theology of thermodynamics that not only set physics in relation to religion, 
but that also expresses a cultural anxiety generated by thermodynamic discovery: entropy, 
specifically the death of the sun.
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 In his article “On the Age of the Sun’s Heat,” Thomson, later 
Lord Kelvin, estimates the point at which the sun will expire. Thomson calculates that the sun, 
upon first forming, held enough energy to light and heat the earth for 10-100 million years. He 
concludes ominously: “As for the future, we may say, with equal certainty, that inhabitants of the 
earth cannot continue to enjoy the light and heat essential to their life for many million years 
longer unless sources now unknown to us are prepared in the great storehouse of creation” (393). 
                                                                                                                                                             
general term. An author’s choice of energy versus force was perceived as a shibboleth marking 
sympathy with either the X Club or the North British School. That fact that these terms were 
territorial markers appears in the letters and writings of P. G. Tait, who on several instances 
lambasted authors for unwittingly using the “wrong” term. 
135
 The word entropy describes the tendency of energy to disperse evenly throughout a closed 
system. In other words, entropy describes the tendency of energy to become “dissipated” 
(Thomson’s term) and unavailable for use.  
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However, Thomson’s introduction tempers his conclusion. In his introduction, Thomson 
reasons that since life began by God’s “overruling creative power,” it will be upheld by God’s 
power as well. In Thomson’s words,  
It is also impossible to conceive either the beginning or the continuance of life, 
without an overruling creative power; and, therefore, no conclusions of dynamical 
science regarding the future condition of the earth can be held to give dispiriting 
views as to the destiny of the race of intelligent beings by which it is at present 
inhabited. (356) 
Such a claim, particularly in an article centrally concerned with the origin and duration of 
the sun’s life-giving energy, positions God’s “creative power” and the energies of the cosmos in 
close relation. While Thomson does not equate God’s creative power with the other forms of 
energy in the world, he does posit a causal relationship between it and them. Given this 
introduction, Thomson’s final words in his concluding sentence -- “unless sources now unknown 
to us are prepared in the great storehouse of creation” – accrue greater weight and certainty. No 
matter the age of the sun’s heat, Thomson trusts in the “creative power” of God to sustain life, 
not in the energy stored in the sun.    
Hopkins’ sonnet to God’s grandeur shows a similar anxiety about energy, and expresses a 
similar trust in God’s creative power. While Thomson addresses the ravages of entropy, Hopkins 
makes sinful industrial society implicit with entropy in “dissipating” the natural energies of the 
world that God entrusted to humanity to husband.
136
 Like entropy, industrial waste disperses 
energy for naught, producing death and illth instead of life and wealth. Additionally, entropic 
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 “Dissipation” is Thomson’s term, but Hopkins’ linkage of entropy with Satan and sin (see 
below) signals his concurrence. For a discussion of the moral implications of Thomson’s 
terminology, see Crosbie Smith, The Science of Energy, pages 101-2 and 110-11.  
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production decreases the amount of energy available for future production. In the imagery of the 
sonnet, humans have trampled nature underfoot: After “Generations have trod, have trod, have 
trod” the earth with their hard-“shod” feet, the soil “is bare now” and incapable of producing 
more (5, 8). “Seared by trade,” and “bleared, smeared with toil,” the earth at the end of the 
octave appears exhausted and depleted (6).    
In the sonnet, industrial waste or the denudation of the world functions as a type of 
entropy. But as a type, industrial excess also corresponds to sin. Immediately before the second 
quatrain’s catalog of industrial excess, the sonnet’s narrator questions “Why do men then now 
not reck his [God’s] rod?” (4). Given this introduction, the second quatrain’s account of 
industrial waste appears as an instance of dis-reckoning God’s rod, or rebelling against his rule. 
Accordingly in the logic of the poem, industrial mis-spending of energy is both entropy and sin. 
Entropy and sin are figuratively linked, then, but what form does this figure take? Does entropy 
merely represent sin, in the figure of a metaphor, or is entropy physically or causally related to 
sin, in such a way that a concrete relationship obtains? In short, is entropy a metaphor or a 
metonymy for sin?  
In linking sin and entropy, Hopkins is not entirely original. Rather, he follows scientific 
language and the general Victorian virtues of thrift and economy. William Thomson, the 
prominent physicist and co-locutor of the laws of thermodynamics, applied the word 
“dissipation” to describe the workings of entropy. Like Hopkins, and like Victorians in general, 
Thomson felt a deep responsibility to apply God’s gift of energy appropriately. As Crosbie Smith 
writes,  
[Thomson’s] resolution [to articulate efficiency criteria for industrial machines] 
rested upon a fundamental conviction that ‘everything in the material world is 
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progressive’. The directional flow of energy through space offered human beings 
the opportunity of directing, though not restoring, the mighty gifts of the Creator, 
the energies of nature. . . . Human beings had a duty to employ [industrial] 
engines for the benefit of mankind and in aid of its commercial and moral 
‘progress’. Failure properly to direct and harness those gifts of energy was 
therefore only a waste, and in that sense a sin of ‘dissipation’. (Smith 101)   
In one sense, dissipation describes the way energy disperses within a system. But as 
Smith observes, “dissipation” also carries the connotation of moral degeneracy, of prodigality 
and riotous living. Waste for Victorians, and for Christians in general, is a moral matter. 
Dissipated energies are symptomatic of moral dissipation. Particularly for the ecologically-
conscious Hopkins, industrial pollution and spoilage would have been a direct violation of God’s 
first command to human beings to “dress and keep” the Garden. Furthermore, in industry’s 
collusion with entropy to “dissipate” the divine energies invested within nature, industrial mis-
production appears all the more egregious.  
In allying sin and entropy, Hopkins’ poetry chimes with Victorian culture. The 
association appears even more explicitly in Hopkins’ spiritual writings. Jude Nixon observes that 
Hopkins in his notes on the Great Sacrifice depicts “the Devil [as the] architect of entropy” 
(“Death Blots” 137). While Hopkins does not use the word “entropy” in these notes, Nixon is 
nevertheless correct. Much of Hopkins’ notes are devoted to explaining Revelation 12, in which 
the “great red dragon” attempts to devour the child of the woman in the wilderness. Hopkins 
interprets the red dragon as Satan, the woman as Mary, the child as Jesus, and the wilderness as 
the world of matter. As Hopkins explains, Satan, knowing God’s plan to incarnate the Son within 
matter, made plans to forestall the incarnation by eliminating the human race. In Revelation 12, 
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the red dragon vomits a river of water from his mouth to sweep the woman away, but the earth 
preserves her by swallowing up the flood. As in the Wreck of the Deutschland, Hopkins typically 
interprets rivers as symbolizing passage of time, and he follows this pattern here in his 
meditation. Already in the present meditation on the Great Sacrifice, he has compared time to 
“the Sea of Galilee, which has the Jordan running though it and giving a current to the whole” 
(196).  
Accordingly, Hopkins interprets the dragon vomiting the river from its mouth to “[mean] 
that Satan, who is the cosmocrator, the worldwielder, gave nature all an impulse of motion 
which should destroy human life” over time (198). Apparently, this impulse was death. But it 
was death in a much more virulent form than humanity currently experiences, for the world, in 
sympathy with humanity, swallowed up the river “to digest and distribute it throughout, making 
[the world] still habitable for man” (198). The material world engorged Satan’s curse, dispersing 
the curse throughout its bulk in order to preserve humankind from taking the full brunt of Satan’s 
rage. Presumably, had the world not done so, Satan’s mordant curse would have worked death 
too rapidly within the human frame to allow reproduction and propagation of the species. 
Thus the world drinks death from the serpent’s mouth.137 Accordingly, Hopkins considers 
the symbolic meaning of a coil or spiral-shape of a serpent. As Hopkins muses, “A coil or spiral 
shape is then a type of the Devil, who is called the old (or original) serpent, and this I suppose 
because of its ‘swale’ or subtle and imperceptible drawing in towards its head or centre, and it is 
a type of death, of motion lessening and at last ceasing” (Sermons 198).138 Yet in considering the 
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 Hopkins switches between referring to Satan as a dragon and as a serpent. As Hopkins 
explains, “a dragon is a serpent with any addition you make” (199). 
138
 Once more, Hopkins’ penchant for concrete figures appears in this passage. Notice that the 
coil is a symbol and not merely a metaphor for death and Satan. When Satan appears in the form 
of a serpent, he is a coil, and moves by coiling and uncoiling his body. While it may be argued 
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coil as a figure of death, Hopkins does not restrict death to humans or sentient beings. Rather, 
Hopkins speaks of death as a principle of energy within nature, of “motion lessening and at last 
ceasing.” In short, Hopkins speaks of death as entropy.  
Hopkins’ equation of death with entropy appears in his subsequent figure likening 
creation to a machine. In this, Hopkins overtly tailors his account of creation to the language of 
thermodynamics, energy, and entropy. In his Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire (1824), the 
French engineer Sadi Carnot described a hypothetically perfectly efficient machine as being 
completely reversible. In such a machine, no power would be lost to friction or heat conduction. 
Since the machine lost no power in its forward stroke, it would retain the same amount of power 
to work in reverse. Working backwards, then, the machine could accomplish the same amount of 
work as it did working forwards, without needing any additional fuel. William Thomson adapted 
Carnot’s Reflections in his articulation of the second law of thermodynamics. Essentially, 
Carnot’s machine defied entropy, and lost no energy as heat through friction or conduction. 
Carnot’s machine was perfectly efficient – a true perpetual motion machine.  
In the present passage, Hopkins likens creation as God originally intended it as a 
similarly perfect machine, capable of perpetual motion. Hopkins proceeds to explain that “God 
gave things a forward and perpetual motion; the Devil, that is / thrower of things off the track, 
                                                                                                                                                             
that Satan is not truly a serpent, and that serpents are merely metaphors for Satan, such an 
argument sidesteps the manifest imagery of Genesis, Revelation, and Hopkins. Neither is a coil 
merely a metaphor for death. In its behavior of “subtle and imperceptible drawing in towards its 
head or center,” a coil enacts the lessening motion of entropic death. A coil then is a 
metonymical symbol or a sign, not a metaphor, and instantiates death in physical and concrete 
terms. 
Hopkins in this meditation also casts the earth and the material world in a figurative 
relationship. Hopkins explains “[Satan] was foiled, cast from heaven, and left master only of the 
material world, by a figure the earth” (198). The “figure” that Hopkins describes here is 
synecdoche. The earth is a part of the material world. Once more, Hopkins’ figures and analogies 
are rarely mere metaphors, but usually partake of a substantial or concrete identification. In such 
a passionate devotee of the Real Presence, such an estimation of figures makes sense.  
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upsetter, mischief maker, clashing one with another brought in the law of decay and consumption 
in inanimate nature” (Sermons 199). As God originally ordained creation, it was a perfectly 
efficient machine, entirely free of friction and capable of running perpetually without loss of 
available energy. Yet Satan damages God’s machine, warping and bending its parts to grind 
against each other and to produce friction. Satan “clash[es] one [part] with another,” and the 
resulting loss of energy as the machine’s parts grind upon each other makes the machine 
imperfectly efficient.
139
 Gradually, the machine’s motive force will be leached away through 
friction as unusable heat, and over time it will slow and stop. Thus, if the word is a machine, 
Satan is a devilish mechanic bent on stalling the device.
140
  
The entropic friction of death that Satan introduces to the world effects all created matter, 
“[bringing] in the law of decay and consumption in inanimate nature, death in the vegetable and 
animal world, moral death and original sin in the world of man” (Sermons 199). The total wages 
of sin may be summed in one word: entropy. Entropy causes the inanimate world to waste and 
decay, brings death to plants and animals, and corrupts the nature of human beings.  
                                                 
139
 The trope of grinding, groaning machinery clashing together recurs in Hopkins’ Dublin 
sonnets. Invariably, the machine’s frictional inefficiency forecasts its demise. In “Patience, Hard 
Thing,” the poet portrays the human heart as a friction-fraught machine, observing that “we hear 
our hearts grate on themselves: it kills to bruise them dearer.” That the heart is a “failing” 
machine appears more forthrightly in “To His Watch” when the speaker likens his beating heart 
to his ticking watch, and wonders “shall I earlier or you fail at our force”? Another grinding 
machine appears in “Spelt from Sibyl’s Leaves,” where the world is a torture machine -- a “rack” 
-- upon which “thoughts against thoughts in groans grind.”     
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 In this figure of world to machine, Hopkins again avoids mere metaphor. If the world 
genuinely does operate according to mechanical principles as Victorian science claimed it did, 
then the world truly is a machine. When the Enlightenment authors first compared creation to a 
clock or watch, they may have been invoking metaphor. But Hopkins and his Victorian 
contemporaries truly regarded “all nature as mechanical” (Journals 252 ). Nature was not like a 
machine; it was a machine.  
In effect, then, Hopkins compares a large machine (the world) to a small machine (an 
industrial engine). The comparison hinges on scale, not likeness in difference. Once more, the 
comparison is metonymy instead of metaphor.  
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If entropy and sin are figuratively related, the figurative relationship is not merely 
metaphorical. For Hopkins, entropy is the universal instantiation of sin’s final cause, and 
signifies sin as an effect signifies its cause. Sin causes entropy, and thus entropy stands in for sin 
by metonymy of effect for cause. Moreover, entropy is the sign or symbol of sin, the physical 
manifestation of sin in the material world. Sin and entropy are not merely like each other in 
certain respects, then, but are wholly identified with each other. By Raymond Wilson’s 
definition, entropy is Hopkins’ “metonymical symbol” for sin (“Ricoeur’s ‘Allegory’” 297-9). 
Once more, Hopkins eschews metaphor for a more concrete and physical analogy.        
Repeatedly in Hopkins’ writings, energy sublimes from the physical to the metaphysical, 
passing from the one state to the other and reconciling both as aspects of a single integrated 
universe. Accordingly, the first quatrain of “God’s Grandeur” accounts for God’s outstress as a 
form of natural energy much like electricity, light, or heat. Importantly the likeness between 
grandeur and other forms of energy is not metaphorical. Rather, the analogy depends on 
metonymy, and God’s outstressed grandeur relates to electricity, heat, and light as one form of 
energy relates to another. Similarly, in Hopkins’ spiritual journals, entropy is the metonymical 
symbol of sin, including the sinful waste of natural energy by misguided industrial production. 
Much as natural energy instantiates God’s creative outstress, so entropy instantiates sin.  
While the sestet of Hopkins’ sonnet answers and overturns the octave in several ways, it 
also follows from the octave in representing energy’s permeation of the physical and the 
metaphysical. In order for the healing power of the Holy Spirit’s “warm breast” and “bright 
wings” to reverse the onslaught of industrial mis-spending (and by extension, the world’s loss of 
energy to entropy), this power must be energetic. In other words, the Holy Spirit’s outstress must 
be communicable with natural energy, or with electricity, light, heat, magnetism, and work. The 
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regeneration of the world that the poem describes is physical and spiritual at once, and depends 
upon the interposition of physical energy to counteract entropy and entropic industy.
141
 
As we have seen, William Thomson trusted life’s preservation to the “overruling creative 
power” of God (356). Hopkins, in the sestet of his sonnet to God’s grandeur, expresses a similar 
faith that despite industrial waste and even more broadly, despite entropy itself, God’s creation 
and the vital energy within his creation will persist:  
And, for all this, nature is never spent; 
There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;  
And though the last lights off the black West went 
Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastwards, springs – 
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent 
World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings. (9-14) 
To closely paraphrase the sestet, nature is never spent because there “lives” a “dearest 
freshness” deep down in things. Far from a commonplace or castaway term, the verb “lives,” 
together with the expression “deep down,” suggests that “dearest freshness” identifies a vital 
energy or force – instress. Furthermore, if the instress resident within and intrinsic to objects 
descends from the outstress by which God created the world of objects, then the difference 
between outstress and instress is a matter of perspective. The power that God outstressed from 
himself into the world is the same power that he instressed into his creatures at their creation and 
which he continues to instress in maintaining their being. In the words of the sestet, the dearest 
freshness that lives deep down in a thing is simultaneously the thing’s own instress and God’s 
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 As a caveat, please review my discussion of “outstress” on pages 45-46. I do not mean that 
Hopkins viewed the substance of God himself as physical or natural, or that Hopkins viewed the 
eternal power and deity as conformable to nature. Instead, I mean that the power that God’s 
outstressed into creation was a bona fide form of energy.  
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outstress. God’s outstress is the creature’s instress, much as Christ is his creatures in Hopkins’ 
“Kingfisher” sonnet: “Christ plays in ten thousand places,/ lovely in limbs, lovely in eyes not his/ 
to the Father through the features of men’s faces” (“Kingfishers” 12-4). If each individuated 
being is an expression of Universal Being, then each creature in its innermost identity expresses 
an aspect of God’s nature.142  
Similarly, the vital energy or instress of each object stems from the vital energy that God 
outstresses to the world. Thus, “nature is never spent,” “there lives the dearest freshness deep 
down things,” and “morning over the brown brink eastward springs” because “the Holy Ghost 
over the bent world broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.” Much as God’s 
grandeur figures in the first quatrain of the octave in physically energetic terms as charging and 
flaming and shining, so the Holy Ghost figures in terms of heat (warm breast) and light (bright 
wings). The “dearest freshness” deep down in things is supplied by the creative energy from the 
Holy Ghost.  
Yet just as ontological “freshness” depends on the Holy Spirit’s warm breast and bright 
wings, so do the “never spent” energies of nature. The Holy Spirits’ outstress is not merely an 
ontological or metaphysical force. Contrarily, if the octave threatens the extinction of physical 
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 Much the same conclusion may be drawn from Hopkins’ expression “dearest freshness.” 
Typically in Hopkins’ poetry, the one that he calls “Dear” or “my dear” is God or, more 
specifically, Jesus. “The Windhover,” for instance, is addressed “to Christ our Lord.” In the 
second tercet of the sestet, Hopkins apostrophizes Jesus as “ah my dear.” A similar apostrophe 
appears in “In the Valley of Elwy” when Hopkins implores “God, lover of souls, swaying 
considerate scales,/ Complete thy creature dear O where it fails,/ Being mighty a master, being a 
father and fond.” While “dear” evidently modifies “creature,” it can also be considered an 
apostrophe addressing God. In other instances, however, “dear” unambiguously modifies 
creatures. In “Binsey Poplars, the speaker mourns “my aspens dear” that have been “all felled, 
felled, … all felled.” Similarly, the intercessory speaker of “Henry Purcell” prays for the spirit of 
Henry Purcell, “so dear to me.” Yet given that Hopkins views the inscapes of creation as “word, 
expression, news of God,” the dear qualities of creatures express the nature of Hopkins’ dear 
Lord (Sermons 129).  
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energy due to entropy and wasteful industry, then the energy resupplied by the Holy Ghost must 
also be physical. In the logic of “God’s Grandeur,” the Holy Spirit replenishes not merely a 
spiritually drained world, but an energetically drained world, a world depleted by entropy and 
industrial misspending. In order for the Holy Spirit’s outstress to be restorative, the warmth of 
his breast and the brightness of his wings must be physically communicable in terms of natural 
energy.    
4.5 Summary 
In the beginning of this chapter, I observed a distinction commonly made in Hopkins’ 
scholarship among spiritual, psychological, and physical stresses. This distinction stems from 
Hopkins’ poetry, namely his frequent metaphors linking spiritual and psychological energy to 
physical stress. If the relationship between metaphysical and physical stresses is “merely” 
metaphorical, then critics legitimately distinguish the two categories.  
Contrarily, I argue that Hopkins’ metaphors are often more than metaphorical. In contrast 
to the normal operation of metaphor that Ricoeur describes, Hopkins’ metaphors often lack the 
absurd negation of tenor and vehicle. In a typical metaphor, the absurd negation between tenor 
and vehicle forces readers to reinterpret figuratively the metaphor’s literal claim. To effect this 
figurative reinterpretation, readers empty the vehicle of its concrete objectivity and transmute it 
to a semantic quality that may be applied to the tenor. Hopkins’ metaphors, however, lack this 
absurd negation, and tenor and vehicle correspond readily in a literal and concrete sense. To put 
it baldly, Hopkins’ metaphors are often more (or less) than metaphorical, and often make literal 
claims. While Hopkins’ metaphors are conventional in form, they are unconventional in 
function. If Hopkins’ vehicles pose no absurdity and retain their concrete objectivity, then by 
Ricoeur’s theory they provide no impetus to abstract the metaphor’s literal claim. 
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The strangeness of Hopkins’ metaphors stems from the unusual ontology compressed 
within in his poetic mythos of the Great Sacrifice. The ontological correspondence of created 
things in Christ authorizes metaphoric comparison. Accordingly, in “As Kingfishers Catch Fire,” 
the semantic relations posited by metaphor point to a deeper consanguinity stemming from 
creatures’ participation within Christ’s universal nature.  
But Hopkins’ metaphors apply to energy as well as to matter. In “God’s Grandeur,” 
Hopkins compares divine outstress with natural forms of energy. Once more, the Great Sacrifice 
authorizes metaphorical comparison. If physical energy originates from the outstress of Christ’s 
progressive incarnation in the Great Sacrifice, then not only does all physical energy correspond, 
but divine or metaphysical outstress corresponds with physical energy. Energy is not confined to 
relations between material objects, but rather scales from the physical to the metaphysical. Much 
as Christ’s universal being finds expression within the specially distinct forms of creatures, so 
his outstress finds expression in the physical forms of energy – light, heat, magnetism, 
electricity, and work. In all, Hopkins’ is an integrated cosmos: not only is the metaphysical 
immanent within the physical, but the same order shapes the seen and unseen world alike. 
5 HELL IS ENERGY: SCAPES, INSTRESS, AND HOPKINS’ ENERGETIC MODEL 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
The present chapter extends from the previous, and explores the role of energy in 
Hopkins’ literary representations of subjectivity. Particularly, this chapter will compare Hopkins’ 
term instress to contemporary brain and aether science. It will ultimately argue that instress 
should be understood as a form of energy mediating body, matter, and substance generally.   
 “Body,” “matter,” and “substance” are complex terms, and the extent of their overlap 
varies depending on the author one reads. Hopkins, as a Catholic and a special devotee of Duns 
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Scotus, would have been familiar with the Scholastic treatment of these terms. In Scholastic 
philosophy, substance acts as the most general term and applies to all that exists, whether 
physically (as matter) or metaphysically (as mind, soul, and perhaps even God). Matter forms a 
subset of substance, then, and characterizes all that exists physically or materially, as opposed to 
all that exists metaphysically or immaterially. Body is the most specific term, and may be 
defined as an arrangement of material substance. In plant and animal bodies, the arrangement is 
orchestrated to promote life throughout the body’s parts. However, nonliving objects may also be 
referred to as “bodies,” provided they exhibit some principle of coherence, combination, or 
arrangement. Effectively, body may be taken as a particular instance of matter. 
The trouble with “body,” “matter,” and “substance” begins when entities typically treated 
as immaterial are considered materially, whether as matter per se or as somehow analogous to 
matter in composition or function. This was the trouble characteristic of what Alan Richardson 
calls the “Romantic brain science” of the late eighteenth century through the nineteenth century: 
the immaterial mind was made conformable to the material brain and body. This was also the 
trouble characteristic of aether theories of the same period. In several regards, in its 
imponderability, incompressibility, fluidity, rarity, and imperceptibility, aether approached 
immaterial substance. Yet in other regards, particularly in its capacity to transmit energy, aether 
was the substrate of all material processes. Accordingly, the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
sciences of brain and aether illustrate the quandary of distinguishing between physical and 
metaphysical existence. 
William Cohen sees this troubling trend in Victorian literature generally as ghosts, souls, 
and psychology began to be discussed in increasingly material terms. While Cohen recognizes 
that many Victorian writers cherished “spiritual aspirations [. . .] such as a Christian afterlife and 
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an immortal soul,” he argues that these authors consider the soul as “interior to the individual,” 
closed up within and in some mysterious way substantially consonant with the fleshly body (131, 
xi). While Hopkins was not a materialist, he nevertheless was sensitive to this trend, and he 
responded to its challenge (see his “The Probable Future of Metaphysics” for one). In this 
chapter, I argue that while Hopkins takes metaphysical substance at face value, he nevertheless 
situates the metaphysical realm in the same universe as the physical. In Hopkins’ writings, the 
laws of energy govern the physical and metaphysical worlds alike, and energy spans 
substance.
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Specifically, this chapter will compare Hopkins’ psychology to Victorian brain science, 
and his vision of hell to scientific models of the aether. Both comparisons show energy 
mediating physical matter and metaphysical substance. Pertaining to Hopkins’ theory of mind, 
Hopkins insists that thought begins not in the physical brain but in the spirit, and thus “the 
activities of the spirit are conveyed in those of the body” (287). In accord with nineteenth 
century brain science, however, Hopkins admits that the embodied brain plays its necessary part, 
and that the “images” or “scapes” within the mind are “in fact physical and a refined energy 
accenting the nerves” (Oxford Essays 307). Likewise, in his meditation on hell, Hopkins 
acknowledges that the pain the souls in hell feel must be “imaginat[ive],” since the souls are 
disembodied and have no bodies with which to feel (Sermons 136). Nevertheless, Hopkins 
describes hell as a torture machine that sets souls on fire through friction by setting them 
“texturally at stress” within two opposed fields of energy (136). In its unabashedly mechanical 
functioning, albeit a mechanical functioning the preserves space for metaphysical existence, the 
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 However, it should be remembered from chapter 4 that while Hopkins’ metaphysical world 
includes angels and the souls of human beings, it does not include God. As uncreated, God’s 
Being rests outside and beyond creation. 
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hell Hopkins depicts resembles several nineteenth century scientific models of aether. In fine, 
this chapter compares’ Hopkins conceptions of mind and soul to contemporary scientific theories 
of psychology and aether, arguing that in either case, energy mediates material and spiritual 
substance.    
5.1 Review of Scholarship 
A handful of critics have observed the physically energetic nature of Hopkins’ instress. 
Gillian Beer surveys Hopkins’ knowledge of physical science, and reads “That Nature is a 
Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection” and “The Blessed Virgin Compared to 
the Air We Breathe” as analogues of contemporary developments in thermodynamics and optics. 
Similarly, D.C. Haggo interprets the resurrection in “Heraclitean Fire” as a chemical reaction 
which changes the speaker’s carbon (his “matchwood”) to “immortal diamond.” John Gordon, 
explicating “The Windhover” in terms of Victorian meteorology and electricity, describes the 
synergy between falcon and speaker in terms of the charge between cloud and sky at the moment 
of thunderstrike. Likewise, Marie Banfield interprets “Spelt from Sybil’s Leaves” as a vision of 
thermodynamic apocalypse, observing a simultaneous decomposition of energy and order as the 
selves in the poem steep and pash together. And most recently, Hazel Hutchison scans the 
metrical stresses of Hopkins’ verse for correspondence with theories of stress in Victorian 
physics, showing both the poetic and the scientific enterprise as engaged in expressing “the 
problem of whether sequences and laws within language as in nature are objectively 
apprehended or imposed on the riot of sensory experience available to the individual mind” 
(231). 
While the aforementioned critics read Hopkins’ poems against developments in 
nineteenth century energy science, three critics – James Leggio, Daniel Brown, and Jude V. 
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Nixon -- stand out for defining the term instress as a form or field of energy. James Leggio, 
writing in 1977, was the first to my knowledge to observe that “a number of [Hopkins’] 
undergraduate poems deal with entropic conditions,” or translate the newly-enunciated second 
law of thermodynamics into poetic terms (60).  As Leggio explains, the second law describes the 
tendency of energy in any closed system to transform into heat and disperse throughout that 
system.  Since the universe is a closed system, albeit on a grand scale, the second law describes 
the way heat radiates from hot regions of the universe – stars, primarily, but also the planets 
close to stars or with atmospheres sufficiently dense to hold heat – into space. As interpreted by 
Victorian physicists, the second law of thermodynamics points to a final and universal 
consummation when the heat of the cosmos will be uniformly distributed throughout all matter.  
The warm regions of the world will equalize with the cold, and the resulting temperature will be 
too low to sustain life.  Not only this, but since energy flows from high to low concentrations, a 
universally uniform concentration of heat will effectively forbid all movement, transfer, and 
process, and the universe will “[decelerate] [. . .] to a dead stop” (Leggio 57).  
Leggio accordingly interprets several of Hopkins’ undergraduate poems – “A fragment of 
anything you like,” “I am like a slip of comet,” and “Summa” – in terms of the entropic 
apocalypse predicted by Victorian physicists.
144
 Yet in Hopkins’ later poems, Leggio sees an 
opposing principle at work, one that maintains God’s creation by replenishing the energy lost to 
the cold wastes. Leggio identifies this principle as instress, claiming that far from being a poetic 
fiction or metaphorical cipher, instress in Hopkins’ poems describes a real and literal force, an 
                                                 
144
 I should note that I have suppressed here the understated but influential quandary regarding 
Hopkins’ knowledge of physical science as an Oxford undergraduate. For my discussion of this 
quandary, please see chapter 3. 
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interposition of energy direct from God. The chief sources of instress, Leggio claims, are 
Christ’s historical Incarnation and his ongoing incarnation as the Real Presence in the host:  
The language with which Hopkins describes the Incarnation and the Blessed 
Sacrament suggests that he senses in them a theological counter to the predictions 
of the new astrophysics [or thermodynamics]; the transformation of bread and 
wine into body and blood provided a model for change that served as an 
alternative to the physicist’s model of thermodynamic relations. (63)  
While Leggio here treats the instress of incarnation as analogous to (“as a model for”) 
actual energy, he later phrases his argument much more directly: “The Incarnation brings energy 
from outside into the closed entropic system we call the universe” (64). Instress then is divine 
power translated to physical energy. Furthermore, in preserving God’s creation from heat death, 
instress is a physical analog of spiritual grace. As Leggio writes, “The action of grace 
compensates for a spiritual condition resembling the diffusion of heat energy. God’s grace is 
analogous to the fire: without it the soul, and the universe, cool. Grace puts new energy into the 
system and keeps it going” (62).  
Daniel Brown also observes the likeness of grace to instress, observing that “grace is [. . 
.] equivalent to ‘divine stress’” (261). As discussed in chapter 3, stress for Brown is an 
ontological force by which objects come to be and maintain their hold on being.
145
 Given that all 
particular beings originate from Jesus’ universal Being, or – phrased alternately – that 
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 There are actually two opposed types of stress, flushing and foredrawing. As Brown 
describes, objects consist as particular iterations of universal Being. Universal Being “flushes” 
all things, but each object “foredraws” to form its discrete self. If flushing and foredrawing are 
opposed stresses, instress describes the unique balance of stress (flushing vs. foredrawing) that 
results in the particular object. Accordingly, stress in its total sense is a field of ontological force, 
and flushing and foredrawing are opposed types of stress within this larger field. Instress, 
furthermore, is a specific configuration of stresses – a specific balance of flushing and 
foredrawing -- within the field of stress. 
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“ontological force” simply renames God’s power outstressed at creation, the “divine stress” that 
Brown describes is a field of spiritual force suffusing all creation and maintaining the being of 
each created thing. If stress is a field of divine force, then an instress is a particular point of 
energy within this field: “Instress can be represented [. . .] as a discrete point, a knot or vortex, of 
energy in the field of being, and particular stresses, such as those of grace or the epistemological 
‘stem of stress’, as lines of force in this field” (238).  
In likening Hopkins’ “divine stress” to a field of spiritual force, Brown finds cultural 
analogues in the field theory of Michael Faraday and the aether theory of James Clerk Maxwell. 
As Brown writes, “Hopkins’ [. . .] physical principle of stress [. . .] strongly suggests the [. . .] 
field [theory] that Faraday pioneered,” which was subsequently adapted to Maxwell’s 
“mechanical model for an ether” (238). Brown argues that in Hopkins’ model of reality, instress 
and nature stand in relation to Faraday’s field and Maxwell’s aether: much as Maxwell’s aether 
is the medium through which Faraday’s field acts, so nature is the medium of through which 
instress acts. Particularly, nature bridges the distance between God and human beings, and 
mediates or carries God’s outstress – grace -- from Him to his creatures. Thus Brown observes 
that in “Duns Scotus’ Oxford,” the “’Towery city and branchy between towers’ has its 
intervening spaces filled with energetic commotion” (241). In “Spring,” the lightning-stroke of 
the thrush’s song travels to the listener’s ear through the “echoing timber” of the wood (242-3). 
Likewise, in both the Wreck of the Deutschland and “The Virgin Mary Compared to the Air We 
Breathe,” God’s sunlight travels through the liquid blue of the May-month’s sky (243-4). As 
Brown explains, given that the various energies – the commotion, the lightning-stroke, the light 
of the sun – in these scenes are instances of instress or “divine stress,” then nature is the medium 
in which the field of divine grace acts to draw percipient observers to their Creator.   
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An aspect of Brown’s analysis bears further comment. While Brown likens Hopkins’ 
religio-poetic philosophy of instress in nature to Faraday’s and Maxwell’s physical theories of 
energy, the comparison remains elusively metaphorical. Brown repeatedly relates the 
philosophies of the poet and the physicists in analogical terms: “Hopkins’ identification [. . .] of 
stress forms an ontology that strongly suggests the mechanistic concept of the field”; “Instress 
can be represented according to the ontology of Faraday’s theory”; “Nature is often depicted by 
Hopkins in a suggestive analogy to the dynamic principle of the physical field”; (238, 238, 241 
my emphasis). So prefaced, Brown’s analysis treats the overlap between Hopkins’ instress/nature 
and the Victorian theories of energy/aether as metaphorical, when Hopkins’ consistently 
energetic descriptions of instress seem to call for a more direct and literal equation. In simple 
terms, Brown treats physical energy as an analogy for spiritual instress, as if the physical and the 
spiritual worlds are ultimately separate and distinct. Following Leggio and Nixon (see below), I 
will argue that for Hopkins, the spiritual and the physical belong to a single, integrated universe. 
Much as Hopkins’ scientific contemporaries were rapidly unifying the various energies in nature 
as various forms of a single, pervasive force, so Hopkins posits spiritual instress as yet another 
manifestation of nature’s power.  
Jude Nixon seconds James Leggio and Daniel Brown. Like Brown, Nixon discusses 
stress as a field of force. While Brown’s analysis remains ambivalent, however, whether instress 
is physical energy or merely analogous to it, Nixon forthrightly identifies Hopkins’ instress with 
the energies of nature, specifically with electromagnetic energy. As Nixon explains, “Hopkins 
assumes that electromagnetic energy, seminal fluid or ‘instress,’ flows from God” (144). And 
like Leggio, Nixon asserts that through instress God infuses the world with new energy to 
compensate for that lost to entropy:  
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Hopkins’ [cosmic] economy relies on ample supplies of energy to counter 
entropic degradation [. . . .] To stave off entropy and to preserve caloric 
equilibrium, Hopkins employs Joule’s Great Architect [God] who maintains the 
world’s energy supplies – ‘morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs--- / 
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent / World broods with warm breast and with 
ah! bright wings (146).  
Thus the energy of the natural world ultimately stems from God, continually radiating out from 
him as electromagnetic instress to recharge the world from entropic dissipation.  
This chapter takes its cue from Leggio, Brown, and Nixon, and will be motivated by two 
objectives. First, it will consider Hopkins’ psychology, drawing from nineteenth century “brain 
science” to show that for scientifically-minded Victorians, the energies of the embodied mind 
and the immaterial spirit were closely akin to the other energies in nature.
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 Second, extending 
from Brown, this chapter will set Hopkins’ energetic conception of hell against contemporary 
Victorian models of the electromagnetic aether.   
5.2 A Meditation on Hell: Hopkins’ Mechanical Model of Spiritual Instress 
“I wake and feel,” one of the most “terrible” of Hopkins’ sonnets of desolation, includes 
this bleak autobiographical portrait:  
I am gall; I am heartburn. God’s most deep decree 
Bitter would have me taste: my taste was me;  
Bones built in me, flesh filled, blood brimmed the curse. 
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 I do not mean to argue that Hopkins was a monist. He was without question a dualist. Yet in 
Hopkins’ dualism, energy in its various manifestations partakes sufficiently of immateriality and 
materiality to mediate between the two states of being. Particularly, the “spiritual energy of 
instress” (alternately known as the “energy or instress with which the soul animates and 
otherwise acts in the body”) is an exceedingly refined form of energy that acts upon the spirit or 
mind (Sermons 137). 
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Selfyeast of spirit a dull dough sours. I see  
The lost are like this, and their scourge to be 
As I am mine, their sweating selves; but worse. (9-14) 
What makes the hellish curse of the sonnet so damning is its source. Although the curse 
may be enforced by “God’s decree,” it arises internally and ultimately becomes synonymous 
with the speaker’s selfbeing. God decrees that the speaker will taste bitterness by tasting bitter 
himself. Ultimately, the bitterness that the speaker tastes is his own being or “selftaste.”147 The 
speaker’s very bones “build” his curse, his “flesh fill[s]” the bitter tankard of self, and his “blood 
brim[s]” the tankard to the full. Like the “lost” souls in hell, the speaker’s punishment – his 
“scourge” – is “to be [. . .] [his] sweating [self].” Much as with Milton’s Satan, the worst hell of 
hells is to be oneself: “Me miserable! [. . .]/ Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell; And in the 
lowest deep a lower deep/ Still threatn’ing to devour me opens wide” (PL 4.73-9). 
The sonnet (1885-6) condenses Hopkins’ prior prose commentary (1881) on Ignatius’ “A 
Meditation on Hell.” As in the sonnet, the “lost” in the prose commentary are punished to be 
“their sweating selves.” Given the autobiographical character of the sonnet, the commentary 
possesses intrinsic interest for readers of Hopkins’ poetry. The commentary does not merely 
express Hopkins the priest’s conception of hell. Rather, the commentary expresses Hopkins the 
poet’s construction of self, and reflects his self-loathing during periods of despair. Not 
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 In this poem, Hopkins compares self-knowledge to eating. By his own account, the speaker’s 
self-knowledge is like tasting rancid “dough” that causes “heartburn” (12, 9). But in his spiritual 
writings, and at a happier moment, Hopkins compares self-knowledge to drinking the “tankard [. 
. .] of my own being.” At one point, Hopkins exults, “When I consider my selfbeing, my 
consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things [. . . 
.] Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, 
this selfbeing of my own. [. . .] There is no resemblance: searching nature I taste self but at one 
tankard, that of my own being.” (Sermons 123). Part of the tragedy of the terrible sonnet is that 
the selfbeing that Hopkins celebrates in his other writings has turned into a bitter curse. 
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surprisingly given the close connections between sonnet and commentary, at issue in the 
commentary is the psychological ontology of the subject. Specifically, Hopkins’ commentary 
inquires as to the material basis of memory and consciousness. Moreover, germane to the 
interests of this dissertation, the commentary sets memory and consciousness in the language of 
stress, or treats them as products of energy. 
The commentary takes the shape of an essay, with a thesis that, while initially mystifying, 
gradually becomes intelligible as its subsidiary claims are elucidated. The thesis of the 
commentary is that “our action leaves in our minds scapes or species, the extreme ‘intention’ or 
instressing of which would be painful and the pain would be that of fire, supposing fire to be the 
condition of a body (and by analogy of any substance) texturally at stress” (Sermons 136, 
emphasis original to text).
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  Given that this thesis describes “the present condition of the lost” 
in hell prior to the resurrection of the damned (ie, a disembodied state that nevertheless feels 
pain), Hopkins writes that “it is by [. . .] the imagination that the lost suffer” (136).149 From this, 
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 A full definition of “scape” is made difficult by Hopkins’ habitual practice of structuring 
words as matrices or concentric hierarchies of meaning (à la the previous chapters’ discussion of 
stress) instead of as discrete terms. In the present instance, a scape is an organization of 
substance and energy to lend permanence to a past act. However, in a related usage of the word, 
a scape is a substantial organization of matter and energy that instantiates the nature of a created 
object. The two definitions are related, and, if space permits, I will entertain their associations 
below.  
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 Traditional Christian eschatology teaches that the damned, before their judgment, are 
imprisoned in hell in a disembodied state. Though disembodied, they nevertheless feel pain. At 
the judgment of the damned, the lost souls will be resurrected and reunited with their bodies. 
After judgment, the lost (now body and soul) will be sent not back to hell but to the lake of fire. 
Hell then is a temporal place of punishment for disembodied souls prior to judgment. The lake of 
fire, contrarily, is an eternal place of punishment for the whole being (body and soul) after 
judgment. The difficulty that Hopkins attempts to solve here is how the disembodied soul in hell 
can feel pain. He surmounts this difficulty by positing the soul as being composed of immaterial 
substance that is nevertheless capable of material relations – “tension,” “texture,” “stress,” 
“extension,” “energy,” exertion, and pain (Sermons 136-7). Though the soul’s substance is not 
bodily or grossly corporeal, it is substance still. For Hopkins, the energies and relations that 
obtain for bodily substance obtain for spiritual substance as well.   
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a number of questions occur: One, what is the nature of the substance of the soul, and how can it 
be set “texturally at stress” and burn? Two, how are the soul’s scapes “instressed,” and which 
energies or forces are involved in this instressing? Three, how does an instressed scape result in 
fire, and what is the nature of this “imaginative” fire? Each of these questions is compressed 
within the thesis and is critical to its meaning, yet is explained only after the thesis has been 
initially broached. Structurally, the commentary first posits a seemingly indefensible claim – that 
the soul and its imaginative pains are somehow susceptible to physical relations -- and then 
explains component parts of this claim to warrant the claim itself.  
The first component claim addresses the nature or “substance” of the disembodied soul in 
hell. According to Hopkins’ description, “our [past] action leaves in our minds scapes and 
species…” (136). It should be remembered here that Hopkins describes the disembodied soul in 
hell, not the currently embodied soul on earth. From this, the disembodied soul in hell has a mind 
(or perhaps is a mind), and the soul’s mind contains “scapes” of its past embodied life on earth. 
Moreover, when these scapes are “instressed,” they produce pain within the disembodied soul, 
and this pain is “that of fire, supposing fire to be the condition of a body (and by analogy of any 
substance) texturally at stress” (136).  
Through parenthesis, Hopkins avoids referring to the soul as “a body.” If the parenthesis 
were removed, then the only interpretation possible would be that the soul consists as a body of 
matter, albeit matter exceedingly refined. The parenthesis makes possible another interpretation, 
however – that not only is fire is the condition of any bodily substance texturally at stress, but 
that it is also, by analogy, the condition of “any substance” (including immaterial substances) 
texturally at stress. But Hopkins’ parenthetical analogy prompts one further question: How can 
an immaterial substance have texture? How can an immaterial substance experience stress?  
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The present passage emphasizes, once more, the importance of Hopkins’ analogy. While 
Hopkins casts body and soul in an analogical relationship, his language must be scanned in light 
of the previous chapter’s discussion of Hopkins’ metaphorical tenor and vehicle. Hopkins’ exact 
words are “supposing fire to be the condition of a body (and by analogy of any substance) 
texturally at stress.” In so saying, Hopkins sets up a synecdotal relationship between “body”  
(whether animate or inanimate) and “substance”: body is a kind or subset of substance. Given 
that the larger passage concerns the disembodied soul, the specific “substance” that Hopkins 
apparently has in mind is the soul. Thus, “fire [is] the condition of a body [. . .] texturally at 
stress,” and by analogy, “fire [is also] the condition of a [soul] texturally at stress.” It should be 
noted here that “body” and “any substance” are not opposing terms. Rather, bodies of matter -- 
animate and inanimate alike -- represent one kind of substance, and souls and spirits represent 
another kind of substance. Hopkins’ analogy between body and soul is not metaphorical in 
comparing two dissimilar things, but is rather metonymical, in the way discussed in the previous 
chapter, in comparing two parts within a larger whole. Body and soul are substance then, and the 
analogy shows the correspondence of one part (body) within another part (soul) within a whole 
(substance). In short, both body and soul partake of the larger category of substance, and 
Hopkins’ metonymical analogy hinges upon likening the energetic relations characteristic of 
body to the energetic relations characteristic of substance generally, including those of the soul. 
Thus, the soul is set “texturally at stress” in a manner conformable to the way a physical body is 
set texturally at stress.
150
 Instead of difference, Hopkins’ analogy emphasizes correspondence, or 
the likeness of two things within a group. 
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 Admittedly, I have not yet answered how a soul may be set at stress, or how a soul may have 
texture. I will attempt to do so below.  
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Pertaining to the second question -- how are the soul’s “scapes” instressed? – I will delay 
definition of “scape” until later in this chapter, except to say that scapes are the remnants of 
deeds (particularly sins) committed in the body while on earth.
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 This appears in Hopkins’ later 
equation of “scape” with the soul’s “act of its own, which blotted out God and so put blackness 
in the place of light” (138). Yet how are scapes instressed? Hopkins subsequently explains that 
the “energy or instress with which the soul animates and otherwise acts in the body is by death 
thrown back upon the soul itself” (137). It should be remembered, however, that Hopkins speaks 
here of the damned. That the soul-stress of the righteous is not reverted in death appears in his 
identification of the efficient and material causes of this reversion: 
How then is the soul so set at stress? As I suppose by some main stress from 
without, and that this is expressed by ‘ingentes illos ignes’ St. Ignatius speaks of, 
as the current of air in the blowpipe casts or addresses a jet of flame this way or 
that. The seven gifts the Holy Spirit are spoken of as seven spirits, seven jets or 
currents of breath; so it may be of ‘the breath of the Lord that kindled Tophet of 
old’, the stress of God’s anger which first ‘prepared’ or called into being fire 
against the Devil and his angels (137) 
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 I intentionally avoid using the word “memory” to emphasize the substantial composition of 
scapes. As I discuss below, a scape is a physical arrangement of the brain’s matter that codes for 
past deeds and sensations. A scape is not an insubstantial idea, but is an arrangement of energy 
and matter that perpetuates an act within the physical brain. See my discussion of Hopkins’ 
associationist psychology, below.   
Curiously, however, these scapes persist in the disembodied soul even after death. 
Apparently the material brain-scapes are translated to the soul’s substance where they exist 
immaterially (but not insubstantially – see footnote 7). Again in Hopkins’ writings, the physical 
and the metaphysical belong to an integrated universe. Although the soul’s scapes are not 
physical or material, they are substantial nevertheless. The laws of energy apply to substance 
generally, whether material or metaphysical.    
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Accordingly, the stress with which the soul animates the body in life is, at death, rebuffed 
or turned against itself by a countermanding stress “from without,” from God. The stress of 
God’s wrath reflects the soul’s stress back onto itself, where it bores into and “instresses” the 
scapes of the damned soul’s past. In this description, Hopkins treats soul-stress in physically 
energetic terms, effectively spanning the gap between the metaphysical and the material, or even 
the mechanical. Thus, Hopkins identifies the energy of the soul’s instress, as well as the energy 
of the wrath of God, with the mundane relations of force and energy commonly on display on 
earth. Once more, the quality of Hopkins’ analogy should be remembered. In setting the spiritual 
in the language of the material and even the mechanical, Hopkins is not comparing two 
dissimilar things. Rather, he is comparing two things that partake of the same larger category – 
namely, that of energy in the universal realm of substance.  
The identity of spiritual with physical stress appears in several facets of Hopkins’ 
commentary. Initially, the fact that Hopkins refers to the instress of the soul as “energy” likens it 
to the other forms of energy at play in nature. Moreover, the fact that the soul’s “energy or 
instress” “animates [. . .] the body” implies that energy is capable of transposition from the realm 
of spiritual substance to the realm of material substance. In effect, energy is not relegated to 
gross matter, nor does the spiritual world operate by a qualitatively different form of energy than 
the material world. Instead, energy operates in the seen and unseen worlds alike, or, better said, 
the seen and the unseen are territories within the same world, the physical universe.  
In depicting the reversion of the damned soul’s stress, Hopkins treats the conflict between 
the soul’s energy and God’s wrath as an instance of mechanical reflection. At one point in his 
nature journals, Hopkins describes waves breaking upon and rebounding from the seawall of the 
Kennaway Tunnel: 
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The seawall is picturesque and handsome from below – it is built of white and red 
and blue blocks and with a brim or lip or cornice or coping curved round to beetle 
over and throw back the spray without letting it break on the walk above: this 
shape and colour give it an Egyptian look. --- The laps of running foam striking 
the sea-wall double on themselves and return in nearly the same order and shape 
in which they came. This is mechanical reflection and is the same as optical: 
indeed all nature is mechanical, but then it is not seen that mechanics contain that 
which is beyond mechanics. (Journal 252) 
Hopkins often describes God as a seawall. Perhaps the most memorable instances of this 
comparison may be found in the Wreck of the Deutschland:  
I admire thee, master of the tides, 
Of the Yore-flood, of the year’s fall; 
The recurb and the recovery of the gulf’s sides, 
The girth of it and the wharf of it and the wall; 
Stanching, quenching ocean of a motionable mind; 
Ground of being, and granite of it: past all  
Grasp God, throned behind 
Death with a sovereignty that heeds but hides, bodes but abides.   
Likewise human beings often figure in Hopkins’ poetry as “motionable” fluids. To refer 
to the stanza quoted above, Catherine Phillips interprets the phrase “ocean of a motionable mind” 
as meaning “the restlessness of men’s minds” for which God, the seawall, supplies a structural 
bound or form-giving limitation (Phillips 341 n.118). 
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In his poems, and particularly in his great Deutschland ode, Hopkins repeatedly identifies 
humanity with waves of energy and God as the structuring, bounding “wharf” or “wall” that 
shapes human energy and gives it form.
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 In life, God is a salutary and supportive wall, one that 
supplies structure and consistency to human energy. But for the damned in the afterlife, God is 
an imprisoning wall, reflecting the soul’s energy not benevolently, to fruitful pursuits, but 
punitively, to pound against the scapes of its past sins.      
If God’s wrath is a wall of countermanding force that reflects the soul’s instress back 
upon itself, then Hopkins shows spiritual energies obeying the same laws that preside over 
physical relations. Much as a wave of water rebounds via mechanical reflection from a seawall, 
or much as a wave of sound rebounds from a wall as an echo, so the condemned soul’s energy 
rebounds from God’s wrath. Hopkins’ conceit is admittedly analogical here. But for Hopkins, 
analogy does not suggest surface similarity despite ontological difference. Rather, for Hopkins, 
analogy reveals underlying ontological correspondence made evident by apparent similarity.
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Things that are analogous belong to the same order, and apparent similarity reveals ontological 
unity.  
Finally, how does an instressed scape result in fire, and what is the nature of this fire, 
given that “it is by [. . .] the imagination that the lost suffer” it (136)? Hopkins claims that when 
the soul’s stress is reflected back from God’s wrath, it engenders “[textural] stress” within the 
substance of the soul (136). As he describes at the end of his commentary, two stresses are at 
work in the fibers of the soul’s substance. On the one hand, Hopkins describes the natural bent of 
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 A wave of water is a wave of energy. The water is merely the medium for the wave – the 
energy within the watery medium is responsible for the wave-like undulations. The same applies 
to sound in air, or any other compression wave in a medium. 
153
 In Scotist terms, I might say that formalitas implies haeccitas. In Hopkins’ terms, I might say 
that inscape implies essence or being.  
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the soul’s energy outward, toward objects and “natural activities” (138). On the other hand, 
Hopkins describes the confining stress of God’s anger forcing the soul’s agency back within 
itself. As Hopkins writes, “the one stress or strain then encountered and clashed with the other” 
within the tissues of the soul’s substance, creating textural stress or friction within it (138). Fire 
is the natural result of friction (see Brown 275). More than this, however, the soul’s returning 
stress, reflected by God’s anger, bores and drills into the scapes of its sin as the imprisoned soul 
instresses its past misdeeds: “against these acts of its own the lost spirit dashes itself like a caged 
bear and is in prison, violently instresses them and burns, stares into them and is the deeper 
darkened” (138).  
But what of the “imaginati[ve]” nature of hell’s pains? Surely, one might argue, if the 
pain is imaginative, then it cannot be actual or substantial. By this argument, the pain must be 
psychological, and what Hopkins really means is that the guilty soul reflects upon its misdeeds, 
and feels remorse and loathing for them. Thus, one might say, the soul feels such mental anguish 
that it is as if it has been set on fire. “Pain” and “fire” then are mere metaphors for psychological 
distress. 
Several aspects of Hopkins’ commentary make this interpretation persuasive. Hopkins 
observes that the lost in their “present condition [. . .] are disembodied” (136). Likewise, 
Hopkins remarks that the reason why Ignatius “speaks only of the pain of sense” in his 
description of hell is that “sensible considerations” are the most likely to “deter us from sin” 
(136). Presumably, Ignatius is motivated primarily to elicit the proper moral response from 
exercitants, and uses creative license to do so. Ignatius delineates hell in physical and sensory 
terms because these terms most successfully stimulate the desired reaction. Furthermore, 
Hopkins notes that Ignatius “mingles without reserve or remark physical and figurative things, 
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like brimstone and tears (which the disembodied soul cannot shed) and the worm of conscience” 
(136). Apparently, then, the fires and physically sensuous pains that Ignatius describes exist in 
no more real a sense than the figurative elements (brimstone, disembodied tears, and the worm of 
conscience) do. In light of such considerations, Hopkins concludes that “as it is by the 
imagination that [exercitants] are to realize these things so I suppose it to be by the imagination 
that the lost suffer them and that as intensely as by the senses or it may be more so” (136). Much 
as an excercitant “feels” hells pains imaginatively, so the damned feel pain in the same way in 
their disembodied state.  
At this point, Hopkins declares that his “simple explanation” of the source of pain in hell 
“will never strike our scholastics, because they do not see that there is an intellectual 
imagination” (136). Most likely, by “intellectual imagination” Hopkins means the Romantic 
“intellectual intuition” or the Coleridgean secondary imagination, which sorts and reassembles 
prior sensation in order to create a new reality. Hell for the condemned, then, is the continuous 
overflow of painful feelings at the recollection of deeds done in life. Likewise, the Ignatian 
excercitant must also select and rearrange prior sensuous experience to posit hell. In this way, 
hell, whether projected by the exercitant or experienced by the condemned, is a product of the 
imaginative faculty.    
Had Hopkins stopped there, hell’s pains would be purely mental creations devoid of 
substantial objectivity. But Hopkins doesn’t stop there. Instead, he continues to set even the 
imagination on a substantial basis. While I have here reserved discussing hell as an imaginative 
product until after I had discussed scapes, textural stress, the field of God’s wrath, and the field 
of the soul’s energy, the order of my discussion opposes that of Hopkins’. Hopkins first 
contemplates hell as an imaginative product, and then analyzes scapes, stresses, and fields to 
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account for the way the imagination works. As I will argue below, for Hopkins and for 
Victorians generally, the memory, imagination, and other mental faculties were materially 
embodied within the brain. Thus memories and impressions are inextricable from the medullary 
structures within the brain (“scapes,” Hopkins calls them) that house and preserve them. As I 
will also argue below, in positing the soul, Hopkins extends from bodily substance, and 
considers the soul as substantially equivalent to the material body. If memories within the 
physical brain take the form of material “scapes,” then the soul’s misdeeds are similarly etched 
within its substance. Localized within brain, memory and imagination in an embodied human 
being result from physical processes, or from the interactions of energy and matter in the brain. 
Much the same, the memories and imagination within the soul result from similar physical 
processes, or from the interactions of energy and immaterial substance within the soul’s being. 
Hopkins grounds imagination in substance, then, and the operation of the imagination depends 
upon the scapes, fields, and forces that he subsequently describes.  
To summarize Hopkins’ account, the soul in life exerts a field of energy outward from 
itself, “towards being, towards good, towards God” (137). In hell, however, this outward-tending 
field meets the opposed field of God’s wrath, which forcibly throws the soul’s energy “back 
upon the soul itself,” to bore into its substance and the scapes of past misdeeds housed within 
that substance (137). Strained internally by the conflict between its outwardly-oriented stress and 
God’s punitive compression, the soul experiences internal friction and combusts.        
  Hopkins’ causal theory of hellfire is evidently speculative, and it may be tempting to 
dismiss his language of physics and energy as merely analogical. To strip his meditation of all 
figurative analogies, Hopkins presents hell as an intense and eternally-prolonged period of 
introspective remembrance. The soul feels pain as it reflects upon the misdeeds committed in 
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life. But to strip the analogy is to miss the point. Not only does such a stripped-down 
hermeneutic eliminate the objective reality of God’s wrath and the damned soul’s torment, but it 
also misses a recurring feature of Hopkins’ figurative language. Hopkins’ analogies reflect from 
surface likeness to ontological congruence. In setting up the soul’s energy and God’s anger as 
analogous to forms of energy that operate in the visible world, Hopkins implies the similarity and 
compatibility of spiritual and physical energy. In short, spiritual energies of the soul’s stress and 
God’s outstress in nature are yet more forms of the various manifestations of energy in the total 
universe. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Hopkins’ comparisons between natural and spiritual 
energies are more than metaphorical. In sum, I suggested that Hopkins viewed the spiritual and 
the material as inhabiting a single, integrated universe, and considered energy to be subtle 
enough to communicate spirit to matter and matter to spirit. In the following sections of the 
present chapter, I will compare Hopkins’ psychology and pneumatology to nineteenth century 
brain and aether science. First, I will attempt to show that according to nineteenth century 
psychology, the forms of energy that act within the brain to produce thought are identical to 
those that act in nature to produce the phenomena of the physical world. Second, I will analyze 
Hopkins’ treatment of the soul and the afterlife to assess the applicability, for Hopkins and for 
scientifically-minded Victorians, of the physical science of energetics to the unseen world.  
5.3 Aethers and Brain Science: Victorian Physiology and Psychology 
Victorian psychology has deep roots in aether theory and Galenic physiology. 
Consequently, discussing Victorian psychologists’ poise between physics and metaphysics 
requires a brief excursion into the longer history of aether and the Galenic “subtle fluids.” 
Aether, for the Greek atomists, was a highly rarified substance. While the Greek atomists 
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contradicted each other freely, aether was often identified with the rarest element of matter 
(either fire or air, depending on the philosopher), or formed a fifth element of the most finely 
subtle matter possible. As the most highly refined element, aether was typically associated by the 
Greek atomists with the celestial heavens, the spirit, or even Reason itself. Aether provided, in 
effect, a site of transfer between matter and soul.
154
 
In Western physics during the Enlightenment period, aether once more occupied a limbo-
land between matter (which, for theological reasons, was viewed as motionless and dead) and the 
life-giving and motion-imparting spirit.
155
 To take Newton’s 1717 Optics as an authoritative 
instance, Newton reasoned that matter is inert. It possesses no force within itself, and all motion 
must be imparted from without. Since all movement and motion ultimately stem from God, 
matter has no agency, nor any active properties.  
The problem with this was that Newton viewed gravity as an “active principle” (Optics, 
query 31). How could dead, inert matter produce gravity if gravity is an active principle? Enter 
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 The nature of this “site of transfer” differs depending on author. In later philosophy, 
dichotomists often treated the aether as an intermediary between matter and soul, a matter fine 
enough to be susceptible to the soul’s motions yet dense enough to communicate movement to 
gross matter. See my discussion of Newton, below. For monists, however, aether (or a highly 
rarified matter like aether) was at times identified as the actual stuff of the soul and of angelic 
bodies, as in the case of Milton’s aetherial angelic bodies in Paradise Lost. Yet even though 
aether permits various application, and may fit a dichotomist as well as a monist ontology, it 
tends to set dichotomism in dialogue with monism. Introducing aether to a dichotomist ontology 
renders the division between material and immaterial contestable. For further discussion of this, 
please see G.N. Cantor and M.J.S. Hodge’s remarks on the Stahl-Hoffman controversy in the 
introduction of their edited volume (28-29), as well as Roger French’s article in the same 
volume.  
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 In the interest of brevity, I am skipping over the aethers and spirits of Galenic physiology that 
were ubiquitous in medieval and early modern medicine. Nevertheless, as we will see in the 
instance of Newton, many Enlightenment natural philosophers adapted the Galenic “subtle 
fluids” to explain the soul’s ability to move the body. I am also skipping over several influential 
natural philosophers (Descartes and Boerhaave particularly) whose writings, along with 
Newton’s, helped to establish aether as an important element of Enlightenment science. My 
reason for focusing on Newton particularly is that Hartley and the later associationists treated his 
theories with especial deference, and proposed their own ideas as extensions of his.  
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aether: For Newton, aether generates gravity by repelling particles of matter. Accordingly, aether 
is a special “matter” for Newton in that it possesses active agency. Aether and mundane matter 
represent two separate orders of material substance, then, a higher and a lower order. While the 
lower order of mundane matter remains inert and passive, the higher order of aether aspires to 
immaterial substance in its possession of qualities (activity, motion) that Newton typically 
reserves for spirit. In a loose and uncertain fashion that Newton never explained, aether is allied 
with the spirit and with life, and even with God himself. As P.M. Heimann writes, “Newton 
conceived the ether of the 1717 Optics as an active principle communicating God’s causal 
agency” to his creation (66). In other words, the aether acts as an intermediary between God and 
his creation, translating God’s power into a form of physical force that can act upon inert matter.  
From Newton’s Optics, aether functions as an invisible, intangible, highly-rarified 
substance that spans the universe and communicates God’s life-giving force and motion to gross 
matter. But aether for Newton is immanent as well as transcendent, and while it spans the 
universe, it also inhabits each living being. To be more precise, Newton did not believe in a 
single, uniform aether. In his “An Hypothesis Explaining the Properties of Light,” Newton 
argues that “it is not to be supposed, that this medium [the “common aether”] is one uniform 
matter, but compounded, partly of the main phlegmatic body of æther, partly of other various 
æthereal spirits” (250). Newton further distinguished the “common æther” and the “ætherial 
animal spirit.” 156 The animal spirit is a subtle fluid resident within the brain and nerves of the 
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 Note that “spirit” is an semi-intentional pun. Newton and his physiological predecessors 
intended “spirit” to designate a finely subtle fluid or vapor. However, the “animal spirit’s” close 
relationship with the soul suggests additional meanings. As Robert K. French writes, the animal 
spirit is a “barely material spirit in the nerves” (112). According to French, Aristotelian 
physiologists equated the fluid animal spirit with Aristotle’s pneuma. French explains, “this 
pneuma was an active subtle fluid far removed from the elements of the mundane world but 
related to the ether of the heavens” (112).   
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body. At the soul’s instigation, the fluid animal spirit moves into and out of the muscles, making 
them more or less “sociable” to the common æther (253-4). A muscle that is “sociable” to the 
common aether attracts the aether, and consequently swells and contracts. Contrarily, common 
aether abandons an “unsociable” muscle, which consequently shrinks and relaxes. In effect, the 
soul controls the movement of the aetherial animal spirit within the body; the aetherial animal 
spirit controls the movement of the common aether into and out of the muscles; and the common 
aether acts upon the muscles to produce contraction and movement.  
Newton’s interpretation of sight resembles his account of muscular movement. Once 
more, aether provides the necessary link between the soul’s volition and body’s response. 
Geoffrey Cantor summarizes Newton’s theory, explaining,  
In his account of vision, Newton suggested that rays of light falling on the retina 
cause this medullary ether to vibrate, and this vibration is then transmitted along 
the optic nerve ‘into the place of sensation’ [the brain]. Likewise, in explaining 
how we move parts of our bodies, Newton considered that the ‘power of the Will’ 
causes the ether in the brain to vibrate. This vibration in the medullary ether is 
then propagated along the capillaries of the nerves and produces movement 
through either contraction or dilation of the muscles. Both of these explanations 
were based on the hypothesis that Newton’s ether could interact with both matter 
and mind. (145) 
Thus aether translates God’s power to creation in the form of gravity, and conveys the soul’s 
motions to the body as medullary vibrations. In both cases, Newton’s aether mediates the 
metaphysical and the physical, and translates the living motions of spirit to the inert mass of 
matter. 
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Poised between mundane matter and immaterial substance, the physiological aethers of 
Newton and many of his contemporaries “somehow partook of the immateriality of the soul and 
of the materiality of the body” (French 111). Thus, Newton posited the semi-material “animal 
spirit” as an adjunct of the soul, a helpmate to do the soul’s bidding. Yet subsequent 
physiologists attributed more and more agency to matter, and depicted the physiological aether 
as increasingly material. Eventually, David Hartley would propose a physiological aether that, 
while ostensibly mediating between soul and matter, effectively explained sensation and thought 
in material terms independently of the soul.   
In several facets, Hartley’s aether extends from Newton’s. Like Newton’s aether, 
Hartley’s aether is intimately associated with the interior medullary substance of the nerves. 
Similarly, Hartley follows Newton in proposing that vibrations in the medullary aether convey 
sensation from the sensory organs to the brain. As Hartley explains, “when external objects are 
impressed on the sensory nerves, they excite vibrations” both in the medullary particles of the 
nerves themselves as well as “in the aether residing in the pores of these nerves” (21). 
Subsequently, “the vibrations thus excited in the aether, and particles of the sensory nerves, will 
be propagated along the course of these nerves up to the brain” (23).157  
At this point, however, Hartley diverges from Newton. For Newton, aether mediates body 
and soul, and explains how the motions of the metaphysical soul may be communicated to the 
gross matter of the mortal body. Hartley, in contrast, employs the vibratory aether to transfer 
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 Hartley’s theory of muscular contraction is similar to Newton’s as well in that it depends on 
vibration within the medullary aether to stimulate the muscles to contract. As Hartley writes, 
“muscular motion is performed by vibrations also” (91). The brain propagates a vibration which 
“descends along the motory nerves” to the muscles (91). “These vibrations, when they arrive at 
the muscular fibres, are communicated to them, so that the small particles of these fibres shall be 
agitated with like vibrations. [. . .] The vibrations thus excited in the fibres, put into action an 
attractive virtue”  which causes the muscle to contract (91). Again, however, where Newton 
specifies the soul or the will as the source of the aetherial vibration, Hartley specifies the brain. 
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sensory information from body to brain, and motor commands from brain to body. While Hartley 
remarks that the traditional role of aether in mediating soul and body “appears to be no 
improbable supposition,” the bulk of his work addresses the brain, not the soul, as the center of 
sensation, thought, and volition (34). To be fair, Hartley himself professes belief in the soul, and 
views the brain as the “seat of the rational soul” (84). However, as Geoffrey Cantor observes, 
Hartley’s conservative readers objected to what they perceived as the “atheistic implications of 
Hartley’s fully-fledged system” (146). Hartley’s personal piety notwithstanding, his system 
makes possible a material account of sensation and volition that renders the soul adventitious.     
Hartley’s explanation of ideas and mental dispositions was perhaps the most subversive 
element of his theory. As Hartley explains, “as soon as the [sensory] vibrations enter the brain, 
they begin to be propagated freely every way over the whole medullary substance; being 
diminished in strength, in proportion to the quantity of matter agitated” (24). Within the nerve 
itself, the vibrations are tightly constricted, and are consequently forceful and energetic. When 
introduced to the brain, however, the motive force of the vibrating particles disperses throughout 
the entire mass of the brain. Much like a rock thrown into a pond, the initial splash the vibration 
makes upon reaching the brain attenuates as ripples that spread throughout the brain.  
But if “vigorously impressed” or “frequently renewed,” a sensory vibration can set the 
entire mass of the brain in vibration, and create a stable ripple or “vibratiuncle” in the medullary 
aether of the brain.
158
 Hartley refers to such a ripple stemming from sensory vibration as an “idea 
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 For most philosophers, aether’s extreme subtlety and rarefaction inhibit viscosity and friction. 
Consequently, vibrations in aether, once begun, enjoy a degree of stability and longevity 
unimaginable in frictional substances. The fact that Hartley’s vibratiuncles are stable and long-
lasting suggests that his aether is also nearly frictionless. Apparently, however, some friction 
persists in his aether since he describes minute sensory vibrations as fading away over time. On 
the other hand, perhaps these small vibrations fade away because they are cancelled by or 
subsumed within larger ones.  
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of sensation” (58). This “idea of sensation” is “the [copy] and [offspring] of the impressions 
made on the eye and ear” (58). In its most simple form, an “idea of sensation” is what Hopkins 
might call a scape, a physical arrangement of the material substance of the brain (aether, in 
Hartley’s case) which encodes sensory experience.159 But ideas of sensation stemming from 
single sensations are typically weak, and their ripple in the aether-lake of the brain quickly fades. 
However, if the experience causing the “idea of sensation” is repeated, the resulting ripple in the 
brain will gather force as if through harmonic resonance. Thus, simple sensory vibrations 
cooperate to amplify the vibratiuncle, and at length create a large enough ripple to establish a 
lasting brain-wave -- a “disposition.” Each time a person experiences a particular sensation, or 
each time a person experiences an event sufficiently similar to the original sensation, the new 
sensory vibrations amplify the existing wave in the mind.  
Ideas of sensation compound and associate within the brain, giving rise to increasingly 
complex ideas, including intellectual ideas and propositions. At length, the signature vibrations 
within the brain become stable enough to condition the nature and function of the brain (66). 
Thus, Hartley offers a physical model to explain how sensation begets ideas, ideas beget 
concepts, concepts beget habits of thought, and habits of thought beget personality. Stripped of 
its physical apparatus of aether, nerves, vibrations, vibratiuncles, and dispositions, Hartley’s 
theory advances a Lockean history of mind in which sensation ultimately generates personality. 
But stripping Hartley’s theory of its physical apparatus misses the point and purpose of the 
theory itself. Hartley intends not merely to argue that sensation generates personality. Instead, he 
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 In other words, Hartley’s “idea of sensation” is not the initial sensation itself, but a memory 
of the sensation. But note that memory for Hartley is a product of the physical arrangement and 
conditions of matter in the brain. Hartley is not merely interested in the relationship between 
sensation and memory. Rather, he is interested in the way memory is materially generated within 
the mind. In effect, Hartley creates a physical model of memory in which memories are peculiar 
vibrations of aether within the brain.    
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intends to inquire into the material processes of embodied mind – the brain – and to build a 
model of the processes by which sensation compounds and aggregates. The physical analogy is 
not ancillary but central.     
Hartley’s physical analogy was also controversial. Orthodox philosophers typically 
reserved sensation, thought, and personality as the province of the soul. By Hartley’s theory, 
however, these activities fall under the domain of physical, embodied experience. Even more, if 
each thing in nature possesses its own proper vibration, and if the organs of sense transmit this 
proper vibration to the nerves and the brain, then the nervous system vibrates in unison with its 
external objects. In other words, a percipient subject responds to and becomes similar to the 
objects of sense it observes. Essentially, vibratiuncles dispose (or “pitch,” as Hopkins might say) 
the mind in tune with external objects.
160
 So pitched, the mind takes the character of its 
environment, and a person’s sensory objects define his or her nature.161  
Alan Richardson explores the symbiosis of Hartley’s associative psychology and radical 
religion, politics, and materialism during the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As 
Richardson relates, Hartley stands at the head of a trend of “Romantic brain science” that was 
perceived to challenge not only the soul but also the English political order: 
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 Readers may notice that I apply several words (“scape” and “pitch”) from Hopkins’ 
distinctive idiolect to Hartley’s theory. My usage of these words is admittedly anachronous, but 
the anachronism does suggest, initially at least, several points of contact between Hartley’s 
associationist psychology and the Victorian psychology of Hopkins’ time. I will shortly discuss 
these points of contact in further detail. 
161
 With Hopkins in view, I might add that Hopkins’ concept of instress restores an element of 
freedom to associationist psychology. Hartley’s psychology led him to Necessitarianism, given 
that the objects of sense condition the mind. Hopkins, however, observed that one’s nature 
depends not on the innumerable objects of sensation, but on the limited number of objects one 
chooses to “instress.” Thus, Satan’s sin was to “instress his own inscape,” or to willfully fix his 
mental energies on himself instead of his Creator.  
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The Church and King riots of 1791, in which a “loyalist” mob had invaded 
Priestley’s home and destroyed his scientific equipment, had demonstrated a 
connection even in the popular mind between political radicalism and unorthodox 
science at the very beginning of the period of anti-jacobin reaction. By the early 
nineteenth century, any theory that ‘so much as hinted’ that the mind arose from 
‘corporeal organization’ was branded as ‘atheistical and politically subversive,’ in 
other words, ‘French-inspired’” (15). 
Richardson’s analysis compresses a number of cultural currents of the Romantic 
revolutionary period. First, if the brain could be proven to be the seat of activities typically 
reserved for the soul -- reason, thought, emotion, sensation – then the soul could be dismissed as 
superfluous. With the soul, the doctrines of the established church could also be dismissed, 
particularly those pertaining to creation, the afterlife, and potentially God himself. Second, since 
the Anglican Church was a fixture of the political monarchy, to set aside the church, or at least 
the teachings of the church, was tantamount to setting aside the authority of the head of the 
Anglican Church, the king himself. Third, the revolution of reason in France had similarly 
banished God and the king in favor of a more rational system of political and religious belief. For 
“loyalist” Englishmen, then, any brain-based challenge to the soul ultimately signaled a 
challenge to God’s and the king’s sovereignty. In short, brain-based science smacked at once of 
materialism, atheism, and political subversion – in a word, of Jacobinism. Accordingly, in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, physiologists such as Erasmus Darwin, F.J. Gall, 
Pierre-Jean-George Cabanis, J.G. Spurzheim, Sir William Lawrence, and George Combe were 
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derided in the British popular press for the religious implications – and the perceived political 
implications – of their theories (Richardson 5).162  
Yet despite social and religious impediments, psychological and physiological research 
flourished apace. Erasmus Darwin revised Hartley’s theory, replacing Hartley’s passive, 
receptive sensation with an active sensorium.
163
 As Darwin saw, impressions may stem from 
external objects, but the sensorium augments and arranges impressions to generate the reality one 
perceives. To prove his claim, Darwin discusses a number of optical illusions, arguing that they 
demonstrate the sensorium’s activity in organizing impressions.164  
Yet while Darwin considered the arrangement of sensation to be the prerogative of the 
extended or total sensorium, other investigators focused on the brain specifically. Cabanis 
located perception within the brain, claiming that the brain “digests” sensation furnished by the 
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 Charles Bell, although he taught that the brain was the seat of mental activity, escaped outrage 
for the most part because of his reputation for personal piety and his avowed belief in the soul.  
163
 Darwin’s sensorium included all nervous medullary matter throughout a person’s body 
(whether in the brain, nerves, sensory organs, or muscles) as well as a “sensorial fluid” akin to 
Hartley’s aether or Newton’s aetherial animal spirit. As Darwin defines, “the word sensorium in 
the following pages is designated to express not only the medullary part of the brain, spinal 
marrow, nerves, organs of sense and of the muscles; but also at the same time that living 
principle, or spirit of animation, which resides throughout the body” (Darwin 5). While Darwin’s 
“living principle or spirit of animation” may have been understood by dualist readers to mean the 
soul, Darwin most likely intended it to mean a subtle fluid. Again, “spirit” was a problematic 
word during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.     
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 At one point, Darwin directs his readers to spin around and around until dizzy, and then to 
stop suddenly (12). Darwin observes to his readers that although they have stopped spinning, 
they will briefly see the external world wheel around as if they had not stopped. Darwin argues 
that this proves the sensorium’s activity in arranging perceptions. Although the reader has 
stopped spinning, the reader’s sensorium (his eye, according to Darwin) projects a spinning 
motion upon the field of vision.  
Darwin’s interest in the body’s role in perception was part of a larger trend that spanned 
scientific and aesthetic literature during the nineteenth century. Richardson notes that 
Wordsworth also wrote about this phenomenon(“Stopped short; yet still the solitary cliffs/ 
Wheeled by me – even as if the earth had rolled/ With visible motion her diurnal round”) 
(Richardson 13; Wordworth, Prelude 458-60). Similarly, the brain’s role in perception is a 
consistent theme in Hopkins’ poems, undergraduate essays, and journals. Please see my 
discussion, below, of the brain’s role in “forestalling” an object.  
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sensory and bodily organs. Nevertheless, given that the brain is bodily itself, and given that it 
receives input (much of which, as unconscious, eludes rational control) from the body, the bodily 
appetites condition the brain. Accordingly, human knowledge is conditioned by embodied 
experience and desire.  
Still other investigators considered the structure of the brain. The anatomist F.J. Gall, for 
instance, along with his student J.G. Spurzheim, dissected brains to discover their modular or 
“organic” formation. Instead of a single undifferentiated mass, the brain contains discrete organs, 
each of which controls a specific aspect of human behavior. Gall and Spurzheim argued that 
personality depends on the development of the organs within the brain. Overdevelopment or 
underdevelopment of a region within the brain leads to particular personality characteristics and 
deficits, including criminality and mental illness. With such claims, Gall and Spurzheim initiated 
the study of craniology, from which phrenology would stem later in the century.     
Physiologists in the Victorian era continued in much the same vein as their Romantic 
counterparts. Late nineteenth century physiologists such as John Hughlings Jackson, David 
Ferrier, Eduard Hitzig, Gustav Frisch, and others worked to map the regions of the brain, incited 
by their conviction that each of the brain’s functions could be identified with a specific 
anatomical location. Mapping the regions of the brain required dissection. Moreover, electrically 
stimulating the brain required live test subjects. Even more, since unconscious brains respond 
differently to stimulation than conscious ones do, physiologists like David Ferrier “began 
studying animals that had awakened from anesthesia” and were conscious (Otis 29). 
Consequently, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, brain research stimulated the 
Antivivisection League, and, according to Laura Otis, Ferrier’s research particularly figured in 
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Wilkie Collin’s Heart and Science and H.G. Well’s nightmarish novel of vivisection, The Island 
of Dr. Moreau.  
Through the nineteenth century, sectors of the British populace resisted physiological 
research on religious, political, philosophical, and – lastly – humane grounds. Nevertheless, 
several scientific developments aided it, particularly those in electrophysiology. As Richardson 
writes, “most important in establishing the new climate was Galvani’s demonstration of ‘animal 
electricity,’ which he described in print first in 1791” (7). Among the commonalities that unite 
the radical brain scientists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Richardson lists 
the fact that “they all stress the complexity of the brain [. . .] and exhibit a cautious fascination 
with the role of electricity in neural transmission” (6).  
Aether and electricity were traditionally associated since at least the time of Newton. 
Electricity, like aether, was typically referred to as one of the “subtle fluids.” Hartley himself, in 
his Observations of Man, remarks that “the emission [. . . ] electrical effluvia, may also be some 
presumption in favor of the existence of the aether” (15). Consequently, when the physiologists 
of the early nineteenth century cautiously identified electricity as the active principle of the 
nerves, they were not so much overturning Newton’s and Hartley’s assertion of a subtle 
medullary fluid as they were confirming it and refining it. For the early nineteenth century 
philosophers, if electricity was not one of the aetherial fluids in itself, then at the least it was 
regarded as closely associated with the aether.
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 Given that the physiologists of the early 
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 Although this conception would be revised throughout the nineteenth century, electricity 
nevertheless retained its associations with the aether. By the middle to late nineteenth century, 
philosophers like Thomson and Maxwell regarded electricity not as a variety of aetherial fluid 
but as a form of energy transmitted by the aether.  
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nineteenth century depict electricity as a subtle fluid within the medullary nerves, their 
descriptions of electricity follow from Newton’s and Hartley’s descriptions of aether.166   
As the nineteenth century progressed, it became increasingly probable that the subtle 
nervous fluid within the medullary nerves was none other than electricity. Beginning in 1791, 
Luigi Galvani and his nephew Giovanni Aldini demonstrated that the application of electricity to 
the brain of a recently killed animal (or executed criminal) could produce twitching and 
contortion of its limbs.
167
 Such grisly experiments entered the popular imagination. As 
Richardson notes, no frogs were safe: Galvani’s experiments were “replicated by an eager public 
‘wherever frogs were to be found’” (Richardson 7). Such experiments implied that electricity not 
only stimulated the muscles and nerves, but that it was intrinsically associated with the life of the 
body. Anne K. Mellor, in her interpretation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as a “feminist 
critique of science,” argues that the monster Frankenstein’s gruesome electrical vivification 
criticizes the unnatural experimental techniques of contemporary scientists, most notably 
Galvani and Humphrey Davy (89). Yet In addition to critiquing science, Shelley’s novel also 
attests the popular fascination with Galvanic electrostimulation, and with electricity’s role in 
animating the body through the conduits of the nerves.  
During the Victorian era, the number of natural philosophers and physiologists espousing 
the electrical function of the nerves multiplied. Briefly to list a few, Hermann Helmholtz in 1847 
“measured the speed of nerve conduction [in frogs] and equated it with electricity” (Kennaway 
142). Similarly, beginning in 1848, Emil du Bois-Reymond “posited that [an electrical] current 
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 As Richardson writes, however, the late 18
th
 and early nineteenth century physiologists did 
not agree with Hartley and Newton in all points. Specifically, they “depart[ed] from Hartley and 
Locke” in positing “a biological rather than mechanistic conception of physiological and mental 
functioning” (6). 
167
 In 1803, Giovanni Aldini employed his uncle’s technique of electrostimulation on George 
Forster, a criminal who had been previously executed for murdering his wife and child.   
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flowed continually in the fibers of muscle and nerves” (Matus 174). In 1862, Guillame Duchenne 
published The Mechanism of Human Facial Expression, complete with photographs of test 
subjects whose facial muscles Duchenne had distorted through the application of electrical 
probes. Likewise, in an 1867 work on nervous shock, Edwin Morris wrote that he was “inclined 
to believe that [nervous shock] is of the same nature as electricity, and the nerves act as 
conductors” (11). In 1870, Gustave Fritsch and Eduard Hitzig “applied current to the exposed 
brains of dogs and produced ‘combined muscular contractions on the opposite side of the body’” 
(Otis 29). Alexander Bain, in his 1873 treatise Mind and Body: The Theories of Their Relation, 
observes that narcotic stimulants “expend our stock of power in nerve-electricity in a higher 
degree [. . .] than the ordinary stimulants of the sense” (73). Most notoriously, in 1873 David 
Ferrier began his course of vivisection and electrostimulation that would so incite Victorian ire. 
By the 1870s, the material basis of mind was well established. In an article written for the 
October 1874 issue of Popular Science Monthly, the anatomist T.H. Huxley declared, “It is not 
to be doubted that those motions which give rise to sensation leave on the brain changes of its 
substance [. . . .] The sensation which has passed away leaves behind molecules of the brain 
competent to its reproduction – ‘sensigenous molecules,’ so to speak – which constitute the 
physical foundation of memory” (731). To educated Victorians, physiological research suggested 
that sensation, movement, thought, memory, personality, and even the will may or may not have 
anything to do with the soul, but they have everything to do with the brain. Thought was less 
certainly a matter of the soul, and more certainly a matter of a specific form of energy – 
electricity – at work in a specific region of the brain. In all, a memory or a thought could be 
conceived less as an act and more as a material object. Instead of an arcane activity of the soul, a 
thought could be a defined as a physical arrangement of matter and energy within the 
226 
schematized space of the brain. As Laura Otis writes, part of what motivated the 
antivivisectionists at the end of the century was the implicit claim of physiological research that 
“electricity could replace a creature’s will. Perhaps [. . .] there was nothing sacred about the 
human will, or even the human consciousness” (Otis 31).  
Popular literature attests educated Victorians’ awareness of physiological developments. 
Given the notoriety of physiological brain science, and given the anti-Jacobin and 
antivivisectionist controversies to which it contributed on either end of the nineteenth century, 
materialist accounts of thought within the popular literature of the period should be expected. 
Richardson traces materialist accounts of thought in the works and writings of William 
Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Keats, and Jane Austen. His analysis of Keat’s Fall 
of Hyperion is particularly striking, given that the poem displays a medical student’s knowledge 
of both anatomy (Moneta’s ‘globed brain’) and electrophysiology (the ‘scenes’ or memories in 
Moneta’s brain ‘[swoon] [. . .] with an electrical changing misery’) (Richardson 124).   
Walter Pater’s conclusion of The Renaissance (1873) suggests an analogous 
understanding of the brain’s physical structure and electrical operation. In his conclusion, Pater 
asserts that “our physical life is a perpetual motion” of the natural elements of nature, 
“phosphorous and lime and delicate fibres” (207). Immediately after this assertion, Pater explains 
“Our physical life is a perpetual motion of [these elements] – the passage of the blood, the 
wasting and repairing of the lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain by 
every ray of light and sound – processes which science reduces to simpler and more elementary 
forces” (207). By this explanation, not only does sensation occur as a material process within the 
brain, but each individual sensation “leaves its mark on mind” (as Hopkins might say) or 
generates a physical “scape” within the brain: “every ray of light and sound” causes a 
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“modification of the tissues of the brain” (207). In accord with associationist psychology, Pater’s 
“ray[s] of light and sound” are physically translated by the nerves to the brain, where they are 
physically inscribed within the brain’s tissue. Moreover, science “reduces [this process of 
inscription] to simpler and more elementary forces” (207). While Pater does not name electricity 
specifically, his description of mental processes occurring through the operation of physical, 
“elementary forces” certainly chimes with the electrical researches Romantic and Victorian 
physiologists such as Galvani, Fritsch, Hitzig, and Ferrier.  
Comparably, in Balfour Stewart and Norman Lockyer’s “The Sun as a Type of the 
Material Universe,” Barri Gold notes a similarly materialist analogy between events within and 
without the human brain (Gold 131-49). Gold notes that in Stewart and Lockyer’s article, the 
pair address the tendency of energetic causes to compound, or for a small amount of initial 
energy (what would now be called “activation energy”) to produce large changes. Stewart and 
Lockyer illustrate their claims with various instances of exploding “chambers” touched off by 
small causes: A gun may be touched off with a hair trigger, a canon with a ripcord, a gunpowder 
magazine with an electrical wire. In each of these examples, an energetic chamber is set off by a 
small investment of initial energy. Subsequently, however, Stewart and Lockyer come to another 
“chamber”: the human mind. In Lockyer and Stewart’s words, “We see how from an exceedingly 
small primordial impulse great and visible results are produced. In the mysterious brain chamber 
of the solitary student we conceive some obscure transmutation of energy” (326-7). Although 
this “transmutation of energy” is “obscure,” it consists of energy nevertheless, and much as the 
sparking of a gun, canon, or battery is a matter of physical energy, so is thought within the 
human brain. Additionally, much as the spark that ignites a gun or battery produces an effect 
proportionally much greater than itself, so do the sparks within the brain. Thus, Lockyer and 
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Stewart explain, the “obscure transmutation of energy” in the “brain chamber of the solitary 
student” produces nothing short of the industrial revolution. The solitary student (apparently 
James Watt) has grasped “the transcendent power of steam as a motive agent” (326). From the 
scene of the spark inside Watt’s brain chamber, “the scene widens, and as we proceed, a solitary 
engine is seen to be performing, and in a laborious way converting heat into work; we proceed 
further and further until the prospect expands into a scene of glorious triumph, and the 
imperceptible streamlet of thought that rose so obscurely has welled into a mighty river, on 
which all the projects of humanity are embarked” (326-7).168  
To come to Hopkins himself, several features of Hopkins’ writing show him responding 
to materialist trends in contemporary physiology: 1) His interest in the ability of the mind to 
construct reality; 2) His forthright references to “purely material psychology” and vibratory 
nerve impulses; and 3) His conception of the nature of the soul. Pertaining to the first feature, 
Hopkins’ letters, journals, essays, and poems frequently investigate optical illusions. To cite one 
instance from a multitude, in a June 25, 1873 journal entry, Hopkins describes watching a distant 
firework “pass the crest of Pendle” (Journal 232). For Hopkins, this was “curious,” because 
although his senses reported that the firework passed in front of the mountain, he knew that the 
mountain stood between him and the firework. Hopkins reasons that his vision “forestalled” the 
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 Much as I have remarked in the previous chapter on the literal nature of Hopkins’ 
metaphorical analogies, Barri Gold remarks on the “the truth value of [Lockyer and Stewart’s] 
analogy” (134). As Gold elaborates, “in the course of their argument, Stewart  and Lockyer also 
seem to partake of a principle that chaos theory calls ‘self-similarity,’ a principle that accounts 
for phenomena at vastly different scales looking very much alike” (134). Given that Lockyer and 
Stewart set the behavior of solar energy at one end of their scale, and the energy within the 
human brain at the other end, then their self-similar analogy sets solar and brain energy as 
material types of each other.  
Other scientific authors of the time also considered the reliability of analogy. See 
particularly James Clerk Maxwell’s Cambridge paper, “Are There Real Analogies in Nature?”.  
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firework.
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 Although the firework should have disappeared from sight when it passed behind the 
bulk of the mountain, Hopkins’ sensorium (specifically, his “eye”) anticipated the firework’s arc, 
projecting the image of the firework moving upon the backdrop of the mountain. In Hopkins’ 
own words, “it may be because the eye taking up the well-marked motion and forestalling it 
carrys the bright scape of the present and past motion (which lasts 1/8 of a second, they say) on 
to a part of the field where the motion itself has not or will not come” (232).170 
At various points, Hopkins refers to “purely material psychology” directly, such as in his 
Oxford essay “The probable future of metaphysics” (Oxford Essays 287). In this essay, Hopkins 
assesses the common fear that “the end of all metaphysics is at hand,” and that “purely material 
psychology is the [conqueror] foretold and feared” (287). For Hopkins, such fears are 
“shortsighted” because “material explanation cannot be refined into explaining thought” (287). 
As Hopkins reasons, even if the claims of material psychologists and physiologists are true, “it is 
all to no purpose to show an organ for each faculty and a nerve vibrating for each idea, because 
this only shows in the last detail what broadly no one doubted, to wit that the activities of the 
spirit are conveyed in those of the body as scent is conveyed in spirits of wine, remaining still 
inexplicably distinct.” In these words, Hopkins briefly distills the psychological model that had 
reached educated Victorians through Newton, Hartley, Gall, Spurzheim, and subsequent 
researchers. Hopkins’ reference to “an organ for each faculty” recalls Gall’s and Spurzheim’s 
anatomical dissections of the brain, particularly their discovery that the brain consists of distinct 
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 By “stall,” Hopkins means to position or to house. “Forestalling,” then, means to position 
before or in front. In this instance, the firework, which was really located behind the mountain, 
was positioned in front of the mountain.  
170
 Hopkins is also quick to point out optical illusions other than forestalling. For a signal 
discussion, see Hopkins’ undergraduate essay “Causation,” particularly his explanation of the 
quatrefoil/Maltese cross (Oxford Essays 200-2). 
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“organs,” each of which corresponds to a mental faculty.171 Likewise, his remark about “a nerve 
vibrating for each idea” stems from the associationist psychology articulated by Hartley in his 
theory of the vibratory medullary aether. Finally, in concluding that “the activities of the spirit 
are conveyed in those of the body as scent is conveyed in spirits of wine, remaining still 
inexplicably distinct,” Hopkins recapitulates the pun on spirit characteristic of dualistic discourse 
since before the time of Newton (see footnote 13). In the first instance of the word “spirit” (“the 
activities of the spirit are conveyed in those of the body”), Hopkins means “the soul.” But in the 
second instance of the word (“as scent is conveyed in spirits of wine”), Hopkins means a subtle 
fluid or vapor, like the fumes of wine or the “aetherial animal spirit” that mediated soul and body 
in Newton’s physiological theory.  
Finally, Hopkins’ response to “material psychology” conditions his conception of the 
soul. Without a doubt, Hopkins was a Christian idealist who believed in the soul. However, as 
John Gordon explains, Hopkins “refute[s] the materialists [. . . ] not by denying their findings but 
by extending them” (518). Hopkins’ conception of the soul is informed by materialism, and 
draws from the psychology and physiology of his time (287). In “The probable future of 
metaphysics,” Hopkins concedes that “psychology and physiology may withdraw to themselves 
everything that is special and detailed in the action of the mind” (287). In other words, thought is 
not the exclusive prerogative of the soul, and Hopkins allows for “an organ for each faculty” and 
“a nerve vibrating for each idea.” Nevertheless, thought does not exist apart from the soul. In a 
subsequent corollary, Hopkins reasons that although evolution happens as Darwin describes, 
evolution is not “scopeless” or random (288). Rather, while evolution may seem “chromatic,” as 
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 I do not mean to claim that Hopkins had read Gall or Spurzheim per se. Even had Hopkins 
never heard of the anatomical duo, he would certainly have known of craniology or phrenology. 
Even more, Gall and Spurzheim’s theory of the brain as an assemblage of organs persisted well 
into the 1870s (and arguably the present), as the experiments of Ferrier, Fritsch, and Hitzig show.   
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a series of infinitesimal alterations generating blind and haphazard change, Hopkins predicts that 
subsequent developments of philosophy will show that “species are fixed [. . .] at definite 
distances” from each other (289, 290). Such determinate “fixing” of species implies a plan or 
Idea or Will that organizes the seemingly random progress of evolution. In a word, such a 
“fixing” of species requires God to superintend evolutionary development.172 Thus, while 
Hopkins accedes to evolutionary development, he maintains that God, as the soul of the world, 
conveys his will within the (evolutionary) actions of the world. In much the same way, although 
human thought may be as thoroughly material as evolutionary processes, the human soul guides 
thought within the material brain much as God guides development in his material creation.       
Yet while Hopkins preserves the soul and subordinates materialist discourse to orthodox 
idealism, he considered the biological mechanics of thought to be every bit as materialistic as 
contemporary physiologists and psychologists proposed. Consequently, Hopkins’ description of 
the workings of imagination, memory, and thought should be considered in light of Victorian 
associationist psychology. More specifically, his keyword “scape” should be considered to mean 
not a disembodied act of soul, a thought or memory independent of the material brain, but an 
embodied arrangement of matter within the brain. Accordingly, in the following section I will 
address the material nature of scapes in Hopkins’ model of hell.173       
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 For an incisive discussion of Hopkins “diatonic” or theistic model of evolution, see Cary 
Plotkin’s “Towards a Poetics of Transcendence after Darwin: The Aspect of Nature.”  
173
 Admittedly, since Hopkins describes the state of disembodied souls in hell, my argument 
requires me to explain the ways the immaterial soul and material body correspond for Hopkins. I 
will attempt to do so in the penultimate section of this chapter. For now, I will repeat my 
previous claim that although the soul is immaterial, it is not insubstantial. If Hopkins perceives 
the laws of energy to apply to all substance universally (or if Hopkins considers the unseen world 
to belong to the same universe as the visible world), then similar relations should obtain between 
soul and body. 
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5.4 Scapes: A “Physical and Refined Energy Accenting the Nerves” 
Hopkins’ vision of the fallen angels and damned souls in hell exemplifies the physical 
metaphysics that animates so much of his poetry. In his vision of the damned, Hopkins theorizes 
that the fiery pain of hell stems from the instressed “species or scape” of past “bodily action[s]” 
and sensory impressions (Sermons 136). Hopkins cryptically explains that during life, the soul is 
“instressed in the species or scape of any bodily action (whether this gives rise to a physical and 
quantitative extension of its substance or not) and so towards the species or scape of any object, 
as of sight, sound, taste, smell” (Sermons 136-7, emphasis original). In this description, Hopkins 
assigns objectivity and physical permanence to two things that are normally considered either 
immaterial or transitory: memory (whether the “scape” of a “bodily action” or of an “object [. . .] 
of sight, sound, taste, smell”), and thought itself (136-7).    
Hopkins’ analysis of “scapes” in the present meditation recalls his earlier “All Words” 
essay defining the tripartite nature of a word. All words consist, Hopkins claims, of three “terms” 
or “moments”: connotation, utterance, and application (Essays, 306). While the first and third 
terms in this lexical trinity are single in nature, the second term – utterance – consists of a 
hypostatic union. A word’s utterance, Hopkins writes, involves at once of the “uttering of the 
[word’s] idea in the mind,” and the uttering of the word’s sound with the mouth (Essays, 306). 
Regarding the idea in the mind, Hopkins makes yet another division, and from this term Hopkins 
derives two more, the word’s “image” and its “conception.” The word’s image is the inchoate 
sensory impression on the speaker’s mind that s/he attempts to communicate; the word’s 
conception is the speaker’s act of clothing or “fleshing out” the image with a specific word.174   
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 Hopkins meant his theory of language as an extended theological conceit of the Trinity and 
Incarnation. While the present chapter does not concern Hopkins’ conceit per se, I have tried to 
reflect it in my choice of language. 
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Several associations – particularly the key word “scapes” -- unite Hopkins’ description of 
a word’s “image” in his “All Words” essay with his later description of the damned in his 
commentary on Ignatius’ “A Meditation on Hell.” In the “All Words” essay, Hopkins defines the 
word’s image as the “sight or sound or scapes of the other senses” that reside in the speaker’s 
mind and prompt selection of a word. But Hopkins is not content to assign the “scapes of the [. . 
.] senses” mere psychological or ideological reality. Instead, Hopkins converts the image/scape 
to physical and energetic terms, explaining that the image in the mind is “in fact physical and a 
refined energy accenting the nerves” (Oxford Essays 307). Thus, Hopkins represents the 
psychological image/scape in the mind as a physical artifact in the body, as a quantum of energy 
exciting the nerves of the body. Instead of presenting scapes as abstractions, Hopkins’ pointedly 
demonstrates their physicality according to two criteria, substance and location. Of the 
image/scape’s substance, Hopkins claims that it consists as a form of “refined energy”; of the 
image/scape’s location, Hopkins claims that it resides in “the nerves” of the body (Essays, 307).  
In fine, in his “All Words” essay, Hopkins equates the “scapes of the [. . .] senses” with 
images, originating from the various organs of sensation, that are stored in the brain as physical 
artifacts of past experience. As “a refined energy accenting the nerves,” scapes/images are 
discrete arrangements of matter and energy (Essays, 307). Bound to a specific, physical location 
and consisting of a “refined,” but definite form of energy, these images or scapes are “in fact 
physical” (304). Scapes are memories, then, but much more than mere memories: they are the 
physical remains of prior sensation housed within the nerves of the body. Thus, Hopkins’ 
“scapes” equate to Huxley’s “sensigenous molecules,” or “the molecules of the brain competent 
to [an impression’s] reproduction [. . .] which constitute the physical foundation of memory” 
(Huxley 731). 
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The foregoing discussion suggests that Hopkins treats the mind in physical terms. Mind 
and memory are not strictly immaterial, but take root in matter, specifically the gray matter of the 
brain. But this applies for the mind of an embodied human in earthly life. What of the mind and 
memory of the soul in the afterlife? How can the scapes of Hopkins’ disembodied inmates of hell 
be substantial? Answering these questions requires attention to relationships contemporary 
Victorians saw between apparent and unapparent physical processes. As I shall investigate 
below, the Victorians considered the unseen world to be continuous with observable reality. For 
some, this unseen world included merely the microscopic domain of atoms and energy, while for 
others it stretched to the metaphysical domain of the soul and the afterlife. Whatever its extent, 
though, Victorians held the unseen universe to operate by the same laws of energy that govern 
visible phenomena. Furthermore, for those who included the traditionally metaphysical realm 
within the territory of the unseen universe, the scientific disciplines could be applied to 
interrogate immaterial substance. Given the continuity of existence, if the unseen universe 
existed substantially, then the laws and relations applicable to observable reality must also be 
applicable to it. Accordingly, in the follow sections of this chapter, I will trace several scientific 
Victorian projections as to the nature of unseen substance.  
5.5 “Not Grossly Material”: (Meta)physics and Imponderable Aethers 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have argued that Hopkins’ psychology adhered 
to contemporary science in positing a material basis of thought. Hopkins, as a dualist, held that 
“the activities of the spirit are conveyed in those of the body” (Oxford Essays 287). However, he 
regarded memory or “scape”-formation, and presumably mental activity in general, as “in fact 
physical and a refined energy accenting the nerves” (Oxford Essays 287, 304). If the previous 
sections discussed the unity of natural and psychological energy, the present will discuss that of 
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natural and spiritual energy. Hopkins treats spiritual forces as analogous to natural energies, but 
his treatment extends beyond metaphor to identification. Thus, the energies within nature do not 
merely resemble the workings of the metaphysical realm, but rather the forces within nature span 
the material world and the immaterial, and function in both spheres.  
In Hopkins’ writings, the relationship between material and immaterial being takes the 
form of two intercalated myths, the myths of the Great Sacrifice and the “diatonic” scale of 
being. In the former myth, after Christ’s “procession” outward from the Trinity, he presses 
deeper and deeper into the “barren wilderness outside of God” (Sermons 197). In this procession, 
Christ passes downward through the ranks or “generations” of the various species of angelic 
being before reaching “the term of these generations [. . .] in a material or [. . .] earthy nature” 
(200). Thus, Christ proceeds progressively into the wilderness outside of God, descending 
through the angelic orders to assume a material human body. Matter falls beneath the angelic 
ranks, but matter and im-matter nevertheless coexist on the same scale of created being.  
Moreover, this “scale” is musical at the same time that it is hierarchical. In his essay “The 
Probable Future of Metaphysics,” Hopkins compares evolutionary species to notes on a “musical 
string” (Oxford Essays 289). Much as the notes on a scale or within a chord are “mathematically 
fixed” at definite intervals, so Hopkins conjectures that the species of earthly life produced by 
evolution are “fixed only at definite distances in the string” (289, 290). Hopkins continues, 
surmising that “the developing principle [i.e., evolution] will only act when the precise 
conditions are fulfilled” that will produce a new species at the appropriate place on the string of 
life (289, 290).  
Yet the highest pitches in this musical scale are not produced by evolution, nor do they 
take the form of creatures with material bodies. Instead, the musical scale transposes to the 
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register of immaterial being, and includes the angels as well. In his meditation on the Great 
Sacrifice, Hopkins likens the creation of the angelic ranks to a “concert of music, the ranks of the 
angelic hierarchies being like notes of a scale and a harmonic series” (Sermons 200). Christ “led 
off the angel choir” and the song he sings “call[s] [the angels] into being” (200). Unlike the 
species of earthly life, each angel is a species unto itself, and each is assigned “the note which 
summoned each to his own place and distributed them here and there in the liturgy of the [Great] 
sacrifice” (201). 
Whether a ladder or a musical string, Hopkins’ scale of being suggests continuity 
between matter and im-matter. Indeed, the world of matter recapitulates the higher octaves of 
immaterial being. Hopkins concludes his meditation, noting that the musical “score” of the 
angels’ liturgical hymn determined the nature of the material world (202).175 Ideally, the angels 
were “by cooperating [to] create the species and order of the lower world” (202). However, due 
to Lucifer’s “countermusic,” the material world “is marked everywhere with the confusion, 
clashing, and wreck which took place in the higher one” (201, 202).  
Unlike the Great Sacrifice (which Hopkins believes is assuredly true), Hopkins’ 
description of creation as “a concert of music” appears (to me) to be wholly figurative (200). 
Nevertheless, the point of the metaphor is to show that creation is hierarchically organized, and 
that the ontological nature of the “lower world” chimes with the state of the higher world. 
Likewise, Christ’s progressive incarnation in the Great Sacrifice reinforces the sequential 
continuity of material with immaterial being. Instead of viewing the immaterial world as 
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 Like “mark,” “score” for Hopkins is a complex pun. In one sense, score signifies a musical 
score. In another sense, however, score suggests a mark or a wound. Particularly, in the The 
Wreck of the Deutschland, “score” recalls the mark of the stigmata: “but he scores it in scarlet 
himself on his own bespoken” (173). 
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completely distinct from the world of matter, Hopkins, in his myths and metaphors of creation, 
represents matter and im-matter as a lower and higher octave in a musical scale.  
Often, soul or spirit is considered to be entirely antithetical to matter. But as we have 
already seen from the previous discussion of aetherial subtle fluids and Galenic spirits, 
Enlightenment physiologists considered the soul to be able to communicate its motions to matter 
though a series of quasi-material mediators of exceeding rarefaction. In the nineteenth century, 
aether theories revived again, and Hopkins, in conceiving of the contiguity of the material and 
the immaterial, was not alone.
176
 Prominent Victorian physicists, in their models of energy fields 
and the aether, considered energy to cross between the visible world to the “unseen universe,” to 
borrow the title of P.G. Tait and Balfour Stewart’s book. While the unseen substrate (whether 
aether or energy pure and simple) of the physical universe was at times discussed in a material 
and even mechanical fashion, at other times it was linked explicitly to metaphysical postulates: 
to the soul, to the spiritual realm, and to God himself.  
Two trends of nineteenth century physics lent to the mixing of material and metaphysical 
modes. First, aether, motion, and force descended to the Victorians already freighted with 
metaphysical weight, given their antecedents within Galenic physiology and Enlightenment 
natural philosophy (see above). Victorian physicists failed to distinguish their physical 
speculations from this metaphysical prehistory, or else knowingly invoked it within their 
theories. The result was a physical conception of aether and energy that lent itself easily to 
metaphysical extension. Second, Victorian physicists developed models of the aether that 
explained its function in meticulously mechanical and quantitative terms. Instead of stripping the 
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 For a seminal history of the resurgence of aether in the early nineteenth century, see Edmund 
Whittaker’s “The Luminiferous Medium from Bradley to Fresnel” in his A History of the 
Theories of Aether and Electricity, vol. 1. I will shortly discuss some of the more salient aether 
theories from the middle to late nineteenth century. 
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aether of its metaphysical connotations, however, the physicists’ efforts crystallized the aether as 
a substance that partook of the material and the metaphysical at once.
177
 In effect, the aether, a 
space simultaneously spiritual and mechanistic, conflated the energies of the physical world with 
those of the transcendent sphere.   
Faraday’s force-matter ontology illustrates the persistent resonance of metaphysics within 
Victorian physics.
178
 In “A Speculation Touching Electric Conduction and the Nature of Matter” 
(1844), Faraday argues that matter, in its most basic or atomic form, consists not of particles but 
force. Contemporary physical theory postulated the atom as a hard, spherical nucleus surrounded 
by an atmosphere of force or “powers.” This definition to Faraday seemed to make untenable 
assumptions. Faraday argued that the properties of visible matter are determined not by the hard 
spherical nuclei but by the atmospheres of force/powers that surround them. If these force 
atmospheres determine the way atoms combine, then they effectively determine the nature and 
properties of substances apparent to the senses. Accordingly, while scientific investigators have 
ample evidence of the existence of the force atmospheres or powers of atoms, they have no 
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 Physicists of the high Victorian period considered the aether to have the properties of an 
elastic solid. To investigate the way elastic solids reacted to magnetism, light, heat, and other 
forms of energy, Victorian investigators often studied crystals. (Like all mundane matter, crystal 
is elastic in that it is imperfectly rigid.) Crystals were particularly advantageous for study 
because unlike many solid substances, they transmit light. Accordingly, crystals were used in 
Victorian physical experiments as analogues of the aether. In this way, Victorian physics 
“crystallized,” quite literally, the aether. Give that the aether conveyed light, electricity, 
magnetism, and even (in some accounts) life itself, it seems likely that the New Age fascination 
with crystal in recent years stems from crystal’s Victorian association with aether. Such a claim 
could be substantiated by analyzing the role of crystal in Victorian spiritism. I might add that 
several prominent physicists (Lodge, particularly, as I shall discuss below), were also important 
figures in Victorian spiritism.  
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 I do not mean to say that Faraday himself viewed force as metaphysical. Faraday is quite clear 
that “the force which constitutes [. . .] matter” is material, not metaphysical. Nevertheless, given 
that aetherial subtle fluids often mediated matter and soul in Galenic physiology and 
Enlightenment natural philosophy, Faraday’s imponderable force-matter was similarly viewed by 
other Victorians. See my discussion, below, of Hare’s response to Faraday. 
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evidence of the hard nuclei themselves. In Faraday’s own words, “To my mind, therefore, the a 
or nucleus vanishes, and the substance consists of the powers or m” (141).  
Faraday borrows his model of the atom from Boscovich (in this paper at least), and posits 
the atom as an area of force devoid of any hard material nuclei. These force-atoms combine to 
produce ponderable matter, the substances that we see, feel, taste, and smell. “Force constitutes [. 
. .] matter,” then, and at base, matter is not particulate or ponderable but imponderable (143). 
Force is the substrate of all material existence. 
For Faraday, force exists much as an object or a thing does. Not only does force exist, but 
at base, all particulate matter (all objects or things) exist as force. Such a conception of force 
animates Faraday’s article “The Conservation of Force” (first published 1857). In this article, 
Faraday investigates the relationship of gravity with the law of the conservation of energy, or the 
conservation of “force” as Faraday terms it.179 According to Faraday, saying that gravitational 
force decreases between two objects as distance increases between them constitutes a violation 
of the law of conservation. For most speakers, who view force as a property of matter, such a 
statement poses no problem. Most people assume that the gravitational energy of the object itself 
remains the same, but the force or effect of gravity decreases with distance. But for Faraday, 
force exists independently of objects (and indeed, objects exist dependently on force). From this 
perspective, force cannot increase or decrease, no matter the relations obtaining between objects. 
If force exists in the same way that objects or things exist (or, as Faraday might say, in an even 
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 As mentioned in chapter 1, energy/force was a shibboleth marking affinity for either the 
North British School or the X Club. Faraday, religiously sympathetic to the North British School 
but personally sympathetic to his friend and Royal Society colleague John Tyndall, refused to be 
caught in the middle. When the young James Clerk Maxwell urged Faraday to adopt “energy” 
instead of “force,” Faraday demurred, rejecting the curtailed North British definition of force as 
the “tendency of a body to pass from one place to another” (“Conservation” 379). Instead, 
Faraday accorded force a more universal definition, as “the cause of a physical action; the source 
or sources of all possible changes amongst the particles or materials of the universe.”  
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more real way than they do), then it cannot increase or diminish dependent on relations of 
matter.
180
  
Ostensibly, Faraday has no metaphysical intentions when he delineates his theory of 
force. For Faraday, not only does force cause or condition ponderable matter, but force itself is 
matter. Force may lack definite volume, shape, and mass, but the fact that it is nevertheless 
material appears in Faraday’s description of the force-atom. In describing the behavior and 
nature of the force-atom, Faraday refers to it quite simply as “matter”:  
The view now stated of the constitution of matter would seem to involve 
necessarily the conclusion that matter fills all space, or, at least, all space to which 
gravity extends [. . .]; for gravity is a property of matter dependent on a certain 
force, and it is this force which constitutes the matter. In that view matter is not 
merely mutually penetrable, but each [force-]atom extends, so to say, throughout 
the whole of the solar system, yet always retaining its own centre of force. This, at 
first sight, seems to fall in very harmoniously [. . .] with the old adage, ‘matter 
cannot act where it is not’ (“A Speculation” 143) 
In this passage, Faraday describes the extent and inter-penetrability of force-atoms. If an 
atom consists of force, then it is present wherever its force is. Gravity is an aspect of the atom’s 
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 Faraday astutely observes that the force of gravity between two objects of definite mass 
remains constant no matter how many other objects or how much other mass is also attracted. If 
gravitational force resides within an object, its force must be finite. Thus, it is capable only of a 
given total force, a force that will be distributed among the mass it attracts. The more mass an 
object attracts, the weaker its attraction will be on a given unit of that mass. However, gravity in 
reality acts differently, and attracts a given unit of mass with a constant force, no matter how 
much total mass there may be. Accordingly, Faraday asserts, the force of gravity cannot reside 
within objects. 
Faraday’s challenge went unanswered until Einstein developed his theory of gravity. 
Incidentally, Faraday’s theory that force exists objectively may also be right. According to one 
modern model (the Standard Model), energy exists as particles – bosuns, leptons, gluons, quarks, 
and photons. 
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force; therefore the atom extends as far as its gravitational pull does. Accordingly, every atom 
fills the solar system, to the extreme reach of its gravitational attraction. Force-atoms are 
necessarily inter-penetrable then, and combine and merge together within the same space. Each 
point of space contains an admixture of various forces or force-atoms, and particulate matter 
evolves from the admixture. The combined disposition of the forces within a given space 
determines the nature of the particulate matter that occupies that space. 
In Faraday’s account, force is matter in a sense, but not in the sense usually meant by the 
word. Victorian physicists who subscribed to Faraday’s notion of material force typically 
referred to it as “imponderable matter” (Hare 248). Moreover, despite Faraday’s and his 
contemporaries’ ostensible intentions to treat force as purely physical, their choice of the word 
“imponderable” links their discussion of force to the subtle fluids of Enlightenment natural 
philosophy and Galenic physiology. For example, in Thomas Browne’s Pseudodaxia Epidemia, 
Or, Enquiries into Very Many Received Tenants, and Commonly Presumed Truths (first 
published 1646), Browne investigates the efficacy of gold, if swallowed, to alleviate digestive 
ailments. Browne first observes that the digestive process does not affect the gold’s weight. No 
sensible proportion of the gold is dissolved, then, but Browne reasons that the gold might give 
off salutary “emanations” or “effluvium” or “subtleties” (95). Browne concludes by reasoning 
that if therapeutic amulets “do work by emanations from their bodies,” and “produce visible and 
real effects by imponderous and invisible emissions,” then gold might do the same (95). In 
Browne’s discussion, the term “imponderous” appears in concert with other terms characteristic 
of Galenic physiology – emanations, effluvium, subtleties, emissions, virtues, and effluencies. If 
Victorian physicists intended to distance their hypotheses of force from metaphysical 
speculation, their choice of the word “imponderable” was unfortunate. Instead of implying a 
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form of matter entirely devoid of metaphysical extension, the phrase “imponderable matter” 
recalls the role of subtle fluids, spirits, and aethers that mediate soul and gross matter.   
Accordingly, while Faraday himself might treat force as a purely material substrate of 
ponderable matter, the concept of “imponderable matter” (to say nothing of “force” or “power”) 
was already laden with metaphysical import.
181
 That such import persisted into the nineteenth 
century appears in Thomas Young’s Royal Institution Lecture XLIX, published 1807. In this 
lecture, Young constructs a grand scale of substance leading upward from solids to liquids to 
gases; then to electricity, magnetism, and ether; then to gravitation; and finally to “existences 
absolutely immaterial and spiritual” (610): 
Nor is there any thing in the unprejudiced study of physical philosophy that can 
induce us to doubt the existence of immaterial substances; on the contrary we see 
analogies that lead us almost directly to such an opinion. [. . .] We see forms of 
matter differing in subtility and mobility, under the names of solids, liquids, and 
gases; above these are the semimaterial existences which produce the phenomena 
of electricity and magnetism, and either caloric or a universal ether; higher still 
perhaps are the causes of gravitation, and the immediate agents in attractions of 
all kinds, which exhibit some phenomena apparently still more remote from all 
that is compatible with material bodies; and of these different orders of beings the 
more refined and immaterial appear to pervade freely the grosser. It seems 
therefore natural to believe that the analogy may be continued still further until it 
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 But see David Gooding’s “Metaphysics vs. Measurement: The Conversion and Conservation 
of Force in Faraday’s Physics.” Gooding argues that “the close link between theology and 
physics constrained the development of Faraday’s concept of force” (2). While I treat Faraday’s 
force as purely material, Gooding makes the case that Faraday’s “defenses of the ontological 
primacy of force” were religiously motivated. 
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rises into existences absolutely immaterial and spiritual. We know not but that 
thousands of spiritual worlds may exist unseen for ever by human eyes; nor have 
we any reason to suppose that even the presence of matter in a given spot 
necessarily excludes these existences from it. 
Young’s nineteenth century “analogy” that enabled him to set solids, liquids, and gases 
on a continuous scale with “existences absolutely immaterial and spiritual” was the same 
analogy that enabled Newton in the seventeenth century to associate the body with the “aetherial 
animal spirit” and the soul. Despite Faraday’s ostensible intentions, then, it was possible for 
readers within and without the scientific professions to consider his imponderable matter of force 
in light of its historical predecessors in Enlightenment natural philosophy and Galenic 
physiology. Specifically, many readers perceived force and imponderable matter as a liminal 
state linking the physical and the metaphysical worlds. 
Before examining the ways contemporary readers interpreted imponderable force, I 
would first like to describe another proposed substrate of matter, the vortex atom as conceived by 
William Thomson. Like Faraday, Thomson ostensibly distanced his vortex atom from 
metaphysics, and treated it in purely physical and mechanical terms. As we shall see, however, 
despite Thomson’s empirical treatment, his vortex atom came freighted with metaphysical force 
already. Because Thomson posited his vortex atom as an unseen substrate of visible matter, 
contemporary readers (even eminent scientists who worked closely with Thomson!) regarded it 
as a potentially metaphysical postulate. Together, Faraday’s force and Thomson’s vortex atom 
suggest the difficulty with which physical hypotheses in Victorian science were distinguished 
from their physically metaphysical forebears in natural philosophy and physiology.
182
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 I should repeat, however, that although I take Faraday’s force and Thomson’s vortex atom at 
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Thomson outlines his vortex atom in an 1867 article, “On Vortex Atoms.” In the article, 
Thomson credits Hermann Helmholtz’s research of frictionless fluids with his own conception of 
the vortex atom. As Thomson, following Helmholtz, reasons, if a vortex were created in “a fluid 
perfectly destitute of viscosity (or fluid friction),” that vortex would whirl without end (94). 
Since the fluid contains no viscosity, nothing physical can catch it to stop its rotation. In fact, “to 
generate or to destroy [vortices] in a perfect fluid can only be an act of creative power” (94).  
But what sort of fluid is “perfectly destitute of viscosity,” and what sort of “creative 
power” can solely and singly act upon this perfect fluid? The answers to these questions show 
the debt Victorian physics owes to previous centuries of natural philosophy and Galenic 
physiology. Thomson’s “perfect fluid” is an aether that fills the cosmos. Like its counterparts in 
previous centuries, specifically in the theories of Newton or Galenic physiology, Thomson’s 
aether is a perfectly “subtle” fluid in that it is unapparent to the senses, devoid of any appreciable 
weight, impervious to compression, and free from all friction or viscosity. Likewise, the 
“creative power” that alone can interact with aether to produce eternal whirls and vortices is that 
of none other than God himself. 
  In speculating about whirls and vortices in a perfectly fluid aether, Thomson, like 
Faraday, broaches a new version of the atomic theory. Instead of atoms consisting of force, 
however, Thomson’s atoms consist of aether, or more precisely, of vortices within the aether. 
                                                                                                                                                             
face value as purely physical, I am perhaps naïve to do so. A number of authors have 
interrogated the theological and metaphysical implications of their speculations. Pertaining 
specifically to Faraday’s force, see David Gooding’s “Metaphysics versus Measurement: The 
Conversion and Conservation of Force in Faraday’s Physics,” as well as Geoffrey Cantor’s 
Michael Faraday: Sandemanian and Scientist and Ian H. Hutchison’s “The Genius and Faith of 
Faraday and Maxwell.” Cantor and Hutchison provide a slightly different perspective than 
Gooding, observing the ways that Faraday’s faith contributed to his attitudes about scientific 
experiment and his relationship with other scientists. However, Cantor and Hutchison avoid 
making any metaphysical interpretation of Faraday’s force itself.  
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The perfectly frictionless nature of Thomson’s aether is critical: In order to explain how atoms 
persist without alteration, decomposition, or change, Thomson’s vortices must be eternally 
stable.  
By Thomson’s theory, then, matter does not exist as matter at base. Rather, each atom 
consists as a perpetual rotation within the aether. If one could perceive as God does, one would 
not see matter but innumerable vortices spinning in the fluid medium of the aether. These 
vortices might bump into each other, interact, and briefly merge, but their individual rotary 
movement would not be altered or impaired by the contact.  
Once more, Thomson intends his vortex atom theory to be understood physically. 
Admittedly, in the opening page of his article, Thomson alludes to God’s “creative power,” and 
consequently his explanation rests upon metaphysical assumptions, particularly upon God’s 
agency in stirring the aetherial fluid to generate the myriad vortices within it. Nevertheless, this 
speculation past, Thomson’s discourse proceeds as a physical theory of matter. For Thomson, the 
aether exists materially, and is responsible for the energetic relations between material particles, 
as well as for – speculatively -- the existence of these material particles themselves.183 Other than 
to God, Thomson makes no reference to any spirit or soul or metaphysical substance.  
Such is not the case, however, with Thomson’s colleague Balfour Stewart, nor with 
Thomson’s frequent co-author, collaborator, and friend Peter Guthrie (P.G.) Tait. According to 
P.M. Heimann, Thomson and the majority of scientific notables during the Victorian era 
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 Thomson was typically guarded in presenting his vortex theory, and characteristically hedged 
his claims. In his first essay on the subject, for instance, Thomson defends his theory by 
observing that “it is as easy (and as improbable – not more so) to assume” a vortex atom in 
aether as it is to assume a “solid indivisible” atom (94). As this remark suggests, Thomson 
viewed all atomic theories as “improbable.” For Thomson, at least in 1867, the one thing that 
atoms had in their favor was that matter exists. Otherwise, Thomson viewed atomic theories 
skeptically.     
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(Heimann mentions John Tyndall, James Clerk Maxwell, and Baden Powell, but he might have 
included Faraday as well) considered natural history, post-creation, to have progressed apart 
from divine intervention.
184
 Thus, the workings and energies of nature were of one order, and the 
work and power of God was of another order entirely. Yet Heimann distinguishes Tait and 
Stewart from their contemporaries. Heimann observes that in their book Unseen Universe, 
Stewart and Tait “argu[ed] that the natural order included an invisible realm which was in 
communication with the visible universe, [and] explained the manifestations of divine 
providence in terms of the transfer of energy from the invisible to the visible realm” (75-6). 
Slightly restated, “Stewart and Tait regarded the operations of divine providence as occurring 
within the natural order and they sought to relate the manifestations of divine providence to the 
operation of natural laws” (76).  
In Unseen Universe (1875), Tait and Stewart set out to justify the ways of God to 
Victorian science. Opposed to Thomson and Maxwell, who viewed the creation (or annihilation) 
of matter and energy to be the distinct prerogative of God, and impossible in the natural world 
apart from the divine will, Tait and Stewart argue that continuity characterizes all of God’s 
actions toward his creatures. Consequently, the act of creation cannot oppose the normal 
operations of nature. In Stewart and Tait’s words, “The power of Divine Being is surely 
unlimited, but, nevertheless, we have perfect trust that God will work in such a way as not to put 
us to permanent confusion” (62). In creating, then, God abides by his own laws. These laws 
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 At first sight, Heimann’s grouping of Tyndall with Thomson and Maxwell may seem odd. 
Tyndall was a naturalist in the modern sense of the word, and denied that God had anything to do 
with the universe’s existence. Thomson and Maxwell, contrarily, were devout Christians and 
revered God as Creator. However, Heimann points out that while Thomson and Maxwell 
believed that God had created the world, they took creation to stand outside of nature and in 
opposition to its normal workings. Consequently, creation stands outside of science as well. 
Practically, then, science for Maxwell and Thomson was a naturalist enterprise in that it studied 
the relations of matter and energy exclusive of creation and other divine acts.  
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appear in nature in the relations of matter and energy. If these relations instantiate God’s laws, 
and if God, as a lawful being, acts in accord with his own laws, then the act of creation must be 
of a piece with the behavior of matter and energy in nature since creation. Creation cannot be 
discontinuous with nature. For Tait and Stewart, such a claim impugns the lawful nature of God.  
Effectively, Tait and Stewart deny the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and replace it with 
the laws of thermodynamics. If the relations of matter and energy iterate the laws that God set for 
himself, then thermodynamics is not merely a scientific theory but a divine decree. According to 
the divine decree articulated as the first law of thermodynamics, nothing comes from nothing.
185
 
If God acted in accord with his own decree in forming the world, then creation cannot have come 
from nothing, either. As Stewart and Tait reason, “if the visible universe is all that exists, then 
the first abrupt manifestation of it is [. . .] truly a break in continuity” (64). Given their reverence 
for lawful continuity, such a break they cannot allow.  
Yet if the visible world cannot have arisen from nothing, from whence did it arise?
186
 
Stewart and Tait’s answer to this question is implied in their caveat “if the visible universe is all 
that exists.” For Tait and Stewart, the visible universe coalesces from an antecedent invisible 
universe, the aether. This invisible universe produces the visible through an inexorable process, 
in perfect conformity with the physical laws that God has decreed. The laws of God, then, 
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 My formulation “nothing comes from nothing” perhaps recalls the Sound of Music instead of 
the laws of thermodynamics. To be more precise, then, the first law of thermodynamics as first 
articulated by Rudolf Clausius in 1850 states that “In all cases where work is produced by heat, a 
quantity of heat proportional to the work done is expended; and inversely, by the expenditure of 
a like quantity of work, the same amount of heat may be produced” (4). Effectively, Clausius 
was saying that a given amount of heat energy translates to an equivalent amount of mechanical 
energy, but the total amount of energy remains constant. Energy is neither created nor destroyed, 
then. Nothing comes from nothing, and nothing turns to nothing.   
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 Apparently, they dismiss the possibility that matter could have existed eternally.  
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articulated by human beings as the laws of energy and thermodynamics, govern both the visible 
and invisible worlds.    
To explain the mechanics by which the invisible world produces the physical, Tait and 
Stewart invoke Thomson’s vortex atom. Thus, an atom of matter is not a hard particle but a 
stable whirl within the fluid aether. However, Tait and Stewart object to Thomson’s claim that 
the aether is a perfect fluid. If the aether were a perfect fluid, then nothing in nature could set it 
in motion. Inducing the rotary whirl of an atomic vortex would require “an act impressed upon 
the universe from without [i.e., by God], and [. . .] must therefore have denoted a breach of 
continuity” (117). Consequently, Stewart and Tait modify Thomson’s theory by envisioning 
aether as a nearly perfect fluid. As a nearly-perfect fluid, the aether is not immune to physical 
cause and effect, and atomic vortices may be engendered in the course of nature by physical 
processes. In its “manifestation,” then, the visible world coalesces from the invisible in strict 
accord with the natural processes decreed by God.  
As a nearly-perfect fluid, the aether is still very stable, and the vortical rotations of atoms 
within it will persist “it may be for billions of years” (118). However, as an imperfect fluid, the 
aether experiences friction, and its vortices perpetually slow and approach collapse. At some 
point, they will fail altogether, and when this happens, the visible universe of matter will return 
to the invisible aether from which it developed. 
At first sight, such a catastrophe signals the extinction of material existence, particularly 
of life. Once more, however, Stewart and Tait invoke aether science to justify the ways of God to 
Victorian science. Much as the doctrine of creation can be explained by (or at least altered to fit) 
aether theory, so can the doctrine of the afterlife. For Tait and Stewart, the aether preserves 
material existence in two ways, both as a historical record of it and as a reservoir of its essential 
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energies. Moreover, if the life-principle or the soul of material beings consists of energy, then the 
aether conserves it as well. In the aether, the energetic souls of material beings find their eternal 
abode.  
Stewart and Tait’s discussion of the aetherial afterlife begins with the proposition that 
“this medium – this aether – has the power of transmitting motion from one part of the universe 
to another” (156). By “motion,” Stewart and Tait mean “energy.” According to the strand of 
energy physics favored by the North British School through the 1870s, whatever light, 
electricity, and magnetism may or may not be in and of themselves, they invariably express 
themselves as motions in aether. Light was typically described as a compression wave within the 
aether, and magnetism and electricity were accounted for as either rotary or linear movements of 
aether particles.
187
  
Thus aether conveys energy (or the motion associated with energy) through space. For 
the Victorians, a primary function of the aether was to transfer energy from the sun to the earth. 
But aether conveys energy in all directions: each incident in the material world is like an 
epicenter of an earthquake, and the aether transports the energy released by that incident outward 
through space with astonishing rapidity.
188
 In describing the sun’s expenditure of energy, for 
example, Tait and Stewart write that  
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 See my discussion of Maxwell’s model of the aether, below. Maxwell’s model was one of 
many, but it aptly illustrates energy’s association with moving particles of aether. For the North 
British School generally, energy existed, for all appearances, as a relation of matter. In this way, 
the North British differed from Faraday, who viewed matter as a relation of force. 
188
 Science owes the terms “electromagnetic energy” and “electromagnetic field” to the 
nineteenth century. According to the OED, the word “electromagnetic” was first used in an 1820 
edition of the Annals of Philosophy. “Electromagnetic energy” followed in 1834, in P.M. 
Cunningham’s Motions of the Earth and the Heavenly Bodies. Finally, “electromagnetic field” 
appeared in 1864, in James Clerk Maxwell’s Royal Society paper “A Dynamical Theory of the 
Electromagnetic Field.”   
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All but a very small portion of the sun’s heat goes day by day into what we call 
empty space, and it is only this very small remainder that is made use of by the 
various planets for purposes of their own. Can anything be more perplexing than 
this seemingly frightful expenditure of the very life and essence of the system? 
That this vast store of high-class energy should be doing nothing but traveling 
outwards in space at the rate of 188,000 miles per second is hardly conceivable, 
especially when the result of it is the inevitable destruction of the visible universe. 
(155-6)  
Such waste, for Tait and Stewart and Victorians in general, was “inconceivable.” 
Subsequently, however, Tait and Stewart reclaim the prodigal expenditure. In propagating 
energy outwards, the aether preserves a memory (Tait and Stewart use the word “photograph”) 
of each event in the material world. Since aether conveys light and energy throughout the 
universe, every event is reenacted at every moment in some place in the universe.
189
 If one could 
travel fast enough to keep pace with the lightspeed motions of aether, one could see and 
experience the event in still-frame as its energetic “photograph” sped out into space (156).190     
Thus, the “astounding phenomenon” of energy expenditure “may only be an arrangement 
in virtue of which our universe keeps up a memory of the past as well as the present” (156). 
Ultimately, energy expenditure is “historically” justified – justified in composing a history of the 
visible world. But in addition to justifying energy’s expenditure, the aether also recoups it. When 
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 To be more precise, every event is reenacted at every moment in a thin but ever-enlarging 
shell or sphere.  
190
 For instance, the light of the sun takes approximately 8 minutes to reach earth. When we look 
at the sun, then, we are not seeing the sun as it is at the present. Instead, we are seeing the sun as 
it existed 8 minutes ago. The light energy travelling outward from the sun preserves a “memory” 
or “photograph” of the sun. If we could travel far enough away, we would be able to see the sun 
as it existed any number of years ago.   
251 
energy radiates out into space, it may disappear for a short while from the visible world, but it is 
conserved within the aether. Accordingly, when energy enters the aether, it is not lost but is 
merely “transferred” from the visible world “into an invisible order of things” (158).191 Stewart 
and Tait inquire, “May we not at once say that when energy is carried from matter into ether it is 
carried from the visible into the invisible; and that when it is carried from ether to matter it is 
carried from the invisible into the visible?” (159). For Tait and Stewart, this is a comforting 
thought. Should the atomic vortices of matter ever cease to whirl, and should the visible world 
vanish altogether, the energies of the defunct world will enter the aether where they will be 
perpetually conserved. 
But the consolation of aether applies personally as well as universally. At various points, 
Stewart and Tait consider thought in energetic terms. In one instance, Tait and Stewart remark 
the disparate intensity of thought energy in the brain versus motor energy in the muscles. They 
observe that “a very small and obscure transmutation of energy in the mysterious brain chamber 
may determine some very violent motion” (146). Thought and muscular movement are both 
energies then, and the miniscule energy of electricity in the brain that prompts the explosive 
burst of muscular work is much like the spark that ignites gunpowder or the “slight tap [that 
causes] the explosion of a large quantity of fulminating silver” (146).  
The pair elaborate their idea in a later passage, reasoning that if energy passes from the 
physical world to the unseen universe, so the energies of thought may pass from the physical 
body into the spiritual body:  
                                                 
191
 Stewart and Tait equivocate whether aether is a bridge between the visible and invisible 
worlds, a container or “medium” of the invisible world, or the substance of the invisible world 
itself. See 158-9. Notwithstanding, whether aether is bridge or container or substance, when 
energy leaves the visible world and enters the aether, it likewise enters the unseen universe.    
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Now each thought that we think, is accompanied by certain molecular motions 
and displacements in the brain, and part of these, let us allow, are in some way 
stored up in that organ, so as to produce what may be termed our material or 
physical memory.
192
 Other parts of these motions are, however, communicated to 
the spiritual or invisible body, and are there stored up, forming a memory which 
may be made use of when that body is free to exercise its functions. (159). 
As energies in nature transition back and forth between apparent matter and the 
unapparent aether, so the energies of thought reciprocate between the physical body and the 
“invisible” or “spiritual” body (159). That this invisible body corresponds to the invisible 
universe appears later, when Tait and Stewart entertain the problem how individuality “will be 
preserved in the spiritual world” (164). To answer this difficulty, Tait and Stewart reason that if 
the physical brain can retain one memory distinct and whole from among millions of others, so 
the “universe of the future” can retain the energies of one person’s memories whole and distinct 
from those of other persons’ (164). From this, it appears that invisible bodies stand to each other 
in the aetherial medium of the unseen world much as memories stand to each other in the 
medullary substance of the brain. Just as a memory is a local arrangement of energy and matter 
within the substance of the brain, so the invisible or spiritual body is a local arrangement of 
energy and aether within the substance of the unseen universe. In both spheres, however, grossly 
material or aetherial, memories are energies contained within substance. In the physical body, the 
brain’s substance preserves energetic memories; in the spiritual or aetherial body, the invisible 
body’s substance preserves energetic memories. Much as memories generate identity and self-
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 Observe the similarity of Tait and Stewart’s “material or physical memory” and Hopkins’ 
“scape.” For Stewart, Tait, and Hopkins, scapes/material memories are physical stores of energy 
(electricity) within organic matter.  
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coherence in physical life, so memories extend and preserve identity in the afterlife of the unseen 
world.  
Though farfetched by twenty-first century sensibilities, Unseen Universe illustrates the 
ambiguous status of aether and energy in Victorian speculation, popular and scientific alike. 
Because of their uncertain ontology, aether and energy were often considered by Victorians to be 
in some way analogous with the soul, or with metaphysical existence generally. Admittedly, 
Stewart and Tait repeatedly claim to proceed from purely scientific principles and to eschew 
metaphysical uncertainties.
193
 And to be fair, they depict spiritual bodies and the aether as 
material, albeit matter of an imponderable sort. As Tait and Stewart explain, in contradistinction 
to the typical division between material and immaterial substance, “we substitute for matter the 
words gross matter, and for immaterial the words not grossly material” (161, italics original to 
text). Effectively, Tait and Stewart extend the empire of the physical into regions traditionally 
considered metaphysical.  
Tait’s and Stewart’s protestations aside, it is difficult to distinguish the spirit and the 
afterlife from metaphysics. Such topics are metaphysical by long tradition. Moreover, given that 
imponderable substances mediated matter and im-matter from the seventeenth century through 
the nineteenth, (e.g. Newton’s physics, Galenic physiology, and Young’s ontology), positing the 
existence of matter “not grossly material” seems to be a metaphysical strategy by default. 
Essentially, the strategy involves transposition, and shifts the soul’s substance from strict 
immateriality to imponderability (or to “not grossly material” matter). While such a strategy 
allows for the soul’s substance to be interrogated physically, it nevertheless preserves the 
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 See pg. 73: “We do not here intend to enter any metaphysical speculation.” See also pg. 102: 
“But his attempted proofs are for the most part absurd, based, as they generally are, upon mere 
metaphysical speculations and altogether preposterous analogies.”  
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characteristically metaphysical distinction between mundane and super-mundane substance. 
Accordingly, such a strategy brings the physical and the metaphysical in close proximity. But to 
claim that it avoids the metaphysical entirely is tenable only by positing a narrow definition of 
metaphysics.
194
  
Not all Victorians approved Tait and Stewart’s speculation. Particularly, James Clerk 
Maxwell and William Thomson regarded Unseen Universe with bemused incredulity.
195
 
Nevertheless, Tait and Stewart were anything but cranks, and twenty-first century readers should 
beware dismissing their theories as scientifically uniformed or culturally unimportant. The book 
went through nine editions in the first five years following initial publication. Moreover, Tait and 
Stewart were eminent physicists in their time. Tait graduated from Cambridge as Senior 
Wrangler, and was Professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh from 1860 
until shortly before his death in 1901. As a mathematician and a physicist, Tait collaborated with 
William Rowan Hamilton to develop quaternion mathematics, essential to Einstein’s theory of 
relativity. With Thomson, Tait collaborated theoretically and experimentally throughout his 
career, and coauthored the Treatise on Natural Philosophy, a seminal work in the history of 
physics. Thanks to his theoretical investigations of vortex-filament knots (see below), Tait’s 
reputation is currently rising again, and he has been cited as an influential figure in knot theory. 
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 Etymologically, “metaphysics” means “beyond physics.” Thus any subject that can be 
considered physically or scientifically can be regarded as non-metaphysical. But as with so many 
other words, the conventional meaning of the term “metaphysical” has shifted from its 
etymological roots. Traditionally, the soul and the afterlife have been metaphysical postulates. 
Translating these postulates from immateriality to quasi-materiality does not purge their 
metaphysical associations. It merely punctures the membrane between physics and metaphysics, 
or advances physics into traditionally metaphysical territory.  
195
 William Thomson’s biographer, Silvanus P. Thompson, writes that “Sir William Thomson 
did not like [Tait and Stewart’s] book” (1.480). Maxwell’s bemusement appears in his poem 
“My Soul’s an Amphicheiral Knot.” Maxwell wrote a less whimsical response for Nature in his 
review of Paradoxical Philosophy. A Sequel to Unseen Universe.  
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The Tait Chair at the University of Edinburgh was established in 1922 (Max Born was the 
second incumbent), and Peter Higgs was a lecturer at the Tait Institute (founded 1955) when he 
wrote his theoretical predictions about the Higgs Bosun.
196
    
Nor were Tait and Stewart alone in their speculations. Other Victorian scientists 
entertained similarly metaphysical estimations of aether or matter. Notoriously, Sir Oliver Lodge 
endorsed a similar rapprochement of Christian metaphysics with Victorian aether science. Like 
Stewart and Tait, “Lodge’s scientific work [. . .] convinced him that the ether was the medium 
that unified the whole of nature,” a whole that comprised the mundane and the metaphysical at 
once (Bowler 49). As Peter Bowler explains, Lodge “became committed to the idea of a spirit 
world on the [a]ethereal plane,” particularly after his son Raymond’s death in World War I (49). 
Once more resembling Stewart and Tait, Lodge equated spirit with aether, and regarded the 
resurrected bodies of Christ and the blessed to consist of aether. 
While Faraday’s, Thomson’s, Tait and Stewart’s, and Lodge’s conceptions of the 
material substrate differ, what unites them is that each sought to understand physically a domain 
that had traditionally been understood metaphysically. Each of these figures claims that his 
speculation extends from physical research, and that the unseen world may be apprehended in 
strictly physical terms. Such rhetoric is necessary in order for these physicists to distinguish their 
speculations from metaphysical postulates. These distinctions may hold logically, but only if one 
takes at face value the physicists’ various redefinitions of terms and disciplinary domains. Thus, 
for Faraday and Thomson, one must sever imponderable matter from its traditional associations 
with subtle fluids that mediate soul and body. Likewise, for Stewart, Tait, and Lodge, one must 
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 Stewart was also a highly regarded physicist. He was the director of Kew Observatory, and 
professor of physics at Manchester University. He is best remembered for positing the link 
between sunspots and magnetic storms.  
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redefine spirit in purely energetic and material terms, and locate the afterlife within the domain 
of physical science.  
What distinguishes these figures, however, is the extent to which physics encroaches 
upon metaphysics. Faraday and Thomson extend physics to include imponderable matter, but 
they preserve God, the soul, and the act of creation as entirely distinct from physical processes. 
While Faraday and Thomson stretch the seams of the physical world, they maintain a hard and 
fast distinction between matter and metaphysics. Contrarily, Tait and Stewart, urged by their 
commitment to Continuity, push physics much further into traditionally metaphysical territory. 
They treat the soul or spiritual body as material, albeit “not grossly” so (161). Likewise, arguing 
that “it is the duty of the man of science to push back the Great First Cause in time as far as 
possible,” they maintain that the visible world “develops” from the unseen universe of aether by 
natural processes (65).
197
 In effect, then, Tait and Stewart bring the physical and the 
metaphysical into nearly perfect overlap. Compared to Faraday and Thomson, who expand the 
purview of matter but nevertheless preserve distinctions between physics and metaphysics, Tait 
and Stewart collapse the two into one. Existence for Tait and Stewart is univocal, and the 
categories of physics and metaphysics are tautologies.
198
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 Tait and Stewart’s preference of “development” instead of “creation” is telling. Given the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, the term “creation” implies that the world was made from nothing. 
Such an implication constitutes a sharp break in continuity. Contrarily, “development” implies a 
natural process working continuously over time.   
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 I have limited myself to Stewart and Tait’s speculations concerning aether, but the pair 
actually push the continuity of physics and metaphysics much further. Tait and Stewart conceive 
of the Universe as an endless series of concentric spheres. The innermost sphere is the visible 
universe. It is generated by the next sphere, an aether, which despite it comparative refinement is 
next to the physical universe in gross materiality. This aether, in turn, is generated by a still more 
refined sphere of aether, which is generated by a yet finer sphere. So on and so forth through 
infinite regressions, infinite because God himself is infinite. The ultimate sphere of being is Jesus 
the incarnate word, who has “in some mysterious sense [. .  .] submit[ted] to conditions and [. . .] 
enter[ed] into the universe” (174). Thus the continuity of physics and metaphysics leads all the 
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Along with James Clerk Maxwell, Thomson, Tait, Stewart, and Lodge indicate the 
boundaries of aether physics in the Victorian era. Thomson speculatively posits aether as a 
physical substrate. Tait, Stewart, and Lodge extend Thomson’s speculation, regarding aether as 
the substrate of the visible world and the invisible universe alike. Finally, Maxwell (see below) 
treats aether not as a material substrate but merely as a refined form of matter capable of 
conveying the energies of light, electricity, and magnetism. Taken together, these various 
formulations indicate the range with which Victorians regarded the aether. Indisputably material, 
uncertainly yet potentially more than material, the aether enrolled hard science and religious 
hope, often within the same individual.   
5.6 Cogwheels and Idle Gears: Material Models of the Aether 
With this range in mind, I will briefly sketch several models of aether. It should be 
remembered that aether in the late Victorian era was susceptible to both physical analysis and 
metaphysical extension. Although physicists might ply the aether with complex mathematics and 
excruciatingly mechanical analogies, their rigorous calculations do not prohibit more lively 
speculation, and often (in the case of Tait and Lodge particularly) mask the physicist’s own 
metaphysical philosophies. Such models of aether brought the metaphysical and the physical into 
close proximity, and illustrated the universal action of energy within and beyond physics. 
Drawing from Helmholtz’s and Thomson’s aether vortex theory, P.G. Tait set out to 
classify the various forms a vortex could take.
199
 Instead of wide and shallow, like an eddy in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
way to Jesus, the second person of the trinity. Only God the Father, the “unapproachable 
Creator,” exists entirely beyond physics (174). In fine, Tait and Stewart’s Unseen Universe is a 
scientific romance similar to Hopkins’ theological romance of the Great Sacrifice. For Tait and 
Stewart and for Hopkins, Jesus is a hero on quest to glorify God, who forms the cosmos (seen 
and unseen) as a direct result of his incarnation.  
199
 To be clear, Tait’s knot theory is not a scientific model. Scientific models 1) offer physically 
causal explanations of observed events, 2) make predictions that are testable, and 3) analyze 
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creek, Thomson’s aether vortices were narrow and deep like a tornado. Just as a tornado’s shaft 
of whirling air rises miles above the ground, causing the tornado to appear thin and thread-like 
from a distance, so the vortices of Thomson’s and Tait’s theory took the form of long, thin 
threads of whirling aether particles. But unlike a tornado and more like a length of sewing thread, 
Thomson and Tait’s vortex thread could loop back on itself and knot, forming a “vortex ring” or 
a vortical knot (“Recent Advances” 297). As Tait and Thomson conjectured, if atoms are vortical 
knots of aether, then each different kind of knot forms a different atom or element of matter.  
Accordingly, Tait set himself to classify the various knots. In so doing, Tait was not 
merely embarking on a tedious mathematical exercise. Instead, Tait thought he was “constructing 
a periodic table of elements” (Stoimenow 285). Assuming that the atoms of matter are knots of 
vortex threads, and assuming that the aether contains every form of knot possible, then each knot 
represents an element of matter.
200
 Tait assiduously classified “the first seven orders of 
                                                                                                                                                             
phenomena mathematically to enable additional predictions. Tait’s theory lacks these attributes. 
Because Tait does not explain how the aether vortices developed, his theory lacks causal 
explanation. Likewise, because Tait’s predictions apply to future events (the afterlife, the end of 
the world), testing them in the present is difficult. Finally, while Tait describes his knots 
geometrically, he did not elaborate his theory sufficiently to enable scientists to predict the 
number and nature of knots at higher order knottiness. In this, I do not mean to accuse Tait, an 
accomplished mathematician, of shoddiness. Scientific theories typically lack a model in their 
first inception. Furthermore, knot theory is still developing, and has only recently developed the 
mathematical apparatus necessary to make reliable predictions. Instead, I merely mean to 
distinguish Tait’s theory from a true scientific model. Nevertheless, I discuss Tait’s theory 
alongside Maxwell’s and Lodge’s models in order to point out several salient traits. Namely, that 
Tait takes a decidedly material view of the aether, but nevertheless imbues it with metaphysical 
properties.  
200
 Tait apparently believed that the aether (or at least the earth) did not contain all of the 
possible forms of knots. In his “On Knots,” Tait observes that “we now see that the distinctive 
forms of less than 10-fold knottiness are together more than sufficient (with their perversions, 
&c.) for the known elements” (321). 
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knottiness” by himself, before Charles Little and Thomas P. Kirkman largely took over his work 
(“On Knots” 335).201   
Tait often remarks upon the labor required to tabulate knots. He appealed to the public for 
help in the 1884 edition of the Philosophical Magazine: “The requisite labour increases with 
extreme rapidity as the number of crossings is increased [. . . .] It is greatly to be desired that 
some one, with the requisite leisure, should try to extend this list” (Listing’s Topologie” 97). 
Thus knot tabulation proved to be a laborious and mathematically-intensive task. Nevertheless, 
to set Tait’s Unseen Universe alongside his work with knots, Tait apparently feels no incongruity 
in identifying the aether as the locus of laboriously geometrical knots at the same time that he 
identifies it as the abode of the soul.
202
 For Tait, the physicality of the aether does not besmirch 
its spiritual associations. 
The same cannot be said of James Clerk Maxwell, however. Maxwell and Tait were close 
friends since youth, and “corresponded by the new half-penny postcards almost daily” (Silver 9). 
One of the poems Maxwell sent Tait pokes fun at the knotty spirituality of Tait’s aether: 
My soul’s an amphicheiral knot, 
Upon a liquid vortex wrought 
By Intellect in the Unseen residing 
And thine doth like a convict sit, 
With marlinespike untwisting it, 
Only to find its knottiness abiding; 
Since all the tools for its untying 
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 By “knottiness,” Tait means the number of times the thread crosses itself to form the knot. 
Thus, a knot of seventh-order knottiness has seven crossings.  
202
 Tait and Stewart composed Unseen Universe in 1875. He and Stewart continued to publish 
editions of the book through the early 1880s during the time when he tabulated knots.   
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In four-dimensional space are lying. (Knott 242) 
Maxwell’s poem (written “after Shelley,” Maxwell assures his friend) spoofs Tait’s 
aether, conflating Tait’s aetherial soul with his aetherial knots. In Tait’s actual theory, aether 
comprises both the soul and atoms of matter, but in different ways. The soul consists of aether 
pure and simple, while atoms consist of aether-made-matter in the form of vortical knots. In his 
parody, however, Maxwell confounds soul and atoms, representing the soul as material, as a 
vortex knot. In so doing, Maxwell intentionally misunderstands Tait’s philosophy in order to 
point up the implausibility of an aether that is simultaneously material and spiritual.  
Although Maxwell’s model of the aether lacks the spiritual extensions of Tait’s theory, it 
is every bit as material. Instead of knots and whirling vortices, however, Maxwell employs 
whirling tubes and idle wheels.
203
 Moreover, instead of explaining how aether supplies matter, 
Maxwell attempted to explain how aether propagates light, magnetism, and electricity. By 
Maxwell’s telling, the various forms of electromagnetic energy (light, magnetism, and 
electricity) do not exist in their own right but as effects of the aether. To be more precise, each 
form of electromagnetic energy is caused by a specific type of movement of aether particles.
204
 A 
magnetic field is generated by rotary movement of aether particles, an electric current by 
translatory displacement, and light by contiguous collision of particles (a shockwave).   
For Maxwell, magnetism and electricity link particularly closely. Maxwell explains 
magnetism as the product of vortex tubes whirling furiously. Similar to the Thomson-Tait vortex, 
Maxwell’s vortex tube consists of aether particles in rotary motion. These tubes extend in 
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 Like Lodge, Maxwell actually proposed several differing models of aether. Here, though, I 
will discuss the model Maxwell proposes in his 1861-2 “On Physical Lines of Force.”  
204
 The previous two sentences may be debated. Admittedly, energy takes the form of movement 
of aether particles. Presumably, however, something caused the particles to move. Whether 
energy is the movement or the cause of movement locates energy ontologically postcedent or 
antecedent to aether.  
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parallel lines through a given volume of aether. Apparently, like Tait’s aether, Maxwell’s aether 
is imperfectly devoid of friction, for the whiling tubes impart a rotary motion to the entire mass 
of aether. In this way, the tubes’ local rotation generates a field capable of moving grossly 
material objects.    
At this point, however, Maxwell encounters a problem. Maxwell insists that the aether is 
contiguous, or that each particle is in immediate contact with those around it. Yet if vortex tubes 
are contiguous, they must rotate in opposite directions. Otherwise, their particles will smash 
together and bring the tubes’ rotation to a halt. As with interlocking gears, if one gear rotates 
clockwise, the other must rotate counterclockwise. But an arrangement of alternately rotating 
tubes poses yet another problem. If the vortex tubes rotate in opposite directions, they cannot 
impart a consistent motion to the larger mass. The motion imparted to the mass by one tube will 
be cancelled by that imparted by another tube.  
Maxwell solves this problem by supposing that vortex tubes are separated by intervening 
particles. These particles act as idle wheels. Edmund Whittaker explains that in mechanics, 
“when it is desired that two wheels should revolve in the same sense, an ‘idle’ wheel is inserted 
between them so as to be in gear with both” (247). Thus, if a vortex tube rotates 
counterclockwise, the intervening particle or idle wheel will rotate clockwise, allowing the next 
vortex tube to rotate counterclockwise. This arrangement pervades the aether, allowing vortex 
tubes to rotate in the same direction and to impart a uniform motion to the mass of aether.    
But the idle wheel particles do not exist purely for the sake of saving the model. Rather 
“these particles [are] ‘electricity’” as Maxwell writes Thomson in a December 10, 1861 letter 
(Scientific Letters 692). When the field of tubes and idle wheels is at equilibrium, these electrical 
idle wheel particles rotate in unison with the tubes, spinning in place but remaining still 
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otherwise. However, when for some reason a tube begins to rotate more rapidly than the other 
tubes, the entire system, interlocked so tightly as it is, experiences stress and strain. The faster 
spinning vortex expands as a result of centrifugal force, shoving its idle wheels outward, which 
impinge upon the neighboring vortex tubes, which in turn impinge upon their idle wheels, and so 
on throughout the field. Such moments of stress, in which the particles of the field shift or are 
displaced, constitute currents of electricity.
205
   
While electricity links causally to magnetism in Maxwell’s theory, light does not. Light 
for Maxwell is not generated within or by the aether itself, but is imposed upon it from without 
by a luminous source of gross matter.
206
 Once it enters the aether, light travels through the field 
as a “propagation of disturbances” (Whittaker 251-2). In other words, light is a shockwave or 
compression wave in the aether, and is conveyed as a chain reaction of aether particles bumping 
into one another. 
Oliver Lodge, in devising his cogwheel model of aether, adopted Maxwell’s model but 
revised it in several ways. Particularly, Lodge attempted to explain light as arising from the field 
itself, or as causally linked to electricity and magnetism. To accomplish this, Lodge changed 
Maxwell’s model in several ways. For Maxwell, at least in his 1861-2 papers “On Physical Lines 
of Force,” magnetism was a rotary force, and electricity was a derived translatory force. Lodge 
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 Contrary to modern understandings of electricity, in which electrons move rather freely, 
Maxwell’s electrical particles were closely boxed in by other particles. When they shifted, they 
did not shift far. Nevertheless, because one particle is in close contiguous contact with another, 
one particle’s shift will rapidly propagate throughout the medium. As such, Maxwell’s particles 
do not shift far individually, but they occasion a rapid shift throughout the entire medium.   
206
 Typically, light was considered to be the result of vibrations in gross matter. When the 
molecules of gross matter were sufficiently excited (whether by a blow, by heat, by chemical 
action, etc.) they would vibrate rapidly. Since aether surrounds grossly material objects, the 
molecule, in vibrating, would slam into particles of aether, displacing them and sending them 
crashing into other particles of aether, setting up a chain reaction. Thus the molecular vibrations 
of gross matter would be transferred to the aether in the form of radiant light or heat, depending 
on wavelength.    
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borrows Maxwell’s whirling tubes of aether, but instead of assigning them to magnetism, he 
assigns them to electricity. Furthermore, Lodge eliminates the intervening idle wheels of 
Maxwell’s model, and brings the whirling tubes into direct contact, much like two interlocking 
gears or cogwheels. This induces the tubes to rotate alternately in opposite directions, a feature 
Lodge takes to explain positive and negative electricity. As Bruce J. Hunt describes, “One kind 
of vortex represented positive electricity and spun in one direction; the other represented 
negative electricity and spun the opposite way” (Hunt 31).  Under the influence of magnetism, 
the vortex tubes twisted, “wherefore a disturbance would spread laterally [. . .] and hence that 
light could be got from oscillations” (quoted Hunt 31).  
In physical terms, Lodge’s model of aether is an adaptation of Maxwell’s. Both begin 
with a parallel arrangement of whirling vortex tubes disposed as interlocking cylindrical gears. 
From the basic dynamics of these whirling tubes, both derive the behavior of magnetism and 
electricity, and Lodge additionally derives light. In its meticulously mechanical account of 
physical causation, Lodge’s aether model closely resembles Maxwell’s. But unlike Maxwell, 
Lodge’s physical conception of the aether does not prevent him from subsequently annexing a 
spiritual conception of aetherial bodies in the afterlife. For Lodge, traditionally metaphysical 
entities like souls and spirits are compatible with the aether and the physical mode of causation 
that obtains within it. In his alliance of physical causation with metaphysical speculation, 
Lodge’s total construction of aether resembles Tait’s as much as it does Maxwell’s. 
 Once more, Maxwell’s, Lodge’s, and Tait’s models suggest the uncertainly spiritual 
signification of aether in Victorian England. Maxwell, although a devoted member of the 
Presbyterian Church of Scotland, apparently assigned no religious significance to the aether. In 
Maxwell’s model, the aether is a purely material affair of gear mechanisms, idle wheels, and 
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particles in movement. But while Lodge and Tait do assign religious significance to their aethers, 
their aethers are every bit as physical as Maxwell’s, as are the spiritual bodies that inhabit them. 
In the aether, the physical and the not-grossly physical meet, and souls or spirit bodies get on 
comfortably with cogwheels and vortical knots.   
With their gears, knots, threads, idle wheels, cogwheels, and vortices, the aforementioned 
models of aether may sound to twenty-first century ears more like explosions in a tinker’s cart 
than like models of scientific theories. Yet again though, twenty-first century readers should 
avoid chronological snobbery. First, it should be remembered that models provide a means to 
wrestle with difficulties. While they posit an imagined reality, they are regarded with varying 
degrees of certainty, and are accorded full conviction only after trial. Thus, Thomson regarded 
his theory of vortex atoms hopefully but skeptically. Likewise, Maxwell initially discussed his 
idle-wheel model as a thought experiment, and offered it as a realistic explanation of aether only 
later. Second, the purpose of models often is not to represent things as they actually exist, but to 
approximate relations between things. Whether Lodge actually believed that positive and 
negative electricity striped the aether in oppositely-ginning tubes is not really the point. Instead, 
the value of the model is that it gave him a way to represent the properties of electricity visually, 
and to draw inferences about magnetism and light from the proposed analogy.  
Nevertheless, certain propositions appear from Victorian models of aether. Most 
assuredly, the aether was material, and despite its rarefaction it obeyed the same laws that govern 
courser matter. Somewhat less assuredly, the rarified physical aether bridged the world of gross 
matter and the world of not-grossly-material spirit. And finally, depending on the individual’s 
acceptance of the second proposition, a third proposition appears: that the spiritual and physical 
realms are consonant, ordered by the same laws and relations of matter and energy.  
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These propositions provide a context from which to consider two perplexing questions 
that I mentioned earlier concerning Hopkins’ model of hell: How can scapes within disembodied 
souls be material? How can the soul in hell be set “texturally at stress” and “burn” (136, 138)? 
To these I might add another question in anticipation: How is the soul like a magnet?   
Before answering these questions, I should briefly review the highlights of Hopkins’ 
engagement with physical science.
207
 At Stonyhurst (1870-2, 1882-4), Hopkins shadowed the 
internationally-recognized astronomer and meteorologist, Father Stephen Joseph Perry, along 
with his colleague Walter Sidgreaves. As Tom Zaniello notes, Perry was “Hopkins’ friend” and 
“mentor in matters scientific” (“An Attentive Observer” 326; “Scientific Interests” 511). 
Moreover, Zaniello writes that Hopkins worked with Perry in the Stonyhurst Observatory, “one 
of the nation’s leading meteorological stations” (“Scientific Interests,” 511). As well, 
periodically before, during, and after Stonyhurst, Hopkins read the scientific journal Nature. 
Four of Hopkins’ letters to Nature were published between 1883-4. Moreover, in Dublin 
Hopkins continued to study science. In an 1886 letter to R.W. Dixon, he outlined a plan to write 
a “popular account of Light and Aether” (139). In this letter, Hopkins picks a bone with P.G. Tait 
particularly, claiming that Tait simplifies the natural world to “a world of formulas,” or to an 
ideal reality which exists only “in thought” (139). Hopkins, ever a lover of the distinct, 
individual shapes of nature, was annoyed by Tait’s penchant to set aside phenomenal 
appearances (and the wholistic selves they express) in favor of abstract characteristics.
208
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 For a more complete account, please see the beginning of Chapter 3. 
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 I do not believe that Hopkins objects to Tait’s quest to find an underlying truth in matter, or 
an ultimate substrate of being. Granted, Tait’s theory of aether amounts to this, but so does 
Hopkins’ philosophy of divine instress. Rather, I believe Hopkins perceived Tait as a sort of 
Dickensian Bitzer, a person who identifies a horse as a graminivorous quadruped with forty 
teeth. In other words, Tait enumerates classifications instead of describing appearances. For 
Hopkins, phenomenal appearance was a true witness, if viewed rightly, of underlying essence. 
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Hopkins composed his commentary to Ignatius’ “A Meditation on Hell” in the “Long 
Retreat, and later, 1881” (Sermons 138). This date falls after Hopkins’ first Stonyhurst residence 
but before his letter to Dixon (1886) expressly mentioning Tait and the aether. While Hopkins’ 
does not discuss his knowledge of aether prior to 1886, critics typically consider Hopkins to be 
knowledgeable of basic physical theory post-Stonyhurst, thanks to the influence of Father Perry. 
Certainly, aether theory was basic to Victorian physical science, particularly to astronomy. Given 
the fundamental importance of gravity and light for astronomy, and given the essential operation 
of aether (as understood by Victorian science) in conveying gravity and light through space to 
stars and planets and satellites, it seems difficult to conceive of Hopkins being ignorant of the 
aether while being mentored by the “foremost Victorian astronomer” in Father Stephen Perry 
(Zaniello “An Attentive Observer,” 326).  
A closer look at Father Perry’s scientific achievements illustrates the importance of 
aether theory to his work. Perry’s specialty was “solar and magnetic phenomena,” and “his 
magnetic surveys were standards in the field” (“An Attentive” 327). From the aether models of 
Maxwell and Lodge, we have already seen the importance of aether for magnetic theory. 
Likewise, Perry lectured publically on spectroscopy, “with sometimes as many as one thousand 
in attendance,” Zaniello writes (“An Attentive” 327). Spectroscopy is the study of lightwaves. 
Given that, as Victorians believed, lightwaves could not travel apart from the aether, aether 
enjoyed nearly axiomatic status in Victorian spectroscopy. Indeed, as Whittaker observes, Young 
and Fresnel’s experimental evidence of lightwaves as opposed to light corpuscles was considered 
                                                                                                                                                             
Most likely, Hopkins was simultaneously fascinated and repulsed by Tait’s philosophy – 
fascinated by Tait’s perception of unapparent essence, but repulsed by the dissociative dissection 
by which Tait achieves it.   
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ipso facto evidence of aether (107-27). If there could be no lightwaves without aether, then the 
presence of lightwaves signals the presence of aether.  
In short, Father Perry’s work was intimately associated with aether theory, and Hopkins 
studied under Father Perry for several years. As unlikely as it would be for any scientifically 
informed Victorian to be ignorant of aether, it would be even more so for Hopkins.
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5.7 Instress and Fields of Force: Hopkins’ Model of Hell 
Hopkins, in his 1881 commentary on Ignatius’ “A Meditation on Hell,” never mentions 
aether expressly. However, his mechanical model of hell’s stresses and energy fields resembles 
contemporary physical models of the aether. Moreover, Hopkins’ treatment of souls as 
substantial, and hence subject to physical relations, recalls Victorian speculations about the 
nature of aether and its correspondence with metaphysical states. Finally, in depicting God’s 
wrath and the human soul as fields of opposed energy, Hopkins links the spiritual and the 
physical, and shows the operation of energy throughout the total integrated universe. In this 
commentary, Hopkins constructs a physical model of hell that offers an energetic explanation of 
the pains of damned souls. Similar to the energy and aether models devised by scientific 
contemporaries, which set the metaphysical substrate of the universe in material and even 
mechanical terms, Hopkins’ model of hell advances a mechanically causal account of the soul’s 
metaphysical torment.   
Daniel Brown, in his Hopkins Idealism: Philosophy, Physics, Poetry, observes the action 
of energetic fields and stresses in Hopkins’ hell (269). Building on Brown’s analysis, I would 
like to consider Hopkins’ description of hell in light of scientific contemporaries’ models of the 
                                                 
209
 Hopkins’ poems and papers mention aether and spectroscopy (albeit rarely) even before 
Stonyhurst. For instance, see Hopkins’ Oxford poem “The Rainbow,” as well as his essay “The 
Tests of a Progressive Science.” It is likely then that Hopkins was aware of aether theory even 
while at Oxford. Nevertheless, he almost certainly was after Stonyhurst.  
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energetic aether. While aether theorists such as Thomson, Maxwell, Tait, Stewart, and Lodge 
were not certain that they had found the way aether and energy worked precisely, they were 
confident that energy behaves consistently, whether in aether or in grosser matter. In much the 
same way, Hopkins’ model of hell is speculative, but it does suggest that energy behaves 
consistently, whether upon souls or upon material bodies. Common to models of aether and 
Hopkins’ model of hell is the belief that energy acts like energy, regardless of the substance upon 
which it acts. 
Accordingly, while Hopkins’ model applies to metaphysical entities (souls) within a 
metaphysical state (hell), it works according to physical laws of causation, or according to the 
behavior of energy observed in physical objects. Much as Maxwell’s idle wheels, Thomson’s 
vortices, Tait’s knots, and Lodge’s cogwheels expressed the dynamics of energy within the 
aether as conformable to the dynamics of energy within grossly material bodies, so Hopkins’ 
model expresses the dynamics of hell in terms of the energetic relations of material bodies. If the 
physical and the metaphysical exist within an integrated universe, then energy’s operation within 
the unseen universe is conformable to its operation within the visible world. 
In his history of hell’s creation, Hopkins writes that “the stress of God’s anger [. . .] first 
‘prepared’ or called into being fire against the Devil and his angels” (Sermons, 137). As in his 
1880 and 1881 notes, God’s force or power or – here – his “stress” calls into actual being what 
had previously existed only potentially. While hell may be a location, it is primarily a personal 
state, the condition of an individual suffering “an intensification or terrible instress [of God’s 
anger] upon the substance of one” (137). Hell is God’s wrath, instressed.  
In this description, Hopkins simultaneously treats Hell, God’s instressed wrath, in 
metaphysical and energetic terms. Metaphysically, hell is a potential state that has been 
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actualized or “called into being” by “the stress of God’s anger” (Sermons 137). But energetically, 
hell is actualized by interposition of physical energy, and the “stress of God’s anger” operates as 
an energy field. More specifically, Hopkins describes God’s wrath as a magnetic field. 
Rehearsing the fall of Satan and his angels, Hopkins writes that  
It was an intensification or terrible instress [of God’s anger] upon the substance of 
one, Satan, first of all, casting that, with straining, in one direction [which is the 
being cast down to hell) and acting through that, by a subordination or hierarchy 
(hence “his angels,” missionaries, subalterns), on the rest, so that their obedience 
is one of slavish fear and necessity. (137) 
In effect, God directs his anger against Satan, and through Satan to the rest of the fallen 
angels. God’s wrath behaves as an electrical current or magnetic field, catching Satan first but 
passing through him to his followers. Appropriately, Hopkins at this point inserts a half-
parenthetical analogy likening the fallen angels to iron shards in a magnetic current: “So, I think, 
as a magnetic current is heightened needles and shreds of iron rear, stare, and group themselves, 
se dressent, at the poles” (137, italics original to text).210 Hopkins’ half-parenthesis is ironically 
appropriate in that the analogy it contains is, once more, more than analogical. The parenthesis 
purports to compare God’s wrath to a magnetic field, but in effect it suggests that God’s anger is 
a field, if not of magnetism per se then of a divine energy that similarly affects objects.  
In the figurative terms of the analogy, several images associate the shreds of iron in the 
magnetic field with the devils in God’s anger. First, the iron shreds “rear,” and Satan and his 
angels rise and stand up against God. Second, the iron shreds “stare,” while the Devil and his 
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 I call the present sentence a half-parenthesis because Hopkins forgets to close it, resulting in it 
being imperfectly segregated from the surrounding text. To be more precise, the main 
parenthesis leads to a sub-parenthesis, and while Hopkins closes the sub-parenthesis, he forgets 
to close the main parenthesis.  
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angels presume to look upon God without reverence. Finally, the shreds “group themselves, se 
dressent, at the poles,” as Satan and his ungodly crew assemble themselves at the extreme pole 
of rebellion and Michael and the faithful angels assemble themselves at the extreme pole of 
obedience. In Hopkins’ analogy, then, God’s judgment is a magnetic field that segregates his 
creatures into the opposing poles of faithfulness and disobedience. 
Hopkins extend his analogy further, explaining that God’s wrath “strains” Satan: “the 
terrible instress” of God’s anger “cast[s] [Satan], with straining, in one direction” (137). To 
recall Rankine’s definition of the term, “strain” means to bend out of natural shape. Under the 
duress of God’s wrath, Satan twists or “takes a set” as Rankine might say. His internal strength 
or stress is insufficient to endure God’s force. This twisting or bending of Satan reorients his 
nature “in one direction (which is the being cast down to hell)” – towards evil (137). Satan, 
obstinately resisting God’s wrath, bends and is twisted by it, and his nature is crooked and 
perverse ever after. As in Milton, hell not only is an internal state, it is a self-perpetuating 
condition stemming from an originary act of disobedience. 
Satan’s hell and his “straining” should be compared with the speaker’s conversion in the 
Wreck of the Deutschland. In the Deutschland, God’s wrath also envelops the speaker, who 
exclaims “the frown of his face before me, the hurtle of hell behind, where, where was a, where 
was a place?” Much as the stress of God’s anger “calls out fire against the Devil” within his 
angelic “substance,” so the body of the Deutschland speaker is “laced with fire of stress.” As 
Satan strains in God’s wrenching ire, so the Deutschland narrator’s midriff is “astrain” and 
“[leans].” Satan falls from heaven, and the narrator similarly experiences “the swoon of a heart 
that the sweep and the hurl of thee trod/ Hard down with a horror of height.” But while Satan 
strains in resisting God and consequently bends or twists out of his natural form, the Deutschland 
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narrator leans or strains to bend before God in submission: the speaker “did say yes,” and “fled 
with a fling of the heart to the heart of the Host.” Rather than enduring God’s wrath, the speaker 
hides in the “heart of the Host” to escape it. Thus, he groups himself, se dressent, at the pole of 
obedience to God, or “flashes” from the “flame” of God’s anger to the “flame” of God’s grace. 
God’s wrath drives him to shelter in Jesus, and ultimately the speaker finds that the fields of 
God’s anger and grace are one and the same, the difference inhering in the subject’s response: 
“Beyond saying sweet, past telling of tongue,/ Thou art lightning and love, I found it, a winter 
and warm;/ Father and fondler of heart thou hast wrung;/ Hast thy dark descending and most art 
merciful then.”   
In life, the current of God’s wrath/grace alternates depending on the recipient’s response, 
but in hell God’s wrath obdurates. Nevertheless, God’s wrath accounts for only half of the 
“textural stress” or friction causal of hell fire. The other half of the frictional mechanism stems 
from the condemned soul. After likening the devils to iron shreds in a magnetic field, Hopkins 
then compares the angels’ fall from heaven to death for human beings. According to Hopkins,  
The fall from heaven was for the rebel angels what death is for man. As in man all 
that energy or instress with which the soul animates and otherwise acts in the 
body is by death thrown back upon the soul itself: so in them was that greater 
stock of activity with which they act, intellectually and otherwise, throughout 
their own world or element of spirit. (Sermons 137).   
Not only is God’s wrath a field of energy, then, but the angelic realm and the human soul 
are energetic fields as well. Thus, the “energy” or instress of the condemned soul is thrown back 
upon itself in death. But what throws it the soul’s stress back upon itself? Alternately stated, 
272 
“How then is the soul set at stress? As I suppose by some main stress from without, [. . .] the 
stress of God’s anger which first ‘prepared’ or called into being fire against the Devil” (137).  
Hopkins’ hell functions by a double mechanism, then. The fires of hell stem from the 
friction created by an external force pressing inward upon the soul opposed by an internal force 
pressing outward from the soul. Externally, the force of God’s wrath inverts the vital force of the 
soul, bending the soul’s energies back upon itself. This in itself constitutes a grievous 
conscription of the soul’s liberties, and Hopkins likens this curtailment of the soul’s energies to 
imprisonment or blindness (138). But in bending the soul’s sight and agency back onto itself, 
God imposes yet another penalty on the sinner, depriving the condemned of all sensation except 
of the deeds done in life.
211
 Forcibly self-involuted, the condemned soul has nothing to 
experience except the “scapes” it retains of its past, the self-inscribed monuments to its past sins. 
When the soul “instresses” these shameful “scapes” or “species” – memories – of its past, “the 
pain [is] that of fire, supposing fire to be the condition of a body (and by analogy of any 
substance) texturally at stress” (136, italics original to text).  
Hopkins subsequently elaborates this “textural” stress, explaining that the soul’s natural 
“strain or tendency [is] towards being, towards good, towards God” (137). Thus, the natural 
vector of the soul’s energy is outward from the self, towards life and God. Yet repulsed by the 
negative pole of God’s wrath, the soul’s strength “is broken, refracted, turned aside,” and 
forcibly directed inward toward the scapes of its sins (137). Accordingly, the soul is set 
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 It should be remembered that for Hopkins, memories are not merely psychological in the 
sense of disembodied thoughts. Rather, memories are “scapes” written within the body. As 
bodily – in the sense of consisting of substance -- the soul retains the scapes written in life. The 
fact that the soul itself is a body in the sense of being substantial appears in Hopkins’ description 
of the soul’s pain as “fire, supposing fire to be the condition of a body (and by analogy of any 
substance) texturally at stress.” Like Lodge’s, Stewart’s, Tait’s aether bodies in the afterlife, 
Hopkins’ condemned souls are in some way analogous to matter.  
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“texturally at stress” by two contrary stresses within its substance: the native stress of the soul 
reaching outward toward being and God, and the external force of God’s anger directing the 
soul’s force back upon itself (136). As Hopkins’ writes, “the one stress or strain then 
encountered and clashed with the other; the will addressed [. . .] toward beatitude [. . .] towards 
light, is [bent backward and] confronted by that scape, that act of its own, which blotted out God 
and so put blackness in the place of light” (138). Unable to escape its own selfbeing, and the 
scapes that have been internalized within this selfbeing, the damned soul is cursed to fixate upon 
its past actions, and to be what it has done: “against these acts of its own the lost spirit dashes 
itself like a caged bear and is in prison, violently instresses them and burns, stares into them and 
is the deeper darkened” (Sermons 138). In Hopkins’ hell, one’s punishment is to be oneself, and 
to know oneself with excruciating clarity. As Hopkins writes in “I Wake and Feel,” “I see the 
lost are like this, and their scourge to be [. . .] their sweating selves” (11-14).212 
Hopkins’ vision of hell may be interpreted metaphorically, and its fires and torments 
taken merely as an analogy for psychological remorse. Nor do I claim that remorse is not 
intended. Surely, when the “the lost spirit dashes itself” against “[those] acts of its own,” it feels 
remorse (138). However, to argue that remorse is all that is intended saps the fields, stresses, 
counterstresses, and strains of Hopkins’ energetic hell of their force. Such an interpretation 
ignores the repeated emphasis of the text, and dismisses the two-part mechanism by which 
Hopkins accounts for hell’s pain. Hell for Hopkins operates by physical causation and should not 
be regarded as allegorical or purely psychological.  
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 Hopkins’ hell is similar to Milton’s in that both focus more on the fire within than the flames 
without. Much as Milton’s Satan proclaims “myself am hell,” so the chief punishment for 
Hopkins’ souls stems from the “intellectual imagination” set afire by the pains of sensuous 
impressions of past deeds (Sermons, 136). 
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Like contemporary models of aether, Hopkins’ model is speculative and conjectural. 
Whether reality works according to the exact and precise mechanisms depicted by the model is 
not the point. Rather, the point of such speculative models is that all reality (whether aether or 
hell) works according to physical process and causation, the same sort of causal processes that 
populate the visible world. Hopkins’ model, fanciful as it may be, makes a similar case: physical 
continuities span substance, and energy links the material and the metaphysical.  
5.8 Summary 
In this chapter, I matched Hopkins’ model of hell to two strains of Victorian science. I 
first compared Hopkins’ scapes to Victorian psychology to show that for scientifically-informed 
Victorians, memory, thought, and sensation were material processes grounded in the physical 
substance of the nerves and brain. Memories specifically were the product of “sensigenous 
molecules,” as Huxley referred to them, or of matter within the brain charged with energy and so 
arranged as to be “competent to [. . .] repro[duce]” a sensory impression (731).  Accordingly, 
Hopkins’ scape is an energetically charged artifact within the substance of the brain, and 
“constitute[s] the physical foundation of memory” (Huxley 731). In Hopkins’ own words, a 
scape is “in fact physical and a refined energy accenting the nerves” (Oxford Essays 307). 
Subsequently, I compared Hopkins’ model of hell to contemporary scientific models of 
aether. I did so for several reasons. First, if scapes are material artifacts, how can they exist in a 
disembodied soul? Second, how can physical stresses, strains, and energy fields act in the 
metaphysical space or state of hell? And third, how can immaterial souls respond to and be acted 
upon by physical energy? Pairing Hopkins’ model of hell with scientific models of aether 
discovers several parallels. Namely, in investigating the substrate of matter, Victorian physical 
scientists extended the empire of physics into territory previously regarded as metaphysical. 
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While physicists claimed (some more persuasively than others) to eschew metaphysical 
speculation, in postulating unseen forces, aethers, and universes anterior to the visible world, 
they effectively blurred distinctions between physical and metaphysical being. Several 
speculations -- which would seem radical to twenty-first century eyes if not for the scientific 
authority and prominence of the speculators – included even the afterlife and the soul in the 
expanded sweep of physical science.  
Hopkins’ model of hell falls in with this expanded sweep. It illustrates how Victorian 
philosophers stretched the purview of energy from observable relations between material objects 
to unobservable relations between invisible objects. In some cases, philosophers went so far as to 
subject all substance, grossly material or not, to physical laws and relations of energy. Eccentric 
as it may be, Hopkins’ hell conforms to this impetus of Victorian physics in subordinating 
substance universally to energy. 
6 CONCLUSION: INSTRESS 
In this dissertation, I have argued that Hopkins’ poetics of stress constitutes an adaption 
of Victorian energy science. More specifically, I have attempted to show that for Hopkins, the 
natural world and the supernatural order of creation are continuous, and that energy – or stress – 
unites them.
213
 After an initial survey of Victorian physical science in chapter 1, chapter 2 
surveyed several of the meanings of stress in nineteenth century physics and engineering, giving 
especial attention to Rankine’s use of the term to designate a physical, yet self-defining, energy 
of internal coherence. Likewise, chapter 3 examined Hopkins’ concentric definitions of stress, 
observing that while these definitions may be different, they are not incompatible, and that the 
                                                 
213
 By “supernatural order of creation,” I mean the soul, the afterlife, the “aeonian” order of 
angels, and even the acts or “outstresses” of God in creation (Sermons 137). I do not mean the 
existence of God himself. See chapter 4, pages 51-2.  
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inner “orbits” of definition build up from the outer ones. Thus, to move from the outer to the 
inner orbits, stress functions as energy pure and simple, as the force an object exerts to maintain 
its shape, as the force by which an object maintains its material coherence, and finally as the 
force by which an object maintains its ontological being. In its outermost orbital of stress pure 
and simple, Hopkins’ stress resembles the definition accepted by most Victorian physicists. 
Closer to the core, in treating stress as a force by which an object maintains its shape and 
material coherence, Hopkins’ stress resembles Rankine’s. Yet in its innermost orbit, as a force of 
ontological being, Hopkins’ conception of stress passes beyond science to posit an energetic 
contiguity between the natural and supernatural world.  
Accordingly, chapter 4 investigated the overlap of physical energy and metaphysical 
instress in Hopkins’ poems. Since Hopkins associates instress and energy metaphorically, the 
chapter interrogates the peculiar nature of Hopkins’ metaphor. Hopkins’ metaphors are unusual 
in that they do not posit, in Ricoeur’s words, an “absurd” negation of tenor and vehicle. Instead, 
the apparent similarity between compared objects suggests deeper ontological correspondence, a 
correspondence underwritten by Christ’s Incarnation and Great Sacrifice. In fine, Hopkins’ 
metaphors posit a real and actual connection between objects. Applied to his metaphors of 
physical energy and metaphysical instress, this feature of Hopkins’ metaphor indicates that 
instress is a real and actual form of energy.   
Following from chapter 4, chapter 5 examined Hopkins’ commentary on Ignatius’ “A 
Meditation on Hell,” perhaps the most adventurous treatment of instress and energy in all of his 
writings. In this commentary, Hopkins treats God’s wrath and the condemned soul’s stress as 
two opposed fields of energy. The opposition between these two fields generates “tension” or 
friction within the substance of the soul, which friction sets the condemned soul afire. 
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Accordingly, Hopkins’ hell functions physically; one might even say mechanically.214 Although 
Hopkins’ model of hell is admittedly speculative, in several respects it resembles contemporary 
scientific models of the aether.
215
 These models of aether were similarly speculative, and 
extended known laws and relations of energy to account for phenomena yet unseen. Aether 
models often seem unlikely, particularly in their assemblage of grossly mechanical cogwheels, 
idle gears, and rotary cylinders to figure the quick motions of the subtle aether. Nevertheless, the 
point of such assemblages is not to identify the precise mechanics by which the aether must 
function, but to identify the physical function of the aether’s mechanics, whatever those 
mechanics might be. Specifically, Victorian aether models suggested that the aether operates 
physically, according to the relations of matter and energy observable by science. In much the 
same way, Hopkins’ hell operates physically, according to the relations of matter and energy as 
understood by Victorian science. Again, nature and the supernatural order are continuous, and 
energy unites them.  
Several claims span this dissertation. First, the dissertation assesses Hopkins’ distinctive 
terminology of stress, and argues that Hopkins uses this term to express the energetic relations 
between objects. As chapter 4 discusses, the majority of Hopkins’ scholarship currently assigns 
stress to three loosely analogous categories of physical, psychological, and spiritual stress. 
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 Hopkins’ description of God’s wrath “throw[ing] back” the soul’s stress recalls his 
description of waves rebounding from the seawall by “mechanical reflection.” Compare the hell 
meditation in Sermons, 137 with the Teignmouth seawall entry in Journals, 252. See also chapter 
5, pages 14-16.  
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 See chapter 5, pages 62-78. Both Hopkins’ model of hell and Victorian models of aether were 
freighted with metaphysical potential. The metaphysical significance of Hopkins’ hell is obvious. 
The metaphysical potential of the Victorian aether appears in Tait’s, Stewart’s, and Lodge’s 
speculations of the afterlife and the aether-ial composition of the spiritual body. Despite this 
metaphysical potential, however, both Hopkins’ hell and Victorian aethers operate strictly 
according to physical cause and effect. Indeed, Hopkins’ hell and Victorian aether models 
function mechanically, according to simple laws of energy.  
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Contrarily, from the meanings of stress traced in chapter 2, Hopkins’ central poetic term stems 
from the lexicon of physical science. Moreover, as chapter 3 contends, the concentric definitions 
of stress build up from the outside in, and the ontological sense of stress at the core of the system 
requires the physical definitions that orbit it. Finally, as chapter 5 claims, psychological and 
spiritual stresses are forms of energy, and consequently may be physically described.
216
  
Second, this dissertation addresses Hopkins’ oddly literal metaphors and analogies. 
Chapter 3, in accounting for the concentric meanings of stress, observes that the term sets 
physical and spiritual energy in an analogical relationship that is somehow more than analogical. 
The fact that the metaphysical meaning of stress derives from the physical definitions subsidiary 
to it posits an initial connection between them. Chapter 4 extends from this, showing that 
Hopkins’ metaphors often lack the absurd negation of vehicle and tenor that drives figurative 
abstraction. If Hopkins’ metaphors make literal claims, then when Hopkins compares spiritual 
stress to physical energy, an actual relation obtains between them. Finally, chapter 5 
substantiates the claim of chapters 3 and 4 by showing that spiritual and psychological stresses 
function physically or energetically.
217
 Essentially, chapter 5 sets the mind, the soul, and even the 
afterlife on an energetic basis, animated by physical (physics-ical) processes, thereby justifying 
the analogies between spirit, psyche, and energy posited by previous chapters.  
Third, and perhaps most insistently, this dissertation addresses the contiguity of the 
visible and invisible worlds in Hopkins’ integrated universe. From this perspective, the behavior 
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 By “physically,” I mean “physics-ically.” As chapter 5 claims, if the nerves and brain 
function by physical energy (electricity), then the discipline of psychology opens to physics. 
Similarly, if physical relations of energy may also explain the behavior of the spirit, then physics 
encroaches upon metaphysics.    
217
 Again, in saying that Hopkins’ spiritual and psychological stresses function “physically,” I 
mean that they function “physics-ically,” or in accord with the behavior of energy described by 
Victorian physics and physicists.   
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of energy becomes a central theme of many of his poems, as well as a critical feature of his 
poetics itself.  
I would like to conclude by pointing out how the claims above may be useful when 
reading Hopkins’ poetry. I would particularly like to apply these claims to clarify the meaning of 
instress, a term vital to Hopkins’ poetics and to many, if not all, of his individual poems.  
James Cotter and J. Hillis Miller, in their classical definitions of stress, defined the term 
as a form of the metaphysical “energy” that God communicates to a thing at creation by which it 
exists and maintains its hold on being.
218
 Leonard Cochran subsequently elaborated their 
definitions by distinguishing stress and instress. As Cochran writes, “both [terms] represent kinds 
of energy, stress the energy of the thing as it tends towards existence in general; instress the 
energy which keeps in existence the particular thing” (165). Thus stress affords an object the 
ability to be, or to exist in a general sense; instress affords an object the ability to be itself, or to 
exist as a particular, concrete thing. 
Recent critics such as Brown, Nixon, Banfield, Hutchison, and others have recast 
Cochran’s definitions in light of their contention that Hopkins drew from physical science to coin 
his distinctive poetic terms. For these critics, stress and instress derive from the study of actual, 
physical energy.
219
 By Brown’s account, stress identifies the various forces that combine to give 
a thing its being. Instress, then, describes the “resultant” of these component stresses, or the 
particular configuration or “equilibrium [of energies] which may be said to constitute [a thing’s] 
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 For a fuller discussion of the critical treatment of stress and instress, please see chapter 3, 
pages 6-15. 
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 Each of these critics argues for the physical basis of Hopkins’ poetic terms. Nevertheless, 
their claims exist on a spectrum. While Brown argues that Hopkins bases his poetic terms on 
scientific usage, he typically interprets stress and instress metaphysically, as designating an 
ontological force of being or existence. Nixon, on the other hand, customarily takes stress and 
instress to mean energy of a precisely physical and literal sort. See below. 
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distinctive” identity (219). Such a formulation refigures Cochran’s to include physical science, 
but it nevertheless preserves Cochran’s essential distinction of stress as a force of potential 
existence, and instress as a force of discrete, particular existence. Additionally, such a 
formulation substantially agrees with Cochran’s in casting instress as an ontological force, not as 
an actual form of physical energy. Instress may be compared to energy, but the comparison 
remains merely metaphorical.  
Most recently, however, critics like Jude Nixon, Marie Banfield, and Hazel Hutchison 
have described instress forthrightly as energy. Nixon goes so far as to equate Hopkins’ instress 
with electromagnetic energy. As Nixon writes, “Hopkins assumes that electromagnetic energy, 
seminal fluid or ‘instress,’ flows from God” (144). According to Nixon, Hopkins’ poetic vision 
is cosmic in scope, and institutes a “cosmic economy” in which God’s instress resupplies the 
energy lost to entropy: “Hopkins’ [cosmic] economy relies on ample supplies of energy to 
counter entropic degradation [. . . .] To stave off entropy and to preserve caloric equilibrium, 
Hopkins employs Joule’s Great Architect [God] who maintains the world’s energy supplies” 
(146). This dissertation supports Nixon’s formulation of instress, and verifies several 
preconditions necessary to Nixon’s thesis. If energy bridges the visible and the invisible world, if 
Hopkins’ energetic metaphors for stress should be taken literally, and if the root term stress itself 
stems from physical science, then Nixon’s understanding of instress as an actual form of energy 
seems justified.  
Yet instress in Hopkins’ poetry identifies both the energy that inheres within a thing (or 
in Nixon’s case, within a cosmic system), and the action by which an observer perceives it. 
Accordingly, the meaning of instress that Cotter, Miller, Cochran, Brown, Nixon and others 
develop applies only to one facet of instress’ total meaning. As Glenn Hughes perceptively 
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observes, the energy of instress takes two forms. In one sense, instress applies to the “the force, 
the tensional dynamism, or ‘stress,’ that holds together a thing’s form. Ultimately [. . .] instress is 
the active presence of God’s will sustaining a thing in its being or essence” (118). Such a 
conception of instress closely rephrases Cochran’s definition, subsequently expanded by Brown, 
Nixon, and other energy critics.  
But in another sense, Hughes explains that instress denotes “the subject’s empathic 
perception of [another] thing’s instress, the felt apprehension of [. . .] its stress or energy of 
being” (119). In this sense, instressing is an act of perception, the act of taking an object of sense 
within oneself. In total, then, instress is an artifact (if a quantum of energy may be so described) 
as well as an action. Accordingly, Hopkins’ poetry speaks of instress as a thing (“an instress” or 
“the instress”), as well as a deed to be performed (“to instress,” “must be instressed”).  
Yet this duality of instress poses a problem: how to account for it? Is Hopkins consistent 
in his application of a single term to both of these instances, or is his nomenclature slovenly? 
Conceiving instress energetically justifies Hopkins’ dual extension of the term. As an 
artifact, instress designates the inner stress by which an object preserves its distinct form and 
nature. In terms of the orbital definitions of stress from chapter 3, I might say that this form of 
instress signifies the energy with which an object maintains its shape, material coherence, and 
ontological being. As an action, however, instress designates the psychological stress by which a 
perceiver takes in a sensory object. Similarly, in terms of chapter 5’s discussion of scapes and the 
brain, I might say that the active form of instress signifies the nervous energy by which the 
nerves take in an object of sense and translate it as a scape or “sensigenous molecule" within the 
brain.  
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In special moments, when external pressures strain an object, the formative instress 
within the object is called forth and manifests outwardly.
220
 Hopkins’ poems and nature journals 
attest these instances in their observations of trees laden past their spring, of atmospheric charges 
giving way to flashes of lightning, and of animals and human beings revealing their hidden 
nature in moments of duress or high achievement.
221
 At these moments, the essential energy or 
instress of the thing exerts itself outwardly, and may be “caught” or taken inward – instressed – 
by a perceptive observer.
222
 Thus, Hopkins’ dual application of the term makes sense in that each 
application represents a moment in the total sequence of energetic transfer. In short, instress 
represents two points on opposite ends of a process of transfer in which the energy essential to an 
object enters and is stored within a percipient observer. Each of the component definitions 
depicts either a beginning- or end-point in the larger process. 
But in this process, the nature of energy should not be metaphorized to meaninglessness. 
If the instress within the object is an actual form of energy, so the act of instress in the perceiver 
must also be an energetic act. As chapter 5 discusses, Victorian physiologists conceived of 
perception as the transference of electrical energy along the nerves to the brain, and considered 
memory as a process of energy storage within the sensigenous substance of the brain. Moreover, 
Hopkins’ knowledge of Victorian psychology appears in his energetic description of scape-
formation in both his “All Words” essay and his commentary on Ignatius’ “A Meditation on 
Hell.” From this, the act of instress should be seen as energetic, not merely as a poetic metaphor 
for perception and remembrance. To be sure, perception and remembrance certainly are involved 
                                                 
220
 Cf. chapter 2, when Robison and Rankine define an object’s strength/stress as an internal 
force of self-coherence that an object exerts to counter external pressure. See chapter 2, pages 24 
and 33-35.  
221
 See chapter 3, 33-50. 
222
 Hopkins often refers to the act of instressing an object as “catching” the object – cf. “The 
Windhover, line 1.  
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in the act of instress. But they are energetic processes driven by physically causation, namely by 
the energy outstressed from the object. Thus energy is conserved, and the energy outstressed 
from the object is taken within the perceiver and stored as an energetic scape. 
Hopkins’ poetry depicts a world of continual flux and transfer, as energies arc from God 
to the world, and between objects and observers. The world is a living welter of instress, and 
energetic transfer appears ubiquitously in Hopkins’ poems. It appears in the chemical reaction of 
“That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection” that alters the 
speaker’s matchwood to immortal diamond.223 It dwindles in the “stupendous evening” of 
Hopkins’ nightmarish “Spelt from Sibyl’s Leaves,” and “slacks” in his “Carrion Comfort.”224 It 
resurges in Hopkins’ “Kingfisher” sonnet as creatures catch fire and draw flame in the sun’s 
light, and objects ring their nature when struck.
225
 It flames out in “God’s Grandeur,” from both 
the charged world and the Holy Ghost’s bright wings.226 And it sets the Deutschland awash, 
through the tumult of the sea’s beating waves.227 Nor is this energetic transfer limited to the 
mundane, visible world. Rather, it vibrates in the embodied brain and nerves, and persists with 
the soul in the world beyond.
228
  
John Gordon observes that “when Randall Jarrell said that a poet is someone standing in 
a thunderstorm hoping to be struck by lightning, he might have been speaking for Gerard Manley 
Hopkins” (506). Gordon’s quip has a serious point, and remarks the importance of energy 
(Gordon specifies electricity) for Hopkins aesthetically, poetically, scientifically, and even 
religiously. Like his contemporaries in the physical sciences, Hopkins viewed the world as 
                                                 
223
 See chapter 3, pages 18-20. 
224
 Chapter 3, pages 38-46. 
225
 Chapter 4, pages 31-46. 
226
 Chapter 4, pages 52-68. 
227
 Chapter 5, pages 14-15. 
228
 Chapter 5, all.  
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suffused with subtle forms of energy that motivated visible phenomena. As Hopkins might say, 
the world is charged with the grandeur of God, and stars and storms deliver his stress (“God’s 
Grandeur,” 1; Deutschland, 45).  
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